




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MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The complainant, Standard Basket Company, filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the breach of cartain contracts whereby it was claimed the defendants agreed not to engage in the manufacture of baskets. Defendants interposed general and special demurrers to the bill, which demurrers were sustained. Complainant elected to stand by its bill, whereupon, a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity, to reverse which the complainant had sued out this writ of error.

By ite bill the complainant set forth the following facts. The three Dembski brothers were angaged in the business of manufacturing baskets in the Sity of Chicage, under the name and style of American Basket Company; they entered into negotiations with the complainant which resulted in the sale of their business to the complainant for a consideration of \$14.000.00. To complete and accomplish that sale, the Dembski brothers executed and delivered to the complainant a memorandum in writing acknowledging the receipt of \$1,000.00 as earnest

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STANDARY DARKET CONFAIRY a corporation

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The complainant, Standard Merket Company, Tiled a bill in equity souting to enjoin in Oreach of a right companies in each substant of any one and the analysature of any seven. Defendants interposed contact the analysature of any seven. Defendants interposed general and special demorrants to the bill, which demorrants watershaped. Complainant alocted to stand by its bill, whereupon, a doorse was entered dississing the bill for each of equity, to reverse which the ocm intent has suad out this write of error.

By its bill the complainment est forth the fellewise facts. The three hespain bruthers were angaged in the bushess of manufacturing besters in the billocape, and the passent and the company; they accordate has a septiment that the sendicular bushes in the sendicular chief resulted in the selection of their bushess to the complainment for r consideration of their bushess to the complainment for r consideration of the feethers executed and accomplish that call and delivered to the complainment a measurable brethers executed and delivered to the complainment a measurable in writting accorded that reserve for the restrict of the restrainment.

money, and stating that \$4,000.00 was to be paid on July 15, 1919, and the balance of \$9.000.00 was to be secured by a chattel mortgage, payable \$1,500.00 each menth; and in this memorandum, copy of which was attached to the bill, the Dembski brothers agreed that they would "not start in any basket business." This memorandum of agreement was executed under date of July 10, 1919. The \$4,000.00 was paid as agreed by the complainent. The Demski brothers executed a bill of sale of their business to the complainant and subsequently the balance of the payments from the complainant to the Demski brothers were made as called for in the memorandum of agreement. after, on Becember 16, 1920, Anton Dembski and Boleslaw Dembski entered into a contract in writing, with the complainant, wherein it was stipulated that the prior agreement be so modified as to permit Anton Dembski and Boleslaw Dembski to manufacture backets for the complainant. The provisions of this latter contract are hereinafter referred to more specifically. The bill referred particularly to the several negative covenants contained in this contract on the part of Anton and Boleslaw Dembali, to the effect that they would not compete with the complainant in the business of manufacturing baskets, nor interfere with its business, nor sell any of the baskets they manufactures to any person, firm, or corporation other than the complainant, and that they would refrain from doing any act which might be injurious to the established basket manufacturing business of the complainant.

The bill further set forth that under the terms of and the contract of December 16, 1920. Anton/Boleslaw Dembski agreed to manufacture and sell to the complainant such number of baskets as it might require, from time to time, at certain specified prices; and it also alleged that complainant had performed its part of this contract in every respect but that Anton and

menor, but start that he food as is be pole on foly la-1919, and the balance of \$8.000.60 was to be assured by s charted mortgage, payable \$1,800,00 asch menth; one in this more remains, cast of which was attached to the bill. the Beabski brothers agreed that they would not oters in any baskst business. * This makerandon of egreener's was exempted under date of July 10, 1919. The \$4,000.00 res nate as agreed by the consisions. The Leads brothers executed a bill of male of their Muciness to the complainant and subsequently the belance erendord theept oil of immislance at nort steeming oil to -STREET were wade an malled for as wha memorandum of agreement. after, on mangaher 16, 1980, Anton December ond Holorian Rembert enternd into a contract in writing, with the completent, where in it san athulaled the far prior agreement be so so soulified at to permit suich derbakt and Beleslaw deabakt to reputacture baskets for the emplaceast. The provintence of the latter comtract are imredualies reformed to more specifically. The bill. -ness asmenous autoemen Leveron out at withing berrater tained in this centract on the part of Antes and Suleriam Dembit. to the offer that they wanted may ammeter with the complexity in the business of sanufactaring backets, cor interfere with its basiness, mer seil may of the backete they menufactured to any param. Thru, or aerpoination than the complehence. and that they would refrain from wears, any order in light be Te venninu inimuteulunen iedaad bedaildalan eri al analuululul the complainment.

The bill Wirthin out forth when once the care of and and contract of metaber 16, 1930, Anton/Belegian moserif agreed to hadinature and sell to the completenest much might require, from their to thee, as vertoin spenfalled prices; and it also also alleged that completeness had performed the gent of this contract in a performed the gent of this contract had antonial had and had

Boleslaw Dembski had failed to perform their part of the contract. According to the allegations in the bill it appears that Anton and Boleslaw Dembski, subsequent to the contract of December 16, 1920, established a plant for the manufacture of baskets to be sold to the complainant and that the complainant placed orders for baskets with them up to about March 1921, which orders were filled, but that on or about that time the complainant placed an order for a certain let of baskets under the contract and this order was refused, the Dembskis giving as their reason for this refusal, the fact that the business was then owned by other parties, who were conducting the business under the name of Atlas Basket Company, and that the business mot being under their central they were not in a position to fill the order.

Anton and Boleslaw Dembski made an assignment of either the whole or part of their interest in the business they were carrying on, to the other two defendants, Witold Dembski and Joseph Witkowski, and further, that this assignment was not made in good faith, but rather for the purpose of evading the obligations which anton and Boleslaw Dembskihad had under their contract with the complainant, dated December 16, 1920, and that Witold Dembski and Joseph Witkowski had full knowledge of that contract and its terms at the time of this assignment to them from Anton and Boleslaw Dembski.

The bill further alleges that the four defendants, doing business as the Atlas Basket Company, are now openly violating the covenants of the contract of December 16, 1920, not to compete or interfere with the complainant in its business and that said defendants, since March 1, 1920, have been soliciting orders from complainant's oustomers in the City of Chicage and surrounding territory and that they will continue to do so unless

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restrained by injunction; and that by reason of this interference with its business, by the defendants, the complainant has sustained loss of profits and injury and damage to its business, and that the action of the defendants, if continued, will result in future irreparable damage and injury to the complainant.

It is then alleged in the bill that on, to wit, the 10th day of July, 1919, (the date of the first contract) and thereafter, the reasonable limits of the established trade and good-will of the basket business, formerly owned by the Dembski brothers and purchased by the complainant, extended ever the City of Chicago, and its surrounding territory to the extent of fifty miles, and that since Harch 1, 1921, the defendants, doing businese as the Atlas Basket Company, had made divers sales of baskets manufactured by them, to different persons, firms and corporations within the City of Chicago, and the surrounding territory, and that they will continue to do so unless enjoined, and it is further alleged that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law and that unless the defendants are enjoined, the complainant will suffer irreparable less and injury.

The bill concludes with the prayer that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from violating the negative covenants of the contract of December 16, 1920, and particularly, that they be restrained from competing with the complainant and injuring its established basket manufacturing business, within the City of Chicage and its surrounding territory to the extent of fifty miles while the complainant, its successors and assigns shall carry on said business.

Under the contract of July 10, 1919, the three Dembeki

restrained by injunction; and that by reases of this interference with its business, by the defendants, the complainest has surtained loos of profits and injury and descape to its busimens, and that the action of the defendency, if continued, will result in future irreperable damage and injury to the respictorsoft.

it is then alleged in the pill that an in the teach the teach teach lend if the date of the first contract) and thereafter, the responsible limits of the established trade and med-atil of the busket business, forestly comed by the swaper the fit of the busket business, forestly comed by the even the fit of this and purchased by the even the fit of this as the surrenging teact or the fit of this of this of this and the same and the same the first of the date fermants, deshe hardens no the stient busket 'copany, but care and discress and acreensites whether the the fit of this and corporations about the they will continue to do the majoines, and this further bill continue to do a walcom enjoines, and this further of the same and or estables ready at it is further than the same are enjoinest the same continue to do plaines are enjoinest that and the teach the

The bill corridge with the prayer that the despitable as restrained and solutions we restrained and solution is the magnitus of the contract of somewhat is seen the contract of solutions of the contract of solutions and injurity is the contract of solution of solutions and its correctating that the complete solutions is solved of solutions and its complete the complete the completent. Its successors of assigns their chair charts on sale and the completent.

Under the neatrant of July 10. 1910, and three Deshald

brothers agreed with complainant, that they would not enter into any basket business. In effect the agreement was without limit either as to time or place.

Parties may make a valid agreement in restraint of trade where the operation of the agreement is partial and limited under reasonable conditions and where it is supported by a valuable consideration. For example, where one sells out a business to another for a given consideration and agree not to re-enter such business thereafter within a reasonable limit of territory, the agreement is valid, and if the vender breached the agreement and resenters the business within the territory, to the damage of the other, equity will restrain him. Southern Fire Brick and Clay Co. v. The Garden City Sand Co., 223 Ill. 616. But an agreement in general restraint of trade is against public policy and void. The courts will not enforce any contract which excludes a party, generally, from following any lawful trade or business beneficial to the community and to him. Langit v. Sefton Manufacturing Co., 184 Ill. 326; Union Strawbeard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill. 420; Tarr v. Stearman, 264 Ill. 110. Therefore, the contract of July 10, 1919, was void.

as the complainant under the contract of July 10, 1919, had purchased the basket business of the Dembski brothers for a valuable consideration, which purchase the complainant had made upon the express understanding and condition that the Dembski brothers "would not enter into competition" with the complainant during the time it or its successors or assigns should "carry on the said business of manufacturing baskets within the locality of the established trade and good-will of the said business," and whereas the parties desired to enter into a con-

brothers agreed with complained, that they wou'd not enter inte any hacket business. It effect the oursement mas without limit alther my to the or since.

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Partine may make a rolla agreesent in mentrality trade where the operation of the egracement is partial and lim-W befreques at it canin bus analitimes alianomer reban bell a valuable consideration. For exemple, where one sells out a impiness to enginer for a given consideration and agreem as to re-enter much burthess tacresfter within a requently limit of territory, the extension is valid, and if the vendor breaking the agreenout and re-enters the inniness sithin territory. to the decame of the other, equity will restrain him. Equipment Thre arisk and they for v. The darden City Sand for, 223 111. did. Out un agramment in constul restruint of trade is equinat gubic policy and vaid. The courts will act nothing any some temes which excludes a party, gruerally, from Tellering any lawful trade or business bonefloici to the committe and be bim. Lanelt v. Calten Manufecturing Co., 186 111. 386: Union Strewbeard Co. v. Booffeid, 183 .11. 456; Carr v. Breamen. 864 111. Remember, the hentreet of July 10, 1919, ama wolf.

The constituent the correct to, is it, rated the where as the completement the correct the correct through the theory and gurdhused for health the bootseas of any events the health the theory and as valuable consideration, which associate the consideration and the two septement under the successful the time the leaders the brother that the broken brother than the complete artist of the completement and the completement of the time of the confidence of the classical confidence of the classical and confidence of the classical and confidence of the sample of the same that the parties control of the same the sample of the same that the same that the sample of the same that the sample of the same that the sample of the same that the same that the same that the same the same that t

tract" by which said agreement of July 10, 1919, may be medified so ue to permit the parties of the second part (the Dembskis) to manufacture baskets for the party of the first part (fthe complainant) within the said territory", therefore, "the said contract of July 10, 1919, is hereby modified so as to permit the parties of the second part to manufacture backets for the party of the first part only, within the time and territory aforesaid, provided, however, that with this single exception the said agreement of July 10, 1919 * * * shall be carried out in accordance with the express and implied conditions thereof, which are hereby ratified and confirmed and the parties of the second part proceeded to agree with the complainant to carry out the former agreement "in this respect, that from and after the date hereof, they will desist and refrain from entering into competition with the party of the first part, in the business of manufacturing baskets, during the time in which the party of the first part, its successors or assigns, shall carry on said business, or within the territory where said business has been established, to wit, the City of Chicago, and its surrounding territory to the extent of fifty miles." By this second agreement the parties of the second part agreed that while manufacturing baskets for complainant it would not sell to anyone else or interfere with complainant's business in any way. Further, by this agreement, the complainant agreed to buy its requirements from the parties of the second part and the latter parties agreed to furnish such requirements at specified prices. It is to be noted that the contract of July 10, 1919, had been executed by the three Dembski brothers, Anton, Boleslaw, and Witeld, as parties of the second part, whereas only Anton and Beleslaw were parties of the second part in the contract of December 16, 1920. The latter centract could have

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without yet your . 2561 . if yith it former aga blue deline yet "form"? Tied of an in permit to particul of the sec or year (the important edfil tran terti and in wires of tol staded ermselumes of complainment) within the sulu territory, the retore, "the maid cantinue of only it, inth, is not the modified on to to permit the partion of the second ware to receive becker for the party of the first pert willy, milain die that and territory afoxedund, previded, bonever, that have show single execution the east agreement of well, if the a a maintain the east as acceptance at the other properties for the contract and acceptance for and the assignment and oction of the productions whereit are no like pagents of the convenient of the second the convenient to cannot be assured and the forcer are the former respect, and true contract on the the orthe best and the continue of the about the engineer from anthoring date composition as the var party of discounty page. In the instasees of candheturing buskets, decing the tie a se which the page of the first party its rate of the contract contract on make bushawes, as wathan the contacty wave and bearawes have come and all telemon the nate, and the sales of a contracted on a sales manding termine the me are not not purity as an incidence with the unite married trained benegita it. In a trained to right no. achte to secretary of the extress with the plantes of humanish and the enduse of way. Farther, by this nerthern the their test that the ావారం కథాను చియారికారు అవికే కారా ప్రాయా కార్ కుండా ఉంది. కోస్ కార్ మార్జిస్ కార్ The grades. It is not be not been the lighter the combined to be the ISAR, ind band alocated by the tile of wasti broken, anton, Maleniaw, and directa, as parely or of the econd three whereas only Arton, and Polentam representation of the mooned and in the dontract of beenster in 1986, the letter continue and i have

no effect upon the former one as it was not between the same parties.

There have, therefore, never been any valid contractual relations between the complainant and Witold Dembski and no direct contractual relations of any kind between the complainant and Joseph Witkowski.

While the complainant may have acquired certain contractual rights as against Anton and Beleclaw Dembeki, as a result of the contract of December 16, 1920, in our opinion it is not shown by the facts alleged in the bill to have any rights as against Witold Dembeki or Witkowski such as would be necessary to support the bill so far as it relates to those two defendants.

based, at least in part, on the refusal of Anten and Boleslaw Dembaki and their assigns. Witeld Dembaki and Edward Witkowskip to sell the baskets of their manufacture to the complainant as agreed to in the contract of December 16, 1920, and by injunction restraining defendants from failing to observe the negative covenants of the contract, complainant seeks to accomplish a specific performance of its positive covenants. A bill will not lie in equity which is in effect for specific performance of a contract calling for a continuing performance through a long period of time. Grape Greek Goal So. v. Spellman. 39 Ill. App. 630; Barley v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 54 Ill. App. 537; Lee v. Chicago Leegue Bell Glub, 169 Ill. App. 525.

If we assume that there is a valid contractual obligation on Anton and Boleslaw Dembski, and through them, on their assigns. Witold Dembski and Joseph Witkowski, to furnish the complainant, its requirements in baskets, as the complainant

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There have, therefore, server been any voile contractund reletions between the complement and fitteld Jembert and no direct contractual relations of any kind between the samplement and lesson withoushi.

while in empleient my here negated corrects comincided rights an against amon and helesise tochem, on a result of the constant of header is, 1850, in our crimics it is not chose by the facts offered in the bill to have may rights an against titald hombest or disheacht such as now the mecanomy to support the bill so far as it relates to those the defendance.

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If we accoust that there is a reid contratual obligation on Anton and Industry Medical and Industry Attitudes, or threigh the complete and Industry, at threigh the requirements in backets, on the completenant

contends. It is apparent that complainant has an edequate remedy at law if they fail to do so.

In our epinion the demurrers interposed by the defendants to the bill of complaint were properly sustained, and, therefore, the decree of the Superior Court is affirmed.

APPIREED.


TAYLOR AND O'CONWOR, JJ, CONCUR.

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APPENETYA.

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MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, Rekenis, brought this action in the Municipal Court of Chicago, against the defendant Motor Car Indemnity Exchange, to recover an amount alleged to be due on a policy of automobile theft insurance, which had been issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The case was tried before the court and a jury. The plaintiff's right of action was based on an alleged agreement of settlement, whereby the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had agreed to pay him the sum of \$800.00, and that it later refused to carry out that agreement. The affidavit of merits denied that any such agreement had been made. The jury found the issues for the plaintiff and assessed his damages at the sum stated above, and judgment was entered against the defendant for that amount, to reverse which, the defendant has perfected this appeal.

It is the plaintiff's contention that the agreement of settlement was made on behalf of the defendant by one.

Brown, and the chief question in controversy between the parties, relates to the extent of Brown's authority. That he had no express authority to settle claims generally, or this claim in particular, seems clear from the record, but it is the

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MOTOR OAR LEBOURTLY EXCEANER.

Appellant.

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un. curulling Farrer Transfer delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintif, hekemin, brought this weiton in the Municipal Court of Chirego, against the defendant deter Car Indonnity Exchange, to recever an amount micked to be due on a policy of matemobile theft incurance, which had hear is tended by the defendant to the plaintiff. The cone can tried before the court and a juny. The mishiff's right of action based on an ulleged agreement of matities whereby the plaintiff eleland that the class incurred the last of action plaintiff eleland that is later refused to carry cut that agreement. The militarical is later refused to carry cut that agreement. The militarical is later refused to carry cut that agreement had been made. The jury four the invited for rich agreement had been made, the jury four the invited above, and this was colored his carrages at the man aisted above, and judgment was colored against the carracted above, and present was colored against the carracted that another than appeal.

It is the chartes a consention that the exceedent of sections that the exceedent of sections and the chief success of sections, and the chief success in equation in equations, and the chief success to the extent of breaks anthurity. That he has no express withoutly to settle claims generally, or this such in particular, seems aless from the second, but it is the

plaintiff's position that his implied authority was such as to bind the defendant in this settlement.

The chief witness for the plaintiff was one of the members of a firm of lawyers who were the plaintiff's attorneys of record. This lawyer represented the plaintiff in his negotiations for a settlement and prepared all the papers incident to the filing of this law suit, but, he apparently did not actively conduct the case before the court and jury. His testimony related to what had taken place in the various conferences between himself, his client and Brown.

The witness referred to testified that he had known Brown for a number of years; that Brown had an office in the suit occupied by the defendant; that he talked with Brown ever the telephone, about his client's claim, and later went over to see him; that he asked Brown who would take the matter up for settlement and Brown told him he was the adjuster and he would do so. He testified further that he told Brown he thought his elient ought to have \$1,500.00, - the amount on which his client had been paying premiums; that Brown called his attention to the fact that under the policy, the defendant was liable only for the fair value of the car at the time it wee stolen; that he told Brown that he thought the fair value of the car, in the condition it was when it was stolen, was \$1,000.00; that Brown said about \$800.00 was right, in his judgment; that his client, who was present, said that he would settle his claim for \$800.00, and Brown said that he would pay \$800.00, but asked them to wait a few days, explaining that the defendant did not have sufficient money on hand at the time to pay the claim and they did not want to sell any of the securities they had in their possession. He further testified that he made

plaintiff's partition that his infiled authority one much as to bind the defendant is this partitument.

The chief witness for the plaintiff was one of the penhers of a firm of lagrars who were to plaintiff a star-negre of a firm of lagrar seprenoused the risintiff in his negotiations for a sectionest and prapared wil the papers insident to the faling of this law suit, int, he spanwootly the not activaly evaduot to a once before the court and jury. Mintentiacy related to whee before the court and jury. Mintentiacy related to whee bad taken stage in the verteur contents attached to whee here and the verteur contents attached the stage.

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several subsequent visits to Brown's office, in an effort to collect the money, but without success, Brown explaining, on one occasion, that the defendant's manager, Mr. Rice, was out of the City and had not left any checks which could be used in the settlement of claims; that on another visit Brown told him Rice was not in, but the witness had seen Rice in his office and se told Brown, whereupon, the latter went in to Rice's private office and later came out and told him, the witness, to ge in and talk with Mr. Rice. He further testified that he did go in and talk with Rice in the presence of another man, apparently connected with the company, and that Rice said he would not pay \$800.00 but that he would pay \$600.00. This was not satisfactory and this action was instituted. At one point in his testimony the witness was permitted, over the objection of defendant, to relate that on the occasion of one of his visits to Brown's private office, a man came in who had a claim against the defendant for an autemobile tire that had been stolen from his car; that Brown asked the man what the tire was worth and the man told Brown what it would cost to get a new one; that Brown told him he could get the tire cheaper than that, and he referred him to a place and instructed him to go there and buy the tire, explaining that the bill for the tire could be sent to the defendant and that thelatter would pay it. This testimony was apparently introduced on the theory that it tended to show that Brown had authority to adjust and settle losses. In our opinion the testimony was not incompetent.

Brown testified that he was an attorney and that he was doing some work for the defendant "and practicing law besides". On the question of the settlement of the plaintiff's

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several subsequent visite to Mrsqu'e office, in an affect to ed line memey, but without medena, Bress axelalana, on one corrector, that the defendant's manager, Fr. Mics. car sut of the Mily and had not last any chanks thing could be used in blud meed that west one and theis patein to seem lises odd him Mice wer mat in. 'we the mitment man pany Mice in his of-Mos and so told brown, whereasp, the latter went in on Sice's private office and later rang out and this che at these to ap in and telk with Mr. Blos. Be further territed that he did no the out tails with dide to the agence of specimer was. apparently commacted with the company, and that high rain he wenter set year teles to the the wind pay ter . This was and weithfunderly and this ention was instituted. At one point in an a tertiformy the wither a war permitter, ever the origination of defonders, so relate thes we the sometime of one of his wintte to Arment's private office, a new arms in who had e aleis egastat the universel for se automobile tire and back wis rinkan from the core; there were arressed the area ng deas an ee it sain emone hind has add and dires may arid got a sor one; that become and all the and the the the three . replaced the state of the trail of the sea of the sea of the sea of the season of th ed bin to go there and buy bus the, envision that the bill religion is an act to the transfer of the transfer at the second test and would pay it. fold inclinent we appearably introduced on the thacty that it tended as size that brown it to the to no. Just and nettle lander. In our openier to a cartain billion ben dank . 方明物等单位通过分积点

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claim with the lawyer representing him, he testified that he discussed with the lawyer certain circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the plaintiff's car, and that he told the lawyer he thought, under those circumstances, ar. Rice "would not pass a settlement on the case." He further testified that he told the lawyer that Rice passed on all settlements; that on the occasion of the lawyer's last visit to the defendant, he introduced the lawyer to Mr. Rice in the latter's effice, and then left the reem. On cross-examination he testified that he talked with claimants to find out what they wanted, and then submitted their propositions to Rice and that he had no efficial capacity with the defendant; that, if anything, his status was that of claims attorney and that his name was on the door as attorney.

Rice testified as to his talk with the lawyer for the plaintiff and said that he called attention to certain statements by the plaintiff in bis application for insurance, and told the lawyer that the defendant would not pay anything on the loss. As to the status of Brown with the defendant, Rice testified that he was an investigator. - "he handles our less work, investigating in connection with losses * * * He was locking after claim matters, which means losses"; that under the practice of the defendant, when a loss report came to their office, a file was made which was referred to en investigater and that during the progress of the investigation it was referred to him from time to time, and when it reached the point of disposition, it was brought to him for his final approval, and he initialed the file and dated it and put down the amount which was to be paid on the claim; that Brown never, to his knowledge, approved, passed on, accepted or solicited an offer for settlement of a claim, without his approval.

claim with the lawyer restracting him, he testified that he discussed with the lawyer vertein circumstance autreanding the single of the piecetiff's cer, and that he teld the theorem, and the teld of the lawyer intersections of the factor lead, are the lawyer he the case, he farther testified that he teld the lawyer that acts and all settles restrict that he teld that he teld the lawyer that also passed on all settles acts; that the the lawyer to it. Here the teld the defendent, he atraduced the lawyer to it. Here is the ister's cast that the teld the lawyer to it. Here is the ister's fad that he teltes with the lawyer to it. Here is the fettles, and the teltes with circles acts and the factor of the restriction of the cast are the cast when the teles. It apprishes, the atatus was that at the cast was the atatus was that as that as attention.

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In our opinion the evidence in the record was not sufficient to establish the authority of Brown to bind the defendant on a settlement of the plaintiff's claim, and we are further of the opinion that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. At most, it would seem from the record, that he was representing the defendant as its attorney who was employed to investigate claims and submit the facts to sthers who would adjust or settle the claims.

by virtue of his general employment, to compromise or settle his client's cause of action. Wadhams v. Gay, 75 Ill. 415.

An assured who negotiates with one acting as attorney for the insurer, is bound to take notice of the limited authority of such attorney and, in our opinion, one acting as attorney for the insurer, has not, by virtue of that relation, an implied authority to bind the insurer to pay a given amount in settlement of a loss claimed by an assured. The same would be true with one acting on behalf of the insurer, merely as an investigator. The contrary would be true where one was acting on behalf of an insurer as an adjuster, and was so held out by the insurer. The Millers' Matl. Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 136 Ill. 199.

One Wineke, testified that he was concepted with the defendant on necretary and that he was the same who was in the office of Mr. Rice on the occasion of the interfa conversation with the plaintiff's efferany, and he carrebprate ed Rice on to that or averagion. In reduct 1, plaintiff's siteracy testified that Riveke was out the men he saw in Rice's office, "walses I on booly sistence."

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Plaintiff based his statement of claim on two counts, one based on the policy and the other based on the alleged agreement for a settlement but he withdrew the former and went to trial on the latter. It will, therefore, be unnecessary to remand the cause.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH A FINDING OF FACT.

FINDING OF FACT: We find as a fact that Brown had no authority to settle the plaintiff's claim and that no agreement for settlement was entered into.

TAYLOR AND O'CONROR, JJ, CONCUR.

Plaintiff bosed his attiement of claim on two counts, one besed on the selicy and the other besed on the alleged agreement for a couloment but he ribdired the former and went to trial on the latter. It will, increfore, he ammerement to remark to remark the same.


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PINDING OF FAST: We find as a fact that Storm had an antherity
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TAYLER AND COUNTER, JA. "CRITER.

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MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant, Carlson, seeks to reverse a judgment for \$2500.00 recovered by the plaintiff in the Superior Court of Cook County, following a verdict finding the issues for the plaintiff and assessing the damages at that amount.

The defendant was a contractor and in connection with his business, he owned and maintained a barn in which he stored certain building material. The barn was in the rear of premises or upied by the plaintiff's intestate Benson, who was employed by the defendant as a teamster and laborer. The south side of the barn bordered upon an alley. At the east end of the barn there was a room extending across the barn, in which there was a stall where a horse was kept. The west two-thirds of the barn consisted of a comparatively large room where building material was stored. Between these two rooms there was a stairway leading up to the second floor. In the storage room, some racks had been constructed several weeks prior to the occurrence involved in the case at bar, by one of defendant's employees, and a quantity of finished

Jose T. Devide, administrator of the Totate of John A. Reenen. Decempost.

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by this appeal the defendent, Carleyn, seeks to reverse a judgamat for Saboo. W. renovered by the plaintiff in the Superior Cours of look camery, following a verdict finds ing the levere for the dailer and energing the department at that wearst.

The defendant was a conventor and in occassion with his basiness, he send and entriested a barn in which he stored certain builting moverial. The burn was in the rear of provides or upied by the plaintiff's astentate Benson, whe was employed by the definency as a tenester and laborer. The couty whose of the bear bardered upon an alter. At the end avones guitheers woon a new arend tread and le bas teas barm. As which in a sea a stall where a horse was kept. And was two-thirds of the harm consisted of a conserving targe room where bulleing meterial and eterna, Betwoen these two rooms there were a real rang leading up to the second floor. In the sherege rose, come trained bed been senstructed seatarni weeks pries to the occurrence inviered in the case of bur. by one of defendant's esployees, and a quantity of finished lumber was stored on these racks and from time to time, as it was needed, lumber was taken from the racks and Benson hauled it to the various jobs where it was to be used. The racks referred to were constructed of what are described in the testimeny as "two by fours", a number of uprights being put in from the floor to the ceiling and cross pieces being nailed to the p uprights at a point five or six feet above the floor. These cross pieces were nailed to the south side of the uprights and the lumber, as it lay on these cross pieces, extended north and south. The employee who constructed these racks, testified that he used ten-penny spikes and wire nails, and that he used two at each intersection of cross pieces and uprights. The name of this employee was Emil Carlson. He was not related to the defendant. He testified that the day in question was a cold day and that the streets were icy and slippery and Bensen was told not to take his horse out that day; that he and Benson "worked around a little together" about eight o'clock in the morning; that, among other things, they carried a console from the barn to a building. The witness further testified that he later left Benson at the barn and went to another building and returned to the barn about ten o'clock in the forenoon and found Benson in the barn, dead. At the south end of the lumber rack between the two uprights at the west extremity, there was a cross piece nailed to those uprights two and a half or three feet above the floor. Benson's neck was lying on that cross piece, his head to the south and his body extending north under the lumber piled on the rack. The east end of the cross piece on which the lumber had been resting was still in place, but the west end was down and the lumber was resting on Benson's neck and head. Carlson, the witness above referred to, went for help, and with three others, raised the lumber, released

lunder was elered on those racks and trom time to time, and it was needed, lumber was taken from the make and benron hauled to the various jour maers it sees or ased. The racks you -lived and the basistess of a last to be the true of bests? meny as "two by fours", a number of uprickle being put in from a ent of bolton gared secret secre has galiled tell of rooft and aprighte of a volut five or six foot show the floor. These oress pieces were nation to the state side of the uprights and the lumber, as it lay on these cross picous, extended morth and south. The employee who democrationed these racks, testia-Tied that he used ten-gondy apines and wire mails, son that he weed two at each intersection of experplement and application The name of this copiese was wall besteam. He was not related to the defendant, do testified that the day in question was a cold day and that the atreate rere icy mod clippery and here and on Jan't 1744 June Jan samed was said of Jow blod now note And to to to the two is " we also to the to be true" assent in the marning; that, word, a her things, they carried a can-Bole from the berm to a builting. The withing further tentifind that he being left depart at the burn and went to another building and returned to the been shoul ten elect in threemade and found Pennen in the bern, denc. At the newth end of the lumber rack between the two april its of the west entremit, was a cross piece uniled to those uprishits two and a half or three feet ridge the flagr. Emmen's neek was lying on that eross piece, his head to the south and bis body extending north under the lumber piles on the rank. The east of the draw place on which the lumber is i been resting one cill to place, but the west end was down one the lumber was rentley on leacon's neck and band. Carlaca, the mitman above referred to, went for bely, and with three others, released the lumber, released Benson's body and removed it. He testified that the nails had pulled out of the upper cross piece and let the lumber down. He also testified that the last time he saw Benson alive, he was working around the barn but did not remember just what he was doing.

The defendant had a sort of boss or superintendent named Anderson, who, as was the case with the previous witness referred to, was called by the plaintiff. He testified that he told Benson not to take his horse out on the day in questionl that Benson had stated some time previously that he wanted a door put in between the part of the barn where the horse was kept and the feed room, at the northwast corner of the barn. and so, on that morning he directed Benson to clear out a lot of scrap lumber and cement bags that were lying in that part of the barn, saying that when that was done they would get one of the carpenters and have the door put in; and that he told Benson not to put the lumber he removed, in the barn, but in the basement of his house where it could be cut up for kindling wood as it was not suitable for anything else. Certain evidence was introduced by the defendant, to which, in our opinion, no reference need be made in detail.

In support of the appeal the defendant urges a number of points. He contends first that the evidence fails to establish the negligence charged, or any negligence. In our opinion the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict on this point. The declaration alleges that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide a safe place for the deceased to work. One E. Conrad Carlson testified that he saw the rack in question "around ten e'clock"on the morning Benson was killed; that the lumber was down in the west rack, the east end of the cross piece being up in place

Dencem's body and removed it. To terialise "at the mails and mulled out of the upper order deed and let and lumber down. To also testified that the izer to be no new Peneco alors, be new vorking around the barn but did not a crier junc what in man defing.

nomed and eron, who, so not in care will to newating willness referred to, the childed by the learning . . testified that he told Remson not se take his horse it on the day in question) that leaves had aveted since time arevially best as santed sum satel out wrote made out to transcript months at the test kept and the feed room, it is a unithmest diviner of the bare, and so, on their scranng de divients errest to dienr eat a lot then test of policy of the grow the grown or tedent games to of the bare, seying that shen inch althe days engle one one af the surrenters and lave the near one in: A. that he teld Brace not to put the Lumber he course, is the real, but in the beaments of its bouse we it is it is not near the finalitate wood as it as not saltable "or withing elec. Tertala evidence was introduced of the detentions, it saids, " our Al Dates, no रान्डीकार्यातम सर्वदे देव राजा व इत्राह्म प्राप्त होत

In any ork of the acquarter of the continuent of action of action of action. We account first to the evitation of the negligence observed. On any megityence, it can optation the evidence is culfficient to superfice verying on the point. The declaration alleges that the ceff. The acquarter of alleges the line operate to serve. In the first of the following the time that ask the neglige the serve ask the involved ten of clerks the member search ask the involved ten of clerks and the member search ask the involved ten of clerks and the member search ask the course while the involve and details the member search ask the cross place.

but the west end down; that there was one nail in the west end of the cross piece, which was a "cut nail", - a square nail, somewhat tapered - and that this nail extended through the cross piece about an inch or an inch and a quarter or half; that this nail had left a mark or "gouge" in the west upright about six feet above the floor.

The defendant objected to this witness "describing any conditions around there after this lumber had been moved and the character of the premises had been entirely changed* and the admission of the testimony is now assigned as error. This point was passed upon by this court on a former appeal of this case (Devine, Admr. v. Carlson, 207 Ill. App. 415) where the evidence referred to was held to be admissible, and, consequently, the question is not open to argument now. It may be said further, however, that from the testimony appearing in this record, it is entirely clear that there had been no change in the situation involved, between the time the body was discovered, and the time this witness observed the conditions about which he testified, so far as those conditions are concerned. As the plaintiff contends there was apparently no change in the cross piece or the upright in question, about which there could possibly be any controversy. A very short time had elapsed. Emil Carlson testified that when he discovered Benson's body "it must have been around ten o'clock or so". E. Conrad Carlson testified that he observed the confitions about which he testified "around ten o'clock." It is apparent from the testimony, that at the time Emil Carlson and his helpers took out the body, they merely raised the lumber so as to release the body and then lowered it onto the lower cross piece. He testified that at the time they removed the body they did not do anything with the loose cross piece -

hat the west end down; that there were one not in the rest end of the arcse piece, which were a "est mail". a square asil, consecut tapored - and that this sail extended through the arcse piece about an inch out inch out a quarter or half; that this mail but lest a wark or "gouge" in the west upright about six fact above the floor.

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The defendant contends further, that if there was any negligence in the construction of these racks, it was the negligence of Emil Carlson who was a fellow servant of Benson and consequently the plaintiff cannot recover. This case does not present a situation for the application of the fellow servant rule. The duty of the defendant to provide his servant, Bensen, with a reasonably safe place in which to work, was a personal one which could not be delegated by him, and if the duty was not properly performed, and damage has resulted, he is liable, whether he has attempted to perform it personally or through another, even though that other be another servant of his. As to Benson, the other servant stands in the position of a vice-principal and not a fellow servant. Baier v. Selke, 211 Ill. 512; Himrod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 Ill. 514; Mebile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Godfrey, 155 Ill. 78; Vancil v. Ill. Gollieries Co. 152 Ill. App. 146.

dence showing or tending to show that at the time of the occurrence in question, Benson was exercising due care for his own
safety. No one witnessed the accident which took Benson's life.

M. Conrad Carlson testified that he had known him for some time
and that so far as he knew, he was an ordinarily careful, prudent
man. It was admitted he was a sober man, of good conduct and
habits. His wife testified that at the time of his death, Benson
was thirty-nine years of age and in fine health. There was some
attempt by the defendant to show that at the time Benson suffered his injury, he was nailing the lower cross piece, on which
his neck was resting when his body was found, onto the uprights,
and that this dreve one of the uprights away from the upper

that they "did not take out any nails or emptaing."

The defendent augusties further, that if there wee any negligemen in the construction of these racks, it was the nounch to impures vollet a amy now meaters link to acceptine and censequently the plaintiff sannot recover. This case does not present a situation for the application of the faller servant rule. The duty of the defendent to provide his servent, Benen, with a reasonable aufe place in which to work, was a personal one which acute not be delegated by him, and if the duty one not properly perfereed, and desego has remilted, he is limble, whether he has attempted to perform it personally inavres redicate ed reads that the ever termine appoint to of his. As to Manaca, the other servant stance in the posttion of a visc-principal and not a fellow servant. Unier V. 20120, 211 111, 212; Hered Coal 19. v. Clark, 187 111. 314; Mobile & Onto Railroad Co. v. Oculiar, los 171. 73; Vancil v. Ill. Golliertes Co. 182 (1). App. 146.

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a series of presumptions which have no basis in the testimeny. An ordinary carpenter's hatchet was found on the floor near Benson's body. How it came there does not appear. Rail Carlson testified that he did not put this bewer cross piece on. But whether he had ever seen it there before does not appear. The evidence does not show that it was not there previous to the day in question. Inour opinion, the jury had sufficient competent evidence before them to support their finding to the effect that Benzon was in the exercise of due care. G.G.G. & St. L. Ry. v. Keenan, 190 III. 217; G.B.& Q. R. R. Go. v. Gunderson, 174 III. 495; III. Cent. Ry. v. Newicki, 148 III. 29; Broadbent v. G.& G. T. Ry. Co., 64 III. App. 231.

It is finally contended by the defendant that there is no proof that at the time he suffered the injury causing his death. Benson was engaged in the performance of any duty, in connection with his employment, nor in doing anything under the direction of either the defendant or his superintendent.

The testimony of the latter, with reference to the scrap lumber and cement bags in the northeast part of the barn, has already been referred to. He was asked if he gave Benson any directions calling for the doing of anything about the racks in question or the lumber on them, on the day in question, and he said he had not. Benson's widow testified that she last saw her husband alive about nine o'clock on the morning of the day he was killed and at that time he was "carrying out lumber from the barn - planks." She further testified that about three or four works before Christmas (Benson was killed January 3.) she heard the defendant tell her husband he wanted him to clean

Gross piece and let the lumber down. But this is morely
a series of presumptions which have no hasts in the tentimeny. An ordinary corpunter's hatenet was found on the fleer
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eut the barn; that they were in the kitchen of her home at the time and the defendant said that "any time he (Benson) had a chance, he should clean out the barn because he wented to put a man in there to work, at the west end of the barn,some kind of stair work."

That Benson had no occasion to be in the barn or in the room where the lumber racks were, except in connection with his employment as a servant of the defendant, seems clear. As to whether he was engaged in the course of his duties at the time he was killed, was one of the questions of fact forthe jury to determine from the evidence. In our opinion the evidence is not such as to warrant this court in disturbing their conclusion.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

O'CONNOR, J. CONCURS; TAYLOR, J. DISSENTS. seet the bern; that they ware in the Clark of har none at the time and the time and the time and the time and the barn because to marked the barn because to marked the barn because to mark, at the want one of the barn...

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O'GON'S K. J. PROTEST. TAXLES, J. ELLING. 144 - 27097

EDWIN J. EVANS.

Appellant,

Y.

JAMES J. KELLY, As Executor under the Last Will and Testament of ROSA A. BENSON, Deceased, and the PROVIDENT LIFE AND TRUST, a corporation.

Appellees.

APPHAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT.

COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 5934

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOUSON delivered the opinion of the court.

Court of Cook County, seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien on property which had been owned by Ross A. Benson, one of the defendants, in her life time, on which there was a mortgage in the hands of the Provident Life and Trust Company of Philadelphia and which was under lease to one Meinhardt. The cause was referred to a Master, who, after hearing, submitted his report to the Superior Court, in which he found the complainant was entitled to the lien claimed, in the sum of \$747.55, and recommended that his claim for lien be allowed. Exceptions to the report of the Master were duly interposed by the defendants and these exceptions were sustained by the chancellor, and a decree was entered, dismissing the bill for want of equity. To reverse that decree, the complainant has perfected this appeal.

By his bill the complainant alleged that he was a contractor and builder; that the Meinhardts were tenants of certain lands and buildings owned by Mrs. Benson and that on or about December 15, 1913, they engaged the complainant to

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Appellent,

APPEAL FROM

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JAMES J. KELDY, AS Amounter under the Lest Will and Pastmernt of MOSA A. EMERCY. Decamed, and the PROVINCET LIBE AND TRUET. A corporation.

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Court of Gook Gounty, seeking to foreclose a mockenic's lien of property which had been eased by Room &. Remon. one of the defendants, in her life time, on which there was a sortenge in the hands of the time for the company of Philodelphia and which was under lause to one satisfact. The amuse was referred to a Unster lause to one satisfactive. The amuse was to the important dourt, in which he found the complained was entitled to the lien chained, in the sun of \$767.53, and restantiated to the lien chained, in the sun of \$767.53, and retained that class of the report of the danced were duly interposed by the defendants and the report of the danced were duly interposed by the defendants and these exceptions were dustained by the abundalor, and a second these exceptions were dustained by the abundalor, and a covered was entered, discinning the bill for want of equity. In

By his bill the ecceptaters clieged that he was a contracter and builder; that the beinhorder were tenants of cortein lands and buildings caned by dee, Benson and that on or 'about December 15, 1915, they engaged the complainant to

make certain repairs, alterations, descrations and improvements, upon said property; that Rosa A. Benson, the owner of the property, authorized and knowingly permitted the Meinhardts to contract with the complainant for this work: that there was a written agreement between Rosa A. Benson and the Meinhardts, by the terms of which the Meinhardts were to make certain repairs and Rosa A. Benson was to allow them the sum of \$900.00 on account of rent which was to be used inpayment for the repairs; that the complainant commenced this work on December 15, 1913, and completed it on or about January 5, 1914, and that the work was The bill further contained duly accepted by the Meinhardts. the usual allegations as to the quality of the work done, and its fair and reasonable value, and further sets forth that on February 5, 1914, the complainant filed his claim for mechanic's lien in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Cook County.

It seems that Rosa A. Benson died on or about January

1. 1914. The defendant James J. Kelly, had acted as her agent
and attorney, with regard to the property in question, previous
to that time, and he was the Executor and Trustee under her
Will. The answer filed by him to the bill of complaint, admitted the tenancy of the Meinhardts but denied that the complainant had furnished the labor and material as claimed by
him in his bill of complaint, or that Rosa A. Benson had authorized or knowingly permitted the Meinhardts to enter into any
agreement with the complainant for the work in question. The
answer admitted the existence of the agreement between Rosa
A. Benson and the Meinhardts whereby the former was to allow
\$900.00 on the rent and the latter were to expend such funds
in the making of repairs. The answer of Kelly further denied
that the complainant performed any work on the premises in

make certain repairs, alterations, descrations and improvements. upon said property; that home a. Jennen, the owner of the proporty, sutherized and knowingly permitted the Melahareta to comtract with the complainant for this work; that there was a written agreenest between Here d. Bencen and the seinberfite, by the terms of which the deinherene were to make certain regular and Sens A. Beuren and to allew then the swa of \$900.00 on second ed doub partager and rel languages bear so so can deter ther to demplainant commitmed the same on December 15, 1914, and complaced it on an about Jeniary 3, 1914, and that the very was duly accepted by the Mainterdte. The bill further contained the usual allegations as to the quesity of the early done, and its fair and remeasule value, and farther acts forth that on Tebrasny 5, 1914, the complainment filled his oldin for mechanic's ilea in the office of the digre of the Juperior laurt of thor dennêr.

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that the complainers performed any work on any premium denice

question under any contract between himself and the Meinhardts. but alleged that on or about December 10, 1913, the complainant entered into an agreement with the Meinhardts, whereby he was to purchase from them one half of the capital stock of a corporation known as the Lake Shore Mospital Association, which hospital was the occupant of the premises in question, for the sum of \$1,250.00; and that, pursuant to that agreement, the complainant received one-half of the hospital stock and paid the Meinhardts \$500.00 toward the purchase price and agreed to pay the balance of \$750.00 on or before January 10, 1914, and that after acquiring this interest in the stock of the hospital, the complainant and the Mospital Association made an agreement with one Vincent F. Boyle whereby Beyle was to furnish the labor and material incident to the making of the repairs in question and that Boyle was the one who did the work and was paid therefor, in full, by the Hospital Association. The answer further states that when the agreement, above referred to, was made between Rosa A. Benson and the Meinhardts. such agreement was known to the complainant and that the latter understood that the centractor who was to make the repairs was to look solely to the Meinhardts and the Hospital Association for payment. There were further allegations in this enswer, in general denial of the allegations contained in the bill of complaint.

In our opinion, the principal if not the sole question involved on this appeal is a question of fact as to whether the complainant or Boyle was the contractor on this work. That the work was actually done by Boyle and men hired by him, is not disputed, but it is the position of the complainant that he was the contractor for the work and that Boyle was engaged on the job as his foreman.

question under any contract between himself and the Reinhardte. but alleged that on or about messaber 10, 1915, the resolution est entered into an egrecamt eith the Meinberten, whereby he and to purchase from them one half of the capital stock of corporation known as the leke Shore Hespital Association, which bospital was the essupent of the premises in question, for the sum of \$1.280.00; and beat, gerrenat to that syrteenent, the complainment received one-belt of the boardtail sanck and paid the Meinherdte \$500.10 tevers the percens price and egreed to pay the balance of \$780.00 on or before handery 10, 1914, and that after equiring this interest in the stuck of the haspital, the complainant and the Manylital Association were as agreenent with one Vincent V. Reple werety Beyle was to will be antian and of dunktions introduce bon radal and deternit repairs in question and that Boyle was the one who did the work and one paid therefor, in full, by the doupttel descoletion. The entropy Thremes allotte that when the egreenes above referred to, was under dermede Acea A. Begunn and the Heinburdte. such agreement was known by the somelaisted and thet the letter use exists the contracter who can be made in repairs one te look solely to the Makebuts and the Compited Association for payment. There carting allegations to this ensure, in general dankal of the allegations contained in the till of somplemen.

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Evans testified that he was a contractor and that on or about November 1, 1913. Br. Maximilian Meinhardt called him ever to the Lake Shore Hospital, the premises in question. and asked him to do the work involved in these repairs which form the subject-matter of this controversy, and that he told the doctor that the job was worth \$800.00; that a few days later the dector advised him that he was the lowest bidder and he arranged to begin the first or second week in December. He further testified that at thetime this arrangement was entered into, he had previously done some repairing on the plaster, the floors, and the windows, to the extent of \$50.00 or \$60.00, which was in addition to the \$800.00, which latter item covered redecorating: that he began the redecorating about December 15, and finished the first week in January: that he was personally present in charge of the work; that he saw Kelly at the Hospital about December 20, with Mrs. Benson and Dr. Meinhardt; that he (Evans) came there at that time on appointment to see Kelly; that he and Kelly went through the building, leoking at the work that had to be done; and that at this time Kelly made certain inquiries about what the work involved; that Kelly asked what the price was to be, and he told him about \$800.00, and that Kelly said he realized the building was in bad shape, but asked him to keep the price as low as possible. He testified in detail as to what the work in question consisted of. On cross-examination, he wetified that he had twenty-five shares of the stock of the Lake Shore Hospital andthat at the time the contract for the work in question was entered into with the Meinhardts he had ne partnership or other business relation with them; that Kelly told him tonge shead and do the work on the Hospital; that he did not know how many houses he had painted in the last twenty

tails bus tolegatines a new or that bothlight anoth ou or about november 1, 1915, Br. Maximilian Meinhardt called his ever to the Lake Meere Scapital, the greatens in questien. and cared him to do the week any ived as those repairs which form the subject-matter of this controversy, and that he teld the destor time the job one worth disco. Det time a few days later the dector advised him that his me the torest bidder and he arranged to begin the Tiret of second wask in Secondar. He further testified that at thetime this extendent was antered into, he had proviously dust some regaining on the planter, the flacts, and the windows, to the extent of \$50.00 or \$60.06, which were in addition to the \$200.00, which latter item covered redecorating; that he began the redecorating shout Incember 15, and finished the first meek in Jamuary: time he was serroughly present in charge of the work; that he men kally at the Heaptied about locember the water and Bonson and are delaharde; that he (Swann) some there he that time on appointments to see helly; that he and Helly went through the hitlding, looking at the work that had to be done; and that at this time Folly made cortain inquiries about what the war involved; that body never the orice was to be, and is tale bin appre fact, in, say that Relly said ho restined the building me to but whape, out asked him so keep the price as low as provide. A thetific in Artail as to what the work in question consisted of. (a oreus-examination, he weiling that he had twoney-fire course of the stock of the Lake thorn Mengattal andthat the thing the contract for the ben on albradulations and offic of al baroline con molifaces of Atom ne partenum or other bundant . irration with them; that Helly told him tenge sheet and do the work on the bespital; that he did not know how many houses in and putnited in the lest twenty years, but it was comparatively few. - that "is not my specialty". The witness denied that Kelly had said to him and Dr. Meinhardt that he did not want any mechanic's liens on the building and denied that he, Evans, had said there was to be no mechanic's lien. On the contrary, he testified that Kelly told him to go ahead with the work and that he would be responsible for the work up to \$900.00. He further testified that Boyle was his foreman on that work. He was asked where Boyle lived and he said he did not know.

For the defendants, Kelly testified that in his conversation with the complainant in December, those present in addition to himself, were Dr. Meinhardt and his wife; that Dr. Heinhardt had advised him that Evans was associated with him in the hospital and asked him to come over and meet him: that at this meeting they discussed the alterations that were to be made in the hospital and that he was informed, both by Dr. Meinhardt and the complainant, that repairs to the extent of about \$900.00 were to be made on the hospital, which were to be paid for by Evans; that Evans had subscribed for \$1,250.00 worth of the stock in the Hospital Association, and that he had paid \$500.00 in each, and in further consideration he had agreed to pay Boyle \$365,00 for painting and decorating, and that he was to pay for the balance of the repairs that were to be made, all in consideration for the stock for which he had subscribed in the Hospital Association. Kelly further testified that he told Evans and Dr. Meinhardt, at that time, that he did not want any work done on the building unless it was paid for, and that he wanted no liens, mentioning his doubt of the solvency of Meinhardt; that in this conversation, in the presence of Evans, Dr. Meinhardt said there would

years, but it can desponsitively fee. that "is not my epocialty". The witness denied that Kelly had said to him and Dr. Seinhardt that he did not cant say methanic's liens on the building and denied that he. Evans, had suid there was to be he methanid's lien. On the contrary, he testified that felly teld him to go absus with the work and that he would be responsible for the work up to \$800.00. He further testified that Boyle was his foremen on that work. He was saked where that Boyle was he maid he call he he.

For the defendants, Felly testified that in his conversation with the completench in lessenber, these present is addition to biaself, were in. Beighardt and his wife; that Mr. Meinhardt had advined him tent Evans was esseciated with isid teem bus reveremen of min peden bus istinged and mi mid that at this meeting they discussed the alterations that were to be made in the neggital and that he was informed, both by in. Meinhardt and the completant, that repairs to the extent of about \$900.00 vere is as ande on the hospital, shick were to be paid for by Franc: that Franc ben sussanthed for \$1.250.00 worth of the steak is the Meshical Assaciation, and thut he had paid \$500.00 in cash, and in Ourthor countderation he had agreed to pay coyle \$365.00 for painting and decorating, and that be was to pay for the balance of the remains that were to be made, all in consideration for the stock for which he had sabnorthed in the doublest annocalation. Holly further tentified timt in told Swans and Or, Seinimrot, at that time, of anging paidlind eds no enot drow you then son bib ed tods was paid for, and that he wanted as ilone, montioning bis doubt of the solvency of Actalacut; that in this conversation, in the presence of Svana, Dr. Scinhardt said there would

be no bills on these repairs, for Evans was going to pay for everything that was done. Kelly stated that he gave no directions at any time with regard to any work that was done on the premises: that he did not go over the premises, as Evans had testified, nor discuss any of the details of the work; that in this conversation, Evans told him that he was associated with Meinhardt in the conduct of the hospital, and he asked Kelly if there could not be a little better allowance to the Association, than \$900.00 toward the repairs; that there was some discussion about some insurance or taxes, and his recollection was that Evans gave him his personal check to cover the insurance premiums. The witness denied that he had asked Evans to keep the cost of the work as lew as he could. cross-examination, Kelly testified that the complainant and Dr. Meinhardt, in the conversation referred to, told him they had given the contract forthe decorating to Boyle for \$365.00: that he did not ask them to procure waivers of mechanic's liens but merely said that he did not want any liens on the building.

Mrs. Meinhardt was the secretary of the Hospital Association. She testified as to the arrangements made with Boyle for the painting and redecorating of the premises and that the amount involved was \$359.00.

Dr. Meinhardt testified that in December, 1913, the complainant took a one-half interest in the Hospital Association; that the hospital was to be redecorated and he took this question up with Mr. Evans and the latter suggested that they procure bids; that they communicated with several contractors; that Boyle was one of the bidders; that Boyle was a tenant of the complainant and had done work at the hospital previous to the time Evans became connected with it; that after the bids

be no billy on tasse regular, for france was going to pay for everything that was done. Kelly stated that he gave so directions at our time with repard to any work that was done on the presines; that he did not go ever the granians, as Even had teartified, nor discuss any or the details of the work; that in this conversation. Event told him that he was monociatest with delabordt in the control of the maspital, and he asked eds of engavolin rested also is and some wites at its limited Apponistion, than Boll. to toneth the researst that the wan seme discussion about some insurance or lawer, and his recol-Tevoe of Massic Innested ald mid even must Jadi age molical the insurance presides. The witness denied that asked Sysma to keep the nost of the reak as inv as he aculd. Og eress-esamication, Welly topicited that the conjugate and Dr. Estabardt, in the renversation refoured to, told him they 240 glvan dentarage fast of decement of the feet and add making that he did not saw them to provide valvers of meaning to lient but merely and temit to did not went ony lians on the building.

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were received, he conferred with Evans again and they agreed to give the contract to Boyle, who proceeded to do the work. He testfied that the arrangements were entered into with Boyle, covering this work, at the home of the complainant when the katter was sick in bed; that Evans had his wife telephone for Boyle to come over, and that when Boyle arrived, Evans and the witness told him that he was the lowest bidder and they wanted to have the work done quickly; that Boyle said he might be delayed a little because of selling Christmes trees; that they urged him to proceed as soon as possible, and that he started the work the next day; that the complainant told Boyle he (Evans) was responsible for the payment of the bill and told him about the transaction covering the sale of the stock of the Hospital Association from Dr. Meinhardt to Evans. Dr. Meinhardt further testified that in consideration for the \$1,250.00 worth of hospital stock, the complainant paid \$500.00 in cash: that he was to pay Boyle \$360.00 for the decorating and be allowed sixty or seventy dollars for the carpenter work and glazing work he (Evans) had done in November, and that he gave the Hospital Association a check for something ever two hundred dollars to make up the difference. on which check he later stopped payment. This witness corroborated Kelly as to the conversation between himself and Kelly and the complainant in December, saying that he explained the stock deal to Kelly, told Kelly about giving Boyle the contract for decorating and that they tried to arrange with Kelly for upwards of \$900.00 to meet the cost of all repairs and redecorating. He also testified that there was no remark by Kelly urging the complainant to keep the bill as low as he could. Both Br. Meinhardt and Kelly testified that in this conversation the complainant suggested the assignment of the

were received, he conferred with wrace again and lasy egreed is give the contract to Soyle, who preceeded to do the weik. We testiled that the arrangements were entered into with doyle. covering this work, at the home of the nomplainant whom the Latter was sidk in bol; that Frens bad his wife telephone for Beyle to come over, and that then Meyle surived. Tvers and the beings and bus methid immed and env of ind mid bled elenie to have the mora done quickly; that loyle raid he might be dolayed a little because of solling Thristenes trass; that they bryed him to proceed us corp as passible, and that he steroed the wark the next day; the its complainest told Hoyle ne (Evans) was responsible for the payment of the bill and teld In doors and he oles sur garreres collowersts and duode mid the Hespitul Aurociation from iv. beinherdt to Wesen. Dr. Melahardt fartier teetified that a constacted for the \$1,250.00 moreh of bootstel cook, the employent paid and for the cash; that he were to pay higher than is descraving and be entowed winky or reventy deliars for the carponear work and ginaing vork he (France) had done in boromwo't whose he colinious see that you not aven od smit has . we agmentions over two nandred dollers to make is the difference, en chick about he later stormer payment. This without corroborated waily as to the conversation between almost and relig and the complained in iscomer, asying to a ne explained the atook deal to Felly, told felly about giving Keyle the centract for decorating and that they tried to errange with Welly are upon arenate for the second state of the first and are decerating. He sine tratificating there was ne remark by Relly urgide the cospicions to been thebbill as leven be could. Soch Mr. Uninherdt and holly testified that in this add to innumpiate will originate tunnisique out notineverson

lease to the Hospital Association, which was not done. He also testfied that the complainant did some carpenter repairing but that he did no painting or decorating on the hospital property and further that the stock in the Hospital Association was duly issued to Evans in full payment of the decorating as set forth above. He also testified that Kelly had stated in the conversation with the plaintiff and himself that he wanted no mechanic's lien on the building and that Evans replied: "There will be no mechanic's liens, because the dector and I have an understanding on this, in the payment of this money I have gone in with the doctor." further testified that in connection with the purchase of the stock from the Hospital Association, complainant was given credit for the \$360.00 for the redecorating of the hospital and that he also received credit for the value of the carpenter and glazing work he had done. He testified that the complainant was his partner, having the same amount of stock in the hospital as he had; that they were to divide the profits equally. His testimony was that this December conversation between Kelly, the complainant and himself, was had before the work was commenced and that Kelly was never at the hospital while the work was in progress.

In rebuttal, complainant called Boyle as a witness. He was shown a bill referred to as Defendant's Exhibit 1, which was dated December 1, 1913. The heading on this bill reads as follows:

*Mr. E. J. Evans, Lake Shore Hospital.

To V. F. Boyle, Dr. Painter and Decerator.

The bill then sets forth two items, one for burlaping and

leage to the Hospital Association, which was not done. He also tradiced that the completence did some carpenter repairing but that the did so painting or the tant in gentalogo hospital property and further that the stock in the boupital Association was duly lucue, to lucus is full commont of the decorating as set forth slove. He also vertified that felly had seeted in the conversation with the wheintiff and bimand that he want to mail a classical on buttage of that Ties that Evans replied: "There will be no seeboute's liens, because the dector and I luve on understanding on this. in the payment of this upony I have gone in eith the dontor." He the la sometrue and deem notreasure at last believes redired story from the Hospital Assessant, confident was Harry indicated and to publicate the real total and the state of the total and and that he wise researed drovit for the voice of the carpentar and glasing cort ha bird door. He berthithed that the tools is income some the private and see seem meant the in the horpital as in ind; that is y were to divide the pro-Tite equally. He testinosy out that in Dresmber desiratestion between colly, the gampid that and binnelf, was had before two werk was compand and that being man never at the heeplank while the ours was to saveyseer.

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To was shown a bill referred to an Defendent's Tubbit 1, unter

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**r. E. J. Trans, Lake Chere despital.

To V. V. Boyle, in. Painter and moorstor. "

The bill then sets forth two items, one for burlaning and

painting ceilings and walls of office "as per centract" and, another for refinishing floor, painting desk and chair, touching up woodwork in front hall. Payment in full was acknowledged under date of December 6, 1913. The witness testified that the bill was paid by Dr. Meinhardt. He said the bill came to be made out to the complainant. Evans, in this way; that he first made it out to the Lake Shore Hospital and took it over to Dr. Meinhardt and the latter told him to make it out to Evans and the bill would be paid, so he .ut the name of Evans in and then he went to Evans and the latter told him to go back to Meinhardt and he would pay the bill, and that he went back and the bill was paid. He further testified that after the time mentioned in this bill he had a conversation with Evans about other work at the hospital; that the complainant asked him to take charge of this work; that he told the witness to go shead and act as foreman and take charge of the work in general, which he did; that this conversation took place at the home of the complainant, who was not sick in bed at the time but was sitting in his office; that Dr. Meinhardt was not present at the time; that he was not told he was the lowest bidder or that they wanted the work done quickly and that he did not may he would be delayed because of his arrangement for selling Christmas trees; that nothing of this kind teek place. He further testified that he procured most of the material for the work in question from a man named Rockefellow; that he also brought some of the material over from the complainant's shop; that the men on the job were paid by the complainant and that the complainant paid the witness Boyle; that he bought the material in the mame of the complainant. Evans, and none in his own name. On cross-examination this witness said he was a painter and decorator and that he also sold Christmas trees:

painting sattings and walts of office "as per contract" and, another for refinishing floor, printing deak and chair, touching up weedwork in front failt. Fagment in full was selmowledged under date of December 6, 1813. The witness testified that the bill was paid by Dr. Metmberdt. He said the bill came to be made out to the complations, Svans, in this way; that he first made it out to the laye Shere Roopisel and took it ever to Dr. Weinbardt and the latter told him to make it out to Evens and the bill would be paid, so he ut the name of from in and than he went to Myana and the latter told him to go best to Remineral and he would pay the till, and that he went back and the bill was unid. We further testified that after the enava di in telegant en litte alle a donverontion with avans bottes smantalipmoo and Jans ; taligned and by gare resto sweets him to take charge of this work; that he teld the without to go object and not an equation and take charge of the work is general, which me did; that this conversation took place at ends and the complainment, who was not stok in hed at the but was siteing in his office, that in. deinhardt was not preand at the time; that he was not told be west the fourt bidder or that they manted the work done quickly and that he did not esy he world be delayed because of his arrengement for salling Christman trees; that mathian of this kind took place. further testified that he provided would fire motorial for the work in datablen from a man named hockerlow; that he afannisique ent neve interial cour from the summariant's shop; that the man on the job were puld by the complainant and that the complainment paid the witness Boyle; that he bought the material in the mess of the despicient, Evens, and none of the own name. On organ-exemination this witness said he wee a painter and decorater and that he also ecld first steam trees; that he never took any contract for the complainant but had been working for him by the day.

buttel, who testified that he was a journeyman painter and decorator and also a contractor; that he worked at the premises of the Lake Shore Hospital in December 1913 and January 1914. as a journeyman; that he knew Boyle and the complainant; that he worked on this job as a sort of foreman under Boyle and also as a mechanic; that he was paid for his work by the complainant and not by Boyle. On cross-examination he testified he had orders from complainant and bought material for this work from Rockefellow and he saw complainant about the building nearly every day while the redecorating was being done; that he took orders on the jeb from Boyle and the complainant.

Counsel for the complainant testified in complainant's behalf, in rebuttal, to a conversation he had had with Dr. Meinhardt and also testified about a meeting in his office between the complainant, Dr. Meinhardt, and one Babcock, the latter stating that Dr. Meinhardt had asked him to call and see the witness with regard to some stock Evans had secured in the Hospital Association, on which Dr. Meinhardt claimed Evans owed a balance, which fact the latter disputed; that Babcock further stated at that time that inasmuch as the Hospital Association was not in good financial condition, and as Evans and Meinhardt were in effect partners, he wanted to try to make some arrangement whereby they could raise some money to get along. The witness further stated that at that time Evans said he did not want to loan any money to Meinhardt or the Hospital Association; that he asked Br. Meinhardt if he would assign the lease to the Association and he said he would not.

that he never took any contract for the completency tak had been werking for his by the day.

The completent also called one Neromald, is relatical, who testified that he was a few regard of the precises

decorater and also a controctor; that he verked of the precises
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The complainant testified in rebuttal, to this conference in the office of his attorney, at which Baboock was the spekesman for Dr. Meinhardt, at which time Babcock explained that the hospital was short of funds, and the witness stated he had leaned Dr. Meinhardt \$500.00 and got some stock as collateral, which was no good, and he was not going to put any more money into it. The witness further testified that he paid for all the material and laber used in redecorating the hespital. On grass-examination he testified that he was not a stockholder in the Hospital Association but that he held the stock as collateral; that the conference in his lawyer's office, referred to above, teck place in February 1914. He also testified that he went to the hospital one Saturday evening and found Dr. Meinhardt very much excited; that the latter said the hospital funds had been burglarized and he had no meney to pay his nurses and meet the pay-rell, whereupen, he, the complainant, gave Dr. Meinhardt a check for \$250.00 for that purpose. The witness further testified that his wife accompanied him to the hespital on this occasion and while he and Ur, Meinhardt were conversing, his wife was talking with Mrs. Meinhardt in snother room; that when he and his wife got home she stated that there was something wrong between Dr. Meinhardt and his wife; that he had not been giving her any money for some time and that Mrs. Meinhardt had told her that shehad found some money in the safe that day and had taken it; and the witness testified he had immediately, up on learning this, gone to the bank and stopped payment on this check, "because I was not going to be a sucker. * * # I didn't feel kindly to any more business dealings with the doctor at all.

whereupon, the virings clusted that he could not advice Evens to advance any mean; to the Association to most the expenses of operating the bosoital.

The completent testified in relation, to this conference is the office of bis attorney. at which Rabocck was the spokesman for Mr. Meinhardh, at which than deboook explained that the weepited were short of funds, and the witness stated he has leaned ir. Weinhardt fibt. Of and got some stock as cellateral, which ear he good, and he was me going to put any more money into it. The witness further testified that he paid for all the material and leber wased in redescenting the houghtel. om grans-examination be tostified three he was mor a stockholder in the Hospital Association has that he held tes atour as collateral; that the conference in his lawyer's office, seftroed to above, took place in February 1914. As also traitited that he went to the hospital one Helurday evening and found Dr. Meinhardt very much emotion; that the latter paid the heightel funds had been burglarised and he had no conny to pay its nurses and ment the particall, whereapon, he the complement, gove Dr. Velshordt a chark for \$480.00 for that purpose. The witness further go lationed did to bis mid being more on the all that to the beilt sed inia advactor and shirt he and T. benest to conversing, his wife was talking with tra. deanhardt in mother room: that when we and his wife got bome and etaled that there was something wrong between Er. Meinhardt und him eife; chat he hau not been giving her any manny for sens time one thet its. Meinburds and told her that sh had found some meney in the aufo that day and had taken it; and the attacen test ied he had immediately, up an learning this, gods to the bank and atoaped payment on this check, "because I was not going to be a sucker. * * I didn't forl kindly to any more hardwood dealings with the dector at all. I had had enough of him." The complainant further testified that he was not certain whether he ever sent a bill for the redescrating in question; that the \$500.00 he gave Meinhardt was a loan on which the stock he held was collateral, and that he demanded the return of his money many times, "in 1914, around February or March."

On this testimony we are of the opinion that it is clearly shown that the complainant was not the contractor on this work. We have set forth the substance of the testimony fully and it would serve no useful purpose to analyze it in detail. We appreciate the fact that the Waster saw the witnesses and heard them testify and that he made a finding in favor of the complainant, and that he had a better opportunity to judge of the value of the testimony of the various witnesses than the chancellor had. We are nevertheless constrained to affirm the decree of the chancellor. The manner in which Boyle made out his bill for work done in the fall of 1913, as shown in Defendants: Exhibit 1, above referred to, is significant. It is also significant that the complainant never submitted a bill for the work in controversy in this case, to anybody. All he did was file a claim for lien in February, 1914. In our opinion another significant fact is that he filed his claim for lien just after he and Br. Meinhardt had apparently had some sort of a falling cut, involving among other things, his giving the Boctor his check for \$250,00, and then stopping payment on it. There is no corroboration in the record of the complainant's claim that he was the contractor, saide from the statement made by Boyle that he was the foreman. It may well be that Evans paid the men and paid for the material but that is quite as consistent with the theory that he was doing this work in consideraI had bad enough of him. The complained further leadified that he was not cortain whether he ever sant a bill for the redecorating in question; that the \$500.00 he gave Melahardt was a long on which the success he had that has an analytical that he consider the return of his weigh these allaters. In 1914, around Rebrusty or hareh.

to this tentiment we are of the coining that it is clauric sugar that the despiritest was for some grant of this werk. We may not farth the substitute of the testimony gi fi malian of occurry limber of ormer offer it has will't detail. We addressaid the foot take the catter as the site nesses and hourd then tootify one that he ned a finding in favor of the completement, and that he had a bester appartualty to of the of the relee of the terrimony of the warious situanees then the coencailer med. He are nevertheless constrained to affirm the decree of the compositor. The cannot in which dayle used out hir bill for more done in the fact of 1813, as where in intervolution indicate t. alone reterror to. is aignificant. belitmine reven inemicloses on Sout inselingie ande at Si a bill for the early in contro-ersy is this case, to englady. All he old won file a claim for Hem in February, 1914, In minis with belift and another the foot and the first and another will works had tilianteres but itraduine .t. has no relie int moll in eart of a failten cut, involving whom cities a failed a to tree no dronger makegood and the .U. with the all aster aster and it. There is servolventies in the respect of the sampening. wat's alain that he was the sostesoter, andes from the observable made by Boyle that he me the forces. It my well be that want paid the men and just for the tenterial best time as not been stations with the theory that he was deing this work to considerstion for the stock, as testified to by the witnesses for the defendants, as that he was doing it as a contractor. Some of the testimony of Boyle tends to corroborate the witnesses for the defendants rather than the complainant.

We are further of the opinion that even if we were to assume that the complainant did this work as a contractor, nevertheless, the prependerance of the evidence is to the effect that complainant waived any right he might have in the way of a lien.

We find no error in the record and therefore the decree of the Superior Court is affirmed.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

G'CONHOR AND TAYLOR, JJ, GONGUR,


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To the Gaperian Court is afficeed.

AMOUNTA AVESTANCE.

O'CENSOR ACH MENAR, JA. NACOLA



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MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, M. H. Barsness, brought this action against the Hotel La Salle Company seeking to recover the value of a suit case and the contents, which the plaintiff claimed had been lost through the negligence of the defendant's servants, in connection with their transportation on a taxicab from the Hotel La Salls to the Dearborn Street Station in the City of Chicago. The issues were tried before a jury resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of \$400.00, to reverse which the defendant has perfected this appeal.

The plaintiff was a resident of Superior, Wisconsin, Upon reaching Chicago from that City on his way to West Baden. Indiana, not being able to secure a room at the La Salle Hotel, he checked his baggage at that hotel and secured accommodations elsewhere until the following day. On the evening of the following day, he was joined by three friends from Superior.

a Mr. Hentzen and a Mr. and Mrs. Russell, at the Hotel LaBalle. They secured their baggage and engaged the taxicab in question to take them to the railroad station. They had considerable baggage, consisting of grips, suit cases and golf bags. As

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225 I.A. 594

Mo. PREDicted Thatign Drowless dailyoned the opinion of the court.

The planetit, i. il. Bareners, brought this solice against the noted in inite "coppers, which is receiver the value of a suit were and the contents, which the plaintiff circuit has been last through the acquirence of the defendance as tentage the defendance as tentage them the connection with their transportantian on a tentage from the kets! La Salia is the Jentson liteau transportant at the City of Triangle. The issues were tried before a jusy resulting in a verdiet for the initial in the same of \$400.00, to revolue which the aefendent has parfected this appeal.

The plaintiff was a proided of Especies, Sistemain. Spen resching Chicomo from that Sily on his way to seek haden. Indiana, set being able to secure a room at the La Saile Motel. Indiana, set being able to secure a room at the Lace of Saile Motel. he checked his backing day. On the created woodstrom classific the following day. On the created from Superior.

Lowing day, he was joined by three friends from Superior.

A br. Hestman and a Mr. And Bro. Lamenti. of the Botel Lacella. They secured their backing and engaged the Landes in quention to take them to the railroad species. They add constderaids because of engages. Occasioning of each occasioning of each occasioning of each occasioning of engages. Occasioning of engages. Occasioning of engages.

many pieces as possible were piled in beside the driver in the front part of the cab. When as many of these pieces as could be put there had been placed, the suit case in question remained. Mr. Russell put that case on the cab between the hood and the front fender on the right side. After a drive of ten or twelve minutes they reached the station and the plaintiff' suit case was missing. Just when its absence was noted is not clear from the evidence, as will be pointed out.

The defendant was a common carrier of passengers and baggage in the City of Chicago, and liable as such, for the articles of baggage carried by it.

The plaintiff contends that the defendant is liable for the loss of the suit case and its contents, on the theory that it became dislodged from its position between the right fender and the hood of the taxicab and dropped off into the street while the cab was on its way from the hotel to the railroad station.

In support of its appeal the defendant contends, among other things, that if the suit case was lost as claimed by the plaintiff, his own negligence contributed to that less and, therefore, he cannot recover. The only witness for the defendant was the chauffeur. At the time he testified, he was no longer in the employ of the defendant company and had not been for some time. His testimony was to the effect that there was room inside the cab for five passengers, three on the rear seat and two on movable seats which were folded up against the front of the cab when they were not in use; that with three passengers on the rear seat and one on one of the movable seats, there was ample room for the suit case in front of the other movable seat, or there was plenty of room to place it under the

many pioces as possible were piled in beside the ariver in the front part of the cab. When we many of these sieces as could be gut there has been placed, the cult case in assetted remained. It masked gut that case on the calt case the sund and the front femder on the right side. After a drive of ten or tenise minutes they recent the station and the plaintiff' cust case was missing. Just when its absence was noted in cot cient from the evidence, so will be painted out.

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movable seats even though both of these seats were used. This testimony was not contradicted. When the plaintiff and his friends came out to take the taxicab, several of them assisted in placing the paggage in the cab. The chauffeur did not leave his seat, which was on the left hand side of the cab. Mr. Russell was the one who placed the plaintiff's suit case between the hood and the fender of the cab. There is some controversy as to what took place at that time, the chauffeur testifying that he told Mr. Russell not to put the suit case there because it was against the rules, and because it was a dangerous place to put it and he suggested that the suit case be put inside, whereupon Russell went to the door of the cab and had some conversation with those who had entered the cab. He then came back and jammed the suit case in at the place above stated and said there was no time to argue about it but to go shead: the plaintiff, corroborated by Russell and Hentsgen, testified (the latter two by deposition) that when Russell proposed putting the suit case between the hood and the fender, he asked the chauffeur if it would be all right; that he said, "Yes, it would, that he would keep his eye on it." On crossexemination in connection with his case in chief, the plaintiff testified that after the loss of the suit case had been discovered and a fruitless search had been made for it he stated to one of his

acres sants even though both of these seats were used. This tertimeny was not contradicted. Then the claimitiff and his friends came out to take the taxiosh, several of then assisted in placing the paggage in the cab. The cheuffeur did not leave his arat, which ame on the left hand side of the cab. Mr. Michell was the one who placed the plaintiff's suit case between the head and the fender of the cab. There is some controversy as to what took place at that time the charifeur testifying that is told Er. Russell not to put the must eace there because it was mgainst the rules, and because it was a dangerous place to put it end he suggested that the suit rane of the al inches. wheremore Massell went to the coor of the sab and had some convergencian of the succes who had entered the one. He then come back and jament the sait sure in at the place above stated and enti there was no time to every about it but to go should the painting, corresponded by Mundell and Partagen, Carteling (the letter two by dependency) that when dustral proposed putsing the ouit case between the mood and the Tender, be asked the chartfour if it weed he all right; that he wald, Yes, it would, that he would know his eye on it. " On areseexamination in connection with his case in chief, the plaintiff testified that after the less of the suit ence had been discovered and a fraither search had been under for it, he stated to one of his

party that it was not the chauffeur's fault, "we put it there ourselves." He further testified that he did not blame the chauffeur; that he felt at the time, it was Russell's fault for putting it there; "I blamed him. I talked with Russell about it and told him it was his fault. I thought it was a dangerous place to put the suit case." The plaintiff slso testified in rebuttal and at that time on cross-examination he said that he knew Russell was going to put the suit case on the fender. "I knew it was a dangerous place, but I thought he (the chauffeur) would watch it."

The chauffeur testified that his seat was on the left hand side of the cab but that he could see the suit case plainly from where he sat; that when they reached the station, the suit case was in between the hood and the fender where it had been placed; that as soon as he came to a stop, he looked bakk at his passengers who were preparing to get out of the cab; that a station porter had opened the door and the four passengers get out, the last one being the plaintiff, who paid the cab charges; that the baggage was unloaded from the cab by the plaintiff's two friends and two station porters; that there were twelve or fifteen pieces of baggage in all; that after the plaintiff got through paying the cab charges, the station porters and the plaintiff's friends had gone inside the station; that he then started up his cab on the way back to the hotel and that after he hadproceeded about 200 feet, he heard somone hailing him from the station and he turned around and went back and found it was the plaintiff, who told him his suit case was missing; that he assured the plaintiff the suit case was there when they arrived, and the plaintiff went back into the station and looked again and returned after five or six minutes and said he could not find it; that he then gave him a half dollar

party that it was not the charffour's Isult, "am put it there curselves," He further tentified that he did not blame the charffaur; that he for the time, it was Humseli's fault for outling it there; "I blamed him. I talked sith humseli about it and told him it was him fault. I thought it was a shout it and fold him it was his fault. I thought it was a familified in reduction out that the case." The platetis also testified in reduction was going to out case are muit case as the fine the fact. I knew it was a dangerous place, but I thought he (the charfeur) sould rate at dangerous place, but I thought he (the charfeur) sould rate it."

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and asked him to run back with his cab and see if he could locate the suit case; that he teld the plaintiff "there was no earthly use of going back. That suit case is here."; that he, nevertheless, did go back and look for it, to please the plaintiff, but that he found no trace of it. The plaintiff testified on direct examination that when he got through paying the chauffeur at the station, his friends had taken the baggage out of the cab, and when he looked for his suit case it was missing; that he asked the chauffeur where it was and he said that it must be there and he told him it was not there, whereupon, he said it must have dropped off on the way down. On cross-examination the plaintiff testified that when they reached the station, several station porters came up to help with the baggage; that they helped unlead the baggage from the taxicab, assisted by Mr. Hentzgen; that there were ten or twelve articles of baggage piled up on the sidewalk; that he gave his attention to paying the chauffeur and no attention to the baggage: that he left that to the others: that the chauffeur remained in his seat while he was paying him and did nothing toward unloading the baggage. He further testified that his back was toward the others and he did not pay much attention to what they were doing: that the station porters were picking up the baggage when he turned around and they were carrying it in and that he and his friends picked up other pieces and started earrying them in: that he could not say, of his own knowledge, whether anyone took this suit case in question off the taxicab; that he did not know whether it was on the cab when they got to the station or not; that it might have been for all he knew; and it might have been taken off by a station porter or one of his friends; that he did not know what became of the suit case; that after he paid the chauf-

bl co on "I see one day als als als one it as all bedee bre lecute the nail least that he belt the plaintiff "there was no sertely one of going back. That care dere is here. '; that be, vererthaless, did go back sed look for it, to place the pleinist, but the thund no trees of it. Inc plainist tentified on direct exactantion that when he got through paying the disperson on the exactes, bis friends and taken line කid tol කිවේදන්වේ මිස් සමනීම විසිම ,ජීමත පරිද එර රජා ඉළුමුවුලින් මෙඩ් ough is not bisching; that is appeal the chariffeur such a it was and he seld that it ome, he there and he told his it were not there, whe ratpor, he said it said have dropped off on the way down. In sport. our singular the plaining the plaining that the there they reached the whellow, neveral station pertangular to help with the banguage; that they beinge intend the beinge from the taxtent, eestyseed by is. Hentagen; that in the water tage. us twelve usticion of baggage piles up on the exclusive that ungalingan on bus andegroup, and Nurfue of merticuses and continue and sails then we are is cost that on waits thempores will of Shoulfleur seratted in his seas still one was paying alm and did nothing then and unitending sign and animal the fareing theris. The thirt is at the state over a set and state as the state and the tr subject to the chest were therefore the cold to the termination of the cold programmes was fell my bindre bankes of the espigner and in suitate dame carrying is in each turn he and his friends niched up of the the ten alone wit dealt ins on it withers beared here each of this orn in siralys, whotever arrive took that will once in was the reduced the tank the the end the relation will be notional on the ach when the, got to one protten or not; that it will. have been for all he kare; and it wight force been taken off by a station porter ... eas of the friends; thet as ded not what became of the cutt man; that after he pain have chul-

feur, the latter turned around and started away, and that when he had proceeded a short distance, he called to him to come back and it was then he said that this suit case was lost; that at that time his friends were on their way toward the station steps. As stated above, both Hentzgen and Russell testified by deposition. Hentzgen testified in his deposition that when they arrived at the railread station they discovered that this suit case was missing and that the chauffeur's attention was called to the fact and he said it must have dropped off on the way down. He was not asked as to just when the discovery was made. Russell testified in his deposition that when they got to the station andgot out of the taxicab, "and commenced picking up the grips and bags, the plaintiff asked where his suit case was and the chauffeur said it must be there. . He further testified that he was the first one to get out of the cab and that he knew the suit case wasn't there when they got to the station because he helped take the baggage off the taxicab; that the plaintiff asked for his suit case and they looked all over forit, and for a minute everybody did not know what to think: that they thought it must be there: that they could not see how they could lose a suit case; that they then remembered about it being on the front of the car: that the chauffeur suggested that they look around the station and see if it was there; that later he drave back and tried to locate it but could not do so.

The question of whether the plaintiff's suit case
was lost by falling off the taxicab between the hotel and the
railroad station, was a question of fact for the jury to
determine as was also the further question covering the alleged
negligence of the plaintiff. In our opinion, this court cannot
say from the evidence in the record that the verdict of the

fear, the latter turned eround and started away, and that when he had proceeded a short distance, he called to him one owne link sint that bine on red and li ben fond emon of lost; that at that time his friends were on their way toward the station store. As stated shows, both lentagen and Museuli taginflad by descrition. Mamiagen tredicted in his deposition thet when they arrived at the mailtone station they discovered this suit one was missing and that the charis attemtion was call a to the fact and is and it must have drapped off on the way down. It was one taked as to junk when the diametery was made. Burnell tentified in his deposition that when they got to the station andget out of ten tanicab, "and commenced pinking up the gripe and haye, the piciniiff asked where his mait case was one the charffour said it cast be Charte. * In further tectified this he was the first one to mindi s'anne onte quis and anne ed indi ind the the to the when they get to the nextien because se helped take the onegrade the testical; the plane filter plane filter as one the test to the test the tiony looked all ever forth, and far a minute everybody did not and; erans of taue it shaunds your tods ; and to the work they sould not see how the, outle case a cult case; that they then remembered about it being on the front of the cer; that has coling one can be to the look around the state and see if it was there; that later is drave back and tried to .on ob ton minus fud di wanool

The guestion of whather the plaintiff's suit once was lest by failing off the takingh because the notal nuther white station otalism of faction of the just to determine an was also the further question covering the stinged mediate planet. In our opinion, the court cannot eagy from the ordered of the planet in the reader of the verdict of the

jury and judgment of the trial court are against the manifest weight of the evidence, on either of these questions. If the jury believed the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff, they may have reasonably concluded that when the taxicab arrived at the depot the suit case in question was not on it.

As to the issue involving contributory negligence, the fact that the plaintiff realized, as he admitted on cross-examination, that the position in which the suit case was placed before they left the hotel was not a very safe one, would not necessarily prevent his recovery in this action. The jury may reasonably have concluded, from the testimony, that the chauffeur stated that it was all right to put the suit case there and that he would keep his eye on it, and that with such assurance as that, the plaintiff may have been justified in placing it there.

There is the further contention that the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish the value of the suit case and its contents. In a general way, the plainatiff testified as to what he paid for the suit case and the various articles he claimed it contained at the time it was lost, and further testified as to how long he had had the various articles and to what extent they had been used. In the absence of any other evidence we are of the opinion that this was sufficient at least to make out a prima facie case on behalf of the plaintiff as to values. 25 Corpus Juris, sections 1799, 1802; Johnson v. Canfield-Swigart Co., 292 Ill. 101; West Skokie Drainage Co. v. Dewson, 243 Ill. 175; Languist Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 200 Ill. 69; Peoria Gas Light v. Peoria Terminal R.R. Co. 146 Ill. 372; Rathbone v. Ayers, 121 App. Div. (H.Y. 355) Parmenter v. Pitspatrick, 135 N.Y.196; Sears Reebuck

jury and jedgment of and arial so at are applied the manifest colly of the evidence, an estion of these questions. If the jury believed the testionary of the estimense for the phydentiff, they may have remandably concluded that then the testical artived at the depot the unit case in mestion was it on it.

As to the irrue my fring sentrabutory negligence, the fact that the physicist roulived, as he scritted as cress-encolantion. The the position is obtained as cress-encolantion, that the position is obtain any sale cas, would not necessarily prevent his recovery in this season. The jury cas reasonably have another the chart the chart of any reasonably have another the the their the chart of the chart are chart as and the that is say the chart be sould be the place the the the chart of the say the chart be sould been the the chart and chart as their case placents for any tree the been free that the phenomens as their

There is eye curier contents of exception the the plaintiff failed to extend to extend to extend to extend of the contents. In a general say, the plained the east of the said in the plain for the said of the said in the said of the said of the said of the said of the said far the said far the said far the said far in the said far the said of the said far the said of the said far the sa

& Co. v. Mears Slayton Lumber Co., Ill. App. Court First Dist. case No. 27128, opinion filed October 18, 1922.

We find no error in the record and therefore the judgment of the County Court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND O'CONNOR, JJ. CONCUR.

& Co. V. Heart Glayton Lugber Co. 111. App. Scurt Abret Dist.

We find no error in the resort and therefore the judgment of the Cremy lourt is affirmed.

JULEBRE AFFIRMED.

TATION AND C'CL COR. IN. CHUTCH

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177 - 27132

CENTRAL BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT.

COOK COUNTY.

JOHN GOLICH, et al on appeal of John Golich and Marie Golich.

Appellants.

227 I.A. 594

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The complainant. Association filed this bill of foreclosure, covering two loans, one for \$2,000.00, dated January
27, 1916, and the other for \$5,000.00, dated December 5, 1916,
each secured by a trust deed executed by the defendants and
covering a piece of property owned by them. A reference was
had to a Master who filed a report finding that the complainant had a lien on the property in question to the extent of
\$4,671.82, and recommending that a decree of foreclosure be
entered accordingly. The decree was entered as so recommended
by the Master, to reverse which the defendants have perfected
this appeal and the complainant has filed oross errors.

In 1912, Golioh subscribed for twenty shares of stock in the Building & Loan Association, on which he agreed to pay \$20.00 per month. The stock in question would mature in September, 1918, and with all payments made it would then be worth \$2,000.00. On this subscription he received pass-book No. 1169, and his account with the Association was kept in the ledger on page 1169.

CETTRAL BUILDING & MAR ASSOCIATION. a serperation.

Appelles,

APPRAL PROM

AUPRICA COURT.

CCOK COURTY.

JOHN BOLLON, et al on appeal of JOHN GOLLON AND MAKIN GOLLON

Appellmats.

493 A.I 788

MR. FREIMER JUSTICT THOMACH delivered the opinion of the ocurt:

The complainants Association filed this bill of forealongra, according two learns, one for \$2,000.00, dated Junuary
37, 1916, and the other for \$5,000.00, dated Jecember 5, 1916,
each ascured by a trust deed executed by the defendents and
covering a given of property comed by them. A reference was
had to a Marter who filed a report finding that the acaptainant had a lien on the property in question to the extent of
\$4,671.32, and recommending that a dearen of foreolosure be
entered accordingly. The dearen was antered as ac recommended
by the sater, to reverse which that they are not foreolosure.

by the sater, to reverse which that they are accordingled.

In 1912, Welleh subscribed for twenty shares of stock in the Building a Lean Association, or which he agreed to pay \$30.00 per menth. The stock in question would nature in Reptember, 1918, and with all onyments made it would when be worth \$2,00.00. On this subscription he received pass-book No. 1109, and his moocuat sith the oracletion was rept in the ledger on page 1169.

In January 1916, he purchased the property encumbered by the loans here in question and in connection with that purchase, he berrowed \$2,000.00 from the Building & Loan Association. The fact that he received the money from the Association, and used it for this purpose is not controverted. The trust deed executed by the defendants to secure this loan was one of the two which are involved in this foreclesure. At the time he berrowed this \$2,000.00 from the association, he subscribed for another twenty shares of the stock in the Association, agreeing to pay for them at the rate of \$20.00 per month, and in connection with this subscription he received pass-book No. 1324 and his account in connection with this stock purchase was kept in the ledger of the Association on page 1324.

In the fall of 1916 the defendents improved their property and in that connection found it necessary to make another loan. There is considerable evidence about this last loan and it is in hopeless conflict.

It appears from the record that the secretary of the complainant Association was one, Krueger, and he seems to have run the Association. In the summer of 1919, it was discovered that he was short in his accounts some \$13,000.00, and his connection with the Association was severed. The Association themproceeded to liquidate. The accounts of the defendants with the Association, in connection with the two loans covered by this foreclosure, were in arrears, as shown by the books of the Association, and this foreclosure suit was instituted.

With regard to the making of the second loan in December, 1916, Golich testified that he spoke to Kruemer

In January 1016, he parabased the privery encountered by the loans here in question and in connection with that parabase, no occarwed \$2.00.00 from the fluiding & Loan Asociation, and used it in the the the consy from the Asociation, and used it in the original in not contreversed. The trust deed expended by the originalist to secure this form was one of the two sylvin are ins lysed in this fare-sions in the numbership in the head of the fire the second tion of the second for smother trenty aboves of the stock in the tenesting to you for then second in the tenesty in the numbership to you for the receive paper point. So in connection with this second in connection with this shock purchase was topt in the receive of the Association with this shock purchase was topt in the ledger of the Association with this shock purchase was topt in the ledger of the Association on page 1304.

he the fall of 1616 the unions are improved thair property and in the connection found to necessary to make another loss. There is considerable evidence about this last loss and it is he palace conflict.

It ap, and iron the record test the secretary of the secretary of the secretary extense completenest formation was one, "recor, at he seems to have run the entered that he was night in the runner of 1918, it was also asympted that he was night in his accepted rome \$15,000.70, and his ecomposited with the kalention was served. The sample of the definition the proceeded to itsuidate. The servedues of the definition of the accordance in correction for the covered by this forestenders, were in already as a coverty to beeks of the Association, and this forestenders out was in-

With regard to the skind of a second lead in December, 1916, delich testified that he spoke is hruamar

about it, saying that he wanted \$3,000.00 on a second mortgage and Krueger said he would fix it; that later Krueger brought some papers to the salcon of Golish, who was a Creatian, and said he could read a little English, and Golich signed a trust deed and also an agreement with the complainant Association to purchase certain additional shares of its stock. Golich testified further that these papers were not filled out when he signed them. When introduced in evidence the trust deed recited that it was executed to secure a lean in the sum of \$5,000.00, and that, as further security, the defendants had executed the agreement referred to, whereby they undertook te buy fifty shares of stock in the Association, paying therefor, at the rate of \$12.50 a week. He further testified that nothing was said at the time these papers were executed, about \$5,000.00, but that Krueger only said, "\$2,000.00, and you want \$3,000.00, that makes \$5,000.00."

In connection with this second loan there was introduced in evidence a voucher or order. The trust deed and agreement above referred to were dated December 5, 1916. The order to the treasurer was dated December 7, 1916, and directed him to pay to John Golich or order; \$5,000.00 for a loan on 50 shares of stock. This order was signed by the president and secretary of the Association. At the bottom of the order there was the following: "Received of the treasurer, Michael Winter, \$5,000.00, in full payment of the above order", signed by the defendant and also his wife. The latter signed by her mark and that signature was witnessed by one Collins. There was also introduced in evidence the check of the complainant Association on the Raspar State Bank, dated December 7, 1916, for the sum of \$5,000.00 drawn to the order of both defendants and apparently containing their endorsements on the reverse side, that of

about it, maying that he sangerd \$2.000.00 on a seequa wartgage and Kuneger untd he would fix it; that later Krueger brought some papers to the salson of Golioh, who was a Groatism. and eate he could read a little English, and Colich signed a trust deed and also an agreement with the completeant Assectstice to purchese sertain edditional shares of its rigor. Golish testified further that there papers were not filled out when, he signed then. Then introduced in evidence the trust deed regited that it was executed to secure a less in the sum of \$6.600.00, and that, as further security, the defendants had executed the agreement referred to, whereby they undertook to buy fifty shares of steak in the Association, psying therefor, at the pate of \$13.50 a week. He turcher teethind that nothing was said of the time these payers mere exceeded, about \$5.050.00. but that Eracger only eath. "\$5.000.00, and you mant \$2,000.00, thus makes \$5,000.00.*

In connection with this second loss there was introduced in evidence a veneber or order. The truet deed and agreement above referred to were dated tearriber 5, 1916. The order to the trememen were dated Decombar ?. ifile, and directed him to way to John Gollas or orders \$6.000.00 for a lean on 50 chares of steek. This order was signed by the president and secretary of the Association. At the beings of the order there was the "Hegelved of the treamurer, Michael Winter, following: \$5,000.00, is full payment of the above order", signed by the defendant and also win wife. The letter wighed by her ward and that signature was witnessed by one folling. There was also introduced in weldence the cheak of the complaint Apandiction on the Kaipar State Bank, dated December 7, 1916, for the sum of \$6,000.00 drawn to the order of both defendants and apparently containing their andorseants on the reverse side, that of Mrs. Golich being by her mark, and also the personal endorsement of William J. Krueger, the secretary of the complainant Association.

\$2,450.00 on this second bean; that about ten days after he signed the papers, Krueger gave him a check for \$1,000.00; about a week later he received \$450.00, and later on some other payments totaling all together, \$2,450.00, all of which was received from Krueger, and that he didnot receive any money from anyone else on behalf of the Association. As he received the money he turned it over to the contractor on his building. He also testified that he did not know that he had signed any papers for a \$5,000.00 lean, until after the Association began to liquidate, when he was apparently called upon by counsel representing the Association to pay his indebtedness.

Golich questioned his signature, as it appears at the bettem of the order for \$5,000.00, and also as it appears as an endorsement on the \$5,000.00 check. He admitted, on cross-examination, that at the time of this second lean he received a pass-book in connection with this stock subscription, in the Association, and that he noticed it was for fifty shares covering a \$5,000.00/but that he thought the \$5,000.00 included the first lean of \$2,000.00, and that his indebtedness was only being increased by \$3,000.00. He said he had never seen the check for \$5,000.00 until it was shown to him by the attorney for the Association, in the office of the latter, after the Association had begun to liquidate.

Each of the two trust deeds involved in the suit at bar, contains a prevision for selicitors fees in the sum of

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\$100.00. The decree appealed from provides for solicitors fees in the sum of \$400.00, and of this the defendants complain. Complainant admits that this provision was included in the decree inadvertently and consents that the decree may be modified to the extent of providing that the solicitor's fees, to be paid by the defendants shall be in the sum of \$200 instead of \$400.00.

In finding that the defendants were in arrears to the extent of \$4,671,82, the Master found that they owed the entire amount of the first loan, which was \$2,000.00, and he further found that defendants had received only \$2,450.00 on the second loan, and they, therefore, owed that amount.

In support of their appeal the defendants contend that they paid in to the complainant Association, the full value of the twenty shares of stock for which they subscribed in 1912, and that they directed Krueger, the secretary of the Association, to use that stock in the cancellation of their first loan for \$2,000.00, which was made in January 1916, and that they, therefore, should be credited with that amount in this proceeding. The Master found that the account of the defendants in connection with the purchase of the twenty shares of stock for which they subscribed in 1912, was closed out in December, 1916, and that they then withdrew from the complainant Association, the value which the stock then had, which was \$1321.86. The chancellor confirmed the Master in this regard, and this is claimed by the defendants to have been error.

On this point the complainant introduced a voucher or order fated December 7, 1916, (the same date as the order for \$5,000.00 covering the second loan) directing the treasurer of the Association to pay to John Golich or order \$1321.36.

fice.cc. The decree appealed from previous for collectors fees in the sam of \$400.00, and ofsthin the defendants complete. Completentiant equits that this provinted new included in the decree larger tently and consents that the decree may be modified to the extent of previding that the unlinter's fees, to be paid by the defendants shall be in the sam of \$200 instead of \$400.00.

In finding that the defendants were an arrears to the extent of \$4,671,22, the baster found that they owed the entire amount of the first less, which was \$2,000.00, and be further found that defendants had received only \$2,450.00 on the second loan, and they, therefore, owed that amount.

in appert of their appeal in defendants contend that they paid in to the semplateant Association, the full value of the team of stock for which they subscribed in 1818, and that they directed Frueger, the secretary of the Association, to use that stock in the conceilation of their first loan for \$2,000.00, which was made in impary 1915, and that they, therefore, should be aredited with that acquat in this proceeding. The Sastor found that the account of the desident in connection with the proceeding of the described in 1913, was showed out in becamer, 1916, and that they then withdrew from the nemplain-becamer, 1916, and that they can exist at the nemplain-theorem its close time which was showned in the stock the newplain-ant Association, the value ships the stock then had, which was shall the channellor confirmed the inseter in this regard, and this is claimed by the defendance to have been error.

On this point the occapainant introduced a voucher or order fated Recember 7, 1918, (the count date as the order for \$5,000,00 devening the encount loam) directing the treasurer of the Assentation to pay to John delich or order (1821.86.

"for withdrawal of twenty shares, book No. 1169". This order was signed by the president and secretary of the Association. Opposite to their signatures and to the left, there appears, written in ink, the amount #\$1321.86", after which appears the following: "Received of the treasurer, Michael Winter, . in full payment of the above order. This was followed by the signatures of the defendant Golich and his wife, by her mark, and the signature of P.H. Collins as a witness to a that mark. The assistant to the secretary of the Association, who had been in their employ for some years, and was very familiar with all their records and accounts, testified that a search of the records failed to disclose the check covering that voucher. The original ledger sheet, page 1169, covering these twenty shares of stock for which the defendants subscribed in 1912. was introduced in evidence. This sheet indicates that the defendants made their final payment on this account on December 14, 1916, andthat the account was closed out by the payment of \$1321,86 to the defendants, which appears from this ledger sheet to have been paid by check dated December 1, 1916, and this was the testimony of the assistant to the secretary. This assistant testified that she had tried to locate the cancelled check but could not find it. She further testified that from time to time the secretary would submit to the treasurer a statement covering all items received and all items paid out. There was introduced in evidence the original statement of receipts and disbursements, made up by the secretary and submitted to the treasurer, for the period from February 1, 1916, down to December 1916. Inthis statement there appears an item of disbursement under date of December 7, 1916, Voucher No. 8183, amounting to \$1321.86. Voucher No. 8183 was the order to the treasurer of the Association above referred

"for mindrated of twenty shares, book So. 1160". This order was eigned by the president and secretary of the Association. Oppoints to the training signatures will be the left, there appears, witten in ink, the execut 691321.86", after which appears the following: "Booket of the treasurer, Etcheck Thises.

to Mill payment of the nedve arden." This raw followed by the eignesures of the defendant delich and his wife, by her mark, and the signature of R.R. Colline as a witness to h that mark. The againtment to the secretary of the Association. whe had been to their sipley for some years, and was very funliter with all teat records and accounts, testified that a search of the records failed to disolose the cheek covering tint voucker. The eriginal ledger sheet, page life, covering theen trenty diares of stock for winter the defendants subestibed in 1914, and introduced in evidence. This sheet indieates that the defendants were their flast payment on this account on December 14, 1916, andthos the account wer aloned out by the sayment of \$1351.36 to the defendance, which appears from this trager shoet to leave bren ruis by check dated becomber 1. 1916, and this was the tentimeny of ten assistant to the searstary. Inte mostetant bestified that she had tried to toeste the cancelled check but notif wat find it. The further tantified that from time to time bus secretary would midmit to ils bus bevicour masti ils golderes summers a retresert est Route said out. There was introduced in wishere the eriginal entenent of remeints and disbursements, and up by the econetary and substited to the tressurer, for the partied from Pabruary 1, 1915, down to December 1916. Inthis statement there appears an item of disbursement under date of Passaber 7, 1916. Voucher to. \$153, anounting to \$1521,86. Vorober to. 3163 wee the order to the treasurer of the Association shows referred

te, directing him to pay John Gelich \$1321.86, for the withdrawal of twenty shares of stock under pass-book No. 1169.

Golich testified that he never received \$1321.86, and that he never knew that the original subscription he made for stock in the Association in 1912 had been withdrawn or discontinued; that after that subscription was made and he had negotiated his two loans from the Association, he always had three pass-books covering his three stock subscriptions, the one made in 1912 and the other two in connection with each of his two loans. The young lady who was assistant to the secretary, and who, after the connection of the latter with the Association was severed, became secretary, testified that althougher Golich had had four pass-books in connection with his stock subscriptions with the Association; that his original stock subscription made in 1912 was withdrawn and discontinued in 1916. by a payment to him of \$1321.86, but that shortly thereafter he again subscribed for twenty shares of stock, and a new book was issued to him for which he received pass-book No. 1358, in connection with which he made his initial payments in April 1917. She testified that the only way that she knew the \$1321.86 had been paid to defendants was from the voucher bearing their signatures, from which she had made the book entries.

In our opinion the evidence does not show that the defendants received \$1321.86, from the complainant Association as claimed by it. Golich testified that he never received any such amount and that he never had any thought of withdrawing the shares of stock on which he began to pay in 1912; and that he continued to make payments on these chares until they matured. There is some documentary evidence, which, on its face, does

te, directing him to pay John Goliab \$1341.88, for the withcennel of twenty untras of whoch ander mane-book for 1158.

delich testified that to never received 21321.86. and that he never boom that the original subsuription he hade for atook in the Aspuriation to 1912 and been at therems or discontinued; that often that subscription was made and be bad her event at the least from the Association, be always her because three gase-books covering his three stock subscriptions, the one made in leld and the other two in sommetion with each of his two loans. The young lady the was resistant to the secretary, and ale, after the connection of the latter with the Asseclasion was covered, became sooretery, tentified that althoughter Orlich med hea four peec-backs in cornection with his stock sub--dim leda Isciplica ald infla their and all finis with the establishment meripation made in 1912 was willidramn and discentioned in 1816. by a payment to him of \$1501.86, but that shortly the reafter washin submorthed for tractly chares if eloci, and a new back was issued to him for which he received mass-book Me. 1388, in connection with which no made his initial paymants in toril 1917. the testified that the only was that ene knew the \$1321.98 had been paid to defendante was from the veryber bearing their size makuras, from anteh she had made the book entrices.

in our opinion the syldence does not that the defendant less that the mandants received \$1581.88. From the pospicional less that any oblighted by it. Giliah testified that he never recoived any such meant and that he never had any thrughter withdrawing the observe of stock on which he began to pay in 1912; and that he continued to make payments on these charer until they metured. There is some documentary swidence, which, on its face, does

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indicate that this stock was withdrawn in December 1916. This account was the one known as No. 1169. The original ledger sheet shows that account closed out in December 1916. It is rather inconsistent, however, in indicating a final payment on December 14, 1916, by Golich, and at the same time indicating a closing out of the account by a payment of the full value of the stock under date of December 1, 1916. The account submitted by the secretary to the treasurer, also shows this corresponding item of expenditure, \$1321.86, but under date of December 7, 1916. That was the day Golich was closing his negotistions with the Association for his second loan. On that date he signed a receipt and voucher for his \$5,000.00 on the second loan.

There are a number of considerations, which, in our opinion, counteract and destroy such effect as the documentary evidence may be considered as having, in the way of showing that Golich received this \$1321.86. These considerations are the following: First .- Krueger was an embessler and when it was found he was short in his accounts some \$13,000, it became necessary for the Association to liquidate; Second .- Although checks were produced representing the payment of \$2,000.00 from the Association on the first loan and \$5,000.00 on the second loan, no check was produced to show payment of the \$1321.86; Third,- The voucher signed by the defendants, purperting to acknowledge receipt of this money, is in fact, in blank, reading "Received of the tressurer, Michael Winter, in full payment of the above order. ": Fourth. It seems to us to be significant that the voucher the defendants signed, by which they are claimed to have acknowledged receipt of \$1321.86, is No. 8183, dated December 7, 1916, and the voucher they signed acknowledging receipt of \$5,000.00

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महात तर , पार्टिंग प्रतान के स्थान के स ranto and a continuous and consign men at man a continuo grave only by remedease as a viety, in the one player mico acostino electro electro electro electro de la contrata del contrata de la contrata de la contrata del contrata de la contrata del contrata de la contrata del contrata de la contrata del contrata del contrata de la contrata de la contrata de la contrata del cont at and the the daters a sa see the end of a set in the testing is man to d did . The in a management of the distribution of the dist money way for the can along the control of the control The Me is the for the sections that the telephone and a line of the contract of SEELS OF TREED. -- too for the following the contraction of perting to care there is a control of the stage as blank, resting the sires at the tengers, it were sinter, The region of the righticoils that the second of the second ante elgand, by thick they are things or two arterials. receipt of thinked, is it. 8704, seen bosenler . 1914, and Or. D. a to fit out prompted out a beaute and redepor and

on their second loan, was No. 8182, also dated December 7, 1916. In other words, the defendants signed the two vouchers at the same time. They were foreigners and apparently not familiar with financial matters. They may well have thought they were signing vouchers in duplicate or that all the papers they were signing that day had to do with the consummation of this second loan.

There is no doubt from the ledger sheet No. 1169, that it shows that account was closed out and there is no doubt from ledger sheet No. 1358, which was the new account apparently succeeding the former one, that it was opened in April 1917.

We are further of the opinion that the check was probably issued for the amount specified, and for that reason account No. 1169 was closed out, and the records of Krueger showed a disbursement of \$1321.86. But, we are of the opinion, that in view of the testimony of Golich, that he never got this money; the fact that the voucher on this item, signed by the defendants, really acknowledges receipt of nothing; the fact that the check covering the items is not produced, showing their endersement, and the fact that Krueger was an embessler, is such testimony as to lead to the conclusion that the defendants did not get that money.

There remains to be considered the question of whether the defendants are entitled in this foreclosure proceeding, to a credit equal to the value of the stock for which they subscribed in 1912, thereby wiping out the amount of their first loan. The complainant Association contends that even if it be found that the defendant did not withdraw the surrender value of the stock, for which they subscribed in 1912, they still should not be permitted to set off that value against

on their record loss, was so. Side, when deted December 7, 191d. In other words, the defendents signed the two vouchers at the sugertime. They were foreigners and appearably not familiar with financial matters. They may well have thought they sore signing torehers in dugliante or that all the papers they were enquire that day has to do with the secondamic of this second loss.

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We say turther of the opinion that the chock was probably irsued for the natural massen account if a life the natural and the reservance in the life was the reservance of the life. It is not the same of the collision, where it is not the collision, that it wies of the collision, that it wies of the collision, that it mover got that an energy the fact that the nover got that we defendents, the first that it is shed that the check of the fact that the collision, alone fact that the check of the check of the check of the their same and the collision of the the their same and collision the the check of the check

There reaches to be considered in question of whether the defendance are entitled in this foredecare preceeding, to a credit equal to the value of the stock for which they entertised in 1912, therefore mights out the count of their first ions. The anapharmus hardeletter converted the even if it he found that the cafe; and did not withdraw the entertier with which the circle star which they subscribed in 1912, they walled not be premitted to upt of that value against

their first mortgage indebtedness, the law being that in a foreclosure proceeding, brought on behalf of an insolvent building and lean association, against a borrowing stockholder, the latter must pay the full amount of his mortgage indebtedness and he cannot be permitted to credit any value there may be in his stock, against that indebtedness, but he must receive whatever value there may be to his stock by way of participation with all the other stockholders in such distribution as may be made after the Association has liquidated all its accounts, and paid all its debts. Wright v. Gurtin; 137 Ill. App. 267. On the other hand, the defendants contend that Golich centinued to pay on his account No. 1169, being the stock subscription he made in 1912, beyond December 1916, when, complainants, contend, this subscription was withdrawn and closed cut, and down to September 1918, when that series would naturally have matured and become worth its full face value. They, therefore, contend that Golich had the right to pay up his first lean of \$2,000.00 before it matured and that such notice as might have been required from him to the Association, by the by-laws, could be waived by the secretary; and they further contend that if Golich had received the full value of his 1912 stock subscription in September 1913, which was then \$2,000.60, and had turned the money over to Krueger, with directions to apply it in antisfaction of the \$2,000.00 loan, and Krueger had promised to do so, but had failed to carry out his premise, equity would consider that done which eught to be done, and the result would be that the defendants would get full credit for that first loan of \$2,000.00, and it would thus be eliminated, and the result would be in this proceeding, that it would be held that the complainant association did not have a lien against the defendants' property for the assount of that lean; citing Kadera v. Morava Building and Lean Association, 219 Ill. App. 644.

their first wortgage indebtedness, the lew being that in a foreclouve proceeding, brought on brieff of an inservent building and long askeriktion, egainst a borreving strakkelder, the lutter ment pay the fall annual of his martgage incobledges and he camnot be permitted to oredit any value there may be in his stook. mining that indiblouness, but he cast receive whetever value there may be to his a cook by way of participation water ell the other seecholders in such distribution as may be and after the Association has liquidated all the associate, and paid all the debis. Erigit v. Gurides, 137 ill. App. 237. (n the other hand, the defendants contound that intition design of an all appropriate and account Me. 1169, being the stock cabreription he made in 1912. beyond Weemsber 1916, when, complainable, contend, this subsuring tion was withdrawe and stown out, and dean to teptember 1918. when that parter would make andly seve matured and become north its full face value. They therefore, contend that delich had the right to pay up his first leas of \$2,000.00 before it makered and that even musice on might bave been required from him to the Association, by the law-lowe, could be waited by the accresary; and they forther rintend that of unliab had received the full value of his 1912 steek subsert, then in September 1918, which wan then \$2,000.00. and and turned the newey over to Ergener, with directions to apply it is sotiafaction of the saluce of less, and Erroger had promised to do no, but but falled to cerry out the promise, equity sould densider that deme within to be deme. there fire result would be that differed at mail of bires fire for that first loan of \$2,044.60, the is sould thin be eliminated, and the remult would be in this proceeding, that it wood be held that the complainment carpointion did not move a linn against the defendants' proporty for the evenue of that lean; citing Kolera v. Moreva Building and Lean Association, 218 1) (. App. 644.

The trouble with that contention is that it does not conform to the facts shown by the record in the suit at bar. Golich did testify that in December 1916, when he negotiated his second loan, he had no thought of withdrawing the value of the stock for which he had subscribed in 1912; that he did not receive \$1321.86 at that time and that he never told Krueger that he wanted to draw out his money on book No. 1169, but rather, "I told Krueger I want that book to run out to strike off the first mortgage. " He further testified that when he made his payments at the office of the Association in September 1918. Miss Pauch, the young woman who was the assistant to the secretary, told him that his original stock subscription had run out and that she would have to give him a new book, presumably on a new stock subscription, and that he then told her to "have Mr. Krueger straighten that first mortgage cut * * * Clear up that first mortgage", and she replied that she would tell Krueger about it.

the Association, had the authority to waive such notice as the by-lawsmonled for, in the event Golich elected to use the value of his stock in the Association and pay off that first mortgage, and it may well be, as the defendants contend, that if Golich had tendered that stock in payment of that first mortgage, at that time, and Krueger had accepted it and agreed to cancel the lean, that the defendants would now be in a position to insist that equity consider as done the thing that should then have been done and should conclude that the first mortgage had been eliminated and that, therefore, the defendants should be credited with the \$2,000.00 due on that first loan. This may be true even though the ledger sheet shows that account 1169 was closed out in December 1916, because that account was succeeded by account No. 1358, which ran down to September 1918, and here

The trouble with that denteration is that it done met ecutions to the facts shown by the report to the entt at bur. did tweetry than in december 1916, when he regoriated his mesong loan, he but no thought of rithtraving the value of the stock for which he had subscribed in 1918; this he did not reactive \$1521.55 at that time and that he never told divesor that he manted to draw out its money on hook is. 1189, but rather, "I told Kamegar I want that back to run out to strike off the first sertangego." He further tertified that when he cade his paymember at the effice of the ascretaisant in September 1918. His Pauch, has young women who was the anelstant to the proretary. bes the nur bat multiplacedur reces landglac eld tant als blot thet whe would have to give his anew beek, provumably on a new stenk subscription, and that he then test no "have br. Enveyor Janil Jane that first northness out a a Clear up that .Ji Jaga min nin rigiled thet oue eau'd tol Bruegen abed to

is may well he detected, as the frueger, as the secretary of the Assenhation, had the settering to waive much notice as the hy-lemental defent to the event of this stack in the senciation and cay off ther first cortages.

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yond, at which latter date Golich had a stock value in the Association, outside of the subscription he had made in connection with each of his loans.

There is some testimony by Miss Pauch tending to contradict that of Golich in this matter but it is not very satisfactory. However, if we take the testimony of Golich at its face value and disregard that of Miss Pauch, we will have him merely saying to the secretary in December 1916, that his intention was to use his stock subscription of 1912, at its maturitym in cancelling his first loan, and then, in September 1918, when the stock subscription of 1912 would mature, we have him requesting the young lady, acting in the capabity of a clerk or assistant, to have the secretary use the then value of the original stock subscription in cancelling the first mortgage. In our opinion that is not sufficient to place the defendants in a position now, after the Association has become insolvent and is proceeding to liquidate and suit has been instituted to foreclose their loans, to have the then value of their stock used toward the cancellation of their indebtedness. In short, assuming that Golich had, in the stock subscription he had made in 1912 (No. 1169) and the one which succeeded it (No. 1358), a value of \$2,000.00, he was then in a position to liquidate his first mortgage if the Association agreed to that method of liquidation. Of course, if the stock were not used to liquidate the mortgage, Golich would have had the right, if he chose, to withdraw it and receive the \$2,000.00 in money. But the complainant Association did not make such an arrangement with the defendants to pay eff their mortgage and nobedy on their behalf agreed to such a disposition of the mortgage. Golich merely expressed to Miss Pauch, his desire that she direct the secretary

yond, at which letter date folian had a stock volue in the Association, equality of the subscript on he had unde in some meeting with each of his bean.

कर अवांकालयं मंत्रमाल बहरी हाई श्राप्त कर माना हो। वास्ता है were son it is the responsible to the solid to the state of the solid to the state of the solid to the state of the solid to the solid antiafactory. However, if we take the testimeny of icitch film ow deser sois to fast busporath ban outer coal ask to bave him morely anythmy to the secretary in December 1916, that his interestion was to man bir oter a three rections of are actional air -quality in the real payer and a real rate partition of the regularization of the tember 1929, sher the steek scharz price of 1912 would sature. we base bin anguestin the senter ledy, acting in in remailty of a olark is restrained, is now we executory are the them and mailiangen of holy livedia toole insights and is sular first mertgage. in our crimies . St is not sefficient to almost the defendants in a position now, our the translation has been send and the backers and to proceeding to explain and the past sens inativated to to sections birty legen, to have the " on value of ecombette pel tiere to motimiferner out brusus bear deals tient La short, associan vine of the har, in the stock entropy of the had made in 1717 (be. 1169) ... to no which encouraged in (Ac. 1888), w value of 40,000,000,000 as a position to liquidate his first cortegues to too saccistant and states liquidate the mortgare, Galich was now out or right, a tercheen, to nithiran it and reserve the say. . . t in meney. Dut date insuegament, he what exam an our moissioners institutes est the defanoncian to pay aff their ecrosers and ne'only on their inhalf agreed to such a dispestition of the art, age. bolish merals empressed to him beans, the desire that the acces has engretary to have that done.

Although Golich may be in a position to participate in the distribution of the assets of the Association on the basis of the stock for which he subscribed in account No. 1169, on the evidence which appears in this record, we are of the epinion that the defendants cannot have the value of that stock considered as a credit in this foreclosure proceeding, which includes the loan he made in January 1916, which was the one he says he wanted to have cancelled in September 1918.

In connection with the cross errors the complainant contends that the court erred in finding that the defendants had not received the full amount of \$5,000.00 under the second loan. On that point we are of the opinion that the evidence sufficiently establishes the fact that the defendants executed the trust deed to secure a loan of \$5,000.00, and an agreement covering the purchase of 50 shares of stock in the complainant Association valued at \$5,000.00 and that they signed the voucher or order by which they acknowledged receipt of \$5,000.00 and that they received and endorsed the check of the complainant Association for that amount.

The check for \$5,000.00 was drawn on the Kaspar State
Bank. The record shows that the complainant Association did not
have more than a few hundred dollars in that bank in December
1916, and therefore, this check was not worth its face value at
the time it was given to the defendents, In January 1917, the
Association negotiated a loan at the Kaspar State Bank for \$4,000.00.
apparently putting up with the bank this second Golich mortgage as
security. The proceeds of this loan were credited to their account
in the bank and then this check was paid, the perforations in the

te here that dean.

Atthough Golich may be in a position to perticipate in the distribution of the assets of the Assertation on the basis of the attack of the accept of the start of the start of the start of the original appears in this record, we are of the epidion that the defordante commot have the value of the considered as a areat in this foreclosure proceeding, which includes the load he sede in languary 1916, which was the cas he says he manted to have careful in toptember 1916.

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Apparently putting my with the bank this mosend uclich mortwage an

security. The proceeds of this lean were credited to their account

the bank and then this check was paid, the perforations in the

check, indicating payment under date of January 16, 1917, which was the day the loan was made with the bank. As stated above, this check bears the endorsement of Erueger. Apparently, the Association not having the funds to meet this check at the time it was given to the defendants, Krueger undertook to negotiate it for them and in that way his endorsement appears on it. Between the date of the check, December 7, 1916 and the date of its payment January 16, 1917, Krueger, according to the testimony of Golich, gave the latter several of his personal checks, one being for \$1,000.00 and the others for similar amounts and Golich says he used them in paying his contractor. The latter took the stand and testified to receiving these checks of Krueger's from Golich at this time. The evidence does not show that Krueger gave Golich any of his checks prior to December 7, 1916, as complainant contends.

It is the contention of the complainant that the record discloses no reason why the defendants, upon receiving the check for \$5,000.00 should immediately return it to the Association, and it is argued here that when they turned the check over to Krueger they must be considered as dealing with him as their agent and not as the agent of the Association. The contention of the defendants is to the contrary.

In our opinion the record does disclose a reason for the return of the check by the defendants to Krueger as secretary of the Association, and in so doing, and in endorsing and turning the check ever to him, we are of the opinion that it must be held that they were dealing with him as the agent of the Association. It is conclusively shown by the record that when this check was issued to the defendants it was worthless, for the Association did not have the funds in the bank

oneck, indicating payment under date of Jamery 16, 1917, which .orcda belosa sA wee the day the land was made with the back. Apparently, the this check bears the endouverence of hranger. Assertation not harring the funds to seet this chook at the time it san given to the defendants, dranger andertook to negotiate .It no eraques l'accommander sin yes tadé ni bas meds to it Batraon the Ceta of the chank, December 7, 1915 and the date of its payment January 16, 1917, Kruseger, according to the tastinany of United, pave the intter several of the personal checks, one being for \$1,000.00 and the ethers for a milur amounts and calten mays he need them in paying his contractor. The latter twok the stand and testified to receiving threechaste of Erragar's from delich of tute time. The evidence does not engy that Eracker gave a lick any of his charks prior to Decimars Y. 1916, as carplainess sentercs.

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to meet the check. Of course Krueger knew this and doubtless to avoid having the check presented to the bank by the
defendants, he undertook to negotiate it for them and upon
their turning their check ever to him he gave them his persemal checks to meet payments due from them to their contracter. It is the testimony of the defendants and not contradicted in the record, that the total of the amounts thus
received by the defendants from Krueger was only \$2,450.00.
Of course the \$5,000.00 check was ultimately presented to the
bank on which it was drawn and was paid out of the funds of
the Association. When it was so paid it had been endersed
by the secretary of the Association, Krueger. He doubtless
get the \$5,000.00 and appropriated the difference between that
amount and the sum of the payments he had turned over to the
defendants.

what like that presented in the case of the <u>People v. Jasiecke</u>. 301 Ill. 23. In that case Jasiecke was the conveyancer of a building and loan association. When a person desired to borrow money from the Association and made application for a loan, the application was submitted to the association through Jasiecke. The property which was to be the security for the loan was submitted to an appraising committee and if that committee, upon inspection of the property, approved the security, they so advised the Association and the proper officers thereupon directed Jasiecke to examine the title and if it was found good, to prepare the papers incident to the consummation of the loan. In the case at bar Krueger rendered some services representing the defendants at the time they purchased their property, in the way of examining the title and preparing the papers and he

is need the check. Of course knower than this and doubtless to avaid hering the check presented to the bank by the
defendants, he undertook to angestate it for them and upon
their turning their check ever he him he gave them his pereach checks to meet payments due from them to their contractor. It is the testitiony of the defendants and not contractor in the record, that the defendants and not contractoristic by, the defendants from Krueger was only \$2,430.00.

Of course the \$3,000.00 sheet was ultimately presented to the
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What like that presented in the case of the perpie v. Jariote.

Jel III. 23. In the case Japieche was the conveyener of a building and leas assessition. Then a person decired to berrow near the Association and application for a lean, the application was unjustived to the association through Jasieche. The present which was to be the association through Jasieche. The present which was to be the security for the loss one submitted to an appreting association and if that counties, upon interpretion of the property, appreved the security, they so interpret the present, and the Aresistics and the proper officer there are the sampon differed for analysis to the consummation of the loss. In the case the prepare the consummation of the loss. In the case date are the trueger responsed they representing the defendance at the time the pure time they purchased they representing the defendance at the time the preparing the papers and he the may of examining the title and preparing the papers and he

submitted a bill to them for these services and it was paid by them. Likewise, in the Jasiecke case, Jasiecke was paid certain fees by the applicants for the loans, for his services in examining the title and preparing the papers. Those fees generally came out of the proceeds of the loans. that case Jasiecke, following the method described above, put through several purely fictitious loans. He also put through several of which the following is a type. One Moretz made application to the association for a lean of \$1,300.00. He had just bought a piece of property on which there was a \$\$00.00 mortgage and he desired to use the \$1,300.00 in paying off that \$900.00 mortgage and certain other obligations which he had. The property was appraised, the lean was approved, the proper documents executed and the association issued its check for \$1,300.00 payable to the order of Moretz. The check was immediately endorsed by Moretz and returned by him to the secretary of the Association, who delivered it to the conveyancer, Jasiecke, who endorsed it and deposited it to his personal account. The check was paid in due course, Jasiecke turned ever to Moretz only \$195,00, and gave him a statement showing the expenditure of the remainder of the \$1,300.00, one item of expenditure being the payment of the \$900.00 mortgage, which, by its terms was not due for another year. Jasiecke, in fact, had not paid that mortgage but had appropriated all of the \$1,300.00 except the \$195,00 turned ever to Moretz, to his own use. Jasiecke was indicted for embezzlement and larceny of several checks, among them the Moretz checky all of which were alleged in the indictment to be the property of the association. One of the contentions submitted in behalf of Jasiecke was that the proof showed the checks to have been the property of the payers and not the association

substited a bill to them for these services and it was poid by thon, biresine, in the darkecke case, darkecke was paid certain form by the applicants for the leans, for bits services in exemining the little and proporting the papers. These foen generally came out of the presents of the Loane. is. that came Isalecke. Following the method deposited above. put through neveral purely flatitions leans. He also put through neveral of which the fallowing in a type. One Mareta made application to the association for a less of \$1,300.00. He had just bought a please of property on which there was a \$500.00 mortgage and he decired to use the \$1.360.00 in payanolisalist todio alaites can agrestan 00.0000 tada the gal which he had. The property the appraised, the hear was approved, the proper decunents excounted and the association iswand its anest for \$1.360.00 payable to the order of Worels. The check was ideactistely endorsed by herets and returned by him to the secretury of the Association, who delivered it to the conveyancer, Janisaks, who endored it and depented it to bis personal account. The check was paid in day course. Jesisoke turned over to Moretz nely \$190.00, and gave him a statement showing the ounereliars of the comminder of the \$1,300.00, one item of expenditure being the payment of the \$900.00 mertgage, within, by its terms was not due for suction year. Justecke, in Fact, he one setd that wertgage but and appropriated all of the \$1,360.00 except the \$195.00 turned over to Moretz, te his own use. Jarlecke was indicted for ents made and largeny of saveral charles, whom show the Morets encepy all of which were alleged in the indactions on be the preparty of the association. One of the contentions wismitted in behalf of Jastecke was that the proof showed the chaoks to have been the preperty of the payees and not the association

and that in this respect there was a variance between the proof and the allegations of the indictment. held that the checks, including the Moretz check, were still the property of the association although they had been delivered to the payees, endorsed by them and returned to the secretary of the association. The holding in that case was based upon the fact that the sheeks had been returned by the payers for the purpose of insuring the association the payment of the incumbrances then on the property which it was understood were to be removed with the proceeds of the loan, so that the loan being made by the association would be a first lien. Although the situation in the suit at bar is not just that, it is in our epinion similar to it. In the suit at bar the check, after having been received by the defendants and andorsed by them, was returned to the secretary of the Association, Krueger, for the purpose of enabling the defendants to get their money. The check for \$5,000.00 in the hands of the defendants was worthless. Krueger apparently undertook to negotiate it for them and gave them their In doing so, we are of the opinion that he was acting money. within the scope of his authority as the agent of the association. It is frequently the case that the business of Building and Loan associations is conducted largely by some one individual In the Masiecke case, supra, it was one designated as a conveyancer, who was Jasiecke. In the suit at bar it was an officer designated as the secretary, who was Krueger. It is apparent from the record that all the business which the defendants had to do with the association was done through Krueger. As far as they were concerned, he was the Association. When they applied to him for a loan what they were after was their money not a check on a bank in which there were little or no funds to the

and that in this respect there was a variance between the

proof and the allegations of the indicates. The coors held shat the checks, including the north about, sere atill the property of the seneration although they had board delivered to the payers, endorred by them and returned to the moorecary or the accordation. The halding in thet barragen mand had affecte and that trust and more beare are enter by the severe for the surpose of insuring the saveototick the payment of ine industrances then on the property willed to sheepern out his herener of of ever bootsveber car it the loss, se that the ,one being seds by the ass chatter would be a first lies. Althou a the altestion in the cuit at bar in mor junt out, it is in in opinion of the in. IN the sait of her it. though, efter having hear reasing by the cereminate bod andered by them, was returned to the eegretery of the secretary to the jury on the juryone of enablished the defendants to get their morey. The check for \$8,000.00 in the heads of the defendrate see serialees. Ergerer opens. saily under took to regettate to for them and gove them their wordey. In deang so, we are of the uninion that he am notice within the recept of is authority as fee agent of the senectation. It is frequently the core that the business of Building and Leav asaeofations in septic set largely by account individual. In the Assistance same, sunne, it was one denimbed as a norwaysandling was ser st to the sail at twas an officer designated as the equirtary, she sus Srunger. It to no erent from the reserve that all the topinger which the entendents had to do with the executation was done through transfer. As for as they were connerned, he uge to more tried. Shen trey applied to the for a loss what they were efter was their ment a tel mid of check on a bear in which there rere little or no funde to the credit of the Association. And, when, having received such a check, (whether they knew of the situation at the bank was immaterial) and the secretary undertook to negotiate it forthem, he must be held to have been acting not for them but for the Association in the matter of carrying out the transaction on the part of the Association. A building and lean association which vests its secretary with the management and control of its entire business, so as to make him, in effect, a general agent, is bound by whatever he does under that broad authority. The Frairie State Lean and Building Association v. Mubling, 170 Ill. 240.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Master and the Chanceller were correct in finding that the complainant had a lien on the property to the extent of \$2,450.00, only on the second lean.

For the reasons stated, the decree of the Superior Court is modified, by changing that part of the decree which provides for the payment of \$400.00 as solicitor's fees, 80 as to make it provide that defendants are to pay \$200.00 as solicitors? fees, and in all other respects the decree is affirmed.

DECREE MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND C'CONNOR, JJ, CONCUR.

erodit of the Arechation. And, when, beving received each a check, (whother they knew of the utwaiten at the bank was immaterial) and the secretary undertook to regulate it forthem, he must be held to have been noting not for them but for the Ascociation in the matter of currying out the transaction on the part of the Ascociation. A building and lean ensuciation which vests its secretary with the management and central of its entire busineer, on as to make him in effect, a governt agent, is bound by whatever he deer under that broad sutherity. The Egalric State Lean and Building that broad sutherity. The Egalric State Lean and Building

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
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only on the second less.

Ver the reasons stated, the degree of the Superior Court in modified, by charging that next of the degree which provides for the payment of \$400.00 as collaitor's flow, \$9 as to make it provide that defendants are in pay \$200.00 as solicitoral from, and in all other respects the degree is efficient.

DECEMBER MEDIFIED AND APPINED.

TAYLOR AND C'OLUMOS, DV. CONOIS.



MR. FRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant Thomas seeks to reverse a judgment entered against him in favor of the plaintiff.

Richardson & Company, in the sum of \$284.00. The issues were submitted to the court without a jury. The action was one of the fourth class in the Municipal Court of Chicago, for goods alleged by the plaintiff to have been sold to the defendants at their special insistence and request. No service was had on the defendant Hall and he did not appear.

The evidence shows that the defendant Thomas, doing business as the Franklin Desk Company, now and then had a call from customers for goods that he did not carry, but which were dealt in by the plaintiff. He thereupon entered into an arrangement with the plaintiff, whereby he could send such customers to them for the purchase of this line of goods. The defendant Hall was such a customer, and apparently he purchased the goods in question from the plaintiff and they were charged to the defendant Thomas, and this suit was brought to recover the smount involved in that transaction. The

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o. W. Richardson & Schrakk. A derocration.

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APPEAL FOLK

MUSICITAL COURT OF CRICAGO.

CHARLES S. THURAR, doing butiness

Appellage.

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MR. IN SIDING JUNTIES TERRED AND VESTER the applica of the er at.

By this appeal the defendent Thomas aceks to reverse a judyment assert against the factor of the plaintiff.
Hichardson a tempone, in the was of fast, 60. the issues vers authorities to the centre without a jury. The action was one of the fearth clare in the that that the fearth clare, for anticity to be alleged by the pinintiff to be about oold to the defendent standards at their appeals. He service was had on the defendent Hall and he did not appear.

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The defendant hall was such a dustement, not appearably no purchased the goods in quantion from the plaintiff and they water charged to the defendant limit of the sent was brought to receive the amount involved in that transaction. The

claim of the defendant Thomas is that he never suthorized the plaintiff to charge him for the amount of this bill of goods.

In support of the appeal the defendant Thomas contends that the plaintiff failed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence, to the effect that authority was given to charge him for the amount of this bill, nor is it shown that the minds of the parties ever met to that effect. The issue presented, therefore, is solely one of fact.

One McCoy, an employee of the plaintiff, testified that sometime in 1918, he had a conversation with Thomas, in which the latter asked him if it would be possible for him to make an arrangement with the plaintiff whereby the latter would furnish his customers with goods in their line, which he did not carry, and charge these goods to him, giving him a special price or discount, although quoting the regular retail price to the customer. He testified he did not recall the exact words which had been used by them, but that this was the substance of the conversation. He further testified that from time to time thereafter, goods were sold in this way and charged to Thomas, and paid for by him. In connection with the arrangement made with the plaintiff by Thomas, a letter was introduced in evidence, directed to the plaintiff and signed by Thomas, dated August 27, 1918, reading as follows: "Replying to yours of August 20. Our arrangement with your Mr. McCoy, is that we are to have 10% discount from prices you quote to customers we send or take to you. Please see him in regard to this." In connection with the bill of goods in question, another letter was introduced, directed to the plaintiff and signed by the defendant Thomas, dated August 5, 1919, reading as follows: *Please show bearer, Mr. Hall, your line of rugs, quoting him

slaim of the defrance Throne is that he never extinction the plainties to charge him for the securit of this bill of goods.

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In support of the appeal the defendant Thomas contents the plaintiff fulled to prove the case by a prependerance of the entiance, to the effect that authority was given to charge him for the chount of this bill, nor is it shown that the minds of the purties ever set to that effect. The inseprendanted, therefore, is solely one of fact.

the Mailey, mu employee of the plaintiff, tactified that semetime in 1918, he he denversetten with Thomas, in which the latter asked him if it we be presible for him to make an arrangement with the claiming where you are not attent furnish als curpomers on the goods in taris line, which he due not curry, and charge three goods to min. giving him a cycoicl price or direcues, although queting the regular retail priot to the dustamer. He tertified he aid not reanll the exact verds which had keen used by there, but that the une the substance of the comversation. We further testified that from the to time thereafter, goods arts pold in this way and charged to Thomas, sout for by him. In convection sith the errangement unde with the plaintiff by Thomas, a ictime son introduces to suidemon, directed to the praintiff and aightd by Thomas, drind August 27, 1918, reading as thilless: "Replying to prove of Angust 26. for arrongespal astigues Sx. hodoy, in this ha are to have it's discent from praces you wante to conteners we send or take to you. Fleene see him in creard to this." In connection with the bill of you is quantion, sauther latter was introduced, directed to the plaintiff and signed by the defendant Thomas, dated August 5, 1919, sending an Solicus; "Please show hearer, Mr. Mall, your line of rugo, quoting him

our net price and we will add our percentage for handling."

With reference to his arrangement with McCoy, the defendant Thomas testified that the plaintiff gave him a special price in some cases; that they billed the customers themselves, and sent him a 10% commission or discount, as mentioned in his letter of August 27, 1918, and in other cases they billed the goods to him, when he told them to; that whenever he sent a customer to the plaintiff and he asked the plaintiff "the amount of the prices, they would call us or we would call them and tell them whether or not to charge them to us. We never gave them any blanket authority to charge every customer we sent, by any means." He further testified that the first time he knew that this bill of goods, sold to the defendant Hall, had been charged to him was when he received the invoice efor the goods some weeks after they purported to be delivered.

In rebuttal, McGoy testified that whenever Thomas felt he did not want to assume the risk of the account, the plaintiff either collected it or sold it on a cash basis, and where the plaintiff carried the account, Thomas did not receive any commission.

On this evidence, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the finding of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In the letter of August 27, 1918, which the defendant Thomas wrete the plaintiff, in apparent confirmation of the arrangement he had made with the plaintiff's agent, McCoy, he stated that this arrangement was that he was to have 10% discount from prices quoted to the customers he cent the plain-

ear met price and we will add our percentage for handling."

defendent Thomas tentified that the pisintiff gave him a special price to rock dases; that the pisintiff gave him a special price to rock dases; that they hilled the customers themselves, and cant time a log consistion or discount, as mentioned in his letter of August 27, 1918, and in other cases they hilled the mount to him, when he told them to; that whenever he sent a customer to the prices, they could only us or plaintiff the amount of the prices, they could only us or we would only them and tell thee rhether or not to charge them to us. We never may him had not be further tentified every quotemer we sent, by any nears. He further tentified that the first time he knew that this hill of goods, said to that the first time he knew that this hill of goods, said to ceived the involve for the pare ceived the interest of the first they pareceived the involve for the goods rows weeks after they pareceived to be delivered.

In rebuttal, Medley tratified that whomever Themas falt he did not want to acque the risk of the ecount, the plainfiff eitness collected if or moid it on a cash basis, and where the plainfiff operated the account, linear dad ant reserve con commission.

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In the letter of Laguet 27, 1915, which the Lettermits when the parent confirmation of the arrengement has him made with the plaintiff's agent, notor, he winted that this arrangement was the was to have 10% discount from prime quoted to the surveyment has passed to have 10% discount from prime quoted to the surveyment has peak the plain-

tiff. This would certainly imply that the accounts were to be charged to Thomas, who was apparently in turn to collect from his customers on the basis of the regular retail prices quoted to them by the plaintiff. That this was done from time to time in various transactions, which were had after the arrangement was made, is testified to by McCey, and not denied. It would further seem to be clear from the letter of August 5, 1918, referring to the bill of goods sold to Hall. that the defendant Thomas was expecting to collect the amount involved, from Hall, and be charged for the goods as usual by the plaintiff, for he asks the plaintiff to quote Hall "our" (Franklin Desk Co., which was Thomas) pet price: saying further, that the Franklin Desk Co. would, in turn, add their percentage of discount on the goods to be seld, as a charge for handling. Furthermore, it appears that shortly after the sale and delivery of the goods in question to Hall, Thomas received the invoice covering this transaction, from the plaintiff and it nowhere appears that he ever complained of their method of handling this transaction previous to the beginning of this suit a year and a half later, or complained that the amount of the bill was not to be charged to him as he, of course would have if such were the case.

We find no error in the record and, therefore, the judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

JUICHENT AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND O'COMMOR, JJ, CONCUR.

tiff. Take would certainly laply that the accounts were to be charged to thouse, who esparantly in turn to collect rest id a castomera an tie de the castomera and the castomera castat to them by the niminalit. . has this was done from time to time in warrens transportable, which were her after the extensional was ande, is tentified to by heley, and not denied. It routed further ower to be thour from the letter of August 5. 1910, referring to the bill of goods cold to Hell. Insues add Josiles of galionges and esmedi inthe ted add ladi involved, from 'All, and he omenged for the good as usual by the plaintait, for he need the manufall to quote Mall "our" (Franklin Dank . . . with the water terms of the capital further, thet the Frenklis nach has seven, in turn, add their parametera e a alicentrat on the grade to be be alicentrated for mandilage. Fartwragers, it expects that travely after the sale and delivery of the great is guestion to delig theman remention the involce covering that transaction, from the plaintieff and it combines as were that he ever encolained of their naturally of the or protect of the protect of the books. of this will a year and a balf least, or samplained that the www.pi as the ball was not in be charged to ite as he, of COURSE POLICE DARK IN BURN WORD BILD CARD.

is find no error in the treorid and, therefore, the judgment of the transcort of the transcort.

SUMMEN' APPIRED.

TAXLER AND COLUMN R. JJ. SCHOOL.

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215 - 27172

VASILY LILLOSH.

Appellee.

v.

APPEAL FROM

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

VLADIMIR BRASLAVSKY, ET AL doing business as RUSSIAN-AMERICAN BURKAU, et al on appeal of RUSSIAN-AMERICAN BURKAU, a corporation,

Appellant.

227 I.A. 5944

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOUSON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant, Russian-American Bureau seeks to reverse a judgment for \$94.00, recovered by the plaintiff in the Municipal Court of Chicago.

In his statement of claim the plaintiff alleges that his claim is for the sum of \$80.00, mency had and received by the defendant from the plaintiff on September 30, 1917, which the defendant agreed to pay, as per statement and receipt of that date, together with \$14.00 interest. The plaintiff has filed no appearance in this court.

The evidence shows that on the date in question the plaintiff paid \$80.00 to the defendant for the purpose of having this amount forwarded, in rubles, to his wife at some point in Russia. At the time of this payment, the defendant gave the plaintiff a receipt acknowledging receipt of the \$80.00 from him for 440 rubles, to be remitted to his wife at an address designated in the receipt. On the bottom of the receipt there appears the following: "This remittance will be forwarded to the payer named, as per instruction of

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VASILY LILLOSH.

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OF THIOAGO.

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227 I.A. 594"

MR. PERSIDING SUBTION THE MOON delivered the country of the scart.

By this appeal the delendant, Enteriorabler and Bureau socks to reverse to judge out for \$54.00, recevered by the plaintiff in the handelpal fourt of Oblogo.

In his ristancent of claim the plaintiff alleges that his claim to for the plain of party and the claim to for the plaintiff or implember 30.

1917, which the defendant them the claimist or implember 30.

1917, which the defendant cyraed to par, as per at at what and receipt of that dete, together with \$14.00 interest.

The plaintiff has filed as appearance in this court.

The evidence energy that on the date in question the plantiff and \$80.00 to the defendent for the corpress of horing this encount forwarded, in rables, to it wife at now point in Hazela. At the time of this payment, the defendant gave the plaintiff a reselpt admonistable provint of the \$80.00 from him for 460 rubles, to be resisted to the wife at an address designated in the receipt there appears the following: "Tais remittance the receipt there appears the following: "Tais remittance will be forwarded to the payer named, as per instruction of

the remitter, and subject to the rules and regulations of the post offices used in making the remittance. "The plaintiff testified that his wife never get the money. The only witness for the defendant was a young woman who had been employed in the capacity of clerk in its office for some fifteen years. She testified, in effect, that the remittance in question had been forwarded in the usual course of business, through the Russian-American Line, together with a number of other remittances that were to be forwarded at that time to Russia. She identified, and there was introduced in evidence, the original receipt signed by the Russian-American Line, and given for this remittance, to the defendant, and a communication from the Russian-American Line to the defendant, acknowledging receipt of its check for \$998.73, covering a number of money order remittances, including the one in question. There was also introduced the original check referred to the above communication, showing its endorsement by the Russian-American Line and indicating its payment through the Chicago clearing House, Cotober 17, 1917. This witness further testified that in January, 1918, the defendant received a receipt, indicating that the money in question had been turned over to the post office in Petrograd, Russia, by Third document was in the Russian the Russian-American Line. language but the witness apparently interpreted that part of it having to do with this remittance, saying that it referred to the remittance by number, giving the name "M. A. Lillesh" as the one to whom it was to be paid, and the place at which the payment was to be made to her, and the amount, 440 rubles. She further testified that this receipt bore the efficial stamp "Petrograd Post Office" which was the same stamp that had appeared on hundreds of other similar documents that defendant had received from time to time in the past, on similar remittances.

the remitter, and subject to the rules and regulations of the post offices used in making the remittance. "The plaintiff twatified that his wife never get the meney. The only witness for the defendant was a young nomen who had been supleyed in the capacity of clerk in its office for some fifteen years. She testified, in effect, that the remittance in question had been forwarded in the usual sourse of business, through the Russian-American Line, together with a number of other remittances that were to be forwarded at that time to hunsis. The identified, and there was introduced in evidence, the original receipt signed by the Aussian-American Line, and given for this remittomos, to the defendant, and a occuratestion from the Sussian-American Line to the defendant, anknowledging receipt of tin check for \$998.78, severing a number of money order remittances, including the one in question. There was also introduced the original check referred to the above communication, showing its endorsement by the Austian-American Line and indicating its payment through the Chicage elearing Henne, Cotober 17, 1917. This vitness further testified that in January, 1918, the defendant received a receipt, indicating that the money in question had been turned ever to the post office in Petregrad, Kussia, by the Aussian-American Line. This decument was in the Hunsian language but the witness apparently interpreted that part of it having to do with this remittance, eaving that it referred to the remittance by number, giving the name "d. A. Lillosh" as the one to whom it was to be paid, and the place at which the payment was to be made to her, and the emount, 440 rubles, the further testified that this reache bore the official stamp "Petrograd Post Office" which was the mane stemp that had appeared on lundreds of other similar decuments that defendant bud reselved from time to time in the past, on similar remittences.

The issues were presented to the trial court without a jury and the court entered judgment against the defendant for the amount of the plaintiff's claim: apparently, from his remarks, made at the close of the hearing, on the theory that while conditions in Russia had been such as to prevent this remittance reaching the payer, the conditions were known by the defendant at the time it transmitted the money, but, notwithstanding that fact, it had undertaken to do so. The record contains no competent evidence as to whether the conditions in Russia were such as to prevent this remittance reaching the payee, nor that the defendant was aware of any such situation. Furthermore, there is no proof in the record that there was any undertaking on the part of the defendant to deliver or pay this money to the plaintiff's wife. As shown by the terms of the receipt delivered to the plaintiff at the time he paid his money, the only undertaking of the defendant was to forward it as instructed by the plaintiff, such forwarding to be subject to the rules and regulations of the post office used in making the remittance. This indicated clearly that it was in the contemplation of the parties that use was to be made of the post offices in accomplishing this remittance. The evidence submitted in behalf of the defendant, indicates that the amount in question was forwarded by the defendant through the Russian-American Line to the postal authorities at Petrograd, and was received by them there.

Assuming it to have been proven by competent evidence that the plaintiff's wife never received the money in question, the evidence fails to establish the liability of the defendant. It accepted the plaintiff's money and agreed with him to forward it, such forwarding to be according to the terms set forth in the receipt given to the plaintiff, through post office channels. The evidence indicating that the money reached the postal authorities

the trader were presented to the trial deart without a jury and the court entered judgment against the defendant for the smeant of the plaintiff's class; apparently, from Ma remarks, made at the close of the hearing, on the theory that aids approve on we down need bad ainsul at sectification alies remittence meabing the payer, the conditions were known by the defendent outhe time is brenestited the sensy, but, noteithstanding that fact, is had unisthan to do so. The recent anditions of the district of the cartification of the tent time conditions in Russia over toth me to prover this remittance resching the payes, nor and the defens of the warm of any such altuation. furthermore, there as no prouf in the record that there was any skill yay to terkieb of incaneleb die for juny adi no geinsteben money to the plaintiff aufe. As shown by the terms of the receipt delivered to the planciff or the tion be paid int makey, the only undertaking of the defend at say to forest it as the etructes by the plaintiff, such fermariing to be adding to the raiss and regulations of the post of used in asving the tion of the paralles that use each is no me on the past offices in accomplishing this confinence. The evidence submitted in beand to the standard, inclesive to the end to the end to the control of Porwarded by the detending the ago the abstan-American in to the poetal authorities at Petrograd, ean was for a by them three,

Assuming i. 1. have held nearly sompoind artiform that the desiral? or wife over a control in allestics. The wridence for many in appearance the definition. The asseption the billing and appear that it is to for our interesting to be secretary to the terms letted in the receipt for the the character to the control in the receipt that are the the character receipt the secretary research the the control of the relationship.

in Russia, the defendant cannot be held liable, assuming that for some reason, not disclosed in the record, this remittance thereafter vanished or at least never came into the hands of the plaintiff's wife.

The plaintiff having failed to establish any basis of liability on the part of the defendant, the judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed.

JUDGMENT REVERSED.


TAYLOR AND O'CORNER, JJ. CONCUR.

in Mussia, the defendent usaged be held liable, ascending that for some reason, not disclosed in the record, this remittance thereafter vanished or at least never came into the hands of the plaintiff's sife.

The misintiff bewing failed to establish any basis of liability on the part of the defendent, who judgment of the blunistyni Court is reversed.

JUNEAU RUFFRED.

TAYLOR AND O'COMODE, L'J. TURNING.



MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of forcible entry and detainer brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago, by the plaintiff Jones against the defendant Melson. After a hearing the court found the issues for the plaintiff and gave judgment in his favor for possession of the premises involved, to reverse which, the defendant has perfected this appeal.

The defendant was in possession of the premises in question, an apartment, by virtue of a lease in which the plaintiff was the lessor and the defendant the lessee, said lease covering a term expiring April 30, 1921, and providing that the term was to continue from year to year thereafter, unless it should be terminated on the date above mentioned, or any like date in any subsequent year "by the giving by either party to the other of not less than sixty days notice in writing of such termination."

On the trial, the plaintiff submitted evidence to the effect that he addressed a notice in writing to the defendant under date of February 18, 1921, notifying him that his lease

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Appellac.

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kn. FREELTTEC TORITO IMMEN delivered the opinion of the sourt.

This was an action of forcible ontry and detainer brought in the Audioapal Scart of Salacgo, by the plaintiff Jones smainet the defendent Selsen. After a hearing the court found the reases for the plaintiff and gove judgment in alufavor for provincion of the premises involved, to reverse which, the defendant has paricoted till appeal.

The defeatant was an peacevalon of the premises in question, en apartment, by variue of a leane in which the plaintiff who the leseer and the defendant sin lesson, said lease covering a term expiritue toril &, 1921, and providing that the term was to continue from year to year the easter, unless it should be terminated on the date evere mentioned, or any like of wirey radicle of griving and war many inaughaden one ni orah the other of not 'con then winty days notice in writing of such territantions

On the trial, the plaining of sattless orthonoc to the effect that he addressed a critic is writing to the desendant under date of Ferrary 18, 1921, notifying him that his toars covering the apartment in question would terminate on April 30, 1921, and requesting the defendant to deliver up possession of the premises on that date. The notice was signed by the plaintiff as landlord. There was no objection offered to the introduction of this notice in evidence, nor any denial of the receipt of the notice by the defendant. Upon the expiration of the term, on April 30, 1921, the defendant refused to deliver up possession of the premises, whereupon, the plaintiff instituted these proceedings.

It was shown by the record and the supplemental record filed in this court, that in the trial court the defendant took the position that the lease in question had become cancelled by the notice mentioned above, and that insumuch as the tenancy had been terminated, suit for possession could be maintained only under the fourth clause of Section 2 of the Statute on Forcible Entry and Detainer. In proceeding on that theory, the defendant called the plaintiff to the stand and endeavored to show that the title of the property in question was not in the plaintiff alone, but in the plaintiff and his wife. The court then ruled that the defendant was not in a position to question his landlord's title, and proceeded to enter a finding and judgment as above noted.

In his brief filed in this court, the sole point argued by the defendant in support of his appeals iste the effect that the evidence fails to show that the notice provided for in the lease was served upon the defendant sixty days prior to April 30, 1921, or at any other time.

In contending in the trial court that the notice operated to terminate the tenancy, the defendant must be held to have con-

opvering the apertment in question would terminate on April 30, 1921, and requesting the defendant to deliver up peaceasion of the premises on that dute. The notice was signed by the plaintiff as landiord. There was no objection offered to the introduction of this notice in evidence, nor any tenial of the receipt of the notice by the defendant. Upon the expiration of the term, on April 30, 1921, the defendant refused to deliver up possession of the presuses, whereupon, the plaintiff instituted these proceedings.

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In his brief filed in this court, the cole point argued by the defendant in anyport of his eppeals into the effect that the evidence falls to show that the notice provided for in the lease was served upon the defendant sixty days print to April 20. 1921, or at may other time.

In contending in the trial court that the nation sperated to terminate the tenange, the defendant must be half to have con-

v. <u>Wilson</u>, 146 Ill. 384. It has been held repeatedly that an appellant in this court cannot take a position in presecuting his appeal, inconsistent with that taken by him in the trial court.

The proceedings in the trial court involving the contention of counsel for the defendant to the effect that "the lease was cancelled by giving them notice of cancellation were not included in the original bill of exceptions and do not appear in the original transcript of record filed in this court. After the defendant had taken the position disclosed in his brief, as filed in this court, the plaintiff moved the trial court to amend the bill of exceptions by showing the contention made by the defendant in that court, with reference to the notice, and that the motion to amend the bill of exceptions was denied by the trial court. These latter proceedings were incorporated in an additional transcript of the record, which, on motion of the plaintiff, was duly filed in this court. Subsequently the parties to this appeal entered into a stipulation, providing that in all the proceedings in this court the transcript of the record should be taken and considered as consisting of both the original and additional transcripts of record and that the bill of exceptions. as contained in the original transcript should be treated and considered as amended so as to include the subject-matter contained in the additional transcript. That the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the premises in question is abundantly established by the record. It seems equally clear, from the proceedings involved in the case, to which we have referred, that the defendant prosecuted his appeal solely for delay.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Municipal

eeded the proper rerving of the notice upon him. Themesen v. vilson, 146 111, 284. It has been held rependedly that an appellant in this court counct take a position in proceduling his appeal, inconsistent with that taken by him in the trial court.

The proceedings in the trial court involving the enis" fluis forthe ens of smelon Teb and ret features to make and and and erow and is Illegate to solide medically of belleases was sadd meet tauluded in the original bill of exceptions and do not appear in the original transcript of record filed in this court. the defendant but taken the pentition disabosed in bis brief, as filed in this court, the plaintiff werea the trial court to smend the bill of exceptions by showing the contentian main by the defendant in that court, with reference to the netles, and that the metton to assend the bill of asseptions was doubed by the trial court. These latter proceedings sere incorporated in an additional transcript of the record, which, on motion of the plaintiff, was duly fitted in this court. Inbesquently the parties to this appeal entered into a stipulation, providing that in all the proceedings in this court the transcript of the recent chords taken and constdered as countring of host the original and adda-Clonal transcripte of rearrd sai that the bill of exc plique. as contained in the original transcript should be treated and considered as meaded so so to include the subject-matter sontained in the miditional transcript. That the plaintiff man untitled to possession of the pression in quention is abundantly established by the record. It weems equally along, from the procoolings involved is the case, to which we have referred, that the defendent promented his apparel solely for dolay.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the judicagal

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Court is affirmed, and the cost of preparing and filing the additional transcript of the record and the additional abbatract of the record in this court, are taxed as costs against the defendant.


JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND O'CONNOR, JJ. CONCUR.

Court is affirmed, and the nest of preparing and filing the additional transcript of the record and the additional and etract of the record in this court, ere taxed as posts against the defendant.

JULICHERT APPLIERED.

TATION AND C'SCHRON, JJ. CCHCHL.



MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMEON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant seeks to reverse a judgment for possession, recovered by the plaintiff in a preceeding in forcible entry and detainer in the Municipal Court of Chicago.

The issues and all the points involved in this case are identical with those involved in Case No. 27181, in which we are this day filing an opinion. The leases in the two cases covered different apartments in the same building.

For the reasons stated in the opinion referred to, the judgment in the case at bar is affirmed and the costs of preparing and filing the additional transcript of the record and the additional abstract of the record in this court, are taxed against the defendant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

225 - 37182

H. R. ROWS.

Appel lega.

THUS LASISTNER

AFPEAL FROM

OF CREDNOK.

B. MELSOK.

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227 I.A. 595


MA. ARREIDING JUSTICE FEGURER SOllvered the .Junes edi to gettice

Ar this appeal the defendant seaks to reverse a judgment for measuratem, recovered by the plaintiff in a proceeding in feraible entry end detainer in the Manietpal Court of Chineso.

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For the remember states and the the opinion referred to. To size out our beautitie at red is seen our as smoonbut out preparing and filing the acditional transmilyt of the record and the additional abstract of the reacts in this court, are taxed against the defendant.

JUDGESON AVERTURE.



MR. PRWSIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant seeks to reverse a judgment for possession, recovered by the plaintiff in a proceeding in foreible entry and detainer in the Eunicipal Court of Chicago.

The issues and all the points involved in this case are identical with those involved in Case No. 27181, in which we are this day filing an opinion. The leases in the two cases covered different apartments in the same building.

For the reasons stated in the opinion referred to, the judgment in the case at bar is affirmed and the costs of preparing and filing the additional transcript of the record and the additional abstract of the record in this court, are taxed against the defendant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

226 - 27163

R. P. JOHER.

Appalles.

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For the reaces steted in the opinion referred to. the judgment in the case of ter affirms and in costs of preparing and filing in emidicional banacarbi of the record and the additioned abstract of ree record in this court, are .du - notor and leatings bears.

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165 - 27120

A. MOTH, doing business as Publisher's Press.

Appelles.

Appelles.

Appelles.

Appelles.

GEORGE BLUMENSYCCE, individually.

doing business as the Elumensteck

Advertising Service Co..

Appellant.

227 I.A. 595

MR. JUSTICE O'CONNER delivered the opinion of the court.

A. Roth, doing business as the Püblisher's Fress, brought suit against G. Blumenstock, doing business as the Blumenstock Advertising Service Co., to recover for printing done for the defendant. There was a verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor for \$574.21, to reverse which defendant prosecutes this appeal.

are as follows: plaintiff, who was in the printing busimess entered into an agreement with defendant whereby plaintiff was to print 1000 year books of the Lake Michigan Yachting Association. A large part of the printed matter of the
books wasthe same as had appeared in previous editions and for
this the defendant was to furnish the plaintiff the necessary
type and plates. The evidence tends to show that the work
was to be completed and the books delivered by July 1, 1920.
The work was not completed until a month or six weeks later.
The plaintiff's contention is that the reason for the delay
was the failure of the defendant to furnish promptly the
type and plates that he was to provide. The defendant denies

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that there was any such delay. Defendant's position, as we understand it, is that the books were never delivered or tendered to him by the plaintiff and, therefore, he was not required to pay for them. On the other hand, the plaintiff centends that he tendered the books to the defendant but that the latter refused to accept or pay for them.

The evidence tends to show that on or about August 5, 1920, plaintiff had telephone conversation with the defendant requesting some payment on account and advising the defendant that the books were completed; that it was then agreed that the defendant would pay \$375.00 and that plaintiff would deliver 500 of the books for that amount. Thereupen plaintiff took 500 of the books to defendant's place of business, and sent his messenger boy up to defendant's effice with the bill requesting payment of the bill before the books would be surrendered. Defendant refused to pay the bill and stated that he would not take the books. Thereupen the plaintiff took the books back to his shop. The balance of the books were never tendered, and we think any further tender was unnecessary under the circumstances. Later on, by stipulation entered into between the parties, it was agreed that the books be delivered to the Lake Nichigan Yachting Association without prejudice to the rights of the parties. The books were accordingly delivered. It appears further from the evidence that the defendant was to have the books printed and deliver them to the yachting association without charge, for which he was to have the privilege of securing whatever advertising he could to be printed in the book and retain the proceeds.

Evidence offered on behalf of the defendant tends to show that about July 1, 1920, he called the plaintiff on the telephone and inquired if the books were ready, and that thent there was any such hales. Delignment's position, as we want there were noted of a land with the court of the backs were noted of the same at the court of t

despess and so or deal some about a new decrease well B. 1820, History . " the car area occurranted at the car areas and amplementage were permeat an account advicting the defination Source this emit and the state that the series are a state with books that - Bioth Bailed Biother and the control of the Contr विदेशकार्त, तात्रका भी अंत एक केला है। इस हर्तराल पान देश विदेशकी was the second of the second of the second of the second s म्बद्धार महेल करावास्त्र करा है। इस अस्ति मार्गिय कराहरी है वर्षा है। इस एक एक एक एक एक एक BREWING DIE TO BE THE BULL OF TOTAL TEN CHORN OF I'VE THE SHARE on this boses for little the ten or proper some form. I and object would not being the sound and a second this start it and ชมระการ และ เรียกกับเกราร การ การกราช ขนาย เขาสาราชาว นาย การาชากับเรียกรั้ง कुष - पर प्राप्त कुरूर प्राप्त प्रकार प्रवर्तन कुरूर शिव अस्वर्तन कर प्राप्त अस्ति । कुरूर स्वर्तन के स्वर्तन water the otherwise content of a repeated and relative we go all to be a considerate marketers and beautiful estate and an beautiful indian to live fit her of the second brooks very recephingly delivered. It is next fartler to the established that the age ය ව යන දෙන දෙන දෙන වන වන නියේන දෙන වනියේන් යන්දී ලෙනන් යේ සහම එසන්ස්ත්රීම් grad it intim strong and the transfer of the medical te bere that is the state of participants, with the compartment to programme anyone, and minimum was found and as head the

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he was informed that they were not on account of plaintiff's inability to produce dertain paper and material; that several times thereafter he called and made the same inquiry; that about the first week in August plaintiff called the defendant and requested the payment of \$300.00 on account and stated that the books were finished; that shortly thereafter defendant colled at plaintiff's place of business and found that they were not finished. Defendant further testified that he did not refuse to accept the books and that he was not in his place of business when plaintiff and his messenger boy called there to deliver the books.

Defendant contends that the finding of the jury is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We think the evidence above set forth and other evidence in the record warranted the jury in finding as they did for the plaintiff, and in these circumstances, of course, we are not at liberty under the law to disturb the verdict.

The judgment of the Municipal Court of Chicago is affirmed.

AFFIREED.

THOMSON, P.J. and TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

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193 - 27149

JOHN MILTON GLIVER.

Appellee.

APPRAL PROM

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

DOLLIE F. LEITCH and CLIVE LEITCH.

Appellants.

227 I.A. 595

MR. JUSTICE O'COHNOR delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendents to recover the balance due on a promissory note for \$2432.68 dated March 16, 1917, payable to Harry S. Mecartney on or before six months after date with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, on which note \$1,000.00 was paid September 26, 1917. Defendants were the makers of the note. Plaintiff claims the note as assignee for value before maturity. To plaintiff's amended statement of claim the defendants filed an amended affidavit of merits. which, on mation of plaintiff, was stricken from the files. Defendants thereupon elected to stand by their amended affidavit of merits and they were defaulted. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount due on the note, tegether with interest thereon, amounting to \$1812.93, to reverse which defendants prosecute this appeal.

Plaintiff's amended statement of claim set up the execution and delivery of the note by the defendants; that they had paid \$1,000.00 on account of plaintiff, who was the owner of the note, having received the same before maturity from the payee thereof, Harry S. Mecartney. The amended statement of

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133 - 27149

JOHN MILLYON CLIVER.

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227 I.A. 595

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Mecariney to represent them in a certain condemnation proceeding pending in the Circuit Court of Cock County; that
in that matter there was \$5500.00 belonging to defendants
deposited with the Clerk of the Circuit Court and that
Mecariney had filed a petition claiming a lien on that fund
for his fees; that the defendants here answered the petition and that after the hearing of that matter by the Circuit Court, that court entered judgment which found that the
defendants had paid Recariney on account of services rendered \$4569.06, of which \$2136.38 was each and the balance,
\$2432.68, was evidenced by the note in suit here. In that
case the Circuit Court found that Recartney was entitled to
\$7,000.00 attorney's fees, and he was given a lien for
\$2430.94 on the \$5500.00 deposited with the clerk of the court.

The defense set up in the amended affidavit of merits was that when Medartney was employed by the defendants here to represent them in the condemnation suit he was paid a retainer of \$300.00, and that he agreed to mait the cutcome of the suit for the balance of his fees which were to be reasonable; that before the condemnation suit was completed he demanded further fees on account of services readered, and stated in substance that if he was not paid some additional fees he would withdraw from the condemnation case. and in these circumstances the note in question was given to Mecartney on account of services; that they had been everreached in the matter. It was further set up as a defense that there was no consideration for the note and that a fee of \$10,000.00 had been paid by the railroad company, which was seeking to condemn defendants' property in the Circuit Sourt proceeding, to the defendants for attorney's fees in that case; that the same was deposited by the railread comPagartagy to represent them is a certain continuation proPagartagy to represent them is a certain continuation proeveding pending in the limit tout to the foot fourigy that
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pany with the clerk of the Circuit Court. The affidavit further set up that the plaintiff was not a <u>bona fide</u> owner of the note, but that he was cognizent of all the facts, he being a partner of Mecartney. Other matters are stated, which we think it is unnecessary to mention here, as they in no way effect the decision of the case.

Plaintiff contends that the judgment must be affirmed because there is nobill of exceptions in the record showing the motion to strike defendants' amended affidavit of merits from the files, nor the reason of the court for sustaining that motion, and in support of this the case of Harmon V. Callahan, 207 Ill. App. 506, and other cases, are cited. That case was reversed by the Supreme Court of this State and is reported in 286 Ill. 59. The order of the court in striking the affidavit of merits shows that the defendant elected to stand by its affidavit, and thereupon, and as part of the same order, the Municipal Court defaulted the defendants for want of an affidavit of merits and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on his statement of claim. And the argument in plaintiff's brief clearly shows beyond question that the reason for the court striking the afficavit of werits from the files was that it stated no legal defense. In other words, the court treated the motion as a demurrer, and in these circumstances, of course, no bill of exceptions was necessary. Bermon v. Callahan, 286 Ill. 59.

The defendants argue that the judgment of the Circuit Court establishing Mecartney's lien on the \$5500.00 deposited with the clerk of that court was appealed from by them and that the matter was pending in this court. Since the briefs in the instant case were filed here we have decided that case #

pany with the close of the Carolla lears. The affidants further are up that the limits we set a least lide owner of the note, but that he we commissed of his the facts, he being a partner of Mecerophy. Gener entione are sixted, which we think it is anneaucaty or mention here, as they in so may effect the decines of the care.

Plaintiff contemns than the Judewith much to affirmed because there is noted a of exceptions in the reneral showing the motion to strike defendant amended uffices of notice of from the files, not the respens of the near for matching in aperial? To many out at it to groupen at ban . wolling test Calladag. 267 111. App. 308, and gener ceser, are ulted. st han every elit 's truet empress, will be those that a extent reported in 286 ill. 29. The order of the curt in scribing the efficients of verte above that the definitions to without by ite affilentit, and therefor, one as part of the and the second of the state of the second second of the se Torsi at the subject burning the estimate to diametic me in Same of plaintiff on his rists out of clein. and the argument in giantiff's hide alough access to be and the matter a track the reason for the stark raliating one of the other vertes from the faller was that it elekad on lound defende. In ather yours, the ocure treated the meeter us a docurrer, and is there stroyanterest. .90 .: (1 08G . Kada (107

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and have held that Medartney was entitled to a lien on the \$5500.00 to the extent of \$2230.94.

The record before us slearly shows that in the Circuit Court proceeding, where Mecartney's fees were fixed at \$7,000.00, defendants were given credit for the amount of the note in suit, and having been given credit for it in that case, they could not new, of course, ask credit for it again, as they are in effect seeking to do here. But counsel for defendants seems to argue that if the note were not paid it was Mecartney's fault that he did not pay it out of the money in the hands of the clerk of the Circuit Court. The money in the hands of the clerk was deposited there for the defendants here and Mecartney would not be sutherized: to apply it toward the payment of the note without the consent of the defendants, since it was their money. The defendants having been given credit for the amount of the note in the Circuit Court, they cannot in this preceeding be heard to may that the note was given without consideration.

The judgment of the Sunicipal Sourt of Chicago is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THOMSON, P.J. and TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

and have bulk their despring four extitled to a lien on the

The record before we alwards enoug that in the direct tourt preceeding, where 'construct's then some fired as \$2,660. So, dalar aute week given eredit for the emetiet of the ante in wit, and neving been given eredit for it in these case, they devid not every of course, ask tract fin is a city of the city of the section to the section of the erow elon uni li inni angua ni naves standarette tet Lagando wet padd is wes decemberly a fault that he did not pay it sub of the meney is the beads of the clark of the Circuit Court. The menor in the heads of the clean were teneraled thory for or boxinged we be son thus generally one and wanting to and spring it toward with necessity of the color without the connect of the defendante, since it was their eases. The 's real otts and all each and to ammone and any dibers nevip more united Circuit Court, then a whit in this ornereding be and to only inthinia inne firetin with, age tion one indi

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IMARIA, P.J. such that, J. W. Wille.

ACME PATRILEUS COMPANY.

Appellee.

Appellee.

APPRAL FROM

MUNICIPAL SCURT

OF CHICAGO.

Appellant.

Appellant.

MR. JUSTICE 6 CONNOR delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recever damages slained to have been sustained by reason of the defendant's breach of a contract entered into between the parties. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and there was a finding and judgment in plaintiff's favor for 91710.00. to reverse which defendant prosecutes this appeal.

227 I.A. 596

written agreement May 14, 1920, whereby plaintiff sold 12 carleads of Big Heart Gas Cil to the defendant for 10¢ per gollon,
the cil to be shipped by plaintiff to defendant upon the latter's
furnishing shipping instructions not later than the 25th day of
any month preceding the month of shipment. The contract further
provided that one car was to be shipped in May, two in June,
two in July, two in August, two in September, and one each in
the months of October, November and December; all of the shipments to be made on or before December 31, 1920. The evidence
shows that eight of the cars were delivered and paid for, and
they are in no way involved in this suit. On November 20, 1920,
four of the twelve cars had not been shipped, and on that date

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defendant wrote plaintiff that it had then on hand sufficient gas oil to operate its plant for the next four months, and notified plaintiff that it would not need the car which was to be delivered in December, nor would they need "the three cars whose shipment has now been lapsed." This letter was received by the plaintiff on November 22, 1920, and on that date plaintiff replied stating that the delay in shipping the three cars was caused by the defendant, and suggesting that the defendant take the remaining four cars. On December 1 defendant replied to this letter that it considered the contract to mean that the mathree cars had lapsed and only the December car remained, and they notified plaintiff again that they did not wish the December car. Other correspondence passed between the parties, but defendant refused to take any more of the oil, and this suit was brought.

The contract provided, inter alia, for the shipment of the twelve cars by the plaintiff to the defendant upon the latter giving shipping directions as above stated, and further provided "If during any month Buyer's plant will not sonsume gallonage above specified, Buyer shall notify Sellers in writing ten days prior to the first day of such month, and Sellers shall not be obligated to ship nor Buyer obligated to accept such quantity for said month. * * * Each shipment hereunder to constitute a separate transaction and lapse of any one or more shipments for any of the cuases herein allewed shall not cancel this contract as to other shipments, but the Sellers shall not be required to ship, nor the Buyer obliged to receive oil to cover the shipments which have so lapsed."

The defendant contends that since it had received but eight cars of the oil, the last one during November, that

defending wrate plaintiff that it has then on hand sufficient gas oil to operate its plant for the next four mouths, and netified plaintiff that it would not need the ear which was to be delivered in lecember, nor sould they need "the three cars where ahipment has now been lapsed." Rid letter was received by the plaintiff on Nevember MR, 18M, and on that date plaintiff replied stating that the delay is shipping the three cars was counse by the colondart, and suggesting that the three cars have the remaining four sers. On because I defendent replied to this letter that it couriered the content to mean that the filter that it couriered the content of reseived, and three cars had layed and only the December out reseived, and three cars had layed and only the December out wish the December Char correspondence passed between the sarties, but defendent refused to take any more of the soft his suit was brought.

The desire ours by the 'pisted align, ior the obtained of the testre ours by the 'pistedia' to the defendant upon the latter giving shipping directions as shows rivied, and further provided "if curing any month Buyer's plant will cot consume gallonege above specified. Swyer shall notify deliers in writing test days prior to the days prior to be chilgeted to sing mer dayer obligated to accept such not be chilgeted to sing mer dayer obligated to accept such quantity for sels worth. * * * Grow mithment heresists to censititie a separate transmetter and lapse of may one or ware shipsents for any of the cusaes berein alleged wholl not senvel this sentence on to tester shipsents of the cusaes berein alleged and related by the feature of the cusaes shipsents of the cusaes obliged to reside pil not be required to ship, nor the Suyer obliged to reside pil no sever

The defendant suntends that since it had recrived but eight cars of the oil, the last one during Europer, that

on November 20 when it wrote the letter above mentioned, the delivery of three of the four remaining cars had lapsed and, therefore, plaintiff was not obligated to deliver and defendant was not obligated to receive these three cars. And since on November 20 defendant notified plaintiff that it would not require the December car, and this being ten days before the first day of December, it was not obligated to take that car, and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to recover any sum.

We think this result is not in accordance with the terms of the contract quoted. For it is expressly provided that if the defendant's plant would not consume the gallonage specified, then the defendant might give plaintiff notice in writing ten days prior to the first day of the month, and if this were done, and the fact was that defendant's plant would not consume such gallousge, then the defendant would not be required to take such car, and the delivery of that car would be considered as lapsed under the terms of the contract. there is no contention that the defendent gave any such notice until Movember 20, and, therefore, under the contract, the delivery of the three cars had not them lapsed. As to the December car, the notice was mailed on November 20, 1920, but was not received until November 22. This was not ten days before the first of December, and consequently the notice was insufficient to relieve defendant of the obligation to take the December car. This being the construction we place on the contract it is obvious that the evidence offered on behalf of the defendant tending to show that it had purchased no oil from any other concern and that it had sufficient oil for its plant, could in no way effect the result of the suit. So that the exclusion of any evidence offered tending to sustain this contention of the defendant was not error.

en deventer 20 when it wrote the letter above entirned, the delivery of three of the four resulting the hud lapsed and. tearefore, plaintiff was of obligated to deliver and deliver and delived and stree of antiverse to the stree of the stree of the stree of the stree of the defendant as notified plaintiff that it waid not require the the teamber as and this team days terura the first day of December, it was not obligated to recever any and, therefore, obstitiet was not entitled to recever any and.

est title encepaceae of den of dieser eits waitt es terms of the contrast queted. Her it is exernestly provided one if the defendant's plant in all not enterme the following approfiled. Were the defendant where give plantiff notice in watering ton days prior to the sees my of the numb, and if basin Juney to specifical sous and sue out but which make alms set on a secondary to as a manufaction of a manufaction of the regulation to take which tor, and the to ire to the to the beat of be novalisted as laured under the true of the contract. Sat there is no reaction that here seemed by the contract of the and the same of the tallett and the contract the delivery of the three east too to the land of to the the simi . That , the reference is a final for any of the reference was not constend take! "eterber be. Bis met ten den before the fire or anamer, on occasionaly on actes and invitte amen of education abiling tide of a content over in or device. שוד פעד. ווכח ייתנדת נמי כנפי כ המנבר אם ומים כת נו. ייתנדת כם केंद्र केंद्र केंद्र रहा दे हैं के उपकेशाना स्वार्थिक से तह अधारियां के तह केंद्र केंद्र केंद्र केंद्र केंद्र units of any art fin on reachbourg and all food works as guithmed fine de asion, see the anistential in the announced no may affect the result of the oute. So that a section of to notification of it related to entitle the content of the defections was not error.

The evidence shows that on November 24, two days after plaintiff had received defendant's letter of Mevember 20 refusing to accept the four remaining cars, the plaintiff sold the cil. Other evidence was introduced showing the market price of similar oil on December 1, 1920, as tending to show the amount of plaintiff's damages. Defendant contends that even if it was required, under the terms of the contract, to accept the remaining four care, the judgment is wrong because plaintiff. in its statement of claim, alleged that it was ready, able and willing to deliver the cil, and that the evidence shown that it was not able to make delivery because it sold the oil on November 24. There is some argument whether the contract was breached on November 20 or on December 1. or a few days later. While plaintiff, after receiving the letter of Nevember 20, endeavored to induce the defendant to accept the remaining cars, yet we think it was at liberty to treat the contract as terminated on November 20, in accordance with defendant's letter of that date. This being true, the evidence is sufficient without considering any other in the record, to show that plaintiff was ready, able and willing to deliver the oil as it alleged in its statement of claim.

The judgment of the Municipal Court of Chicago is affirmed.


AFFIRMED.

THOMSON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

the ovince oue of that or dovember is, the unit Today of to the the control of the and the safe to the control of MC refuging to accept the four residing cars, the limite? mold and the chira other are they thered and enough the course met orten of similar oil on Contends i, less, so tenth, to sher the emount of district a da ages, befordent continues that even if it was corushed, means the ter es es to convers. wed among the remain of the section of the areas and agence of some claiming fr. in the course of claim, willing once man trady, while in, william to allyer the eil, one that the named at the second of the second and the second acceptant radiced from the companies, the safety of the rate of te if godgen in it is is in the to the sections of god tealing to eff thire is double, after prong the labler a fen doys later. age on as annument has never to never be against of le the remaining - re, and elected a cold, rety to the the contract of ter uneces in a passers . A secondard all deren, at's letter of t. t. w. v. v an true, ti vidence es at locks this as we so gen getters the first same silling as complete it may the property and one of the termination and

The judgment of the far early of the highest

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MR. JUSTICE C. CORNOR delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover the purchase price of thread sold by it to defendent.

There was a trial before the court without a jury and a finding and judgment in plaintiff's favor for \$507.55, to reterms which defendant prosecutes this appeal.

the thread to plaintiff's salesman upon the express agreement that the thread would be similar in quality to a sample which the salesman exhibited; that upon receipt of the thread it was examined and found to be inferior to the sample and so defective that it could not be used by the defendant. Thereupon defendant, in accordance with its agreement with plaintiff's salesman, returned the thread to plaintiff. In other words, defendant's contention is that the sale was by sample and since the goods did not correspond to the sample and were properly returned to plaintiff. The thread appears to have been lost in transit and it does not appear that either party ever recovered possession of it.

Plaintiff's position is that it sold "Old Reliable" thread to the defendant; that that kind of thread was deliver-

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227 I.A. 596

MR. JUBIICS C'OURMER delivered the cultion of the court.

Plaintiff brought mult systmet defendant to recover the extellenc price of thread sold by it to defendant. There was a trial before the court without a turn and a finding and judgeant in plaintiff's lavor for \$507.55, to re-Terms which defendent paragoutes this appeal.

Rofendant's newtiles is that it save as order for the threat to plaintiff's sale mean upon the express surrement that the thread woods be similar in quality to a sample which the selemmn exhibition and their secure of the thread it was exemined and found to be inverter to the secula and no defective time it and de uses by the astendant. Thereupon defendant, in accordance with the agreement with plaintiff's eslaumen, returned the thread to plaintiff. In other words, defendent's centention is that the cale was by semple one cine class of the net correspond to the sample and sere properly retarned to plaintiff. The thread appears to have been lost in transit and it does not appear that either party ever recevered pessension of it.

Paldetist's position is that it sold "Old Helichie" thread to the defendant: that that kind of thread was delivered and that the sale was not by sample. The court found in fever of the plaintiff and thereby sustained plaintiff's contentien that the sale was not by sample. Defendant contends that this finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff to maintain his case introduced the deposition of the sulesman who took the order for the thread, and twelve letters which afterwards passed between the parties. The calcaman testified that he called on defendant at its place of business in Chicago en or about June 2, 1920, and talked to Harry Gordon, the secretary and treasurer of defendant, for the purpose of selling thread; that Gordon saked him "What is the price of the thread we bought from you last time?" and that the witness replied that if defendant would buy a quantity of about 200 tubes, he would give a special price of \$2.50 per tube; that plaintiff could make this price on a large order because he would save express charges in shipping the thread. He further testified that Gordon replied, "Well, that price will suit me. You can ship me 200 tubes of 'Old Reliable' thread, size No. 70/2 ply.": that no thing was said at that time about a sample and that he did not exhibit a sample sithough he had one with him; that he had on a prior occasion sold defendant an order of "Old Reliable" thread and that on that occasion he had shown the semple to defendant. This deposition was taken in New York City. There was no oress-examination. The twelve letters that passed between the parties were then introduced by the plaintiff. The first dated June 2, 1920, from the plaintiff to the defendant states that plaintiff had entered the order for "200 tubes Ho. 70/2 ply, black milk finish, 12,000 yds. Old Reliable @ \$2.50" and that they would endeaver to get it forward by

od and that the sale and not by sample. The court found in force of the plaintiff's contantion that the sale was not by cample. Defendant contants that the sale we not by cample. Defendant contants that the fate finding is similar the camples wright of the evidence.

Plaintiff to amining his care introduced the deposition of the salesses are teck the erder for the thread. and traine letters with afternords nesent between the parties. The releasing tentifies twee he called on terestant at its place of buckmen it thiospu on se about June 2, 1920, and talked to Marry Jerdon, the recretary and treasurer of defendent, for the purpose of sailing thread; that borden sered him "Mant is the prior of the thread se bought from you leat time?" and that the witness regited that if devendant world buy a questity of about 200 water, he would give a special price er 62.50 per tube; thet gialutiff oc.14 mar - this gries on a will al section organize of as office of aspect tebro entail ping the thread. He furence tout tied then dunded regulad. "Well, that price will said no. For our cate no 200 tubes ef '016 Belieble' thread, also no. 76/h ply."; that mething exe for bit and fault one algume a frost suit fault for bine are no bad an sauge of the tand one out of the sale of the sauge a side a prior escapion and defendant an erd of the deliable" thread and that an tract a by try maps the rulle to Auffendant. This dopost tages nor releas in our loit Till. There was so oreservanteeling. The tealy a letters that pas on one traces the pertire were them introduced to the plantiff. The first dated dare B. 1820, from the plaintiff to the nertant minimum that plaintiff has entered the ord : for 'Son whee So. 70/2 ply. block silk finish, lf. . CO yes. Che Belismile # 92.60" and that they would embender a got it forward by

express within ten days. The letter further stated that "If the above description is not correct, please notify us at ence," as the order could not be canceled or changed after being placed in the process of making except for plaintiff's fault. On June 25 defendant wrote plaintiff stating that it had returned by express 263 tubes of thread "which we can't use because the thread is not satisfactory. We have tested one speel and found we could not use it. " To this plaintiff replied on June 25 that he could not understand any "sherteening that may have occurred to the goods we shipped you, to our records they were perfect. We await the arrival of the case for our inspection and will replace the same." On August 16 plaintiff wrote defendant that the thread which defendant had returned had not as yet been received, and spoke about filing a claim against the express company. To this letter defendant repied on August 23 stating that it had a not received the goods back or heard from the express company. On September 8 plaintiff wrote defendant that he had been notified by the express company that defendant had received the goods on June 16; that defendant had written a letter to plaintiff on June 23 advising plaintiff that it had returned 203 tubes of thread, but that plaintiff did not receive any part of this, and stating that it was defendant's duty to file a claim against the express company for this lost merchandice; that plaintiff had endeavored to locate it without success; that defendant was responsible to plaintiff for the goods and that it should file its claim with the express company for the less. On September 24 plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment, and on October 1 it again wrote defendant asking for payment. On October 9 defendant wrote plaintiff acknowledging receipt of demand for payment and calling attention to defend-

sads before radical rested adl . anab not abitin anarque "If the chore describility is not entreet, please notify we at once," as the order could not be conceled or changed after sillinially tot leaven garries to encount out to bushing poled fault. On June 22 defendent wrote claimiliff atating that it had returned by express 200 tobes of throad "which we can't wes become the thread is not antisfactory. We have tested one speek sad forme we early not use it. " To this plainthe tendenteens and bluce of sads do ent on taligon 1115 sherteening that may keve consured to the goods os shipped you, to our receptat they nore perfect. He swaft the efficient the case for our faceparian and will coulines the came." Co August it pinintiff crow defendent that the throad wilch defendent had returned has not an fut ween received, and spoke about filter a civil spanet the sagress company. To this letter defend out reblad on August 28 centing that it had s pot received the woods hack or heard from the america dempany. on Meytomber & plaintiff and to defeath the the had been dottfirst by the empress company that defendant had recovered the goods on June 18; that defendent just william a latter of plaintiff on June 63 advisor claim 17 that it has the manufacture of 205 tubes of thread, hat the claimist it dono receive any part of this, and stabling that it was determent's duty to file a disim meningt the express compacy for this lest more regarder; that plaintiff had madenous to isomes it withing sugarous; bem whose and wor Thistitals as widdensquer and function beds that it should fill the night with the argings reapery for the lors. On September 24 plaintiff orete defici ou demoiding mai grides smann tes esemp ninge si i medetal an han ameneng payment. On Cotober O Antondank wises glaineiff admoving receipt of demand for payment and calling ettention to defendant's letter of June 23d, which would explain defendant's position. On October 11 plaintiff replied again asking for payment, to which defendant replied on October 23 that it had taken the matter up with the express company and would let plaintiff knew of the result. On January 10, 1921, plaintiff wrote that it had complied with defendant's request of the 7th inst. by sending a duplicate invoice to the express company at Chicago.

Harry Gordon, secretary and treasurer of defendant company, testified that in the early part of June, 1920, plaintiff's salesman called at defendant's place of business in Chicago and showed them some thread; that the witness stated that he could not buy the thread because "It doesn't work": that he could not use the thread because it was not satisfactery: that the salesman showed him a sample and told him to test it and that if the thread was not satisfactory and the same as the sample, it could be returned, as had a prior quantity which plaintiff had sold defendant on another occasion. The witness then testified that he had one of defendent's employes, Marry Simon, test the cample and it was found satisfactory; that he then have the salesman the order, and that afterwards when the thread was received the opened part of it and again had Simon test it and it was found to be "knotty" and straggly and could not be used; that thereupon he took the thread to the express company to be sent back to plaintiff in New York City. This witness is correborated by his brother as to what mok place at the time the order was given to the salesman, and by Barry Simon as to the testing of the sample and of the thread when it was delivered to defendant to the effect that it was knotty and could not be used.

and a letter of time 23d, which we ld explain defendant's pastion. On detected ly ininital realist again easing for pastion, to waite defendant replies on detector 13 that it had taken the waiter up with the company and relia to planes the mental image of the result. On demany it, 1911, plonntial replies to the complete of the 7th inch it had compiled the defendant's request of the 7th inch it had compiled the involve to the expression respons we release.

Karry Gergon, regretary and treasurer of defendant company, tentified tent in the carry part of June, 18at, plaintiff's unitement ealing at defendant's place of business in Chienge and mewed then some thread; that the witness stated there a transport all manered became one you and blunc and said operation can now it savened beared and son clove of infi of mid firs one of work a will prompts man fan and iens ivid ndy has great Childes for any baseds and Il fund bas of feet some as the complet it sould be consened by the correct The state of the plaintiff and only tent touch on anether cooper ton. The without a then the attract that he have now or defendant's employes, Marry Simon, test the engils and it was town entilefactory; that an thee mave am entermen the erder, and that afternards when the through our received the opened part of it and analy inc. Then tert it and it was found to on "broity" Near ad Kongunyou's lad; to a not led bloom on hillagarise has the thread to the express coapan to be east back to plate. the the section of the attition is notification to and the section by mary than add amis and standing how draw as an endinged ald given to the microun, and by Marry himm as to the freing and the security and the thread when it was called the car Tandant to the effect test it was becity and our' - not be used.

The witness Harry Gordon further testified that he had been using thrend in his business for eixteen years, and in speaking of the prior sales of thread by plaintiff to defendant
which was discussed at the time the sale in question was made,
he testified: "He sold me eld reliable thread - and it was
returned * ** The eld reliable I sent them back first because it wasn't satisfectory to me; it is breaking; it
slips and it breaks, and they gave me a receipt for it."
Later on he testified concerning the order in question:
"Q. Did he say snything about the old reliable? A. He was
supposed to give me L.Z. I don't know snything about old
reliable. I don't know snything about it in the order. * * *
L.Z. thread was supposed to be sold. THE COURT: Who said
that? THE WITHERS: The salesman. I don't know snything
about old reliable; I never heard that word before."

We have set forth the substance of all the evidence in the record and after a careful examination of it we are unable to say that the finding of the court to the effect that the sale was not by mample is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In these circumstances we carnot under the law disturb the judgment. A consideration of the evidence shows that the order was placed about June 2, and this was confirmed by the plaintiff by letter at about that time; that when defendant returned most of the goods on June 23 1t wrote plaintiff that they were not entisfactory, and in the other correspondence that passed between the parties nothing is maid to indicate that the sale was by sample. This seems significant because if the sale had been by sample it would have been the natural thing for the defendant to have objected to the goods on the ground that they did not correspond to the sample. The first time this question appears was when

The witness darry forden threher traified that he had been seing thread in the business for exteen years, and in speak-ing of the prior onless of thread by plaintiff is defendant which was discussed at the time the cale in the filter was made. he testified; "He seld as eld reliable thread - and it run returned * an The eld reliable I cant took hack first because it was it was it was it was it to breaking; it sains it was it breaking; it sains to heaven, and to the time of an it to breaking; it sains or to be sain to the silled concerning the erder in question; later on he testified concerning the erder in question; and to the test to deal thing about the say saything about the substitute. I den't have anything about old reliable. I den't have anything about old that? The old the say anything about the test of the sain said that? The withing the call that?

We have not firth the achainment of the evidence in the record and after a several anathen of it we are unship to say that the finding a the court to an affect thus the sale was not by eaunty in appear the souther weither weight of the evidence. In these circomotaness se as well ander the law distant the judament. . . anguitant of the water derice shows that the ender one places their type i, and this was confirmed by the claimfiff by letter at whele that themp the established telegraph and the tension of the section of the se weets olaintiff that they were not cateafactory, and in the other correspondence that grand between the particular nothing to maid to indicate that the cale was by sample. This seems significant because if the sets had bred by sample . I would invo been the entered thing for the deformer, to have objectwd to the great en the ground that they did at correspond to the sample. The first time this question appears was shon

the defendant filed its affidavit of merits.

Since we are unable to say that the finding of the court is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the judgment of the Eunicipal Court of Chicago must be affirmed.

AFFIREED.

THOMSON P. J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

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court is against the manifest weight of the swidence, the sudgment of the Existingal Court of Chicago must be affirmed.

JERNIUMA.

THOMBON F. J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

MR. JUSTICE C'CONBOR delivered the epinion of the court.

Hyman Epstein, a minor, by his next friend, brought suit against S. Karpen & Bros., a corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained by him. A demurrer was sustained to his smended declaration. He elected to stand by the declaration and the suit was dismissed at his costs, to reverse which he prosecutes this appeal. The only question for decision, therefore, is whether the smended declaration stated a cause of action.

In each count of the declaration it is alleged that plaintiff was a minor under the age of 21 years; that on August 16, 1917, the defendant was possessed of a certain manufacturing establishment and had therein certain machinery for the purpose of manufacturing furniture; that on July 1, 1917, plaintiff applied to the defendant for employment in the manufacturing establishment during vacation; that defendant agreed to employ him in the office of such establishment; that when plaintiff went to work he was not put to work in the office but was put to work packing boards taken from the back of a

WHAN SPITTIN, a ciner by Amoa Rottnin, bis Inthus so a next friend,

Appellant.

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MR. MUSELGE C'OC SHOW Collysred the opinion of the court.

Hyman Egstein, a siner, by his next friend, brought out agrical it. Sarper & Brow. a corporation, to recever dennges for personal injuries elamed to have been surfained by him. A denurser was subtained to his sampled declaration. He elected to stand at his seated to receve the class and the suit was distributed at his caste, to reverse which he procedutes this appeal. The only susceins for declaration; therefore, is shother the sampled declaration stated a cause of series.

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machine, which was without his or his parents' consent; that after having worked at this employment for a number of weeks, on August 6, 1917, he was ordered to work at a dangerous eachine by one of the foremen; that such employment was dangerous and one at which a minor was by statute forbidden to work; that he was, therefore, illegally employed contrary to the statute and was not within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and while so employed he was severely injured.

As we understand counsel for plaintiff's argument, it is that the court sustained the demurrer to the amended declaration because it did not state the age of the minor, and, therefore, did not state a cause of action, but that plaintiff's remedy, if any, was under the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the Compensation Act does not apply where minors are illegally employed.

tion that both parties were engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation within the menning of section 3 of the Compensation Act.

Bection 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that a minor who is legally permitted to work under the laws of the State is considered an employe and is bound by the provisions of that Act. It follows, therefore, that if plaintiff was legally employed, his remedy would be under that Act and he would have no action at common law. In the declaration it is alleged that plaintiff was employed contrary to the provisions of the statute of this State, but nowhere is it pointed out in the brief or argument that statutes were being thus violated. But from defendant's brief we infer that the contention of plaintiff was that he had been employed contrary to the provisions of Section 20, Ch. 48, R.S., known as the Child Labor Act. That act provides that no

machine, which was sithout his ur his parents' occaent; that after haring worked at this supleyment for a number of wooks, on August 6, 1917, he was ordered to rork at a dangerous machine by one of the formum; that such supleyment was dangerous and one at which a winer was by atertite forbidded to work; that he was, therefore, illegally employed contrary to the cintute and was not within the provinters of the Workear's Componention and was not within the provinters of the Workear's Componention Ast, and while we employed he was neverely injured.

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remedy, if any, one under the Foreman's Compensation act; that
the Componention act does sot mapty where almost are illegally
compleyed.

See think it close from the singustions of the declaration that beth partion were engaged in an extra-hazardous conupation within the meaning of section 3 of the Compensation Act.

Bestion 5 of the fortheen's Compensation Act provides that a since
who is legally permitted to work under the last of the liets is
considered an employe and it beand by the provisions of that Act.

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fitute, hat newhere is it pointed out in the brief or organent
what statutes were being thus violated. But from defendant's
brief we infer that the contention of plaintiff was that he had
brief we infer that the content of outlon St. Ch. 46.

minor under the age of 14 years shall be employed in any manufacturing business. It further provides that persons over the age of 14 and under the age of 16 may not be permitted to work in a manufacturing establishment unless there is first procured an employment certificate. In the case of Reszek v. Bauerle & Stark Co., 282 Ill. 557, the declaration alleged that plaintiff was 15 years of age; that the defendant was engaged in manufacturing sewing machines and operated sand-papering machines; that plaintiff was employed contrary to the statute in operating one of these machines. The contention was that plaintiff was under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, therefore, he had no remedy at common law. The court there said (p. 559): "Plaintiff was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years and might legally be employed in a manufacturing establishment, though not to work with certain appliances or machinery, including cand papering machines, but he sould not be legally employed without a permit required by law of minors between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years. We such permit was obtained by plaintiff authorizing his employment in defendant's factory for any purpose, and, as we understand the definition of employees made subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act by section 5 of said act, it embraces only minors who are legally permitted to work. A minor under the age of fourteen years sould not lawfully be employed to work in a manufacturing establishment, and if employed contrary to law and injured while so employed, he could not be regarded as an employee within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The same rules applies where a minor between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years is working without permit having been obtained. In both cases the employment is unlawful." It was there held that since the plaintiff, who was but fifteen years of age, had not

miner under the upo of le years andil be emuloyed in our minufacturing business. It Tariffer prevides that percent ever the age of 16 and under the age of 18 any not he permitted to vork in a manufacturing establishment unless there in first precessed an employment certificate. In the case of Rensel v. Bauerle & Canth So., San 111. 557, the declaration alleged that pleintiff was if years of ege; thut the defend-Ant van engaged in manufacturing sewing machines and operated sand-papering manninger that plaintiff was capiered contrary to the statute in apprating one of these machines. The contention was that plaintiff one under the deriments Compensation Act and, whiteless, he had no recedy at common law. The court there said (p. 556): "Plaintiff was because the ages of fourteen and sixteen yours and might learly to employed in a manufacturing erteblishment, though not to surk with dertain appliances or ascainary, including sand papering sachines, but he sould not be legally employed without a second required by law of minors between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years. -me aid partitionary titigately of boutands am thorag done of ployment in defendant': Fortory for any purpose, and, as we understand the definition of sconleyees made cubject to the Werkments Compansation not by medicing 5 of test not, it embraces only witers who care lagally paralesed to work. A other ander the ego of fourteen years so it not lawfally be employed to more in a manufacturing natablishment, and if employed contrary to law and injured while so employed, no could not its regarded as an mapleyee within theprovisions of the Werksen's Compensation Act. The same rules epalies where a minor between the same of fourteen and sixteen years is working without pormit mering been obtained. In both comes the employment is unlawful." It was there held

that clace the plaintiff, who was but fifteen years of age, and not

obtained the permit required by statute, he was illegally employed and, therefore, not within the Compensation Act, but had his remedy at common law.

In the instant case plaintiff might have been legally employed, and if he was, he came within the Compensation Act. The declaration should have set forth facts to show that he was illegally employed before it could be held that that not did not apply. This it failed to do. It only alleged conclusions that plaintiff was illegally employed. Facts should be alleged in the declaration to show that the Compensation Act did not apply in the instant case. This was not done and no cause of action was, therefore, stated. Bishop v. C.C. Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 194. The decurrer to the declaration was properly sustained.

Plaintiff makes the further point that it if be contended that the Workmen's Compensation Act applies to minors, it is unconstitutional. Having brought this appeal to this court, that question is waived. Clark Teachers Agency v. City of Chicago, 220 III. App. 319; Berndt v. Chicago Rys. Co., 220 III. App. 307.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook Sounty is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THORSON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

obtained the permit required by statute, he was illogally employed and, therefore, not within the Companention set, but had his remedy at whence law.

In the instant once plaintiff might have been legally employed, and if he ran, on came within the Convenantion Act.

The decimination should have set forth freis to show that he was illegally employed hefore it could be held that that that act did act apply. This it folled to do. It only alleged constitutions that plaintiff was illegally employed. Frote about be alleged in the declaration to such that the Compensation Act did not apply in the instant case. This was not done and no cause of action was, therefore, minical, bished Y. C.O. By. Co., 190 Ill. action was, therefore, minical, bished year property sastained.

Plaintiff makes the further point that it if be contended that the formers, someonetitutions. Sering brought this appeal to this court, that question is unived. Clark Taschere Arency v. City of Chicago, 226 III. App. 319; herpdt v. Chicago are, to. Ser III. App. 309.

The judgment of him Chronit Jours of lock County is sfirmed.

AVI I REU.

THORSON, P.J. AND PAYLER, P. CENCIS.

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24 - 26941

FRED V. PRATHER.

Defendant in Error

CHARLES A. EROPP.

Plainwiff in Error

BRROR TO MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 596

MR. JUSTICE TAYLOR delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment of \$700.00 obtained by the plaintiff for services as an architect.

On October 14, 1920, the plaintiff, Frather, brought suit against Kropp, the defendant, and in his statement of claim alleged that he was employed by the defendant to make drawings, etc. for the construction of a two story brick building and a garage, for the usual fees, being at a minimum, six per cent of the total cost of the completed work, computed upon the lowest bids of responsible contractors. It alleged further that the plaintiff did certain work, and that the lowest bid totaled \$48,500.00; that the defendant abandoned the work after paying the plaintiff \$500.00 and that there is now due him \$1558.00, the usual, reasonable and customary price for such services.

The defendant, in his affidavit of merits alleged that on or about January 21, 1920, he paid the plaintiff \$500,00 in full for all his demands; that he did not employ him thereafter to do any further work; that he never knew of

REED V. DEATHER.

Defendant in Herof.

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of chicago.

CHARLES A. PROPP.

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ak. JUSTICE TAIROR delivered the equation of the

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enif againet fropp, the defendant, sud is his exstanent of claim alleges that he constraint, sud is his exstanent of claim alleges that he can ampleyed by too defendant to make drawings, etc. for the constraction of a two away brick whiles, and a garage, for the wound rese, being, at a wink-building and a garage, for the wound rese, being at a wink-mus, six per annt of two total onet its continues work.

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It aliesed further that the elementals contractors and that the lowest hid totaled ads, but of this life of the entering and that the lowest hid totaled ads, but of this life of the entering and that the lowest will alter asynce the claim of the reasonable and that there are no due him albötice, the unual, reasonable and that there are no due him albötice, the unual, reasonable and that the price for such services.

The defending, in the all destite of destite of legal that an or about January 31, 1990, he with the all as all and derivate that an all ter all aid derivate; that an all ter angley him thereafter to do any further work; that he never knew of

anyoustem among architects to charge seven tenths of a total fee of six per cent, to be computed upon the lowest bid; that when he employed the plaintiff, he told him that his employment would be limited to drawing plans and specifications, and that he had not decided to erect a building and garage.

At the trial, which was without a jury, certain exhibits, and the testimony of nine witnesses was introduced. The testimony of Prather, the plaintiff is substantially as follows: - That he had a talk with Kropp, the defendant, at the latter's home; that the defendant asked him what he was going to charge him for the work; that at first he said eight percent, and then said "I will be satisfied with six per cent."; that the defendant then said, "Well, we will let it go at that": that that was for all the architectural services; that during the progress of the work on the plans quite a few changes were made; that from time to time he sent the defendant blue prints and specifications; that they agreed on the specifications: that he had various conversations with the defendant on that subject; that he, the plaintiff, started to take estimates in December, 1919; that on December 15 or 16 he told the defendant that one Peterson had made a bid which was a little ever \$45,000.00; that the plans for a garage were not prepared until February 20; that before January, 1920, he had received figures from Peterson and one Paul Jensen; that he told the defendant he could get a lower bid; that the defendant said "that is all right"; that about January 21, 1920, he showed the defendant the plans and asked for a payment; that the defendant said "Well, how much do you want", that he told him, \$500.00; that the defendant said, "Now, is that all you want"

enyouston among archibects to charge seven Acaths of a total for of six per cent, so be computed upon the lewest bid; that when he suployed the pleintiff, he told him that his employeest would be limited to drawing plane and specifications, and that he had not desided to erect a building and garage.

At the trial, which was without a jury, certain exhibits, and the tentimeny of nice witnesses was introduced. The testimony of tracher, tos plaintiff is substantialy as follows: Time had a talk of th Froge, the defendent, at the latter's sure; that the defendent asked him what he was deligio blue ad feril de tada paran ada tol alla egrada af gries percent, and then said "I will be untimited with aix per cent.": that the defendant than eath, "Well, we will let it go no that"; that that was for all the architectural vervices; that during the progress of the nork on the plans gotte a few amages were made; that from hime to time he sent the defendant blue printe and appoint entions; time they expreed on the specifications; that be buy verking convermables with the demander of tenders subject; that he, he district, started to take ertimates in December, 1919; that on Bonomber 15 or 18 he teld the Life daand that one feteree med ends a bid with her a little ever \$45,000.00; that the class for a garage sere set prepared ustil February MC: that before January, 1923, he hed received Maures from Peterson and and Cenal James; that he teld the defendant he could get a lover bid; took the defendant said "that is all right"; that chest sensory 21, 1920, he showed the defendant the plans and asked for a payment; that the dofendant seid "Well, hew much do you want", that he told him, \$500.00: that the defendent said, then, is that all you mant

and he, sthe plaintiff said "Yes, that is about all that is due at this time, because the plans are not completed. got to go over them and fix them up here and there. " "That is sufficient at this time"; that the defendant gave him a sheck for \$500.00 and said "If you want any more, all right"; that a great deal of work on the plans, all that concerning the garage, was done subsequent to that time; that he had a talk with the defendant, in Strandberg's presence, in March, 1920; that the defendant said he could do better than certain figures that they had: that he could "get a lump sum figure instead of a cost plus"; that the plaintiff said "All right, you have to take some figures and I will take figures"; that he called up the defendant by telephone about July first and asked him if he had obtained any better figures; that he said he had not; that he, the plaintiff, told him he had, and said, I can get it down to \$37.00(.00 or a little lower than that : that the defendant then said, "I don't knew what I am going to do now;" that he, the plaintiff said, "Well, if things stand that way, then I think you ought to pay me more money"; that the defendant swore and hung ap the telephone; that after the defendant requested some more plans and they were furnished; that later the defendant said he would go ahead as soon as he could get the work done for \$40,000.00 for the residence.

The plaintiff testified that where the preliminary studies, general drawings, specifications, scale and full sized details have been finished by the architect, the total fee due and payable is seven tenths of the total amount of the architect's fee. He, also, testified that he had prepared the sketches and general plans, all the detailed drawings, full sized drawings, specifications and took bids; that the usual, reasonable, and oustomary fee charged by specificats for the

at tady lin sunds at tant . solv bion Thispiniq adda, and beau die at this line, because the plans are not one inted. We JANTE H. OTER DOOR SEE AND MAN THE BOOK OF OF STREET is sufficient at this time"; that the defendent gave him a check for \$500.00 con cala "11" y a some sey more, all right": that a greet deal of werk on the plane, all that concerning a bad ad Jadi tadil fadi ol Janerovafon anno Asw . sasara adi talk with the ordendant, in Etrandborg's presence, in North, minimo many wested on ulump on hims franceleb and just :0001 Henres that they had; timb he could "get a lung sen figure ingle line that the the the vision of the state the bases yen have to take come figures and I will take fill tree; that be called up the defendent by telephone about July first and him of tank to be be absented to be set of the and to make he and he and he and he are he had not that he the planning to bed bed bot and and I can got it down to \$27,75°. Do no ittis lover i tatte that the defending that then madd, "I don't were thee ' as going to do now;" that he, the leader of the late the shane stand that way, then I think you ought to may my more meney"; that the defendant exerc and bung py the telephone; that after the an an error of the definition of the property and the second comediate self tot bi. the test for eller ell test blunc

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work testified to is from 7 to 17% per cent of the total cost of the building, as estimated by reliable contractors and that there is a discount as to the fee charged when the work has been abandoned.

On cross examination the evidence of the plaintiff is to the effect that at an early conversation the defendent said he would not go higher than \$25,000.00 for the residence; that when the plane and specifications have been drawn seven tenths of the architect's work is done; that changes were suggested after the first drawings, one of which was a sclarium that would cost from \$8,000.00 to \$10,000.00.

It is the evidence of one Sohn, employed by the plaintiff, an architect, that he worked on the plans and specifications in question from October 1919, to the latter part of February 1920; that the time they worked on them, if all put together, would be three months; and that the usual, reasonable and customary charge for such services would be \$3,000.00. One Vesely, also an architect employed by the plaintiff, stated that he worked on the same matter, on the pencil drawings, etc. for about 150 hours. It is the evidence of one Strandberg that on March 31, 1920, he submitted a written estimate, addressed to the plaintiff, of \$37,500.00 for the residence, and \$7,000.00 for the garage; that shortly after, he had a talk with the defendant at the latter's home; that the defendant said he would like to get it done a little cheaper; that he asked why the Stranberg Co. would not guarantee its estimate; that they discussed making changes and substitutions, but that the defendant would not agree to any important alterations; that he said he thought he could have it done for less than our estimate and get a guarantee; that he had one already that was better. work testified to in from 7 to 17\$ per nent of the tetal cout of the building, as retinated by reliable contracture and that there is a discount as to the fee charged when the work has been abandoned.

On droot energy the stide the evidence of the placetiff is to the effect that at an early conversation the defendent est in would not go higher than \$25,000.00 for the residence; that area the plane and specifications have been drawn energy tenting of the erroritees? The cort is done; that changes were suggested after the first drawings, one of which were a coloring that sauld cost from \$5,000.00 to \$10,000.00.

-airly ext of berylone . man. and in anabite wat at il tiff, on aranitest, that he sorked on the plane our specifica. tions in question from tereber 1919, to the lotter mars of February 1920; that the time they worked on them, if all put together, house the three suntage and the see that and the con together and customery charge for such arrives would be \$1,10.00. the Vesely, also as erchibed yealsyed by the plaintiff, rinted that he worked on the come matter, on the pencil drawings, etc. for short 150 hours. It is the exidence of one Strandberg that on Garok 31, 1926, no minuteton a written astiguta, addiseased to the plaintiff, of \$27.300.00 due the been represented and \$7.C.C.C. for the garage; that shortly ofter, he had a talk the column of the later's book that the defent and the asked may the Stranberg Co. You due to be green and the collected that they disqueed maines o sages and cubatituitions, but there the defendent mould not agree to any important alteretions; that he that he thought he sould leve it bune for seen then our cate mate and get a guarantee; that he had one elrousy that was better. One Kirch, a general contractor and builder, testified that he examined the plans and specifications at the instigation of the plaintiff, and in June, 1920, made an estimate of cost, and later asked the plaintiff how the owner received it; that the plaintiff then called up the owner and talked with him.

A witness, Davidson, an architect and engineer, testified that in Chicago there exists a custom of charging six per cent on the actual or estimated cost of the work; that an estimate is prepared by the architect or a contractor is asked for his opinion, and the architect's bill based on two or more estimates of reputable contractors; that when the work is abandoned the custom is to charge seven tenths of the whole fee; that the cost of putting up such a building and garage as contemplated by the plans and specifications would have been not less than \$50,000.00.

Erickson, an architect, testified that his estimate of the cost of such a building and garage, built according to the plans of such a building and garage, built according to the plans and specifications would be \$48,000.00; that he had a talk with the defendant in which the latter asked him what he thought of the plans and that he told the defendant they were all right and would make a good building; that later the defendant told him that he had bought a building that was about completed. One Cady, an architect, testified that he examined the blue prints and the drawings for the defendant; that he questioned whether there was a customary fee in Chicago; charges that in 1919 architects/for residence work were between five and ten per cent based on the cost of the work itself as executed.

the Rirch, a general contractor and hulder, armified that he examined the plane and especifications at the instigation of the plane and to dure, 1936, neces as estimate of cost, and inter asked the plaintiff sew the order constraint in that the claiminist then called up the overs and talked with him.

A witness, lawidaes, as preliect and engineer. Sestified that in thirtys there exists a savine of charging of yer cast on the actuated that of the actuated that of the actuated that of the prepared by the architect or a santractor is asked for his opinion, and the architecter his bill based on two or mure estimates of reputable professors; the taben has work is abandous the outloss for charge seven tenths of the whole fee; that the nest of putting up auch a ballator and garage as confrequence by the nion and succifications and carage as confrequence by the nions and succifications

Sticknon, an architent, tegs; the nic colimate of the norse of the sooreing to the plane of such a bulking on attegs, built according to the plane of ruch of baseding and party, built according to the plane ond syentfications on 11d be 160,000. Olds a talk waste the sould be 160,000 of the had a talk waste the shought of the plane on 1 that he thought of the plane of the party action of the the the the talk the print that he can be the print of the print of the print and the drawings for the ocknount; shall he questioned whether there was a continue ochenount; the questioned whether there was a contract for in the chart he president of the carding the file of the presidence will be the president.

For the defendant two witnesses testified, the defendant himself and his son.

It is the evidence of Krepp, the defendant, that he told the plaintiff he intended to put up a residence in Oak Park; that he went with the plaintiff to look at a house in Rogers Park: that two or three weeks afterwards he talked to him about making plans for a residence; that the plaintiff drew up some drawings and specifications and in January, 1920, asked him, the defendant, for some compensation; that at that time the specifications and drawings were not completed; that he, the defendant asked the plaintiff how much it would be after the drawings and specifications were complete; that the plaintiff said \$500.00; that he then gave him a check and said. "Now this is in full to you"; that the plaintiff said, "Up to date and I will send receipt in full tomorrow." The defendant denied that the plaintiff told him he would charge him six per cent. The defendant admitted that the plaintiff worked on the plans and talked them over with Mrs. Kropp and himself, and that he took up most of the matter of changes and alterations with Mrs. Kropp, and that from time to time he brought in various sketches; that the plaintiff consulted with Mrs. Kropp more than he did with him, the defendant. He further testified that he told the plaintiff that he would have to hold the expenses down to \$25,000.00; that he did not go into details as to the changes which his wife was suggesting; that some time in May, 1926, the plaintiff called him on the telephone and maked him if he intended to build; that he told him that he did not know; that he could not get any bid; that the plaintiff had not put in any bid yet; that the plaintiff then said, "You owe me money."; that he, the defendant, then said, "Oh, well, get it."; that he never got any estimate or figures about the cost of the

For the defindant two witnesses testified, the defindant binnelf and bits son.

it in the swidence of Krepp, the defendant, that he tals the gladgette be incomed to put up a recidence in tale Much; that he went with the plaintiff to lock at a heuse in Rogers Park; that two ar times works afterworth he talked to him about saking plans for a residence; that the plantias fueds up some drawings and specifications and in January, 1920. taked him, the defendent, for some compensation; that at timt time the specifications and drawings were not completed; that he, the defendent asked the picintiff now such it would be after the drawings on | englished tons aure domplate; that the plaintiff said \$550.00; sheet has them gave his a cheek and enta. "Now this is in Tall to gran; that the eleintiff and. "Op and "worrowed flut mi letoour base fits I ban stab at defendent denied that the pleiteiff teld him he would charge Attaining out that and indentified such that the plaint of worked on the plant and tailed thus own with ire. Eropy and himself, and that he took up most of the matter of changes and alterations with Mrs. Mrsgs, and that from time to time ha breught in various aketehes; that the Hearth gonnulted with Ers. Eropy more than he did with him, the defendant, so turther blost of mend bluow on Jakis "Tidatela and blos and land bottlened the expenses down we full too. to. that he old not go into details an to the changes chich his wife was suggesting; thus come time in day, 1990, the picintiff unlied him on the telephose and sakes him if he intended to build; that he tald him that he did not though that he could not get any bid; thus the claustiff had not put in any hid yet; that the plaintiff than said. "You ove we memoy."; that he, the defendent, them well, well, get 10.0; that he sever upt may estimate or figures chall the cort of the

building after the time when Strandberg was present, some time in April; that the plaintiff never told him about a figure of \$48,750.00 which he had from Peterson & Co.; that he, the defendant, never built the house, but subsequently bought one.

The son, R. A. Kropp testified that he heard a conversation about January 21, 1920, between his father, the defendant, and the plaintiff; that the plaintiff said he wanted \$500.00 and the defendant asked what for, to which the plaintiff snewered that it was for the drawings and specifications; that his father then asked the plaintiff if that covered all drawings and specifications; that the plaintiff said yes; that his father then gave the plaintiff a check; that when he heard the conversation he was in an adjacent room.

At the close of the evidence the trial judge made the following statement:

"I am going to find in this case, that the defendant authorized the plaintiff to draw these plans, employed him to draw these plans, and acquiesced in the drawing of these plans that would cost at least \$32,000. for the garage and the other: that these changes were made at the request of the defendant, or defendant's wife. with the acquiescence of the defendant himself - with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant; that whether there was a contract price of six per cent or whether there was a fair and reasonable value of six per cent - six per cent on \$32,000, would be \$1,920. The work is not all completed, and he has got plans to get in and the contracts to let and the supervision of the work to do yet. If he abandoned it after the contracts were in, the customary charge of seven-tenths-three-tenths off, goes to the supervision of the work. If you figure that he has done 50 per cent of the work he is hired to do, two-thirds of the work he is hired to do, and I think that is a fair estimate here, it would be about \$1,200. He has been paid \$500, and that would leave \$700, and I will find the issues against the defendant and assess the plaintiff's damages at the sum of \$700."

Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of \$700.00 and

building of in the land fraudiory and promest, one the in Appel; the holder in the crest of the control of the crest of the derivative of the crest of the the crest of the creek of the crest of the cr

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costs; and by writ of error the defendant seeks a reversal of that judgment.

The evidence shows, unquestionably, an employment of the plaintiff to render certain architect's services concerning the erection of a residence and garage which the defendant had in contemplation, and, further, that the plaintiff di perform, pursuant to his employment, certain protracted and valuable services. The defendant makes two claims. first, that the plaintiff was paid \$500.00 in full payment of his claim, and, second, that the plaintiff was employed to furnish plans and specifications for a building to cost not over \$25,000.00 and that as the building could not be built for that sum there can now be no recovery. As to the parment of \$500.00:-The evidence as to the conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant some time in the latter part of January 1920. when the plaintiff showed the defendant certain plans and asked for a payment is conflicting. The trial judge, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony evidently concluded that what was said at that conversation and the payment of \$500.00 did not constitute a settlement. If the trial judge believed the testimony of the plaintiff, he was quite justified in concluding, as he did. The plaintiff testified in substance that the payment of the \$500.00 was not in full, and the defendant testified that it was, and the latter is slightly supported by the testimeny of his son. With the evidence in that condition we do not feel warranted in concluding that the trial judge erred in deciding that the payment of the \$500.00 was not a payment in full.

Second: As to the claim of the defendant that the plaintiff was employed to furnish plans and specifications for a building to cost not over \$25,000.00 but failed to do so.

depth; and by writ of error the defendant meaks a reversal of that judgment.

The evidence shows, unquestionedly, as exploymome of the classiff to reaser certain archifect's cervices concerning the erection of a residence and marma which the defendant had in suntemplation, and, further, that the plaintiff did perferm, pursuant to his employment, certain gretracted and valueble services. The defendant makes two claims, first, that the pleintiff van potd \$500.00 in inlinent of his claim, and, second, that the plaintiff was employed to furnish plans and specifications for a building to cont not over \$25,00% .Ot and that as the building could not be built for that sum there can new be no recovery. As to the paintent of \$500.00:-The syldends as le the conversation between the cisintiff and the defendent seme time in the latter tent of Jenuary 1920, when the plaintiff showed the enfond at certain plans and maked for a payment to conflicting. The trial judge, who saw the witnesses and beard the testimony evidently concluded that what ton all 00.000 to thempay of the nationalous of the blas new constitute a settlement. If the trial junge believed the testian spinisher, he was quite justifud in soncluding, an and did. The shrintiff testified is substance that the pavener of the folia to rate ont in full, and the defendent tentified that it was, and the latter is shightly supported by the testimony of his aca. With the enidence in that acoustiful we do not feel marconted is concluding that the trial judge erred in deolding that the prement of the \$500.00 was not a payment in full.

Second: As to the read the defendent that the plant fire the the plant and specifications for a building to cost not over \$26,000.00 but fulled to do se-

The evidence shows that in August, 1919, the defendant told the plaintiff that he intended to put up a residence in Cak Park, and that shortly thereafter the plaintiff and the defendant looked at a residence which the plaintiff had built in Rogers Park. The plaintiff testified that the defendant told him that it was just about what he wanted. From that time on the plaintiff worked on plans and specifications which he presented to the defendant, and consulted with the defendant and his wife, but chiefly with the latter, about various alterations, some of which were alterations that added considerably to the cost of the building. It is not denied that the plaintiff did a great deal of work in the matter as an architect and produced and delivered to the defendant various plans and specifications. Several witnesses, employees of the plaintiff, testified as to the quantity of work which they had done in conjunction with the plans and specifications. It is insisted, however, on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiff never prepared and delivered plans and specifications for a building which could be built for \$25,000.00.

The trial judge was of the opinion that the defendant authorised the plaintiff to furnish plans, etc. for a residence and garage that could be erected for a total of \$32,000.00, that is \$25,000.00 for the house and \$7,000.00 for the garage.

It is quite obvious, even from the evidence of the defendant himself, that substantial changes were made from time to time as the result of interviews between the plaintiff and the defendant's wife. It is the claim of the plaintiff that certain work was done which was authorized; that plans and specifications were furnished at the instigation of the defendant; that certain estimates were made and received and that, as

The evidence chart that August, 1919, the defendant told the plaintiff that he intended to put up a residence in Ock Park, and their snortly the restter the plaintiff and the defemona looked at a restuence which the plaintiff had built in degera serk. the plaint, if takelited that the defendant tald him that it mue fuer short went is wanted. True tient time on the pinintiff worked on plans and specifications which he presented to the defendant, and countled with the defendant and his wife, but abietly with the latter, about various alterations, some of which were alterations that added considerably to the neck of the building. It is not depiced that the plaintiff did a green deal of work in the meter as an architect and preduced ond delivered to the defendant various plans and ageoifications. Several withmanes, supleyen of the pinitiff, testified as to the quartity of work which the feed done in conjunction with the place wild epacifications. It is idelated. however, on behalf of the detraduct, that the plaintiff unver prepared and delivered plans and specifications for a building . 30. 130, and to built for bush daide

The tried judge one of the asinion that the defendent sufficient we plaintiff to furnity plant, etc. for a residence and garage that neutil be exceled for a tetal of \$32,600.00 (9).

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It is quite obvious, even from the evidence of the defendant bioself, this subministed changes were made from that to time so the result of interviews between the plaintiff and the defendant's wife. It is the claim of the plaintiff test certain work and fone witch was muthorized; that plain and specifications over furnished at the instigation of the defendance were furnished at the instigation of the defendance that certain estimates were made and the instigation of the defendance were made and the instigation of the defendance were made and their and that certain

the defendant finally abandoned the whole thing, having bought another house, the defendant was liable for the customary fees.

The trial judge held that the plaintiff had done 60% of the work he was hired to do and so allowed 60% of \$1920.00, which latter figure of \$1920.00 was 6% of \$32,000.00, being the total cost of the house figured at \$25,000.00 and a garage figured at \$7,000.00. As the plaintiff had been paid \$500.00 the trial judge deducted that amount from \$1200.00, leaving a balance of \$700.00, for which judgment was entered.

clusion seems to be that the defendant employed the plaintiff as an architect to furnish plans and specifications and render architects services for the erection of a residence and garage, and that although the defendant may have had in mind at the outset the erection of a house and garage that would cost not over \$32,000.00,interviews were had from time to time between the plaintiff and the defendant and his wife which led to various changes, some of which were substantial, and that, as a result of their negotiations and the work of the plaintiff, there arose in the eyes of the law an obligation on the defendant to pay the plaintiff on an quantum meruit, that is the value of his services as determined by reason and custom.

That amount would be at least six per cent of seven tenths of \$32,000.00, which would be \$1344.00. And crediting \$500.00, the amount paid, would leave \$1036.00. The judgment which was entered, however, being less than the latter amount, and no cross errors being assigned, we are of the opinion it should stand as it is.

the defendent finally shandoned the whole thing, having bought enother house, the defendant was liable for the austomary free.

The trial fadge hald tens the plaintiff had done 50% of the work he was alred to de and so allemed 60% of \$1920.00, which laster figure of \$1920.00 was 6% of \$32.000.00, being the total cert of the house figured at \$25.000.00 and a garage figured at \$7.600.00. As the plaintiff had been paid \$5000.00 the trial fudge deducted that amount from \$1200.00. Leaving a balance of \$700.00, for which fudgment was entered.

Considering all the evidence, the only reseasable conclusion areas to be then then are employed the pisterist
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as an architect be furnish plane and specific them are conditional or a condition of the end fact although the definition of a condition of a bere ind the size of the creation of a bours and garage that would cost
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Some contention is made concerning a variance, and the admissibility of certain evidence. The statement of claim is somewhat inartistic in form, but a careful consideration of it, justifies the conclusion that as a statement it is sufficiently consistent with the judgment, and, also, broad enough to justify the evidence that was actually introduced.

The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.

AFFIREED.


THOMSON, P.J. AND O'CONNOR, J. CONCUR.

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The judgment will, therefore, he effirmed.

APPENDING.

THOUSES, F. J. AND D'OCTIVOS, J. SCHOUE.



MR. JUSTICE TAYLER delivered the opinion of the court.

On November 10, 1920, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Olken, charging that he;

"Did make, aid, countenance and assist in making an improper noise, disturbance, breach of the peace and diversion tending to a breach of the peace.

Did unlawfully and wilfully assault another

person, to-wit, Marjorie Scherer.

Wes engaged in, abetted in a quarrel and other disturbance"; "in violation of section 2012 of an ordinance of the City of Chicago."

The case was tried before the court without a jury and the defendant found guilty of violating section 2012 of an ordinance of the City of Chicago and fined in the sum of \$100.00. This appeal is from the judgment.

The evidence of the complaining witness, Marjorie Scherer, a young woman 17 years of age, is that on November 9, 1920, about 2:30 in the afternoon when she was in the wash room of the Metropolitan Business College where she attended school, the defendant came in there, took hold of her and threw her over the radiator and put his arms around her and tried to kiss her. Her testimony is entirely corroborated

APPRELIANCE WORLDIAM THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SECOND STREET, STR

We. JUPILT: TAY'. . dolivered the cultilant the court.

(a deverber 10, 1980, a compision was filed against the defendant, olken, charging that se;

"Did owing, aid, cointenmore end assist in making an imprepar mates, disturbance, breech of the peace and diversion tending to a breach of the peace.

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Whe engaged in, checked is a quarrel and other disturbances; his vielation of accidences; his vielation of section of an erdinance of the lity of latery.

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by Edith Plothow, Mildred Sleight and Florence Jurback, fellow students of the complaining witness.

Edith Plothow, a student, testified that the defendant "grabbed her (Marjorie Scherer) around the waist and kind of moved and she screamed for help and tried to pull his hair." The witness Mildred Sleight, another student, testified that the defendant "grabbed held of her (Marjorie Scherer) and threw her against the radiator and tried to put his head down on her shoulder as though he was going to bite her * * * and it looked as though he was trying to kiss her"; that Marjorie shouted for help and one of the students ran for the principle, Baker, and defendant ran out; that Marjorie was then very weak and they helped her to a chair. The witness. Florence Jurbeck, another fellow student, testified that "we were all in the wash room combing our hair and I saw Mr. Olken come in and I said to him, what are you doing here you darn feel get out of here. Mildred and I went and stood by the window and Marjorie was coming after and he grabbed Marjorie and * * * pushed her up against the radiator and put his head down by her beck * * * and he rubbed his body against hers then ien she hollered and we ran to her sesistance." etc.

There is evidence also by one Baker, the manager of the Metropolitan Business College, that there was some trouble about a man working on the electric lights in the wash room concerning some girls in the room, and that on the afternoom in question he saw Olken, the defendant, on the second floor of the premises.

The testimony of the defendant himself is that he is an electrician and on the day in question he went in to

by Milth Platinow, Whidred Claight and Vierence Jurheck. Failor students of the completuing witness.

waten election, a student, tentified that the defende ant "grabbed her (Surferic Scherer) around the enter and kind of moved andshe sermond for bely and tried to mall his hair." The st tuens wildred idelaid, another student, testified that the defendent 'grabbed held of her (Marjorle Scherer) and med hand sid Jug of beirs bus relabber out fentage ted words an her shoulder as though he was quing to tite and a * * * and singly send as though he was trying to was lear; that Marierie shouled for holy and one of the statemis ran for the principle. Beker, and defendant ron out; that Asrierte was then very weak and they helped has to a chair. The ultured, Tarence lin sum that fulles stanger, tonestind that the were all in the weak reen combing our heir the I was Mr. Silven come in and I said to bia, where we got doing note you darn fool met out of here. Whidres and I want and stood by to whader and the content was commended that we wanted the particular to the second second ed awob have aid the tora toraiber and tunings go and badoug her heek * * * and he subbes his bedy against hera then or abe hallered and our ran to her ensistence." etc.

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The testimony of the defendant bigself is that he is the an electrical he mad on the day in carrites he ment to the

the wash room, fixed some meters, and that none of the circumstances testified to by the four young women took place; that he merely did his work and when he got through he separated two of the girls who were standing holding hands in front of the wash bowl, in order that he might wash his hands.

Colbert, an electrician who was working for the defendant on the day in question end was with him on the second floor at the time of the circumstances herein involved, testified that he and the defendant went to the girls lavatory to take out some fuses; that the door of that room was partly open; that Olken then went to the toilet to adjust the fuse; that they were there about fifteen minutes; that the defendant walked out as soon as he tested the switch; that he heard no cry for help inside the wash room; that he heard some talking and laughing in there.

The only other testimony is that of Cohen and Weinberg that the defendant had a good reputation.

We are of the opinion that the evidence sufficiently proves that the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct and of a violation of Section 2012 of the Ordinances of the City of Chicago.

It is contended by counsel for the defendant that the judgment is not supported by the weight of the evidence; that improper evidence was admitted; and that there is a variance between the complaint and the evidence.

The cause was tried before the court without a jury and the evidence was somewhat conflicting, but in view of the fact that three witnesses in addition to the complaining witness

the rock room. Sixed come weters, and that mene of the eirquasimose testified to by the four young wamen took place; that he morely ald his sork and when he set through he reperated two of the girls she were shoulding holding hands in front of the wash bowl, in crass that he might work his hade.

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The dause was tried before the court without a jury and the evidence was considered in the confidence of the fact that three witnesses in addition to the acoplanting withese

testified definitely and expressly to the disorderly conduct of the defendant and that, practically considered, that evidence was not only by the denial of the defendant himself and his helper, it would not new be reasonable for us sitting in a court of review, knewing merely what the record itself presents and suggests, to override the judgment of the trial judge who not only heard the testimony of the witnesses but saw them and was able to consider more satisfactorily their credibility.

The defendant suffered no detriment by reason of the testimony of Baker concerning what was said by the "girls" concerning the identity of Clken; outside of what he testified to there was ample evidence that the defendant was the man referred to.

The argument that there is a variance between the complaint and the evidence is untenable. The court found the defendant guilty of a violation of the ordinance and it was not necessary that the court should in its finding describe in detail the facts which the evidence proved.

ciently shows that the defendant was guilty of a breach of the peace and that of itself would justify the finding that was entered. The contention that there was a variation as to the name of the complaining witness and the name of the person assaulted is untenable. The name of the complaining witness was originally Marjorie Haselrich, the latter being the name of her own father. Apparently, her mother married again and her second husband was named Scherer, and the daughter, the complaining witness here, took the name of her stepfather and

teenified definitely and expressly to the disorderly conduct of the defendant out that, gracially considered, that evidence was not enly by the derial of the defendant himself and his helper, it would not now be recommished for us sitting in a court of review, knowing serely wind the record itself presents on auggests, to override the judgment of the irial judge who not only heard the testimeny of the witnesses but judge who not only heard the testimeny of the witnesses but are independently their mat them and was able to consider hare actualnesserily their credibility.

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so filed the complaint in the name of Warjorie Scherer.

Finding no error in the record the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


THOMSON, P.J. AND O'CONNOR, J. CONGUR.

no filed the scaplaint in the name of Marjoria Scherer.

Finding no error in the report the judgment is affirmed.

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THEMSEN, F. J. SHIP O'GORDER, J. CHICUR.



MR. JUSTICE TAYLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, Louis Frangipane, brought suit in the Municipal Court of Chicago against Frank Agosto and Salvatore Agosto, doing business as Agosto Brothers, for \$70.00.

The statement of claim is as follows: That he intrusted seventh dollars (\$70.00) to the defendant, defendant promising to hold said sum for the plaintiff and to return it to him upon request. Plaintiff further alleges that though he has repeatedly requested the defendant to pay said sum, defendant has refused and still refuses so to do, to the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of seventy dollars (\$70.00).

The defendant Frank Agosto, was duly served with summons, but he neither appeared, nor pleaded. There was no service on Salvatore Agosto.

At the trial the court entered an order that the suit be dismissed as to the defendant, Salvatore Agosto, and, in the same order, after reciting that the cause was tried without a jury, and evidence heard, and finding the issues against the defendant, Frank Agosto, assessed the plaintiff's damages in the sum of \$70.00. Judgment was entered on that finding

LOUIS PRANCIDANE,

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HORE CARRES PROM

RUBLING AND SOURT

OF CHICAGO.

PRANT AUGSTO.

Appel ment.

PRYLA. 597

ME. JUSTICE TAYLER Gollvered the opinion of the

court.

The planetiff, house Francipane, brought suit in the Punicipal Jours of Chicago against Frank Agesto and Salvatore Agesto, doing becames as Agesto Brothers, for 370.00.

The statement of claim is as follows: That he intrusted seventh dollars (\$70.00) to the defendent, defendant promising to hold suit sum forthe plaintiff and to return it to him upon request. Plaintiff further alleges that though he has repeatedly requested the defendent to pay said sum, defendant has refused upu still refuses so to do, to the camage of the plaintiff in the each of seventy deliure (\$76.00).

The defendent Frank Agosto, was only served with summens, but he nefited annual annual of pleaded. There was no service on Galvaters agosto.

At the trial the sout entered an erter that the suit to disminsed as to the defendant, telvatore agosto, end, in the esta order, after reciting that the couse was tried enthouse a jury, and extended heard, and finding the indeed heard said finding the interiffe decorpt the defendant. Frank agosto, norman in the listeriffe decorpt in the sum of \$70.00. Judgment was envered on they finding

against Frank Agosto and from that judgment this appeal is taken.

What the evidence was which was introduced before the trial judge before whom the cause was tried, we do not know, as all that is brought to our attention is the common law record.

It is contended on the part of the defendant that the statement of claim was defective in that it set forth an indebtedness on the part of Frank Agosto and Salvatore Agosto doing business as Agosto Brothers, That contention, however, in untenable. The case is one of the fourth class and in such cases in the Municipal Court written pleadings are unnecessary. Further, the matter it involved cannot be considered for the first time in this court. <u>Doggett</u> et al v. Rppert, 178 Ill. App. 230.

When Salvatore Agosto was dismissed out of the suit there then remained but one defendant, Frank Agosto, and it could not make any difference whether the judgment was entered against him in the name of Frank Agosto or as Agosto Brothers.

There being no material error in the record the judgment bof the Municipal Court will be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THOMSON, P. J. AND O'COMMOR, J. CONCUR.

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against Frank Agesto and from toat judgment hits appeal is taken.

What the evidence was which was introduced before the trial judge before why the cause was triad, we so not know, as all that is brought to our attention is the common law record.

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There being so exterict ex.or in the record the judgment ter the Manicipa 'nurt will be affirmed.

APPERCIAL.

TROMECH . P. J. AND D'ELNECH . J. CC. (1754.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Defendant in Error,

YS.

SAMUEL JOSEPH (Impleaded) Plaintiff in Error.

ERROR TO CRIMINAL COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 5972

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MESURELY
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Defendant asks for the reversal of a judgment finding him guilty of petty larceny, entered upon a plea of guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the Chicago House of Correction for one year and to pay a fine of \$100.

It is argued here that it was error to enter judgment upon a plea of guilty without the defendant being fully advised by the court of the effects of his plea. While the original record filed by defendant failed to show such warning, the State has filed a supplementary record which shows that defendant was properly advised by the court of the effect of his plea of guilty. It follows therefore that the assignment of error in this respect is not supported by the record. People v. Harney, 276 Ill., 236.

It is next argued the record does not show the court examined witnesses in aggravation or mitigation of the defense.

No bill of exceptions was preserved, and we will therefore presume that the court heard such evidence. People v. Pennington, 267 Ill., 45.

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

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THE PECPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Suror,

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SAMMEL JOSEPH (Imploaded).

MUNCH TO CHEMINAL COURT OF COOR COUNTY.

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MR. PARECULAR JUSTICE MOSUREIX
MALIVERED THE OPLETON OF THE COUNT.

'Defendent aske for the reversal of a judement finding him guilty of perty larveny, entered upon a plea of Julity. He was mentenced to imprisorment in the Chicago House of Correction for one year and to pay a fine of \$100.

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the judgment is eificeed.

ALLE TAYA.

Dover and Matchett, 55., concur.



MAUDE BALDER, Appellee,

YS.

JOHN HANGOCK MUTUAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

227 L.A. 5533

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$500 in an action alleging damages from a personal assault upon plaintiff by one of defendant's agents in furtherance of defendant's business.

The only occurrence witnesses are plaintiff and her son, who was about eleven years old at the time. Their story is substantially that plaintiff was a policy holder in defendant company; that premiums were collected about every week by a collector who called at her home; that upon the occasion in question Harry Gurvich, a collector, called and knocking at the door was told by plaintiff's son that his mother was not at home, whereupon Gurvich replied that he knew that she was at home and he was going to stop her insurance; that Gurvich then stepped out on the front porch, closing the door after him: that plaintiff, who was up stairs, heard this conversation and came down stairs. opened the door, stuck her head out and asked Gurvich what he meant by saying that the insurance would be stopped. The witnesses say that Gurvich replied by cursing and calling plaintiff a vile name. The boy testified that the door was half way open and his mother standing in the doorway, and that Gurvich took hold of the door and pulled it towards himself to close it, and that the edge of the door struck his mother's head, cutting it. Plaintiff's testimony is that Gurvich pushed the door inward

MADIN DAILSMH, ADRALLOCAL

AN

JOHN HANCOCK BRITUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. Apprelight.

AMESAL FROM CINCUIT COURT
ON COOR COURTY.

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HR. PRESIDING JUSTICH MCSURELY PALLVERED THE CRIMICH OF THE COURT.

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striking her head; that Gurvich started away, but plaintiff pursued him and caught him by the coat collar; that he continued to attempt to break away and plaintiff was pulled down to the bottom of the porch stairs. The boy says that Gurvich got away, but his mother ran after him for about half a block and again grabbed him by the collar, but he broke loose. Plaintiff says she followed him only a few steps after he first broke away. Both witnesses testify that when plaintiff first opened the door Gurvich was standing upon the porch writing something in a book. At the time of the trial Gurvich was no longer employed by the defendant and did not testify.

stances is not whether a given act was done during the existence of the eervant's employment, but whether it was done in the prosecution of the master's business. Klugman v. Samitary Laundry Co., 141 III. App. 422. The doctrine of respondent superior applies to acts performed by an agent within the scope of his employment. Kehoe v. Marshall Field & Co., 141 III. App. 140. It is concededly the rule that an employer is liable for the consequences of an assault by an employe on another only when the act of the employe is incidental to the employment, within its scope, and authorized by the employer. Grillo v. Octting Bros. Ice Co., 27085, opinion of this court filed April 3, 1922; Neville v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 210 III. App. 163.

It is evident that whatever part Gurvich took in the physical altercation with plaintiff was not in pursuance or furtherance of defendant's business, was not within the scope of his employment nor authorized by his employer. Both the occurrence witnesses agreed that after he had been told pplaintiff was not in the house, Gurvich quitted it, closing the front door and went on the porch to leave the premises. It is evident that plaintiff was angered by what was said concerning the insurance and got into

striking her head; that Gurvich started away, but plaintiff pursued him and caught him by the cest-coller; that he continued to attempt to broad away and plaintiff was pulled down to the bottom of the porch stairs. The boy says that Gurvich get away, but his mether was after him for about half a block and again grabbed him by the coller, but he broke loose. Plaintiff mays she followed him only a few steps after he first broke away.

Both witnesses testify that when plaintiff first opened the door Gurvich was standing upon the porch writing semething in a book. At the time of the trial Gurvich was no lenger employed by the defendant and old not testify.

The test of a master's liability under set circumstances is not whether a done during the existence of the servant's amployment, but whether it was done in the prosecution of the master's Luainess. Aluming v. Sanitary Landty Co., 141 Ill. App. 422. The destrine of respondest superist applies to acts perfermed by an agent within the scope of bis exployment. Hence v. Marchallipicia & Co., 141 Ill. App. 140. It is consequences of cededly the rule that an sapioyer is likele for the consequences of an assault bytan suploye on another only when the act of the capleys is incidental to the amployment, within its scope, and authorized by the sapioyer. Itsile v. Cetting Bros. Ise Co., 27035, opinion of this court filed April 3, 1922; Newille v. 27035, opinion of this court filed April 3, 1922; Newille v. Shionge & Alton E. Co., 27035, opinion of this court filed April 3, 1922; Newille v. Shionge & Alton E. Co., 2001.

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an altercation with Gurvich, in which she was the aggressor and during which her head came in contact with the door. The testimony tends to show that Gurvich was attempting to escape from plaintiff rather than to assault her. The collector had completed the business of his master when he had closed the front door and was starting to leave. Any subsequent altercation was entirely personal between the plaintiff and him and not incidental to his employment. Under such circumstances there can be no liability upon defendant, and the judgment is reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH A FINDING OF FACT.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

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BEVERSED WITH A FINDING OF FACT.

Rever and Mutchett, JJ., concur.

FINDING OF PACT.

We find that the defendant's employe, Harry Gurvich, did not, in furtherance of defendant's business, wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully strike and by divers other violent means injure the plaintiff as alleged in plaintiff's declaration.

Permit of the contract.

We find that the defendant's implaye, Harry Gurvich, did not, in furtherance of defendant's business, wilfully, maliolously and wrongfully strike and by divers other violent means injure the plaintiff as alleged in plaintiff's declaration.

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104 - 27578 AUGUSTA CZERWENKA. Appellant. VB.

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VAUGHAN'S SEED STORE. Corporation, etc.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 T.A. 5974

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MOSURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought suit on defendant's promissory note for \$5,500, claiming this amount with interest. Defense was a partial failure of consideration, which, upon trial by the court, was sustained and plaintiff's damages were reduced to \$4,445, and judgment against defendant entered for this amount. Plaintiff appeals.

There is no serious dispute as to the facts. April 1, 1915, Frank Czerwenka leased from John M. and Florentine Kranz a four-story and basement building numbered 8-10-12 West Randolph street, in Chicago, for ten years at a fixed rental. April 14, 1915, Czerwenka sublet to Maison Richard Delicatessen Company the store and part of the basement of number 12, which was about one-half the frontage, from May 1. 1915, to April 30, 1920. Said sublease contained a rider as follows:

"It is further understood and agreed that the parties of the second part have the option of renewing this lease under new conditions,* but the party of the first part has the privilege to cancel by giving three months notice in any year after April 30, 1920. In the event the rent is increased on the party of the

first part the parties of the second part will pay their pro rata share."

October 31, 1918, the Maison Richard Delicatessen Company duly assigned its sub-lease to Kate Mueller, who there-

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AUGUSTA CREMUNEA,
APPOLLUNE,

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VAUGRAM'S USED STORS, a. Corporation, etc., Appalac

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APPULL FROM MUNICIPAL SOUNT OF UNIDAGO.

227 A. E98

HR. PRIBIDING FURTION MOSURELY USELIVERS THE OPENION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought out on defendant's prosisory note for \$6,500, chains this assumt with interest. Defense was a partial railure of consideration, which upon trial by the court, was enctained and plaintiff's domagns were reduced to \$4,445, and judgment as defendant entered for this amount. Plaintiff appeals.

There is no serious dispute as to the facts.

April 1, 1915, Frank Creswenka leased from John W. and Florentine Kranz a four-play and basenest building numbered d-10-12

West Randolph street, in Chicago, for tem years at a fixed rental. April 14, 1915, Cretwenka subjet to Maison Nichard Delicateszen Company the Atoro and part of the basesent of number 13, which sake about onw-half and frontage, from May 1, 1915, to April 30, 1920. Said subjease contained a rider as follows:

"It is further understood and agreed that the parties of the second part have the option of renewing this lease under new dobditions," but the party of the line part has the privilege to emocal by giving three months active in any year after April 30, 1930.

In the event the rent is increased on the party of the first part the parties of the second part will pay their pre-rate share.

Company duly mestgred its null-leace to hate Musice, who there-

upon entered into possession of the premises. March 12, 1920, Augusta Czerwenka, plaintiff, as executrix and sole beneficiary of Frank Czerwenka, deceased, sold to Vaughan's Seed Store, defendant, the lease of April 1, 1915, from Kranz. This sale was by a contract reciting a consideration of \$7,500, \$2,000 in cash and the balance by note for \$5,500. This note is the subject of this suit. In this contract plaintiff covenanted with defendant

"that the lease of every tenant of said party of the first part now upon said premises or claiming under her will expire on the 30th day of April, 1920, or may be terminated on said day."

Defendant claims that plaintiff at this time knew of the possession by Kate Mueller of the store, and that she had an option for renewal; that defendant did not see the lease from plaintiff to the Delicatessen Company and by it assigned to Mueller, and had no notice of this outstanding option to renew. Kate Mueller gave due notice March 27, 1920, of her election to renew her lease. At this time defendant was occupying other premises under a lease expiring April 30, 1920, and in order to vacate the old premises and move into the new it was necessary to enter into negotiations with Kate Mueller to obtain her release of her renewal, and to this end defendant paid her \$500. A further sum of \$500 was paid for rent of the old building during the time defendant was compelled to hold over; also extra costs of moving were paid and attorney's fees incurred incident to the negotiations with Mrs. Mueller. not until May 10th that it was able to move into the new premises. Defendant claims that plaintiff breached her covenant in the contract as to all leases expiring or terminating April 30. 1920, as the optional renewal rights of Kate Mueller were then

upon entered into passession of the presison. March 12, 1930, Augusta Germanka, plaintiff, as executrix and sele beneficiary of Frank Cherwanka, document, and to Vaughan's Seed Shore, defendant, the lease of April 1, 1915, from Erans. This sale was by a contract resiting a consideration of 77,500,50,000 in cash and the balance by note for \$5,500. This note is the rubited of this suit. In this contract slavanish coveranted with defendant

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outstanding, and it claims these expenditures as damages to be allowed against plaintiff's claim on the note.

Plaintiff asserts that the alleged option for renewal is not a present demise and hence not a lease, and that in any event its terms are so uncertain and indefinite as to be void. It may be conceded that an option to renew is not a present demise or a lease, but that is aside from the crucial point. construing these provisions we must allow for the circumstances of the transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing granted and the end to be attained. Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Co., 241 Ill, 42; Adams v. Gorden, 265 Ill, 87. was clearly the intention of the parties to the Delicatessen Company lease to give it and its assignee an option for a renewal. The words "under new conditions" contemplated that the party of the first part might have to pay an increased rental, in which event the lessee agreed, if the option for renewal was exercised. to pay its pro rata share. Kate Mueller so understood it, as in the notice of her wish to exercise her option to renew she inquired if there was to be an increase of rent, saying she was willing to pay her proportionate share of such increase.

We are not persuaded that the existence of this outstanding and definite right in Kate Mueller to renew, which was known to plaintiff and not known to defendant, was not a breach of plaintiff's covenant as to the termination of all lessees' rights on April 30th, which was evidently made that defendant might be sure it could move without delay into the newly leased building upon the expiration of its right to possession of the premises then occupied by it. Construing the provision of the contract in the light of the circumstances of the parties and the end to be attained, the only reasonable conclusion is that plain-

outstanding, and it claims there expenditures as desuges to be allowed against plaintiff's claim on the note.

Plaintiff asserts that the alleged option for renewel is not a present demine and hence not a lease, and that in any event the terms are so uncertain and indefinite as to be void. It may be conceded that an option to renew is not a present demine or a lease, but that is saids from the crucial point. In constraing there provisions we must ollow for the circumstances of the transmotion, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing greated and the arm to be attended. Goodwillis Co. v. Comicawaalsh Co., SAl III, 43; Adema v. ganden, 265 Ill. 87. It was clearly the invention of the parties to the Delicatesons Company loans to give it and its ansignes an option for a renoval. The words "under new conditions" contemplated that the party of the first part might bove to pay an inoreased rental, in which event the lesses agreed, if the option for renewal was exercised, to pay its pro rate share. i.e.e knoller so understood it. as in the notice of her wish to smaroise is a option to renew abe inquired if there was to be an increase of rent, saying she was * illies to per bor propertionate share of such increase.

standing and deflate right in Kate Weller to renew, which was known to pinintiff and not known to defendent, was not a breach rawn to pinintiff and not known to defendent, was not a breach of plaintiff's coverant as to the termintian of all lectors' rights on April 30th, which was evidently under that inferious inferious might be sure it could move without delay into the newly leased building upon the expiration of its right to possession of the president that the occupied by it. Construing the provision of the contract in the light of the circumstances of the parties and the contract in the light of the caronacters of the parties and the contract in the light of the caronacters of the parties and the

tiff's covenant in this respect was breached and that defendant was properly entitled to recover what it was damaged thereby.

Plaintiff very properly calls attention to the fact that the only plea on file at the time of the trial was the general denial, defendant's special plea of set-off claiming special damages having been withdrawn before the trial. As a general rule, a claim for special damages must be specially pleaded. Does the record here show reversible error in this regard? This is a Municipal court case, where formal pleadings are not always necessary. Defendant's affidavit of defense, after stating the nature of the defense, asserted that on account of the occupancy by Kate Mueller of a material portion of the premises, by reason of a lease to her which could not be terminated April 30th, defendant suffered loss and damages "as is more fully set forth in defendant's set-off filed herewith." The set-off purports to give these items in detail. We hold that this is a proper case for the application of the rule that while the withdrawal of the plea of set-off withdrew it as a pleading in the case, it still remained for the purposes of reference. Therefore, taken in connection with the reference to it in the affidavit of defense, there is sufficient to apprise plaintiff of all she needed to knew as to the character and nature of the defense. If, after the claim of set-off was withdrawn, the affidavit of defense was thought not sufficient in particulars and details, these could have been supplied by an amendment incorporating so much of the special plea as was necessary. This view of the proper practice is supported by the decision in Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, and in principal in Vogrin v. American Steel Co., 263 Ill. 474.

The testimony was competent to justify the court in

tiff!s coverent in this respect was breached and that defendent was properly untilled to recover what it was demoged thereby.

Flaintiff very preparty colle attention to the fine

that the only play on file at the time of the trial was the general -conh istempt a maintain l'in-tes lo solo inlunge c'antain, istemb ages haring been withdrawn before the trial. As a general rule, a claim for openial descret must be enceinly pleaded. Done the record here show reversible error in this remark? This is a Municipal court same, shere formal ploadings are not always secessary. Not endant a selfidavit of defense, witer at along the nature of the difference, asserted trai on wounce of the scenowicy by Kate Muchler of a unterial parties of the premises, by reason of a lease to her which rould not be terminated agril 30th, dois direct suffered loss and deserved as a new fully get firth in discrete a set-org list began to the set-off purcers to give these icons in detail. We had that this is a proper unce for the application of the rule in while the selection of the modern for the ples of set-off withdraw it as a placehour in the dass, it saill remained for the purposes of reference. Museinre, taken in conmeetich with the relevance to in the low of this of defender. there is multiefait to against an initial of all are nerted to know as to the obernoter and acture of the dates. If, ofter the claim of mot-off was withdrawn, the officerit of defence was thought not audiciont in particulars on trickly, these tion or quisting could institute on of beligge most even blues The speaks and as as a second of the speaks as and los properties the speaks and los 111. 486, and in principal in fogth v. Apprint Meet to., 163 ILL. 474.

The teathmeny was competent to first the court in

finding that defendant was damaged to the amount allewed. The parties must be held to their contrastual undertakings and the trial court was right in holding that plaintiff's covenant to defendant was breached to its damage, and as there is no sufficient technical justification for reversal, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

finding that defendent was demayed to the essent allowed. The parties sout to their contracted undertakings and the trial court was right in bolding that plaintiff's coverent to defendant was broached to its dumage, and as there is no sufficient fourtied, the fullment is elect tourneal, the fullment is affirmed.

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Dever and Matchett, JJ., conour.

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SEVENTEENTH WARD BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al.,
Appellees,

VS.

SARAH JULIUS et al. On Appeal of ELLEN L. McCLANE, Appellant. APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 5975

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MOSURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by Ellen L. McClane from an order denying the prayer of her petition that certain moneys, \$806.74, in the hands of the receiver in a foreclosure proceeding, be paid to her.

The Seventeenth Ward Building and Loan Association. complainant, filed a bill to foreclose a trust deed. It alleged that the first defendant, Sarah Julius, had conveyed the security premises to Samuel Rubenstein by deed, in which he had assumed and agreed to pay the trust deed indebtedness. Testimony was taken by a master, who reported, and a decree was duly entered reciting the terms of the bond and trust deed, the amount of the indebtedness, and finding that Samuel Rubenstein was personally liable to pay the same by virtue of his assumption and agreement in the warranty deed to him: and it was erdered that if the property was not redeemed it should be offered for sale by the master, and if there was a deficiency a personal judgment should be entered against Samuel Rubenstain. This decree was entered December 24, 1919, and no appeal was taken therefrom. January 10, 1920, a receiver was appointed. April 25, 1921, there being no redemption, the premises were offered for sale and sold to the complainant for an amount which left a deficiency against Rubenstein for \$1,163.75. May: \$, 1921, said sale was approved and no appeal taken from the order of approval.

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DEVENDENTH WARD BUILDING AND HOAR ASSOCIATION et 21.

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BARRH JULIUS et al. On Appeal of ELLER L. McCLARE,

AFFEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOR COUNTY.

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YA. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURLLY DELIVERRO THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an expeal by Ellan L. McClane from an order denying the prayer of her petition that certain moneys, \$806.74, in the hands of the receiver in a Coreclesure proceeding, be puid to her.

The Strentenath Ward Building and Loan Association, complainant, filed a bill to foreclose a trust deed. It alleged that the first defendent, Sarah Tulius, had conveyed the security premises to Samuel Rubenstein by Jest, in which he had secured and agreed to pay the trust deed indebtedress. Testimony was taken by a master, who reported, and a decree was duly entered reciting the terms of the bond and trust deed, the amount of the indebtedness, and finding that Seruel Rubenstein was versonally Hisble to pay the same by virtue of his accomption and appoement in the warranty deed to him; and it was ordered that if the property was not redeemed it should be offered for sale by the master, and if there was a deficircy a personal jud mert should be entered against Sommel Ruberstain. Plis tecree was entered December 24, 1919, and no appeal was taken therefore. Jenvery 10, 1920, a receiver was appointed. April 25, 1921, there being no redemption, the premises were offered for sale and sold to the complainant for an amount which left a deficiency against Eubenstein for \$1,168.76. May 6, 1921, and sale was approved and no appeal taken from the order of approval.

June 22, 1921, the petitioner, Ellen L. McClane, by her petition represented that December 24, 1920, Samuel Rubenstein had quit claimed his interest in the premises and had assigned his interest in the rents to her, and she asked that the money in the hands of the receiver be paid to her. Complainant answered the petition, setting forth the previous proceedings, and asked that the balance in the receiver's hands be paid to the complainant to apply on the deficiency against Rubenstein. After hearing the court entered an order approving the receiver's report and ordering that the balance of \$806.74 in the receiver's hands be paid to the complainant in reduction of the deficiency due from Rubenstein; and denied the prayer of the McClane petition that the payment of the funds be made to her. The present appeal is from this last order.

The petitioner bases her attack on the order denying her petition upon alleged errors in the original decree of foreclosure and the report of the sale. She was not a party to these proceedings and she cannot now, by this appeal from a particular order, bring in review the entire proceedings. She seeks only the rents and cannot attack the decree in such a collateral matter. Sheahan v. Madigan, 275 Ill. 372; Donner v. Highway Comrs., 278 Ill., 189.

Even if petitioner could attack the decree in this; proceeding, her points of criticism are baseless. There was sufficient to justify the finding in the decree that Rubenstein was personally liable for the mortgage indebtedness. The bill alleged that by virtue of the warranty deed he had assumed and agreed to pay this, and the master's report so found.

Sarah Julius properly assigned her stock to Rubenstein, duly noted on the books of the Association. Such shares are personal property and are transferrable. Section 10, chapter 32, 1921 Illinois Statute, Cahill. Other points are raised which June 22, 1921, the petitioner, Ellen I. McClane, by her petition represented that December 24, 1920, Samuel Rubenatein had quit claimed his interest in the promises and had assigned his interest in the rests to her, and she asked that the money in the hands of the reseiver be petid to her. Complainant answered the petition, setting forth the previous proceedings, and asked that the balance in the receiver's hands be paid to the complainant to apply on the deficiency egainst Rubenstein. After houring the ocurt entered an order approving the receiver's report and ordering that the balance of \$506.74 in the receiver's bands be paid to the complainant in reduction of the deficiency due from Rubento the complainant in reduction of the deficiency due from Rubentein; and denied the prayer of the McClane petition that the payment of the funds be made to her. The present appeal is from payment of the funds be made to her. The present appeal is from

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are without merit. We prefer, however, to base our decision upon the rule that the petitioner cannot by this appeal question the decree or report of the master's sale, or other orders from which no appeal has been taken.

The order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

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are without merit. We prefer, however, to base our decision upon the rule that the petitioner cannot by this appeal question the decree or report of the waster's sale, or other orders from which no appeal has been taken.

.bes order is affirmed.

AVFIRED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

149 - 27625

MATT J. O'CONNELL.

Appellee,

YS.

F. LANDON, an Individual, Doing Business Under the Name of F. LANDON CARTAGE COMPANY, and F. LANDON CARTAGE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellants APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 598

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

By this appeal defendants seek the reversal of an adverse judgment for \$600 in an action brought by plaintiff to recover compensation for injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the negligent operation by defendants of an automobile.

The accident happened about six o'clock in the evening, in Chicago, at the point where Twelfth street runs west from Wabash avenue, a north and south street. At that point are the stub ends of two Twelfth street street car tracks. Cars coming from the west on the southerly track stop for westbound passengers and then switch over to the westbound or northerly track. It was a busy time of day and cars left there about two minutes apart. The jury properly could believe that plaintiff attempted to board a street car, but was unable to do so on account of the crowd; that at this time defendants' automobile came from the south on Wabash and turned west on Twelfth, running about eighteen or twenty miles an hour; that no warning was given to the people in Twelfth street who were waiting for a street car; that plaintiff looked up and saw the automobile coming, and that it struck him almost instantly after he saw it. The plaintiff sufficiently proved that the accident was caused by the negligent driving of defendants' automobile at an excessive speed and without warning, as charged in the declaration, and that

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MATE J. O'COMMIL.

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F. LANDON, an individual, Doing Business Under the Twas of F. LANDON CARRAGE CONFIGURATE OLITARY a Corporation, Appellants.

T . . PICON W WORL SA. CAR.

PROBLEM FOR SPECIAL STATES OF THE STATES OF

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. wiley of the solute of a read above of the sealing of in Ohioago, at the point mere Iwelfth street mans west from 'abash avenue, a north of ro. W. erract. At the study of the study of the .energi the thermal morney of the vi ows to 3 :0 11 1.12 x 11 . 3 25 .. to be and the grown are bure tower to be one round glassifice and no over to the west une or certainly train. It sue a dust the of day and care left there about two stantes smirt. The day or or or or or if boil we this six nits? It to go the street are was inable to a compression of the transfer of the party and the contract of the contra on Twelfth, run in about at all on a server as a maney time ; were the second of the second of the second property and the second of t fire algerable a basel to and all the tenters and the obtre, and that is straight and a mile of the first and latter that the same of the state of the state of the same of the

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plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence contributing to the accident.

It is urged that there was no evidence which justified the court in admitting two ordinances of the City of Chicago which forbid a motor vehicle, overtaking any street car which is stopped for the purpose of taking on passengers, to pass ar approach within ten feet of said car. While there was evidence tending to support defendants' theory that at the instant the automobile struck the plaintiff the street car which plaintiff intended to board was moving and not standing still, there was also evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff says that he was standing beside the steps of the street car when he saw the automobile coming about eight or ten feet away. It was for the jury to determine whether the ordinances were applicable to the facts, and it was entirely proper to admit them.

Criticism is made of an instruction with reference to damages. Counsel for defendants do not, however, give the instruction in full but only certain selected sentences. We have repeatedly refused to pass upon an instruction presented in this manner, as we are unable to judge of the effect of an instruction incompletely presented to us in bits. However, as we understand the instruction, it was not reversible error to give it.

It is said that the verdict is excessive, but with this we cannot agree. There is no sufficient reason to reverse and the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

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plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence contributing to the accident.

It is unged. there was no evidence which justified the court in admixting two ordinances of the City of Chicago which forthis a motor vehicle, overtaking any acrest car which is stopped for the purpose of taking on passengers, to pass er approach within ten feet of said car. While there was evidence tending to support defendants, theory that at the instant the automobile struck the plaintiff the street car which plaintiff intended to board was nowing and not standing still, there was also evilence to the contrary. Plaintiff says that he was standing healds the steps of the street car when he has not standing healds the steps of the street car when he has also street to determine whether sight or ten feet away. It was for the forth and it was entirely proper to admit them.

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The is each time to recall the recall of the successive, but with this cannot agree. There is no sufficient roughn to reverse and the judgment in affirmet.

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Derer und Matchest, 11., concur.

SAMUEL RUDINOFF,
Appellee,
Appellant.

Appellant.

2075

COCK COUNTY COURT OF
COCK COUNTY.

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY
DELIVERED THE OPICION OF THE COURT.

This appeal challenges a judgment for \$536 against defendant, entered upon a verdict.

whereby defendant agreed to do certain repair work upon a building belonging to plaintiff for an agreed price. Plaintiff asserts that because defendant failed to complete the work called for by the contract, he was obliged to have it done by other parties at an expense to himself, for which defendant should reimburse him. Defendant filed a set-off claiming something due for extra work. The jury did not, however, allow defendant's claim, but found for plaintiff in an amount which, it is strongly urged, is in excess of the amount permissible under plaintiff's evidence. The testimony was in sharp conflict and we would not feel disposed to disturb the verdict upon the questions of fact involved. However, we are not content to let the judgment stand for the following reason.

Concededly the contract was executed in duplicate, bearing the date October 6, 1919, and signed by both parties, each taking a copy. Upon the trial plaintiff undertook to introduce his copy, which had been subsequently altered by changing the date to November 8 and by adding, after a provision

139 - RT655

SAMUEL BUDINGPE.

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JOSEPH STROKE ASSELLAN

APPLANT PROM COUNTY COURT OF COUNTY.

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IR. PRINCING JUNTES NOTIFIED.
DESIVATION THE SPISSES OF THE COURT.

This appeal challenges a judgment for \$555 wainst defendant, entered upon a verdict.

The perties made a written contract in duplicate, whereby defendent agreed to describ repair work upon a building beleaging to plaintiff for an agreed price. Plaintiff building beleaging to plaintiff for an agreed price. Plaintiff celling that because defendant failed to complete the cork celled for by the contract, he was chinged to have it done by coher parties at an expanse to bimself, for which defendent should reliablese him. Defendant filled a set-oif otticity roustining due for extra verb. The jury did not, however, allow thing due for extra verb. The jury did not, however, allow defendant's claim, but found in plaintiff in an emount worsteel it is strongly arged, is in excess of the amount perceived under claimitt's evidence. The testimony was in abary occurrate and we would not feel disposed to disturb the verdict upon the questions of feet involved. However, we are not convent to lat the fullenting remain.

Consected an executed a desire; e., desire; e., desire; e., desire; e., desire the date Cotober d. 1910, and eigned by both parties, each taking a cupy. Upon the trial plaintiff undertook to intereduce his copy, which had been subsequently altered by changing the date to Nevember 2 and by adding, eller a vervision

wherein the defendant undertook and agreed to start the work as soon as given possession, these words - "and to complete said work in twenty working days." It is admitted by plaintiff that these changes were made in his copy by an attorney, who testified that such changes were made by him after having "talked to both parties." Defendant denies that he ever consented to such changes and produced in evidence his copy of the contract as it was originally executed. The court permitted both copies to go to the jury, with the testimony of the lawyer who made the changes in plaintiff's copy.

Under certain circumstances parties may, by mutual agreement, change their written contract and be held thereto, but not in this case. As far as defendant was concerned there was no change, which means that the contract stood as originally made. It was error to admit plaintiff's altered copy and the testimony of the atterney who made the alterations, thus permitting the jury to predicate the liability of defendant upon a condition which was not a part of the contract of the parties.

The changes as to date and insertion of the obligation upon defendant to complete the work within twenty days were important in aiding plaintiff's claim based upon alleged delay of defendant. The jury should have considered only whether there was reasonable progress with the work.

For the error indicated the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

wherein the defendant undertook and exceed to start the work as soon as given persension, these words - "and to complete said work in tranty working days." It is admitted by plaintiff that those changes were made in his copy by an atterney, who testified that rauch changes were made by him after having "trikes to both parties." Defendant denies that he ever consented to such changes and produced in evidence his copy of the contract as it was originally executed. The court permitted both copies to go to the jury, with the testimony of the lawyer who made the changes in plaintiff's copy.

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LLVEREND AND REMARDED.

Dovor and Matchett, JJ., conour.

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PAUL SCHROEDER, Doing Business as Paul Schroeder & Company, Appellant,

Appella

VS.

H. H. MCKENZIE,

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 5983

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought suit to recover seal estate commissions on the sale of property owned by defendant. Upon trial by the court finding was against plaintiff, and judgment entered accordingly, from which he appeals.

It is essential for a recovery of broker's commissions to show that he was the procuring cause of the sale.

Dickson v. Owens, 134 Ill. App. 561; Bowers v. Simpson, 160 Ill.

App. 48; Wentworth v. Mann, 178 Ill. App. 621; Murawska v. Boeger, 219 Ill. App. 241; Rigdon v. More, 226 Ill. 382; Ogren v. Sundell, 220 Ill. App. 584.

Was plaintiff the procuring cause of the instant sale? We are of opinion the evidence shows he was not. Plaintiff apparently had the exclusive agency until about March 15, 1921, for the sale of the property in question, a house in Wilmette.

Mr. T. W. Truitt, then living in Chicago, who subsequently purchased the property, first heard of it through a Mrs. Berdwell, a friend living in Wilmette. He told Mrs. Truitt to look at it.

She went to Wilmette, having with her a description of the property which she had gotten from Mrs. Bordwell about the first of March. She was accompanied by Mrs. Tuttle, a real estate agent doing business in Chicago, who went with her to show her the house. They passed plaintiff's office in Wilmette, and one

PAUL BOHNLOSS, 1919, LUNITOSS AS Pul Bonro: en L C rany, Appellant,

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. a. J.c . ii. . Appelled.

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 of them suggested that they should inquire there as to any other houses for sale. There they met a Mr. Huntley, associated with plaintiff, who offered to take them in his car to see the defendant's house, which was done, although Mrs. Truitt does not remember that they had any conversation there with Huntley about the house. She says she would have examined defendant's house without having been taken there by Mr. Huntley. Mrs. Truitt reported to her husband, who about two weeks thereafter went to Wilmette to examine the property, saw several signs on it, one sign reading, "Open for Inspection," and as the place was open, he inspected it. About the first of April the contract for the purchase of the property from Mr. McKenzie was signed. Plaintiff was not present and took no part in making the contract. Plaintiff never reported to the owner that Mrs. Truitt had been shown the property, and neither Mr. Truitt nor Mrs. Truitt had any dealings or communications with the plaintiff except upon the one occasion above mentioned. Defendant testified he had the property listed with other agents; that he paid a commission for the sale of the house, but not to the plaintiff.

It is a reasonable conclusion from this narrative that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the sale. The buyer first heard of the property through other parties, and it would have been inspected and purchased by Truitt even if Mrs. Truitt had not called at the office of plaintiff. This being the case, it is hardly reasonable to say that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.

The judgment of the Municipal court was right and it is affirmed.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

of them suggested that they should inquire there as to any other houses for sale. There they met a Mr. Buntley, associated with plaintiff, who offered to take them in his car to see the deferdent's bouse, which was done, although dra' Truitt does not remember that they had any conversation there with Huntley about the house. She says she rould have examined defendant's house without having been taken there by Mr. Muntley. Mrs. Truitt reported to her bushand, who about two weeks thereafter went to Wilmette to examine the property, new access signs on it, one sign reading, "Open for Inspection," and as the place was epen, he inspected it. about the first of April the contract for the purchase of the property from Mr. Mchenzie was signed. Plaintiff was not present and took no part in making the contract. Plaintiff never reported to the owner tast Hrs. Traitt had been shown the property, and noither Mr. Truitt not Ers. Truitt had any dealings or communications with the plaintiff except upon the one occasion above mentioned. Palencant testified he had the property listed with other agents; that he paid a commission for the sale of the house, but not to the plaintiff.

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it is affirmed.

APPIRMED.

Dever and Entehett, II., comour.

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PAUL SCHRUEBER, Doing Business as Paul Schroeder & Company, Appellant,

YS.

H. H. MOKREZIE.

Appellac.

APPRAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 598 3A

· ADDITIONAL OPISION OF REHEARING BY MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY.

We allowed the petition for rehearing in this cause as it was urged that we had not given sufficient consideration to the fact that the course of Mrs. Berdwell's information was plaintiff's sign on the premises. This is too remote to be the efficient and procuring cause of the sale. At most it was merely the cause of a cause. Marawaky v. Beener. 219 Ill. App. 241. After having given further careful consideration to the points made by plaintiff both in the briefs and petition for rehearing, we are not persuaded to change our fermer opinion and the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIREND.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

PAR SCHECKER, Point Business as Faul Schroeder & Company, supellant,

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R. R. Bekenklik,

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SUPERL FROM MURICIPAL COURT OF CHIDAGO.


227 I.A. 598 OK

ORIGITORAL OF LABORITOR ROSTING.

We allowed the petition for rebunding in this esses as it was urged that the test of the device of the fact the test that the course of the device of the fact the course of the fact the course of the fact the course of the precises. This is too whats to be the efficient and producing cause of the sale. At west it was merely the cause of a cause. Marsher careful to paid the fact having given further careful consideration to the points made by pinicist both in the briefe and petition for releasing, we are not persuaded to shangs our former spinion and the fadgment is militared.

AWEREND.

Doyer and Betwheel, II., conour.



MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MESURELY DELIVERED THE COURT.

Plaintiff by his statement of claim alleged that defendant ewed him a balance of the purchase price of certain real estate contracts sold by plaintiff to defendant. The affidavit of merits admitted \$116.73 to be due. The amount in dispute was \$500. Upon trial the jury was favorable to plaintiff's version and returned a verdict of \$616.73. From the judgment for this amount defendant appeals.

Respective counsel have argued a number of matters involving details of accounts and statements. It would unduly extend this opinion to comment upon these. Having considered the various contentions, we are not convinced that the verdict of the jury was wrong.

In brief outline the transaction was as follows: Plaintiff is a contractor and builder of small homes and owned seven cottages in Chicago, which had been sold by him to seven different persons under installment contracts. In October or November, 1915, defendant bought plaintiff's interest in these contracts for \$6,800, of which \$6,300 was to be paid in cash and the disposition of the balance of \$500 is the question in dispute.

Defendant testified that it was agreed he should retain this \$500 for two years as a guaranty, contingent upon the persons obligated under the real estate contracts meeting

184 - 27660

Joseph L. Thoken

WILLIAM R. WALRATE

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LARIDIEUM MUNE JANASA OF CHICAGO.

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ME. PRESIDILE JUSTICE MOSURELY LELIVERSED LIKE OF THE OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff by bis statement of claim alleged that defendant owed him a ballance of the purchase price of certain real estate configues and by plaintiff to dafendent. The arfidewit of morite admitted \$116.75 to be due. The amount in dispute was \$500. Epon trial the jury was favorails to plaintiff's version and returned a verdiet of \$616.73. From the judgment for this amount defendent amounts.

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Defendant testified that it was agreed he cheuld retain this \$500 for two years an amaranty, contingent upon the persons obligated uniar the real ratate contracts meeting

their monthly installment payments promptly: that two of the obligors under the contracts defaulted within the two years, and the defendant was compelled to sell their property. Hence defendant says he is entitled to retain the \$500 pursuant to the agreement between the plaintiff and himself. Plaintiff denies that there was any such agreement and claims that all of the \$6.800 was to be paid unconditionally; that in December, when defendant made a payment of each, plaintiff was first told defendant would hold back \$500 to guarantee the contracts: that nothing had been said about this prior to that time. Plaintiff then told defendant. "I wanted all that was coming to me. I told him I would not stand it." In the following January defendant wrote plaintiff enclosing a statement in which he undertook to charge plaintiff's account with the item of \$500 "deposit to guarantee contracts! Shortly thereafter plaintiff called at defendant's office and demanded that this \$500 be paid. tiff testified he called a number of times after this, demanding payment.

The variant stories of the witnesses, with the documents which it is said tend to support their respective claims, were considered and weighed by the jury, and we cannot say that its conclusion is against the greater weight of the evidence.

The claim of an account rendered is sufficiently met by the testimony of the plaintiff that he refused to accept defendant's version of the transaction between them or to admit defendant's right to withhold \$500 as a contingent fund.

A number of points have been made asserting errors upon the trial. We have noted all of these, and while not approving of everything said or done upon the trial, we are of the epinion that no error occurred of sufficient importance to compel a reversal. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

their marthly installment aspects promptly; that the of the obligors under the spatracts defaulted within the two years, and the defeatant was compailed to sell their property. Hence defeatest says be is smillied to retain the \$500 pursuant to the agrooment between the blantaff and lineal'. Flaintiff donder eds to fin Judy malufo bus measures done yes sur what that \$6.800 was to be path unconditionally; that in December, when defendant made a payment of oash, plaintiff was first told defendant would held been your to gouranten the contracte; that notiting has been ealld about this prior to than time. Plaintiff then told defendant, "I wanted all that was coming to me. I teld bind I would not count it." In the following January de-Tendant wrote element onclosing a statement in which he underdingular ODE to wait sait diby buscons at little inig ograde of root to grammee contracts! Shortly thereafter plaintiff called at defendant's affice and demanded that this \$500 be usid. anthugench, side worth werely to andered a better and boltises thit narment.

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203 - 27679

CLYDE R. MYERS, Appellee,

YB.

NORTHWESTERN ELEVATED RALFROAD COMPANY and CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellants. APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 599

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff while a passenger on an elevated railway station platform of defendants was struck by a passing train, receiving injuries. He brought suit for compensation and upon trial had a verdict and judgment for \$6,800. Defendants appeal.

In the counts of his declaration plaintiff alleged that while in the exercise of due care for his own safety, defendants caused the accident in question by various negligent acts, - general operation, speed, absence of guard rails, lights, warning and proper trainmen - which are not necessary to particularize, as the only argument presented by defendants for reversal is that plaintiff was injured because of his own negligence.

The accident occurred at the Howard street station in Cheage, where the elevated company operated trains propelled by electric trolley over tracks belonging to the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. At this point the whole road bed is about fifty feet in width, elevation about sixteen or seventeen feet above the street level, resting on a fill between concrete retaining walls. The tracks at this point run virtually north and south. The east retaining wall was completed and the fill on the east side had been put in and the easterly track laid for some years before the date of the accident. The west wall was not fully completed and some of the westerly tracks still rested upon timber. The

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HORTHESTEIN PLANTE HALLIONS CONFAIR AND CHICARD, NELBANNESS & ST. PAUL HALIVEY COMPLEY, AST GLIGGER.

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PH. PSECHIELS DESCRIBE ACCESSES.

Plaintiff while a posessager on an elevated railway etation platfor, of telephanes were street of a passing train, receiving injuster. He brought will for a commentar and upon trial had a vertiet and jaforna for 10, he. Outer denis appeal.

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station runs southerly from the south side of Howard avenue, which runs east and west. There are four tracks here. The west track was for freight; the next track east was used by south bound passenger trains: the third track was the main track for north bound trains; and the fourth track, being the last to the east. was also used for north bound elevated trains, although it was called a switch track or runabout. The station platform was between the third and fourth tracks and was about 280 feet long and nine feet four inches wide; it was three feet six inches higher than the rails, and its floor was about on a level with or a few inches higher than the platforms of the cars as they stood on the tracks alongside of it. A canopy ran along the platform supported by posts in the center. At the extreme north end of the platform a stairway five feet in width led down to the street level. The stairway was also covered by a canopy uniting with that of the platform, and was boarded up at the sides. From the east side of this stairway to the east edge of the station platform was two feet six inches; between the east side of the stairway and the east edge of the platform at or near the north edge of the platform was a post running up to and supporting the canopy. The distance from this post to the east edge of the platform was seventeen inches.

Howard avenue wtation was a terminus for certain trains which run no farther north. At the feet of an inclined track beginning at the north line of the street were yards where cars were laid up. Certain other trains after stopping at this station continued on north bound to Evanston or Wilmette. It was customary here to cut off cars from certain north bound trains and run them northward across Howard avenue and down the incline into the yards; also cars at this point were added to south bound

station rune southerly from the nouth side of Henned avenue, which runs ourt and ment. There are four tracks here. The most track baned draws of been ear seas most dren ent trigler's rel ear passenger trainer the third trank was the main trank for north bound trains; and the funrth brack, being the last to the east, was also used for north bound elevated kraims, although it was called a switch track or manageut. The station platform was between the third and fourth tracks and was about 980 foot load and nine feet four inches wide; it was three feet six laches higher than the rails, and its floor was about on a layer with or a few tackes higher than the platforms of the care as they steed on the tracks slangetde of it. A campy ran along the platform supported by goots in the center. At the extreme north and of the platform a stairway five feet in ridte led down to the stroot level. The chairway was also savered by a conopy uniting with that of the glatforn, and was boarded up at the sleet From the wast oide or this stairway to the east edge of the etation platform was two fast six inches; be tween the eact side of and the states and the wast type of the platform at the near the north edge of the of them was a post winting in 't wid augmenting the comong. The leatest even fits port to the err edge of the platford was seventeen inches.

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trains coming from Evanston and Wilmette. This cutting off of cars from north bound trains was done on the track east of the platform. The cars taken from north bound trains were the front cars, and the rear cars of such trains so out in two were run down, crossed over and brought back on the south bound main track, where they were added to south bound trains. It was one of these rear cars detached from a north bound train and pushed north on the east track which, while passing the platform where he was, struck plaintiff.

Plaintiff, forty-five years old, lived in Evanston, and had alighted from a north bound train which went no farther than Heward avenue, and which arrived at the station on the track west of the platform about six o'clock in the evening of January 14. 1919. He was familiar with the surroundings, as he had been traveling between his home and his business by this way for a year and a half. Sometimes on alighting from a train whose terminus was at Howard avenue, he would proceed homeward by taking a north bound Evanston train from the same platform, or would go down the stairway at the north end of the platform and take a surface street car to Evanston. These surface cars came on Heward avenue from the west and their terminus on Howard, before returning to Evanston, was west of the elevated tracks. Plaintiff was in doubt at this time whether he would wait on the platform for a north bound elevated train or go down to the stairway at the north end and take a surface car to Evanston. He looked to the south from both sides of the platform, to see whether a train was coming which he might take, and saw none. He testified that he then went towards the north stairway, walking about a foot from the east edge of the platform, and had reached a point about four or five feet from the head of the stairway, when he

trains coming from Branch and Wilmette. This cutting off of care from Borth bound trains was done on the trains were the 'platform. The care taken from north bound trains were the 'frant care, and the rear care of such trains we cat in two some run down, ordered over and brought beat on the south bound anin trade, where they were added to south bound trains and one of these rear care detached from a morth bound train and 'pubbed north on the cast track weich, while pareing the planform 'pubbed he was, stends glada'. It.

Plaintiff, forty-live yours old, lived in Lyanston. and had allahed from a north books trong show sent no farther Month wit me and a mould be having Ables her seemen brawell made west of the placed speak als clock in the recipies of January 14. 1919. So was failles wit the accountages, on the been raveling between Mis lone and bis itsacens by this ver for year and h badr's Sourtiese on which the free a train whom guinal se or record become the confined and the saw summer is a north bound Avenue on train from the same of this man, or tende go a send but were fig and to have ristua and the yearses and awell surface wirest dar to Eyes stas. Those surf or cire out on Howard avenue from the week and bushr ter buse on Morand, byfore Tetarning to Syenaten, who ever in the tit trucks. Fight -2. Is only in South to the other to be such that the block of form for a morth bound ellerant brain or a correct to see ... resy at the morth and and take a spring our to Bywiston. He looked ាក់ ។ ស្រាស់មាននេះ នៅ , ក្រុមិស្រីស្នាស់ នៃ នេះសំសំសំសំសំសំសំ នៅស្រែសំ នេះសំបាន នៅការបាន នៅការបាន នៅការបាន នៅក train was coming which he of hit take, and some neme. To testified the train girthfar . witide to the sold absect from med and the control of the co thought one the sage or the stations, and it maded a point ad need go, the in the to have the hold will an used twode

The cars which struck plaintiff had been part of a north bound train which had pulled in and stopped at the east track shortly before the train from which plaintiff alighted stopped at the west side of the same platform. After the passengers had alighted from the train on the east track the first three cars were taken on north into the yards, leaving two rear coaches empty and without lights standing along the east side of the platform, the north end of the north coach being about 125 feet south of the north end of the platform. As soon as the first three cars were out of the way a motor car came in from the south, was coupled to the rear coach, and these three cars started to move north. The station platform was lighted with incandescent electric lights under the canopy and there is no evidence of insufficient light on the platform. One of plaintiff's witnesses testified that he could see these cars 150 feet away, and that from the north end of the platform he could see they were moving towards the witness. This was a busy hour of the evening. North bound trains were arriving at short intervals on both tracks, and cutting off and switching cars on these tracks were customary movements. Plaintiff was familiar with these conditions.

The testimony of two other witnesses tends, although very slightly, to correborate plaintiff's story of the occurrence. Another of plaintiff's witnesses, however, testifies that he was within five or six feet of plaintiff when he was struck and saw the accident; that plaintiff reached the head of the stairs and took hold of the post or the southeast corner of the stair canopy, and was holding onto this canopy or the post, looking northward,

vas etrack drop behind by a cer passing on the sast track, was incoded of from the platform and felt to the ground fear or five fact north of the end of the platform. The wheels of the train which struck his ran over his right log.

The care union atruck pininitiff had been sure of north bound train which had pulked in and stopped at the east track shortly before the train from which plaintiff alignied stopped at the west side of the same platform. After the pageongers had aligneed from the train on the east track the first three cars were taken on nurth into the yards, leaving two rear ocachas empty and at though lighted atomiting along the east olds of the glate form, the north end of the north seach being about 125 feet mouth of the marks and of the platfame. As soon as the three three to vere out of the way a meter dur danc in from the south, was coupled to the rear coach, and these three cars started to move north. The station platform was lighted with incumdescent electric lights under the capery and there is no evidence of inpufficient light on the platform. One of plaintiff's of thesees tootified that he could not these care 150 feet way, and that from the north and of the platfor, he could see they were moving towards the vitness. Tale was a busy hour of the evening. Acres bound trains were arriving at amore intervals on both trucks, and oursend off and artiching cars on these trucks were customary more meats. Plainthis was fordilled the three conditions.

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when his right shoulder was struck by the train. This witness says that no part of the ceach extended over the platform and that plaintiff's "shoulder must have been extending out in order to allow the train to hit him."

a switchman who was on the front end of the north car with a lighted lantern. He testified that when the front end of the car in which he stood was approaching the north end of the platform, plaintiff stepped cut, took held of the post by the stairway with his left hand, leaned out to the east and looked north; that he leaned out far enough that the front end of the car struck him across the shoulder or back, and his head broke a window in the front of the car. Witnesses testify that the cars were then moving eight or ten miles an hour.

There was also evidence tending to show that one standing at this corner of the platform, by leaning easterly and looking along Howard avenue, could see whether or not an Evanston surface car was on Heward avenue, and it is plausible that, as plaintiff was undecided whether to wait for a through north bound Evanston elevated train, or to proceed homeward by the surface car, he wished to ascertain before leaving the platform whether or not a surface car was at hand.

It was shown that the side of the particular car which struck plaintiff, standing on the track beside the platform at the point where the accident occurred, was five inches from the edge of the platform. There was a grab-handle attached to the front of the door which projected from the side of the ear something less than four inches. The general testimony was that passing trains came as close to the east edge of the platform as they do at other stations - probably about three inches.

There was considerable evidence introduced by

when his right choulder was struck by the train. This witness says that no part of the couch extended ever the platform and that plaintiff's "shoulder must have been extending out in order to allow the train to hit him."

The only other witness who new plaintist struck was a switchmen who was on the front out of the newth car with a lighted lantern. He testified that when the front and of the certa which he stood was approaching the corts and of the platform, plaintist stopped but, teak held of the past by the stairway with his left hand, leaved out to the east and hooked nowh; that he leaved out far enough that the front out of the car struck lim across the shoulder or buck, and his had broke a window in the front of the car. Since testify that was cars were then moving eight or ten with he would again the then.

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It was about that the side of the particular cor which struck plaintiff, starting on the track by ide the plaintiff, starting on the track by ide the plaint where the accident occurred, the little and from the edge of the plaiform. There we a armbemula attached to be from from the door which prejected from the rule of the door which prejected from the rule one thing less than four incies. The general testinony was that passing trains case as close to the east edge of the platform as they do at other sintless - probably about three inches.

There was considerable syldence introduced by

plaintiff tending to show that the east track was uneven, which would cause a passing train to oscillate or sway, and one witness testified that the upper part of the car as it passed projected over the platform. It is highly improbable, even if the conditions claimed by plaintiff were proven, that the car, starting from a standstill, five inches from the edge, could, in a distance of 125 feet, going eight or ten miles an hour, so project or sway over the platform as to strike a person thereon who was a foot from the edge. The greater weight of the evidence shows, however, that the east track was solid and well ballasted, straight and level, and neither rail higher than the other; that there was no unasual rocking or oscillation of the cars as they ran along the east side of the platform, and no part of the cars overhung or protruded over the edge. Photographs introduced in evidence showing the platform, cars and track, tend to prove this.

We are of the opinion that the greater weight of the evidence proves that the plaintiff, although fully acquainted with the surrounding situation and knowing the possibility of unlighted, empty cars being pushed past this point at frequent intervals at this time of evening, wishing to see whether or not a street car was available on which to continue his journey, leaned out from the easterly edge of the platform into the line of the movement of cars passing upon the cast track, directly in the pathway of the approaching cars, and that he was struck by the front end of the car because he had put himself in this position of danger.

It is the plain duty of a passenger when not getting on or off a train, but while waiting upon the platform or engaged in walking upon it, to keep such a distance from the edge of it next to the rail that he will be beyond the reach of projections

plaintiff tending to show that the east track "as uneven, which would couse a passing train to osaillate or over, ond one witmore toward them no odd to some recent and that beliliast sees seezed over the platform. It is highly improbable, even if the conditions claimed by plaintiff were preven, that the car, storting from a standatill, tiva inches from she edge, eacht, in a distance of 125 feet, going of 't or tor mains un hour, se profact or sway over the platform as to sirike a person thereon. who was a foot from the sake. The greater weight of the eyedence energy, however, that the cast truck was solid and rell and the transfer of love realist and level for the target and the and level for the transfer of the transfer o other; that there were no unmound receim, or occimistion of the ou has some her eds to alim toos edd garde are year as atao part of the cars overblug at coefficient over the other. Thete, raphs introduced in our seaso aboute the olliform, come and exact, temp to prove this.

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of on-coming trains. A railway company cannot be held liable for injury to a passenger who suffers himself to go beyond such a limit and is injured by a passing train. Such conduct is contributory negligence as a matter of fact. Among the many cases involving facts like those in the instant case, in which it was held there was no liability upon the defendant because the accident was caused by the conduct of the plaintiff in negligently placing himself in a dangerous position, are: Chicago, B. & Q.

R. R. Co. v. Mahara, 47 Ill. App. 208; Chicago & E. I. R. R. Co.
v. Weir, 91 Ill. App. 420; Matthews v. Penn. R. R. Co., 148 Pa.
St. 491; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 122 Pa. St. 58; Louisville & M. R. R. Co. v. Glascow, 179 Ala. 251; D'Arcy v. Int. R. T. Co.,
152 M. Y. S. 500; St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co., v. Douglass, 175
S. W. 518; Hutchinson v. Boston & M. R. R., 219 Mass. 389;
Dotson v. Krie R. R. Co., 68 N. J. L. 679.

We are convinced that the accident was caused by the negligent conduct of plaintiff and that with ordinary and due care for his own safety it would have been avoided; we must therefore reverse the judgment with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACT.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

of secondar trains. A reliewy company cannot be held liable for injury to a passenger who setters himself to the buyond such a limit and is injured by a poneing train. Such conduct is contributory negligance as a motter of fact. Among the many cannot involving facts like those the the inathest case, in which it was need there was no liability upon the detailant because the so-close was caused by the conduct of the plaintiff in negligantly planting microff in a dangerous position, are: Chisago, f. & P. & R. & Co. v. carago, 67 111. App. 203; this case the selection of the select

"e are or ancess that the scondent are and by the negligent avertout of plaintliff and thus the order of the order of the care for his own safeth would have been switted; as art insectors reverse the justices with a finite, of face.

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
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203 - 27679

FINDING OF FACT.

We find as an ultimate fact that the proximate cause of the accident described in plaintiff's declaration and each count thereof was the negligent conduct of the plaintiff in placing himself in a position of danger, thus negligently directly contributing to the accident so described.

Ve find as an elithest fact that the gradicate ones of the encilon and seek court there described in placifity overlanding their seek court thereof was the newly one conduct or the of ineils in a posts in of danger, then negligantly directly concribating to the societar, so described.



MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MESURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff, bringing an action for replevin subsequently changed to trover, upon trial by the court had judgment for \$400.

We are of the opinion this was error, and that the court should have found defendant not guilty.

The object of the replevin suit was a refrigerator which in the early part of March, 1921, was owned by and in the possession of Joseph Martine. March 22nd, plaintiff, who was doing business under the firm name of the Englewood Sausage Company, purchased in the name of this company the refrigerator from Martins and obtained a bill of sale of that date for the same, which was recorded in the recorder's office of Cook County. The refrigerator was left in the possession of Martins and not removed therefrom until July 1, 1921, when it was sold by defendant.

It appears that Martins had been buying meats from a concern represented by defendant and owed it therefor approximately \$700. May 5, 1921, Martins executed a chattel mortgage to defendant, conveying with other property the refrigerator in question as security for advances to be made by defendant by way of extending credit for meats to be sold to Martins by defendant. Defendant at this time had no knowledge of any claims of ownership of anyone other than Martins, and nothing appeared upon the refrigerator

AFFOAR PROM MUDICIPAL COURT ON CHICKS!

TIMOTHY CRIMMINGS.

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a most state maken and bad bad satural dai's stanger dI concern represented by following and and it therefor an rectining \$700. May 5, 1921, Marth is magnified a or at of a erthmate to delenge ent, conveying mith ather measurty whe refrigerated in mostion as sequely ty for afternoon to be de by the control of agreements and climber as credit for meata to be suid 'o marting by eles 'ann. Defentunt at this time had no knowledge of any chains of pracrable of unyone other than Martine, and societag appeared upon the refrigerator

to indicate that Martins was not the owner. In the latter part of June Martins defaulted in payment of his indebtedness to defendant, who thereupon advertised for sale the articles mentioned in the chattel mortgage, including the refrigerator. The sale was held July 1, and the refrigerator was sold. It was not until about the time of the sale that defendant knew plaintiff claimed to own the refrigerator.

The integrity of the chattel mortgage is attacked and it is claimed that the beneficial interest therein is in parties of other than defendant. None of these questions is/controlling importance. The chattel mortgage showed a valid conveyance to defendant which would entitle him to possession of the refrigerator provided plaintiff does not have a superior right. What superior right had plaintiff to the chattel which he had purchased but permitted his vendor to continue to possess for over three months? This is answered by section 23 of the Sales Act, chapter 121 a. Illinois Statute, Cahill.

"Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods *** the delivery or transfer by that person *** of the goods *** under any sale, pleige, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same."

In Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 Ill. 471, the court said:

"The policy of the law in this state will not permit the owner of personal property to sell it, and still continue in the pessession of it. Pessession being one of the strongest evidences of title to personal property, if the real ownership is suffered to be in one, and the apparent ownership in another, the latter gains credit as owner, and is enabled to practice deseit upon mankind. It is the well established doctrine of this court that an absolute sale of personal property, where the possession is permitted to remain with the vendor, is fraudulent ner se, and void as to creditors and purchasers."

This is the unvarying rule repeated in a large number of decisions in this state.

Plaintiff says that this rule does not apply when the

To inferrity of the Jacks of the Jackson is attended and it is claimed if the claimed in the parties of the character than defendant. Note of these eventions in it is in parties of other than defendant. The detical entirely whole a valid encourance to defendant valor and entirely id a to necrossion of the refrictor provided of the character of

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transfer of possession is impracticable en account of the size or character of the chattel sold, but this would not apply to the instant article which plaintiff, himself, testified could have been removed in one day.

The recording in the recorder's office of the bill of sale from Martins to plaintiff does not constitute motice.

We know of no law providing for the recording of bills of sale of this character or that such recording constitutes notice.

It seems to be decided otherwise in <u>Gilbert v. MationalCash</u>

Register, 176 Ill. 288.

In replevin plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and under the circumstances of this case plaintiff can assert no right of pessession superior to that of defendant; hence the judgment of the trial court was erroneous and judgment of nil capiat is entered in this court.

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF HIL CAPIAT.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

transfer of possession is impracticable on account of the size or character of the plaintiff, himself, tertified could have been removed in one day.

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REVINCED AND JUDGMENT.

Dover and Matchest, JJ., concur.

255 - 27731

PALACE CLOAKS, SUITS AND MILLIMERY, a Corporation, Appelled.

VS.

AMERICAN RAILWAY EXPRESS
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Appellant.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 599°

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MCSURELY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff's statement of claim alleged that two shipments of dresses were delivered to defendant for transportation and delivery from Chicago to certain parties in New York City, but that the deliveries to the consignees were never made. It sought to recover the value of the shipments and upon trial by the court was awarded \$175, and from the judgment defendant appeals.

The briefs are not written in conformity with rule 19 of this court and the abstract is deficient in many respects. This has made it difficult for us readily to determine the merits of the points involved.

Two shipments are involved, one on September 16, 1919, consigned to Eisenberg & Summerfield, New York City, and another on September 17th to Abe Eatz at New York City. By its affidavit of merits defendant asserted that claims were not filed within four months after it received the chipments or within four months after reasonable time for delivery had clapsed; that the shipment consigned to Eatz was delivered to him and that plaintiff was not damaged to the amount claimed, which plaintiff had asserted was \$196.

The receipt or bill of lading reciting that the carrier received the goods in apparent good order is prime facie

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MILLIMRY, a Corporation, MILLIMRY, a Corporation, Appelling

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AMERICAN RAILFAY DIFFESS COMPANY, a Corporation, hypelisms.

APS 445 FROM FINICIPAL COURT OF UNICARO.

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MI. PHUSCHAR RESTREE MOTHERY SECTIVERS THE GERTICK OF THE COURS.

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proof of that fact. I. C. R. R. v. Cobb et al., 72 Ill. 148.

and what is called the "Official Express Classification" on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission require a shipper as a condition precedent to recover to file a claim in writing on each shipment within four months after delivery of the respective shipments or within four months after a reasonable time for delivery of the respective shipments has elapsed. Defendant asserts that claims for the alleged loss of the shipments in question were not filed within the prescribed time. It was shown that a reasonable time to move a shipment from Chicago to New York City would be four days. There is controversy as to the time that a claim was made on the Kats shipment, but the trial court was justified in concluding that the claim was duly made by plaintiff's letter of December 1, 1919, which was within the four months.

The claim for the Eisenberg shipment was filed in March, 1920, which was after the four months, hence there can be no allowance to plaintiff of this claim.

In defendant's replies to plaintiff's claim and demand for settlement on account of the failure to deliver the Eatz shipment the refusal to settle was based upon the asserted failure of the shipper to file his claim within the time required by the receipt. Non-delivery to Eatz was in effect admitted. Having thus taken its position defendant will not be allowed upon the trial to change this or to mend its hold. The Cary Maple S. Co. v. The Pierre Viam M. Co., 173 Ill. App.93.

Testimony for the plaintiff, by its general manager and buyer, was that the value of the Katz goods was \$106, and of the Eisenberg shipment \$90. Rather than return this case for present another trial, we shall reverse the judgment and enter judgment

proof of that fact. I. C. E. R. v. Coth et al., 78 111. 148.

The defendant's receipts issued for the two shipments and what is called the "Official Eupress Clausification" on file with the interstate Commerce Convission require a shipper as a condition precedent to resever to file a claim in writing on each shipment within four worths edter delivery of the respective shipments or within feur months after a respective into for delivery of the respective shipments rat slapsed. Defendant assorts that claims for the alleged less of the shipments in question were not filed within the prescribed time. It was shown that a reasonable films to move a shipment from Chiuage to her Yerk City would be four days. There is controversy as to the sinc that a cinim was four days. There is controversy as to the sinc that a cinim was concluding that the slipment, but the trial court was functified in made on the Sate shipment, but the trial court was functified in concluding that the slaim was duly made by plaintiff's letter of concluding that the slaim was within the four months.

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Footherny for the plaintiff, by its general number and buyer, was the the the cure that the ships whith of the itam return this case for present trial, we shall general the find another trial, we shall general the find and enter fulgaest.

here against defendant for \$106, the value of the Katz shipment; each party to be taxed with its own costs of this appeal. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT HERE FOR \$106.

Dever and Matchett, JJ., concur.

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Dever and Matchett, "J., concur.

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J. C. I. McGRATH, Defendant in Error,

MARGE TO MUSICIPAL COURT

vs.

ADANS EXPRESS COUPANY Plaintiff in Error.

227 I.A. 5994

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

By this writ of error defendant seeks to reverse a Judgment of the Municipal court of Chicago entered December 5.

Plaintiff brought an action in the trial court to recover damages to an automobile as the result of a collision with an automobile truck owned by the defendant. December 8, 1920, an ax parts verdict and judgment were entered in the cause in favor of the plaintiff for \$193.72. December 10, 1920, defendant filed its motion to vacate the judgment. The trial Judge ruled that he would vacate the judgment and verdict and permit a defense upon the merits upon condition that defendant deposit with the clerk of the court the sum of \$200 to secure the payment of any judgment that might be rendered in the cause. He also ruled that in lieu of the cash deposit defendant might file a bond with a reliable bonding company as surety. Thereafter defendant's counsel brought into court \$200 and presented a form of order which recited:

"This day comes Charles B. Elder, attorney for the Adams Express Company, and presents in open court the sum of two hundred dollars (\$200.)"

In the trial court the attorney for the plaintiff contended that the order should read:

"This day comes the Adams Express Company, by Charles B. Elder, its attorney."

19 - 26305

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.av.

ADAMS SAPERDS CORRANGE IN SPECE.

ENGR TO MURICIPAL COURT OF CHIRT

PRESIAL ESS

MR. JUSTICH DEVEN BALLVARED THE OFFICER OF THE COURT.

By this writ of exper defendant ceeks to reverse a judgment of the Kunicipal court of Chicago antered December 5, 1917.

Plaintle brought an authorist to sential court to recover decayes to so authoristic as the result of a colision with an automobile truck owned by the defendant. Decayber S. 1980, an as agained the truck owned in the sequence of the plaintiff for \$150.72. Decayber 10. 1970, defendant filed its motion to verme the judgment. The trial Industrial that the first of the judgment. The trial Industrial that he would versit the judgment and versited and per it a defense upon the mortes upon condition that defenient doub it with the class of the court that court that other can deposit the court that court in assemble in the case deposit that a the case deposit that of the case deposit into court filed and presented a form of order course broaded into court filed and presented a form of order which recited

"This lay comes Charles h. Ther. atterning for the adors Argress Company, and presents in open court the sun of two hundred dullage (\$200.)"

In the trial court the entroping for the wideliff contented that the order about read:

[&]quot;This day aures the Asses Express Sempory, by " theries B. Sider, its attorney."

The trial Judge held that the order should be modified: as suggested by plaintiff's attorney, which counsel for defendant refused to de, and the court overruled the motion to vacate the Judgment.

It is argued that an affidavit in support of the motion to vacate the judgment shows that a judgment had been entered without fault or negligence on the part of the defendant or its attorney. The affidavit filed for the defendant shows that the attorney relied upon the Municipal court zecord for information as to the time when the case was to be set for trial, and copies of this publication for December 6th and 7th were attached to the affidavit. The affidavit on behalf of plaintiff, however, shows that the case appears in the Municipal court record as listed under its right number, 492319, but entitled MacGrath v. Naether, the only error in the title being in the name of the defendant.

An affidavit filed for the plaintiff recites that May 25, 1920, the case was continued by agreement until September 28, 1920; that on the latter date it was called and no one answered the call on behalf of defendant; that on this date it was continued until December 7, 1920, upon which date it was again called and set for December 8th; and that no one answered for defendant when the case was called December 8, 1920.

We are not ready to say on the record before us that the action of the trial Judge and that of counsel for plaintiff constituted "a trap for the unwary." There is much argument in the briefs of counsel touching the question of whether defendant's counsel was in any degree at fault, or whether by reasonable diligence he could have been apprised of the fact that the case was set for trial on December 3, 1920. There does not seem to be any dispute that on May 25, 1920, the case was continued by agreement

The trial Judge held that the order should be medified as enguested by plaintiff's attenty, which counsel for defendant refused to do, and the court overruled the motion to vacute the judgment.

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until September 28, 1920, and that on the latter date, in the absence of defendant, it was set for trial for December 7, 1920.

The trial court did, however, grant a motion to vacate, and we do not believe the terms imposed were either enerous or unreasonable.

In the case of <u>Hovey</u> v. <u>Middleton</u>, 56 Ill. 468, the Supreme court said:

"The power of setting aside defaults, as a general rule is a discretionary power, and the court exercising it may impose upon the party guilty of laches such terms as the court deems equitable and just under all the circumstances, and its action will not be reviewed in the Appellate court. The terms imposed in this instance by the court, as a condition upon which the appellants should be allowed to plead to the merits of the action, were not unreasonable. It was a proper exercise of that discretionary power with which the court is clothed."

In that case the trial court set aside a default judgment upon condition that defendant would pay all costs to the date of the judgment and deposit in court the amount thereof. <u>Burhaus</u>
v. <u>Village of Nerwood Park</u>, 138 III. 147.

In allowing the motion to vacate the judgment the trial court acted reasonably and fairly, but defendant's counsel insists that it was not reasonable to require the deposit of the money in the name of Adams Express Company, the defendant, rather than in the name of the atterney. We can see no merit in this contention. There were only two parties to the suit - the plaintiff and the defendant. Obviously the order, if it was to have effect at all, was to operate upon the parties to the litigation. While it may be true, as contended, that the attorney was desirous of depositing his own money to protect his client, in the event of judgment against it, this fact in and of itself did not require the trial Judge to enter a form of order drawn to meet the exigencies of the attorney's relations with his client.

The judgment of the Municipal court is affirmed.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

AFFI RMED.

until September 28, 1920, and that on the latter date, in the absence of defendent, it was set for trial for Beember 7, 1920.

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The judgement of the unitality of true is artismed.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur. AFFI WEST.

210 - 27167

GEORGE P. TAYLOR,
Appelles.

Vs.

NATIONAL RAILWAYS ADVERTIGING COMPANY, a Corporation.
Appellant.

227 J.A. 599

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Municipal court against the defendant for the sum of \$5372.80. Defendant seeks here to reverse this judgment.

Two actions which were brought by plaintiff against defendant were consolidated in the Municipal court. Defendant's claim of right to a setoff against the claims of plaintiff was denied in the trial court. Plaintiff's claims are founded upon his assertion that he was employed by defendant as an advertising solicitor and that at the time he left the defendant's employ the latter was indebted to him for commissions. It was shown on the trial that plaintiff was so employed from June. 1911. to September, 1912; that he was to receive for his services 10 per cent of all sums collected upon contracts obtained by him; that subsequently plaintiff was again employed by defendant as a solicitor on a 15 per cent commission basis; that this last employment began on September 15, 1912, and ended about September 1, 1916; that during this latter period the plaintiff obtained contracts upon which he was entitled to a total sum of \$9788.74, and that during the same period he had been paid by defendant \$10.471.85. stipulated that in addition to the contracts above referred to other contracts were entered into between the defendant and other parties described in the stipulation as Forest Park, Midway Gardens and Bunte Bros., "concerning which contracts the parties

210 - 27167

GEORGE P. TATLOR!

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NATIONAL RAILWAY

COMPANY, a Corporation.

APPEAL SER MOTICIPAL COURT OF UNICAGO.

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ER. JUSTICE DEVER BELLVERED THE OFF. TON OF THE SOURCE.

Pictoriff recorded a judgment in the Suniutyal court against the Sefendant for the Sefendant seeks hare to reverse this judgment.

In actions which were brought by plainthit against defendant were composited in the Municipal sourt. Defendant's saw littricia to eminio sit for may litte to the of right to was dealed in the trial court. Firthelff's .Line are founded upon his assertion that he was employed by defendant as no pairwiteing golden also and the time he left and defen use a supply the latter was indebter to bim for comminations. It was a own on the trial that plaintis was so employed from June, 1911, to September, 1912; that he was to rensive for his service 10 per cent of all seems solleated upon ventracts obtained by in: that is sequently might was spain contoyed by defends to an a middle trib on a 15 per cont anatheles and this last empreyent began on September 15, 191 , and anda' about September 1, 1910; that during this latter period the plaintiff obtained outrests upon which he was entitled to a total has of 39700.74, and that during the same period he had been poid by defeatent \$10.471. 's. It was stipulated that in addition to the contracts done not truck to wende fine citalisto, our neward stat possine eask materiale weige parties described in the supplyfulon or Porost Park, Mira, wardone and bunte Brow. "concerning diddle continues the pilities

hereto make no agreement whatsoever. We leave those questions open." As to these latter contracts the only one in dispute is the Bunte Bros. contract, upon which plaintiff says he is entitled to a commission amounting to \$5938.80. This latter is one of the two main disputed questions in the case. concerns a question as to whether \$50 a week, which was allowed to plaintiff by defendant, is, under the evidence, to be charged against commissions due plaintiff under his contract for commissions. The Bunte Bros. contract with defendant for advertising was dated September 9, 1914, and was to be effective January 1, 1915, for a period of 60 months thereafter, subject to the right reserved to Bunte Bros. to cancel the contract by written notice on or before December 1, 1916. The contract gave Bunte Bros. advertising space in 686 cars operated on two elevated railways in Chicago. Evidence was introduced on behalf of the defendant to the effect that during the month of November, 1916. at a conference between defendant's officers and a representative of Bunte Bros., the latter stated that his principal intended to exercise its right to cancel the contract; that during this conference it was agreed between the persons present that Bunte Bros.' right to cancel the contract would be extended until January 1, 1917, a period of thirty days. This oral understanding was confirmed by a letter from defendant to Bunte Bros.. dated November 9, 1916, and on December 29, 1916, Bunte Bros., by a letter to defendant stated that the latter desired to exercise its right to terminate the contract. January 5, 1917, Bunte Bros. entered into a new written contract with defendant for advertising space in 1033 cars in four elevated railways operated in Chicago, including the two covered by the contract of September 9. 1914. The new contract was to run for a period of thirty months from January 1, 1917, and it provided for the cancellation

hereto make no agraement whatsoever. We leave those questions open." As to these latter contracts the only one in dispute is the Bunte Bros. contract, upon which plaintiff says he in entitled to a commission emounting to \$5943.80. This latter is one of the two main disputed questions in the case. The other concerns a question as to whether \$50 a week, which was allowed to plaintiff by defendant, is, under the evidence, to be charged against commissions due plaintiff under his contract for commissions. The Bunte Bros. contract with defendant for advertising was dated September 9, 1914, and was to be effective January 1, 1915, for a period of 60 months thereafter, subject to the right reserved to Bunte Bros. to concel the contract by written notice on or before December 1, 1916. the contract gave Eunte Bres. advertising weace in the oars openeded on two slavated rallways in Chicago, avidence was introduced on behalf of the defendant to the effect that during the month of Movember, 1916. at a conference between defendent's officers and a reprosentative of Bunte Bron. the latter stated that his wrincipal intended to exercise its right to cameel the centract; that during this conference it was agreed between the corrects present that Bunte Brow. ' right to dence: the centrans would be extended until January 1, 1917, a perion of thirty days. Nue oral understands Lag was confirmed by a letter from defendant to lunte aros. dated Movember 9, 1916, and no Docember Ly, 1916, Bunk Eroc., by e letter to defendant stated that the letter costrol to axilite its right to terminate the contract. Junuary 1, 1917, Sunte Eron. entered into a new written contract with defeatant for advertise ing space in 105% owns in four elevated rallways operated in Chicago, including the two covered by the convract of deptember 9. 1914. The new contract was to run for a period of thirty months from January 1, 1917, and it provided for the concellation

of the contract of September 9, 1914, and also of a contract dated January 17, 1916, for advertising space for a period of sixty months in 355 cars upon two elevated railways not included in the contract of September 9, 1914.

The contract of January 5, 1917, provided for advertising space in 1033 cars. The earlier contracts combined provided for space in 1041 cars. So far as we are informed in the briefs of appellant there was no substantial difference between the contract of January 5, 1917, and the sum of the two earlier centracts either with reference to the number of cars in which space was given to Bunte Bros., or in the time the contracts were to remain in force.

The trial court held as a proposition of law that the contract of September 9, 1914, was not cancelled by the new arrangement made on January 5. 1917: that the latter constituted a continuation or modification of the original contract "made in conformity with, and not in derogation of, the terms of the original Bunte Bros. contract." It is our opinion that this holding of the trial court was not erroneous. The new arrangement did not make such a material change in the contractual relations between the parties as would authorize a holding that the plaintiff was thereby deprived of his right to commissions earned by him when he produced the contract of September 9, 1914. The new arrangement fixes the same rate per oar for advertising space as was provided in the original contract; and such difference as was provided in the modified contract for the time during which advertising was to be had in the cars was not so material as to thereby permit the defendant, without plaintiff's consent, to so materially affect plaintiff's right to commission under his contract. The evidence gives much basis for the argument that the new contract was entered into for the purpose of defeating

of the centract of Reptember 9, 1914, and also of a contract dated Jenuary 17, 1916, for advertising space for a period of sixty manths in 355 cars used two elevated railways ust included in the contract of September 9, 1914.

The contract of January 6, 1917, provided for advertising reade in 1003 ance. The earlier contracts combined provided for space in 1041 cure. So far as we are antorsed in the briefs of appellant there was no substantial difference between the contract of January 5, 1917, see the sun of the two earlier contracts of there will reference to the number of cars in which space was given to Bush, or in the tentests which space was given to Bush, or in the Contracts which space was given to Bush, or in the Contracts

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plaintiff's right to commissions. Without attempting to refer here to all the evidence touching this question, we are of opinion that the trial court did not err in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to commissions on the contract of September 9, 1914, during the whole period of time that Bunte Bros. was given advertising space in 686 cars, a period of sixty months, during which time the evidence shows it actually used and occupied such space at the rate fixed in the contract.

It is contended for the defendant that it was permitted under its contract with plaintiff to deduct from commissions due plaintiff the sum of \$50 a week, which had been advanced to plaintiff during the time he was employed by defendant. employment with defendant terminated about September 1. 1916. There is evidence from which it may be said that the defendant notified plaintiff on August 15, 1916, that his employment with defendant would cease on September 1st. Testimony and documentary evidence introduced on behalf of the defendant tends to prove that the weekly allowance of \$50 made to plaintiff was to be charged against his account for commissions due him. The plaintiff made no attempt on his direct examination to assert that the \$50 a week was to be allowed him in addition to his commissions. He first made this assertion when testifying in rebuttal of testimeny introduced by defendant. Mr. Bour, president of defendant, at the time of plaintiff's employment, testified that plaintiff was to be allowed a drawing account of \$50 a week against his commissions; that "that is the general arrangement made with a solicitor, and has been during my career in the advertising business." It is argued that the commissions to be paid plaintiff were to be compensation not only for securing contracts with advertisers, but that he had additional duties to perform in connection with his employment; that in addition thereto he was to prepare a copy, to see that the accounts were collected on contracts which he secured, and that he

plaintiff's right to commissions. Vithout attempting to refer here to all the evidence traching this question, we are of opinion that the trial court did not err is holding that the plaintiff was antitiod to commissions on the contract of September 9, 1914, during the whole period of time that Bunte Bren, was given advertising space in 686 cars, a period of sixty months, during which time the evidence shows it actually used and cocupied such space at the rate first in the contract.

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was to aid advertisers in other ways. On this question we think there was sufficient evidence introduced to warrant a finding that such services were not required of plaintiff under his contract. This argument is made in support of the contention that plaintiff was not entitled to commissions on the Bunte Bros. contract on sums paid thereon by defendant after plaintiff had left the employ of defendant. Under the first arrangement with the defendant plaintiff was to receive a commission of 10 per cent and a drawing account of \$50 a week, which defendant's evidence shows was to be charged against commissions. Plaintiff had overdrawn his account with defendant during the first months of his employment, and in September, 1912, his commission was raised to 15 per cent, as testified to by Mr. Bour, so that plaintiff might reduce his drafts. The evidence shows that on several occasions during the course of his employment plaintiff was given statements of his account showing these overdrafts and there is no evidence in the record that during all this time he made any claim at all that the \$50 a week which had been paid him should not have been charged to his commissions account. Without attempting to indicate all the evidence in the record on this latter question, it is our epinion that the preponderance of the evidence thereon manifestly supports the contention of defendant. In a letter dated July 31, 1916. about thirty days before plaintiff left the employ of defendant, plaintiff wrote that in a statement furnished/by defendant an overdraft appeared that was not justifiable; that defendant had failed to give him credit on certain accounts that plaintiff had worked on for some time. In this letter plaintiff calls attention specifically to the accounts referred to. No mention is made of his present claim that the \$50 a week allowance during a long period of time was improperly charged against commissions due him.

was to ald sovertimers in other ways. On this guestion we think there was sufficient avidance introduced to varrent a finding that such services were not required of plaintiff under his contract. Tale ergument is made in signort of the contention that plaintiff. was not entitled to conslavious on the Bunte Bros. contract on surs paid thereon by defendant after plaintiff had left the employ of -uinfq suctor the direct arrangement with the defendent planttiff was to received a consulation of 10 per cont and a drawing account of \$50 a west, which defendent's evidence shows was to be charged against commissions. Plaintiff had overdrawn his account with defendant during the first wenths of his employment, and in September, 1912, his conminains was raised to 16 per cont. as testified to by Mr. Menr, so thei plaintiff might reduce his drafts. The syldence shows that un several occasions during the course of his employment platetiff was given statem and of his account chowing these evertraits and there is no evidence in the teds that during all this time one made any claim at all that the \$50 a week which and been paid iim should not have been charged to his consisting secount. Without attempting to indicate all the evidence in the record on this letter energion, it is our epinion that the proposterance of the eridence thereon untilestly supports the contention of defendant. In a lotter dated July 51, 1915, about thirty days before nimmila? left the employ of defendant. plaintiff wrote that in a statement farmiened by detention or oremdraft appeared that was not justifiable; that defer out the light to give him credit on certain accounts that plainti" had worsed on for some time. In this lotter plaintiff, omlin accounts appedfically to the eccounts referred to. He mention to make of his present chair that the \$50 a menk allower os during a long period of time was improperly churged against com instend ave itm.

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We think the court erred in holding that the \$50 weekly payments were not chargeable against commissions due plaintiff. The Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the facts of the case. The centract of Bunte Bros. and the defendant was in writing. Plaintiff was employed by defendant under an oral agreement which provided for the performance of services by plaintiff for an indefinite period. The evidence shows that plaintiff was not employed by defendant for a definite period of more than one year, and his substantive right to commissions due him, while measured by collections made by defendant under its written contract with Bunte Bros., was founded on his oral agreement with defendant.

The judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff was for the sum of \$5372.80. We think the evidence shows that plaintiff had overdrawn his account with the defendant aside from the amount due plaintiff under the Bunte Bros. contract in the sum of \$2454.77; deducting this latter sum from the amount of the judgment leaves the sum of \$2918.03 legally due plaintiff.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment in favor of plaintiff entered in this court for the sum of \$2918.03.

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT HERE IN PAYOR OF PLAINTIFF FOR THE SUM OF \$2918.03.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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The judgment of the trial court in favor of the platniff was for the sum of \$5572.30. We think the evidence shown that plaintiff had overdrawn his account the the defendant aside from the ansunt due plaintiff under the furte Bros. contract in the sum of \$5654.77; Teducting this latter mas from the amount of the judgment leaves the sea of \$5918.05 lagally the plaintiff.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment in fever of plaintiff entered in this court for the sum of \$7916.05.

MEVERGAE AND TO CREAK STREET IN PARTS OF

Medurely, 2. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

26830

222 - 27179

LOUIS A. KLEIN, Appellee,

YB.

E. B. SODE, Doing Business as E. B. SODE PAPER BOX 60, Appellant. APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 600

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought suit in the Municipal court of Chicago in an action to recover commissions which, in a statement of claim, he alleges were due him from defendant on an oral contract, under the terms of which plaintiff was employed by defendant upon a commission basis of 5 per cent. to solicit orders for material produced by defendant.

Verdict of a jury for the sum of \$600, which the defendant seeks to reverse by his appeal to this court. It is said that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. It seems to have been conceded on the trial that defendant had employed plaintiff under the contract from June, 1919, to January 6, 1920, upon which later date plaintiff was discharged by defendant; that at this time plaintiff received \$2.40, a balance due him for commissions upon orders obtained by him and which had been paid for by purchasers. The dispute between the parties is as to whether defendant is liable to pay plaintiff commissions on orders taken before the termination of the contract and which had not been fully executed by delivery before that date. On this question there is a direct contradiction in the evidence.

Plaintiff testified that at the time he severed his connections with defendant there was due him a commission of 5 per cent. upon orders amounting in the aggregate to \$23,269.38.

222 - 27179

LOUIS A. KUMIR,

E. E. SONE, Doing Business . B. SONE PAPER BOX 60;

APPRAL FRUE MUNICIPAL OCURT

OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 600

AR. IVSTICA DEVISE DELIVERAD DE SPINION OF THE COURT.

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Judgment was entered in Taror of the pisintiff on a verdict of a jury for the sum of \$000, which the defendant seake to reverse by his appeal to this court. It is said that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. It resists to have been concessed on the trial that defendant had enployed plointiff under the contract from June, 1919, to Junuary 6, 1920, then which later date pisintiff was discharged by defendant; that at this time pisintiff reactived \$2.40, a bilance due him for commissions upon erders obtained by him and which had been putd for by purchasers. The alapute between the parties is as to whether defendant is liable to pay pisintiff concissions on orders taken before the termination of the contract was which had not taken before the termination of the contract was which had not taken taily executed by delivery before that date. On this queetion there is a direct contract in the evicence.

Plaintiff testified that at the time he severed his connections with defendant there was due him a connicate of 3 per cont. ween orders amounting in the empression to \$25,369.36.

From our examination of the evidence/it appears in the record we are unable to hold that the verdict of the jury is against the weight of the evidence. The jury saw fit to award plaintiff the sum of \$600, and if his testimony be true, he is clearly entitled to receive this sum from defendant.

There is no merit in the point made that the court erred in giving an eral instruction to the jury touching the question of the prependerance of the evidence. Defendant did not object at the trial to the giving of this instruction. Freet v. American Electrical Supply Co., 171 Ill. App. 512.

The judgment of the Municipal court is affirmed.

AFFIRED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

From our excellention of the evidence/it appears in the record we are unable to hold that the vertict of the jury is against the weight of the evidence. The jury saw fit to eward plaintiff the sum of \$600, and if his testiment to true, he is clearly exittled to recoive this aux from defendant.

There is no merit in the point ande that the court erred in giving an oral instanction to the jury touching the question of the proponderance of the evidence. Defendent did not object at the trial to the giving of this instruction. Freat v. Agerican Ilactrical Jupply Co., 171 111, App. 513.

The judgment of the Kunianpal court is affirmed.


Medurely, P. J., and Katchutt, J., concar.

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MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiffs brought suit in the Municipal court of Chicago in an action of forcible entry and detainer to obtain possession of a second floor flat in the building known as No. 3622 Lexington avenue, Chicago. A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs for possession of the premises, which the defendant seeks to reverse by appeal to this court.

It is agreed that defendant was occupying the premises as a tenant from month to month. For defendant it is urged that plaintiffs had served her with a thirty days notice of their election to terminate the tenancy and that this notice expired April 30% 1921; that a statute in relation to landlord and tenant in force July 1, 1873, had been amended by an act approved April 29, 1921; that under the amendment plaintiffs were required to give a sixty days notice in writing of their election to terminate the tenancy.

It is asserted that the notice served upon the defendant was a thirty days notice; that it expired April 30, 1921, one day after the amendment was in force, and that hence the thirty days notice was, under the amendment, ineffective to terminate the tenancy. This contention is not well grounded. If for no other reason, the judgment must be affirmed because the notice in question does not appear in the abstract of record filed in the cause. One of the plaintiffs testified that she served a notice

245 - 27263

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Arfial from Menicipal Court

Of Chicago.

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HER. JURILLY LAND BELLYMEND HER CRIRICA CALLER COURT.

Plaintiff's brought suit in the Municipal court of Chicago in an metion of forabble entry and detainer to obtain personal of a second floor fint in the bullding known as No. 3622 Lexington arones. Unlange. A judgment was entered in faror of the plaintiffs for personation of the presiden, which the definition to reverse by appeal to this court.

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on defendant on March 29th; this notice does not appear otherwise in the abstract, but even if it were shown therein, it is our opinion that if a thirty days notice had been duly served on March 29th, the notice would have been sufficient under the law.

It is true, as said, that there can be no vested right in a particular remedy, or any special mode of administering a remedy. Woods v. Soucy, 166 Ill. 407. At the time plaintiffs served the notice in question it was sufficient under the law to terminate the tenancy. The service of the notice, which was legally sufficient at the time it was served upon defendant, put an end to the tenancy as of April 30, 1921. The passage of the law on April 29, 1921, could not deprive plaintiffs of their property rights in the premises for another sixty days. No such intention appears in the language of the amendment to the statute and nothing therein indicates a purpose on the part of the legislature to give the amendment a retrospective effect.

The judgment of the Municipal court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

en defendant on March 29th; this notice does not appear otherwise in the abstruct, but even if it were shown therein, it is our epinion that if a thirty days notice had been duly served on March 29th, the notice would have been sufficient under the law.

It is true, as maid, that there can be no vested alght in a particular remedy, or any special meds of administering a remedy. Foods v. Bours, 156 ill. 407. At the time plaintiffs earved the notice in question it was safficient under the law to terminate the tenancy. The service of the metics, which was legally sufficient at the time is an served upon defendant, put an end to the tenancy as of April 30, 1931. The passage of the low an April 30, 1931, could not deprive plaintiffs of Unit property rights in the premises for another sixty days. He such intention appears in the language of the seemdment to the statute and nothing therein indicates a purpose on the part of the legislature to dive the mendment a retrespective effect.

The judgment of the Manielpal court is affirmed.

MoSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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257 - 27215

CONTINENTAL AND COMMERCIAL MATICAL BANK OF CHICAGO, a Corporation,

Appellant,

YS.

RELEGE COAL COMPANY, a Corporation,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 600°

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit court of Cook County entered therein upon a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, Reiner Coal Company.

The material facts of the case are as follows: October 25, 1918, defendant executed a promissory note payable to Taylor Coal Company for \$3,500 due six months after date. Thereafter Taylor Coal Company discounted the note at plaintiff's bank and received credit for the amount paid in its account with plaintiff. April 23, 1919, Taylor Coal Company executed and delivered to Reiner Coal Company a general release, excepting therefrom three notes not involved in the present case. 25, 1919, the note in suit became due and was marked "paid" on the books of the plaintiff bank. Plaintiff asserts that on the same day a red line was drawn through this credit item and it was agreed on the trial that the practice prevailed in the bank of enturing a payment item on the morning when a discounted note became due, and then in the evening of the same day, if it was found that as a matter of fact the note was not paid, to erase the credit item by an interlineation. Testimeny introduced for the defendant was to the effect that the red line did not appear on the book on May 2, 1919. April 26, 1919, the day after h the note became due, Taylor Coal Company drew its check payable to the order of plaintiff and drawn on plaintiff bank for the sum

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CONTINUENCE AND CONCERNIAL MATTORAL BANK OF CHICARY. a Corporation,

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RELEGAL COAL COMPANY, A Corporation, appendicted.

LEGICAL FROM CINCULT COURT OF COOK COURTY.

227 LA 690

THE STATE OF THE STATE WILLY SHE CHIEF OF THE COURT.

than is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit 2 (Ch.) court of Cook County entered therein agen a directed vertice in favor of the dafentant, Bather Coal Company.

The meterial facts of the case are as follows: October 26, 1918, daffendant emembed a gromismory note payable to Taylor Coal Company for \$3,500 due of mounts after date. Thornafter Taylor Good Company discounted the note at plaintiff's dily tomeson at a a bis acoust out to red in a to recent with April 23, 1919, Yaylor Coul coversy oneo.ted and de-. Winigists. livered to heiner Coal Company a general release, executing 1.1203 therefrom three motes not involved in the present ance. 25, 1919, the note in suit became due and was marked "paid" on the books of the pluistiff house. Flaintiff encores that on the same day a red line was drant the unit this oredit team and it was agreed on the trial that the practice prevailed in the besk of enturing a payment itom on the morning when a discounted note beenes the, and thou the the eventue of the same that if it was found that as a matter of fact the note van met paid, to because the credit items by as interlinguiten. Tratification introduces for the defendant wes to the effect that the my line did not mepear on the bond on May 2, 1919. April 26, 1919, the may after & the note became due, Taylor Good Company dres its check payable

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of \$3,605, being the amount of the principal and interst due on The check was certified by plaintiff and was delivered the note. by Taylor Coal Company to plaintiff to be held by the latter, as it insists, as security or indemnity in the event plaintiff failed to recover a judgment against defendant in the present action. Evidence introduced on behalf of defendant tends to show that on April 25, 1919, a notice of protest of the note was sent to defendant and that on the next day its president called at the bank and informed plaintiff's note teller that arrangements had been made by defendant for payment of the note by Taylor Coal Company; that Doering, plaintiff's note teller, informed defendant's president that the note had been taken care of; that he.defendant's president, had exhibited the Frelease above referred to to one Gilkes, assistant cashier of the bank; that May 2, 1919, defendant's president and its attorney went to the bank and talked with Mr. Doering, defendant's note teller, and that the latter said that the note in question had been paid.

evidence offered by the plaintiff. Mr. Gilkes, plaintiff's assistant eachier, was called as a witness on behalf of defendant. He testified that the check of the Taylor Coal Company was received by the bank and that the word "accepted" which appeared on its face meant that the amount of the check was deducted from the Taylor Coal Company's account therein and placed in a certified check account "to meet this check when it comes in."

The check was introduced in cyidence. On cross-examination this witness testified as follows:

[&]quot;I received that check from the Taylor Coal Company on April 26, 1919. At the time we received it there was a conversation as to the purpose for which it was to be used. The conversation was between Mr. Sheppard, secretary of the Taylor Coal Company, Mr. Waldeck, vice president of

of \$3,003, bains our manuat of the primpleal and interet dur on hereviled new has Thisless of telling and deede add by Taylor Coal Company to plaintiff to be beld by the latter as at the training on underty or indeeding in the view of the lift. ed to recever a from the against defendant is the property action. Byidence intringed on bounds as durkidant tends to show that ou april 26, 1919, a notice of on sent of the note res reat to definitable and think on the and the president carried at ethers warne does tolled tolled along a first tolled to are the edit waker wit water by the course for regree to the best of whee week with the course to the course the cou Cont Company; that Dearing, plain the make the garaged defaultant's president that the rote bod bear taken care of that he defendant's aremident, had exidulated : a relegge about re-Jaks ; mil 1 82 - 1 25 1100 Carred to to one often, May 2, 1991, intraduct a circle and the stranger real to the and talked sign of the deal of the control of the sale bearing and while word bed and a a state and a selection and take It is remembered that the court wired in more of it

evidence offered by too willists. Our obtains, maintifyld another, was enfield and the end of the e

[&]quot;I received that of a from a few and terms as a series was a special SG, 1832. At the time we realized 11 terms was a commerced on a few to the parentes of with the conversation was befores a. Stepp of a conversation was befores a. Stepp of a conversation of the Indian

the bank, and myself. I was also connected with the bank at that time. The substance of it was that it was to be held as indemnity pending the outcome of this suit."

On motion of defendant's counsel this evidence was stricken out and the court refused to permit any evidence of conversations had between representatives of the Taylor Coal Company and the bank occurring at the time the check was delivered to plaintiff. The point was not made, as we read the abstract of record, that this evidence was not proper to elicit on cross-examination. It was insisted that the evidence was immaterial. Later in cross-examination the witness stated:

"The substance of the conversation was that we were to collect the amount of this note out of the Reiner Coal Company, and the check was given to us as an indexnity, and the check has been held as such ever since."

This evidence also was stricken out on motion. While the witness was on the stand counsel for plaintiff offered to prove by the witness that "at a conversation had before the check in question here was given, after the note became due. it was agreed between the Taylor Coal Company and the Continental and Commercial National Bank, the plaintiff, that the Taylor Coal Company should give to the bank a certified check as and for indemnity, and that the bank was then to proceed against the Reiner Coal Company; that the purpose of the check was that if the bank did not succeed against the Reiner Coal Company they might have this indemnity for the liability of the Taylor Coal Company on paper by reason of its endorsement." Objection was made and sustained to this offer of proof also. Later in the hearing, as shown by several pages of the abstract of record. the trial Judge and counsel for both parties, for the purpose of facilitating the trial, entered into a somewhat extended discussion as to what evidence should or should not be admitted on the trial. During the course of this colloquy it was agreed

the bank, and ayearf. I was also someored with the bank of that time. The substance of it was that it was to be held as indessity pending the outcome of this mit."

On motion of defendant's a unused this evidence was stricted out and the court reflected to permit any evidence of conversations had between representatives of the Paylor Coal Company and the bath occurring at the time the check was delivered to plaintiff. The point was not unio, as we reed the abstract of record, that this evidence was not unoper to slicit on erecutantian. It was fundation the evidence was immaterial. Inter in cross-countration the utiness chief check the cross-countration the utiness chief.

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by both sides "that immediately after the making of the note in question and at the time when the same became due, the plaintiff in this case became and was a holder in due course, before maturity and for a reasonable value, of the note in question, without any knowledge of defense on the part of the maker."

It was further admitted on the trial by defendant's counsel that plaintiff had no knowledge whatsoever of the release which was given to defendant by Taylor Goal Company until after the maturity of the note, when it was first brought to its attention.

The court permitted the defendant to show that the certified check was delivered to plaintiff April 26, 1919. The note became due April 25, 1919. Evidence introduced on behalf of plaintiff tends to show that the red line was drawn upon the word "paid" on the evening of the day that the note became due.

release executed by Taylor Coal Company to defendant. It is charged in defendant's plea that Taylor Coal Company had actually paid the note in question and that the suit brought against defendant was the result of collusion between that company and plaintiff. It is conceded that at the time the note became due plaintiff had no knowledge whatsoever of the execution and delivery of the release to defendant. In the absence of evidence tending to establish the collusion, as alleged, the release would not be admissible in evidence. The defendant was primarily liable on the note as maker. The plaintiff's interest as a bone fide holder of the note for value before maturity could not be effected by the release executed by the endorser of the note. The release was admissible in evidence only on the theory that the note in question had been paid by Taylor Coal Company and

by heth sides "that inmodiately after the making of the note in question and at the time when the arms became due, the plaintiff in this case became and was a helder in due course, before madurity and for a remanable value, of the note in question, without any knowledge of defense on the part of the maker."

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The sourt persitted the defendant to show that the certified cheek was delivered to plaintiff April 25, 1019. The note became due April 25, 1219. Evilence introduced on behalf of plaintiff tends to show that the red line was drawn upon the word patentiff on the evening of the day that the note because due.

It is eath that the error to defendant. It is planted in defendant. It is planted in defendant's plea that Engler Goal Company had setually paid the note in question and that Engler Goal Company had setually paid the note in question and that the suit brought against defendant was theoremit of collusion harmon that company and plaintiff. It is conceded that at the time the nets become due plaintiff had no knowledge whatmoever of the execution and delivery of the release to defendant. In the absence of switteness itselfag to establish the collusion, as allowed, the release wanted set be dailedte is evidence. The defendent was prinarrly realise on the note as maker. The plaintiff's interest as a keing like helder of the note as maker. The plaintiff's interest as a keing offected by the release executed by the endersor of the nets.

The release was adalerable in swidenes only on the theory that the note in section was adalerable in swidenes only on the theory that

that the release constituted a part of the transaction or transactions which evidenced the collusion charged in the plea. The only evidence introduced on the trial in support of the plea was certain admissions said to have been made by representatives of plaintiff after the note became due and demand for payment had been made upon defendant. This evidence was not sufficient to authorize the admission of the release. Dod v. Edwards, 2 C & P. 602, 12 Eng. C. L. 757; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 943; 5 Corp. J. 960; Creighton v. Village of Eyde Park, 6 Ill. App. 272.

It may be conceded, as urged for defendant, that there are authorities in this State which hold that a mere offer of evidence to prove a conclusionis objectionable. Martin v. Hertz, 224 Ill. 84. We are not prepared to say, however, on the authorities called to our attention, that a witness must in every case be placed upon the stand and interrogated before error can be predicated on a refusal to admit offered evidence. The record before us shows that plaintiff's counsel offered to prove by three witnesses that the Taylor Coal Company's certified check was delivered to plaintiff as indemnity or security to cover Taylor Coal Company's liability as enderser of the note. A careful examination of the somewhat extended discussion between counsel and the court as to what proof was admissible and material upon the issues in the case discloses that counsel for both parties and the neurt in definite terms expressed their clear understanding of what evidence the trial Judge believed was admissible in support of plaintiff's case. Counsel for defendant showed a commendable desire to facilitate the trial by admitting material facts; and it is perfectly clear from what was said by both the trial Judge and counsel that the court refused to permit the plaintiff to prove its version of what appears to have been the

estions which evidenced the collusion charged in the plea. The only evidence introduced on the brish in anypert of the plea was certain adminstance introduced on the brish in anypert of the plea was certain adminstance and to have been made by representatives of plantiff after the note became due and demand for payment and been made upon defendant. This exists who had althorize the administration of the release. However, the administration of the release. How althorize the administration of the release. How althorize the administration of the release. However, the color, is seen as the first payment. So a first one is the standard of the standard

It may be capeeded, as urged for defendant, that there are authorstone in this Otate older half thus a more offer of evidence to prove a conclusionit essectionable. Martin v. Horis, 284 Ill. 94. We are not propered to act, however, on the without the called to our established a visit a visite authorities case be placed upon the verse and inverse, the being enter care, can be predicated on a refusal to adult offered swittened. The record offere us stows that whitehir to rounded wifered to prove by three with resea that the ferier cond Company's cartification then were delivered to plaintiff as indestity or security to cover Tarior Coul Gompeny's liability as witerser of the mets. A carethi commination of the constitute attended interrector to notional and sel and the court of to what perce way speculative on to true aftend the work the terrent in the came discussed had connect to have pure tion and the new t in deficitle terms expressed their times extended of the state of what evidence is to be the first of animal ending the second of the se is surport of plaintiff's case. Cour of her case was the transmit at commendable design is Tabilitate and intal by addition is cortain facts; and it is parfectly clear from was ran ari- by both the mir to was inquire remon and tools for anon bee onbet lairs plainfiff to prove its vorsion of chat appears to the title

dence was admitted which tended to show that Doering, plaintiff's note teller, had made a statement that the check was given in payment of the note. We do not think, however, that this evidence was conclusive on the rights of plaintiff even though it remains undisputed in the evidence. We are convinced that the trial Judge was of the opinion that the plaintiff was conclusively bound by the single fact that it had received the certified check from the Taylor Goal Company and had given the latter credit therefor in its discount ledger; and on this point we think the court was in error. It was competent for the plaintiff to show that the check was given by way of indemnity and not in payment of the note. Proper evidence tendered for this purpose was excluded.

(Aurd's R. S. 1919, p. 2029) provides that "a holder in due source holds the instrument * * * free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves." Defendant was primarily liable on the note as maker, and plaintiff was not precluded by law from accepting security from the endorser to be applied in payment of the note only in the event that the holder had failed to recover the amount due thereon from the maker. Peoples National Nank of Hackensack v. Rice, 133 N. Y. Supp. 622. Indeed, as we read the brief filed on behalf of defendant, it is not urged that plaintiff could not by competent proof show the purpose for which the check was given. The objection urged here is that the proof upon which plaintiff relied was not properly tendered or submitted in the twist court.

The judgment of the Circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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Mesuraly, 2. J., wit Matchett, ... concur,

266 - 27224 SHERIDAN TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, a Corporation, Appellee, APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT YS. OF COOK COUNTY. FRANCIS J. CASEY et al. On Appeal of Francis J. Gasey. 227 I.A. 6001 Appellant.

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Francis J. Casey was made defendant in a bill filed in the Circuit court of Cook County to foreclose a trust deed dated December 10, 1915, executed and delivered to secure a principal note of even date for the sum of \$8,500 and ten interest notes for \$233.75 due and payable semi-annually.

The grantors in the trust deed therein agreed as follows:

To pay said indebtedness and the interest thereon as in said notes provided.

2. To pay prior to the first day of July in each year

all taxes and assessments against said premises.

To keep all buildings at any time on said premises insured against loss by fire in companies to be approved by the holder of and in an amount equal to said indebtedness and deliver to the holder of said indebtedness such insurance policies so written as to require all loss to be applied in reduction of the indebtedness.

The granters also waive all right to possession of and income from said premises pending foreclosure proceedings and until the period of redemption from any sale thereunder expires, and they agree that immediately upon the commencement of the foreclosure suit a receiver shall be appointed to take possession or charge of the premises, to collect the income, and to apply the same, less expenses, in satisfaction of the debt or of the deficiency decree and to pay any everplus therester to the person entitled to the deed on the certificate of sale or in reduction of the redemption money if the premises be redeemed." be redeemed.

The bill was filed April 19, 1921, at which time there was due the principal note of \$8,500 and two interest notes, due June 10, 1920, and December 10, 1920, respectively. The bill charged that the defendants had defaulted in payment of taxes and

366 - 27294

SHERIDAR TRUST & SAVINGU BARK, a Corporation, & Appelles.

THANCIS J. CAREY et al. On Appeal of Francis J. Chesy, Appeal of Francis J. Chesy,

APPEAR PROM CIRCUIT COURT

-01816

227 I.A. 600

ME MR. JUSTICE MEVAG DESTRICTS THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Francis J. Gasey was made defendant in a bill filled in the direct court of Gook Gounty to forecloss a trust deed dated December 10, 1915, executed and delivered to secure a principal note of even date for the sum of \$8,300 and ten interest notes for \$235.75 due and poyable semi-unually.

The grantous in the trust dead therein agreed as

follows:

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21. To pay said indebtedmass and the interest thereon as in said notes provided.

2. To pay prior to the first day of July in each year

all taxes and assessments against said pressions.

3. To keep all buildings at any time on sold premises theored against loss by fire in companies to be opproved by the in an amount equal to said indebtolmess and deliver to the holder of said indebtodmen such innucance policies so written as to require all lose to be roulted in requestion of the indebtedness.

The grantors also makes all light to powershow of and income them said promises pending foresteems proceedings and until the period of redemption from any sale thereunder expires and they agree that furedintely upon the commonsement of the end they again that furedist shall be appointed to take presented or charge of the premises, to collect the twome, and to apply the sense, less expenses, in sotisfaction of the debt or of the dest or of the destination of the dest or of the destination of the dest or of the gerson estities to the dead on the certificate of sale ex a reduction of the sale ex a reduction of the sale ex in reduction of the reduction of the sale ex in reduction of the reduction.

The bill was filed Agril 19, 1901, at which time there was due the principal note of \$8,800 and two interest notes, due has 10, 1980, and Ducember 10, 1980, respectively. The bill charged that the defendants had defoulted in payment of temes and

assessments levied against the premises; that the premises had been repeatedly sold for taxes and that they were meager and scant security for the indebtedness due complainant. The bill prayed for the appointment of a receiver. Defendants filed an answer neither admitting nor denying certain allegations of the bill and denying certain other allegations therein and they alleged in the answer that the premises in question had a fair cash market value of four times the sum alleged to be due complainant. The bill and answer were referred to a master to take proofs and report his conclusions of law and fact, and the chancellor also referred to the master a sworn petition filed by complainant, which prayed for the appointment of a receiver. This petition is in substance the same as the bill except that it contains a further allegation that defendants had failed to pay taxes due on the premises for the year 1920. The master filed a report in which he found the matters in dispute in favor of the complainant. Objections filed to the report were permitted to stand as exceptions thereto. The report of the master stating the account between the parties as of August 9, 1921. finds that there was due complainant as of that date a total sum of \$12,618.46. An order was entered appointing a receiver. as prayed in the petition, and a further order was entered denying a petition to discharge the receiver. Defendants bring both orders to this court by appeal for review.

Upon complainant's petition for the appointment of a receiver the master found that "a receiver ought to be appointed upon complainant's petition, in view of the provisions of the trust deed * * * in and by which the grantors therein expressly waive their homestead and all right to the possession of or any income from the premises pending foreclosure, and agree that immediately upon the commencement of a foreclosure

had assented and the president the president and amount the burners and assented as the burners and the burners are burners and the burners and the burners and the burners are burners and the burners and th bus repeatedly sold for taxes and that word word coast security for the indebtedment due coastainant. The vill prayed for the appointment of a receiver. Defendants filled an and the solitance rated that har dary lag cortain allegations of the all and denying correin clier allegations therein and they alleged in the answer than the premines in encosion had a fair canh murket walue of from times the our wileped to be bee complainant. The bill and answer were referred to a caller to take proofs and report his constant of low and fact, and the chanedlia maisting mayor a unactor and terrarian place by complainant, which prayed for the uppointment of a receiver. indi intoxice file out on rows out so welcole of of wrisking wiff it contains a further allegation that determine had falled to retrem out . NOR range on for the party 3000 . The marter moved at engage as expenses of these as solds at mager a boll? of the complainant. Objections filled to the recent word permitted to shand an among tions that rate. The report of the muster stating the measure between the parties as of August 8, 1881, fagod a otel turis to an iteministance out one profit rand uball tom of \$12.618.46. in order as entered appointing a repolitor. of prayed in the restiton, and a further order was outered denying a petition to at coharge the raceions. Defendants bring buth orders to this saurt by appeal for review.

Upon nomplathene's polition for the appointment of a ranciver the ansate of condition that the ansate to a petition in view of the provinces petition. In view of the provinces of the trust deed of the and by which the armore therefore appreads and off the trust their chair houseness and off the the trust the previous pending forestowned, and or any income from the previous pending forestowned, and off or any incomistaly upon the observers of a forestowned.

suit a receiver shall be appointed; and agree to pay prior to July 1st in each year all taxes and assessments and to keep said premises insured against fire, and in view of the fact that the principal indebtedness and two interest coupons are past due and totally unpaid, and that the property has been repeatedly sold for non-payment of taxes and special assessments, and that complainant has been obliged to spend over \$2,300 to pay off tax liens, and has been obliged to pay a fire insurance premium on said premises, all as set forth above, and in view of the fact. and in the opinion of the master this is the controlling reason that the general taxes for 1920 and certain current special assessments are now past due and totally unpaid, as set forth above. This is a present direct breach of the covenants of the trust deed, and unless a receiver is appointed the complainant will be obliged to pay these taxes and special assessments to protect its lien, in addition to the large expenditures made by it as above set forth. "

Vilcox. 159 Ill. App., that two conditions are essential before a receiver can legally be appointed in a case such as the one at bar: First, that the debter is insolvent; and, second, that the property is meager and scant security for the debt. The evidence in the case shows that the defendants have failed to pay taxes and special assessments for any year following the date of the execution of the trust deed and notes. The trust deed specifically provided that the owner of the property would surrender possession thereof and would permit the appointment of a receiver therefor upon failure on their part to comply with the terms thereof. Ordinarily where the value of the property is largely in excess of the mortgage lien a receiver will not be appointed to take possession of the rents and

of rolly and of agrae and indeed; and agree to any order to July let in each year all tures and eaccausets and to keep and presides insured against fire, and in view of the fact that the principal indebedness and two interest conjunction are pust the and totally unpaid, and that the property has been repeatedly sold for non-payment of tames and apacial assessments, and that comglainant has been obliged to spend over \$2,300 to may off tax Misses, and has been obliged to pay a fire insurance premine on said promises, all as set forth amove, and in view of the fact, and in the opinion of the macter this is the controlling reason -Islance increase cindres him Of 91 to? cover farmer and fails assessments are now yant too and totally unpuld, as set forth above. This is a present direct breach of the coverants of the truet deed, and unleas a receiver is appointed the complaints will be oblined to may these taxes and second agraed and or moisishe at , and for seeing of edmonasona expenditures works of it as above set forth.

It is asserted on the authority of <u>lieurous</u> r. <u>Milecy</u>, 150 III. Ann., that the donkinler and essential before a resolver own logally by appointed in a case much ar one one at har: Sirst, that the doctor is to vivent; this, eccoud, that the property is measure and acast security for the doct. The original is the chart that the dose shows that the defendants have failed to pay teams and special assessments for any year full oring the date of the execution of the trust deed and needficelly provided that the order. The reset surface possession increof and or all property would surrander possession increof and or all property would a receiver therefor upon failure on their property would with the terms therefor upon failure on their property for amply with the terms thereof. Ordinarity where the value of the property is largely in excess of the applying lies appointed to take cossession of the appliance to the special of the special and said

profits issuing therefrom pending foreclesure proceedings. It appears here that the principal note and two interest notes were due and unpaid and that the property at different times following the execution of the trust deed had been sold to pay taxes and special assessments due for the years subsequent to the year 1915.

The property in question consists of a lot of land with a residence thereon occupied by defendants as their home-No income is derived from any part of the premises. stead. The master found and the evidence sufficiently shows that the property was worth at least double the amount found due the complainant. Complainant had purchased prior to the filing of the bill a number of tax certificates, some at least of which constituted apparent liens against the premises. All of these and other expenditures were properly included in a final decree in favor of the complainant. The master gave as a controlling reason for his recommendation that defendants had failed to pay the general taxes due on the property for the year 1920. and certain current special assessments, and he concluded that the failure to pay these assessments and taxes was a present direct breach of the covenants of the trust deed.

In the case of Bagley v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Eank, 199 Ill. 76, the Supreme Court said:

"It is not meant, however, to be said a court of equity will appoint a receiver simply because such appointment is stipulated for in the mertgage. The court is not bound to enforce such a provision where it is not necessary to enforce the lien on the rents and profits for the payment of the mortgage debt. But it has been held that such an agreement in the mortgage is entitled to weight in determining whether the power of the court to make the appointment should be exercised or not."

In the case of <u>Stephenson</u> v. <u>Porter</u>, 191 Ill. App. 303, it was held that an order appointing a receiver would be reversed where it appeared from the evidence that the property

profits issuing therefrom pending foreolouse proceedings. It appears here that the principal mote and two interest notes were due and unpaid and time the projectly at different times following the execution of the trust deed had been cold to pay team and special assessments have for the years subsequent to the year 1915.

The property is question consists of a let of land with a residence thereon escapies by defendants as their homenical. As theorem the derived from any part of the promises. The mester found and the avidence sufficiently shows that the property was north at least double the sepant found due the complainant. Complainant had purchased prior to the filling of the bill a number of the services, some at least of which constituted apparent lies a specification, some at least of which and either expenditures were properly included in a final decree in avor of the complainant. The master gave as a controlling reason for his resourcementation that defendants had failed to gay the general times we sat the property for the year land, and cortain current apealsh ansenwents, and he complained that the failure to pay those seasons out of the concluded that

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"It is apt menor, however, to he noth a grunt of equity will appoint a receiver singly necessar much supplitant is sityviated for for the the markneys. The drunt is not bound to anteres outh a provision where it is not recessary to some force the the tent on the rente out in the first part of the rente out in the first part of the markney to surface the first lies a rest outh that no out agreed the first income the south of the control o

In the case of <u>Stanhanson</u> v. <u>Parter</u>, 191 111. 1pp. 303, it was held that an exhar appoint a reversed where it appeared from the extinor that the property

was worth more than the amount of the indebtedness. In the present case the property is worth at least double the smount found to be due complainant, and in view of this fact we are unable to discover what purposes would be served by the appointment of a receiver therefor. No income was derived by defendants from the premises, and at least at the time of his appointment and up to the time when an order was entered in the cause requiring defendant Francis J. Casey to pay rent for the premises, the receiver would of course be unable to collect an income therefrom. Except as to the general taxes for the year 1920 and currect special assessments, the complainant had of its own motion protected the lien of the trust deed by purchasing certain outstanding tax certificates against the premises. At the time the receiver was appointed no deficiency decree had been entered in the cause. It is our opinion, therefore, that the court errod in appointing a receiver for the premises. Such appointment could not, in view of the evidence. serve to protect the interests of any of the parties to the litigation. The complainant, by reason of the large value of the property, appears to have been well protected from less.

It is our further opinion that the court erred in refusing to discharge the receiver on petition of Francis J.

Casey, defendant, not specially because, as urged by defendant, that he had tendered payment of the 1920 taxes due, nor because he had a substantial money offer for the purchase of a part of the premises. It was error in the first instance to appoint the receiver and, as a consequence, we think the court erred in refusing to discharge the receiver when application was made therefor. It follows from what has been said that a subsequent order requiring defendant Francis J. Casey to pay rent is void.

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was warth more than the amount of the indebtedness. In the present case the property is youth at least double the senunt found to be due complainent, and in view of this fact we are unable to discover what purposes would be served by the sppointment of a receiver therefor. To income was derived by defendants from the premines, and at least at the time of his nd herein and white the when when we enter was an and an invented the onuse requiring colonial Transle J. Casey to pay rent for the promises, the receiver would of course be unable to collect an income therefrom. Madage on to the gaueral taxes for the year 1920 and current spushal sussuments, the complainent had of its own motion protected the lien of the trunt deed by nurchasing deriate outstanding ten cortificates against the promisee. At the time the receiver was appointed no deficiency degree had been entered in the cenes. It is our epinton, therefore, that the court exist is eppointing a receiver for the promises. Juck appointment could, not, in view of the svidence, all to a sulfang and to gaze to aleased, but doctore or evene litigation. The compact of remaps of the terms are than of .inol word halocter flor mass ave or a magga, giragora and

It is now britten option that the court error in refusing to alwaining to alwaining to alwaining the requirer of partition of structly.

Casey, asterdamt, not of callly because, as arged by lot admit that he had tendered payment of the 1920 takes he, nor broaded be had a substantial money rifer for the partition of a protect of the previous. It was error in the first to cause to appoint the receiver and, so a consequence, we think the court errod in the receiver. It follows how receives about any locality than the court credit therefor. It follows how shat has be a call that a calmetiment order requiring defendant francis d. Heap to pay rest quest order requiring defendant francis d. Heap to pay rest quest order.

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The order of the Circuit court appointing the receiver, and the order denying the defendant's petition to remove the receiver are reversed.


REVERSED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

The order of the Circuit court appeinting the receiver and the order dauging the defendant's putition to remove the receiver are reversed.

RAVERMUD.

McGurely, R. J., and dated att, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by Francis J. Casey, defendant, from a decree entered in the Circuit court of Cook County in favor of the complainant, Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, a corporation, in proceedings to foreclose a trust deed conveying certain premises owned by appellant and his wife.

Haterial facts in the case are stated in an opinion in case No. 27224, filed herewith, and the facts and conclusions of the court as therein stated may be taken as incorporated in this opinion.

purchased by complainant did not constitute valid liens against the premises. These certificates were issued in the first instance to one E. A. Deans. The holder of the trust deed and notes had the right under the trust deed to purchase any tax certificates or tax titles which did or might affect title to the premises, and such holder had the further right to pay any tax of record which might create an apparent lien against them. Where real estate has been sold for taxes and a deed issued, the purchaser thereof may acquire a title superior to that of the holder of the trust deed and notes. Woitymek v. Franken, 300 Ill. 418.

It is urged in the brief filed for appellant that complainant had purchased a lot of old, void and worthless certificates that could not be considered valid liens against the

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property: that some of the certificates were over three years old when purchased. In support of these statements we are referred to several pages of the abstract of record and to an inspection of the original exhibits admitted in evidence. Nothing in the argument of counsel tends, in our opinion, to disclose any reason why these tax certificates, which were at least apparent liens against the property, should be held to be void. Clearly, at least as to certain of them, they constituted apparent liens against the property. The complainant was charged with knowledge that an outstanding tax certificate or tax deed might supersede the lien conferred upon the holder of the trust deed. Under the circumstances, complainant was justified in purchasing the certificates and in concluding that they were at the time of their purchase apparent liens against the premises. Defendant will not be heard to complain of the fact that no assignments appear with or upon the certificates of sale or receipted tax bills. It appears without question that, for whatever reason, defendant made little or no effort to protest the property from these tax liens for several years following the execution of the trust deed. Under the circumstances shown by the evidence complainant's possession of the certificates and receipts was sufficient. It is our opinion that no error was committed in entering the decree, and it is therefore affirmed.


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McSurely, P. J. and Matchett, J., concur.

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AVET FRUID.

Medurely, P. J. and Matchett, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

A judgment was entered in the Municipal court of Chicago in favor of the defendants in an action begun by the plaintiff to recover the sum of \$600, which sum, plaintiff alleged in a statement of claim, was delivered to defendants as innkeepers on August 14, 1920. It was also alleged in the statement that defendants had failed and refused on demand to return the \$600 deposited with them. In an affidavit of merits the defendants denied that plaintiff had deposited with them the \$600 or any sum of money. The case was tried by the court without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that on August 14, 1920, he was a guest at the Morrison Hotel in Chicago and on that date deposited with defendants' cashier the sum of \$600; that defendants' cashier placed the money in an envelope, had plaintiff sign his name thereon and then delivered a stub term from the envelope to plaintiff, which stub, plaintiff testified, was to be signed by him and presented to the cashier when plaintiff saw fit to demand his money. Plaintiff testified that he delivered the stub to the cashier and asked for his money on August 16, 1920; that the cashier made a search for the envelope containing the money and later informed

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Appallant,

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APPRAL FROM MUSICIPAL COURT

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MM. JUSTICA DEVEN DULLY HER THE CALLION OF THE CHURT.

A judgment was sustered in the Smitispel court of Chicago in favor of the defendants in was notice became by the plaintiff to recover the sum of \$600, which sum, plantaiff alleged in a etatement of chair, was delivered to defendants as innicapers on August 14, 1920. It was also alleged in the statement that defendants had failed and reflered on demand to return the 1600 deposited with them. In an affidavit of mority the defendants design of not plaintiff had democited with them the \$600 or any our of money. Are case our tried by the court without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment was entered in favor of descent without a jury and judgment.

Plaintiff's owldance tends to see the resonance of the conduct at 1920, he was a guest at the secrition seed in the these or that date deposited with defendants' consider the consecution of 5600; that defendants' consider places the nearly in an annaloga, had plaintiff alon if we need the condition is that term from the envelope to plaintiff, which attained no be aloned by him and presented to the certiff from when plaintiff sew fix to demand his money. Their iff thesis field that he delivered are noted to the cashier and the condition and care for the seventh his money on August 16, 1930; that the combier made a second for the expense and the expense and intermed

plaintiff that she did not know where it was; that plaintiff informed the hotel manager that he was unable to procure his money from the cashier, and that he, the assistant manager and the cashier again made search for the missing envelope. Plaintiff further testified that he was compelled to leave the city at ence; that he so informed the hotel assistant manager, one Bowman, and the latter told him that "they would locate my money in the meantime and give it to me when I came back;" that plaintiff returned to the hotel the Saturday following and was informed by Bowman that they had not investigated the matter, as the cashier had reported sick Tuesday, the day after plaintiff left the hotel.

Plaintiff testified that he registered at the hotel for a third time a week later: that when he did so he called upon the vice-president, who told him to call again the same day at four o'clock. Plaintiff called as directed and was taken to a room in the hetel where he met the young lady who he says acted as eashier at the time he deposited the money; that when confronted by him she said, "I do not recall this man's face at all;" that he, plaintiff, then called her attention to an alleged statement made by her at the time plaintiff made the first demand for the money, to the effect that she had said that she "told the head cashier that she had placed it with the rest of the envelopes." The stub which plaintiff says was taken from the envelope was introduced in evidence. Plaintiff testified that he took the \$600 from a vault in the Chamber of Commerce, where he kept about \$5,000 in cash; that the money was to be used by him on a trip to New York, which he took the following week.

There is undisputed evidence in the record to the effect that the plaintiff, from October 19, 1919, to December

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plaintiff that she did not know where it was; that plaintiff informed the hetel manager that he was unable to promure his money from the eachier, and that he, the assistant manager and the coahier again made search for the missing suvelops. Plaintiff further testified that he was compelled to leave the city at ence; that he so infermed the hotel assistant manager, one howman, and the latter told him that "thay would locate my money in the meantime and give it to me when I came beat;" that plaintiff returned to the hetel the Saturday Following and was informed by Bowmen that they had not investigated the matter, as the cambier had reported sick fad not investigated the matter, as the cambier had reported sick fad not investigated the matter, as the cambier had reported sick

Plaintiff testified that be remistered at the hotel for a third time a week later; that when he did so he called upon the vice-president, who told him to call again the same day at of clock. Plaintiff culled as directed and was faken of a room in the hotel where he met the young lady who he says soted as cashier at the time he deposited the money; that when confronted by him she said, "I do not recall this san's feee at all;" that he, plaintiff, then called wor attention to an alloged statement made by wer at the time plaintiff made the first demand for the money, to the effect that she had not that one "told the head ambiter that who had placed it with the rest of the envelopes." The stub which plaintiff says was taken from the envelope was introduced in wytheree. Plaintiff tentified that he took the \$600 from a vault in the Chamber of Commerce, where he kept about \$5,000 is oash; that the money was to be used by him on a trip to Mew York, which he took the following wack.

There is undisputed evidence in the record to the effect that the plaintiff, from October 19, 1919, to Bosember

19. 1920, had certain stock transactions involving an expenditure by him of several thousand dollars.

she was cashier at the Morrison hotel and that she was employed in that capacity on August 14, 1920; that she first saw plaintiff on the day he presented the stub for the envelope; that plaintiff did not deposit the \$600 or any other sum with her August 14, 1920, or at any other time; that she first saw him August 14, 1920, at which time plaintiff presented the signed stub to her and demanded the envelope containing the money.

timony of the plaintiff and that of the cashier. The plaintiff's testimony, however, is supported by his possession of the stub. The cashier testified that no book account was kept of the receipt of money left with her for safe keeping; that the envelopes containing deposits were kept in a drawer and that each of two cashiers, a day cashier and a night cashier, had a key to this drawer. Miss Fulkerson testified that she left defendants' employ on the 18th or 19th of August, 1920.

There is evidence which tends to show that the defendants actually kept in their employ three cashiers, each of whom had access to the drawer in which was deposited money and valuables delivered to defendants, through their agents, by guests of the hotel; that the practice was to place deposits of money in envelopes from which a stub was removed and given to the depositor, who was required, upon demanding return of the deposit, to deliver the stub to the cashier with the depositor's signature written thereon for comparison with the signature of the depositor written on the envelope at the time of the deposit.

19, 1320, had certain stock transactions involving an expenditure by him of several thousand dellars.

Calherine Fullermon terrified that in August, 1920, she was capitar at the Advistment betal and that she was exployed in that capacity on August 14, 1920; that she livet new plaintiff on the day he precented the sine for the cancalope; that plaintiff ild not deposit the \$6000 or any other new with her August 14, 1920, or at may siner time; that the first own him August 16, 1920, at make the plaintiff, present the signed outs her and demanded the envelope containing one oner.

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Only one of these cashiers testified, and while it is true that she directly denies that she received the deposit, as testified to by plaintiff, it is our opinion that the prima facie case made by the plaintiff was not sufficiently met by the single denial by the cashier of plaintiff's testimony. Defendants offer no explanation of plaintiff's possession of the stub, which bere a number corresponding with the number on the envelope from which it was detached. The envelope should, according to defendants' practice, have remained in their possession even though the stub had in some way, accidentally or otherwise, been detached. persons at least had access to the drawer where the valuables of guests of the hotel were deposited; only one of such persons testified. Where, as in the present case, it appears that a hotel entertains guests and assumes to act as a depositor for money and valuables, every reasonable precaution should be taken to protect property so deposited. It is intimated only that plaintiff may have found or otherwise obtained the stub which he presented to the cashier, with his room number and signature thereon, at the time he demanded the return of the \$600. the circumstances it is not quite enough to show that the person whom plaintiff says received the money now denies the receipt of it, and this is more particularly true where it appears, as it does here, that other persons had ample opportunity to gain possession of the money which plaintiff says was deposited with defendants. Plaintiff's evidence establishes a prima facie case in his favor, and it is our view that defendants failed to produce witnesses, whose absence is unexplained, who might have been able, if they saw fit to do so, to give some evidence touching the matter of fact in issue between the parties.

The judgment of the Municipal court is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

Only one of these castiers testified, and wills it is true that bullives to timeger odd beviever ove at getanb viscoul ade to by picintiff, it is our spinion that the prima figie ous made by the claimit I was not on', cien't met by the single tental by the east of pr intiffe trathmony. Diaminto offer no explanation of plaintiff's government the state of the bore . number corresponding with the number on the envelope from which "Bis were upo a raile according to deferd att it was detached. practice, have remained in their persession even though the citib had is some way, appidentally or offerwise, been detected. To estantia at least had access to the terms where the sales of west of the head deposited; but to seek out to steep tilled. Where, as in the present case, it appears that letel entertaine guesta of assum the action a depositor in a description and valuables, every research by precontion about to the terer to protect proporty at tenosia. It is intioned only that of delife are not been sup a treaty to track evan you this misle procented to the cashier, ith its news much or attactive thereon, at the time in de mided and return of the arm. the effection taneous is an entire entry to the taneous termination of in tyling, and the class cause and the transfer of the transfer and the tr it or , to the re or the rest the light of the the series and the series of the series t grippings of the 1 street and the the proof and possession of the makey w't shabitiff cays was deport of with defendants. It suffice evilence estille on a privation of ac in his favor, and it is the trained in the read of the proer. i / i. dw _ while 'tx an al so tv / sandy , se sendly sould been with the same of the second of the second ing the mitter of the a fame between the parti.

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McSurely, V. J., and Actobott, J., : none.

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MICHAEL BOROS, Sr., as Guardian of the Estate of Michael Boros, Jr., a Minor,

Appellee,

VS.

OLSON RUG COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT
OF COOK COURTY.

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MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Michael Boros, Jr., a minor, sustained serious injuries while in the employ of defendant, Olson Rug Company. Boros, by his guardian, his father, prosecuted suit in the Superior court of Cook County to recover damages for the injuries received by him and on a trial before a jury a verdict and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for \$15,000. Defendant seeks to reverse the judgment by appeal to this court.

Plaintiff bases his right to recovery upon the allegations of two counts of an amended declaration and also an additional count filed thereto. The first count sets up in substance that Beros was employed by defendant at and about a certain dangerous and hazardous machine, known as a picker machine, in violation of Section 20 I of the Child Labor Act approved June 26, 1917. This section of the act contains a provision which prohibits the employment of minors under the age of sixteen years "in any capacity whatever in any employment that may be considered dangerous to their lives or limbs or where their health may be injured." Under the second count recovery is sought for a violation of Section 89, Chap. 48, Hurd's Illinois Statutes. This section is as follows:

"That all power driven machinery, including all saws, planers, wood shapers, jointers, sand paper machines, iron mangles, emery wheels, ovens, furnaces, forges and rollers of metal; all projecting set screws on moving parts; all drums, cogs, gearing, belting, shaving tables, fly wheels, flying shuttles and hydro-extractors; all laundry machinery, mill gearing and machinery of every description, in any factory,

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MICHAR EGAGS, Dr., as Guardian of the Satate of Michael Beron, Jr., a Minor, Appelles,

.BY

GLOCK RUG COMPANY, " Correction, Augustlant.

APPEAL TROM BUFERION COUNT OF COOK COUNTY.

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MR. JUSTICE DEVEN DELIVERED THE OFILION OF THE COURT.

Michael Boros, Jr., a minor, suctained serious injuries while in the mapley of defendant, Olson Mug Company. Bores, by his guardism, his father, promouted suit in the Supernor court of Cook County to recover damages for the injuries received by his and on a trial before a jury a variiot and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for \$15,000. Defendant seems to reverse the Judgment by appeal to this court.

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the second count recovery is sought for a vicantian of advection 30,
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the second count recovery is sought for a vicantian of as fellows:

"That all power driven machiner, including all save, planers, wood shapers, jointers, such nour mobines, iron mangles, emery wheels, evens, furnaces, forges and relieve of maisle; all projecting set sorsws on moving parks; all druss, come, gearing, belaing, abaving tables, fly wheels, flying chuttles and hydro-extractors; all landary machinery, all gearing and machinery of every description, in any factory,

mercantile establishment, mill or work shop, shall be so located, wherever possible, as not to be dangerous to employes, or shall be properly enclosed, fenced or otherwise protected."

of his employment by defendant and at the time he received the injuries for which suit was brought was under the age of sixteen years and between the age of fourteen and sixteen years; that defendant, in violation of sections 20 and 20 C of the Child Labor Act, had employed him without complying with the sections of the act which prohibit employment of any minor over the age of fourteen and under the age of sixteen years unless there is first procured and placed on file in the place or establishment where such minor is employed an employment certificate issued as provided by the act and accessible to authorized officers of the State Department of Labor. Section 20 C of the act provides for the issuance of the employment certificate by persons authorized by the act.

The evidence shows that on June 29, 1919, Boros was employed by the defendant at and about the feeding of a machine operated by electric power, known as a picker machine. This machine consisted of a drum, about a foot and one-half in diameter and three or four feet in length, upon the murface of which were many metal teeth about an inch in length. The drum was attached to a shaft which was revolved by means of a pulley and belt. Immediately in front of the drum were two rollers which were operated by a system of cog wheels placed at the end of the machine. Boros was put to work in a room adjoining that in which the picker machine was located. His work was to place wool before the opening of a pipe into which wool would be drawn by air suction and carried through the pipe to the picker machine. When so employed he would occupy a position about 48 feet from the machine. The drum of the machine was covered except at the top, where a space of about 12 to 14 inches was open to permit pieces of dirt or other material to be thrown

contile establishment, will er work shep, chall be so loeated, wherever possible, as not to be dangerous to employes, as enall be properly unclosed, femced or otherwise protected.

The additional count charges that Bores at the time of his employment by defendant and at the time he received the injuries for which suit was brought was under the age of sixteen years and between the age of fourteen and sixteen years; that defendant, in viciation of exceluse 20 and 20 C of the Unitd Labor Act, had saployed him without complying with the sections of the act which prohibit amployment of any minor ever the age of fourteen and under the age of furteen years unless there is first procupad and placed on file in the place or establishment where such minor is employed an employment certificate issued as provided by the act and coverable to sutmorticate issued as provided by the act and coverable to sutmorticate issued as provided by the act labor. Section 20 C of the not provided for the issuence of the exployment certificate by poreone sutherized by the set.

The evidence shows that on danc 29, 1919, Norce was employed by the defendent at and about the feeding of a machine operated by alsotric power, known as a pieker machine. This machine equatisted of a drun, about a frot and one-half in diameter and three of four fact in length, upon the surface of which were many metal tests about an inch in length. The drum was attached to a shaft which was revolved by means of a pulley and helt. Immediately in front of the drum were two maliers which were operated by a system of equation. Bores was put to effect in a room adjoining that in which ware operated by a system work in a room adjoining that in which the picker machine was lowered. His work was to place the opening of a pipe eated. His work was to place the opening of a pipe into picker machine. When so employed he would occupy a the pipe to the picker machine. When so employed he would occupy a position about 46 feet from the machine. The drum of the machine

was open to permit pieces of dirt or other material to be thrown

out of the machine by the movement of the drum. The pipe into which Boros fed the wool led from the room where he was employed over a door between that room and the one in which the machine was placed and was brought down to a point near the west end of the machine where it opened into a clute from which the wool passed down to and between the rollers, which caused the wool to be fed into the drum; from there it passed through another pipe to a carding machine. The evidence tends to prove that the cogs which constituted a part of the picker machine were unguarded, and there is evidence from which the jury might conclude that proper guarding of these cogs was practicable.

Boros testified that he had been working for defendant for about six weeks before July 16, 1919, the day upon which he received his injuries; that he had been employed on a prior occasion by defendant for about four or five weeks; that he was then laid off; that about three days thereafter he went back to work again and was put to work "on the machine I got hurt on;" that he was employed by a Mr. Dobson, defendant's superintendent, and that mething was said to him at any time up to the time he was hurt about his age. In describing the picker machine Boros said:

"It stood on a structure, four wooden legs, and it was about a yard wide and a yard high, and there was a big drum there, a revolving drum, and that was to rip up rags, and there was two or three rolls in front where the rags went through, so the ripper could take them right out from the rolls as it passed through to rip them up. There was two or three rolls so that the rags could go in between them two rolls, and as they came out the ripper ripped them up. The ripper was a big drum with iron teeth in it like spikes."

He further testified that another large machine was located in the same room with the picker machines; that no one was employed to work on the machines during the week before the accident except himself; that sometimes the picker machine "got stuck once or twice or maybe three times a day, and sometimes it didn't get stuck at all;" that for some days

out of the manifies by the movement of the drum. The pipe into which beroe fee the wood had from the rows where he was ampleyed ever a door between that rows and the one in which the mechine. Was placed and that mongh's demi to a point mean the earth ead of the inachine where it speced into a citate from which the word one of passed down to such between the rolliers, which earth the world to be fed into the time the rolliers, which earth the modilier pipe be fed into the drum; from there it passed that the past of the picker amount of one of the picker amounted, and there is evidence from picker amounted that from these cops can these cops and the pasting and these cops can practicable.

Boses in tilled the best reciting the bod best reciting for infendent for shout alx maste helped the few upon which he resolved his injuries; that he had been compayed on a saider occasion by defendant for about four or five recke; that he was then had had off; that about three days thousalter he must have no read had and was put to reak for the smohine i ye' hart on! The the massemble of ye' hart on! The the massemble of ye' hart on! The the massemble of the the thet shout his was but the upon the massemble of the the shout his second by a line of the start of the massemble of the shout he was but the shout his shout his ago. In inserthing the winder was here was but

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after he first went to work feeding the wool to the conveyor pipe two or three men were engaged at or about the machines; that after they had quit work witness had to remove from the drum or rolls material which had at different times caused the machine to become clogged and to cease operating; that just before the time of the accident he, the witness, went to the left side of the machine to pull out certain material which had become clogged therein; that he removed this material from that side of the machine and that then he went to the other side and bent down, and as he did so his shirt became caught between the cog wheels: that at this time the machine was in operation: "it just threw. or pulled, my shirt together and took all my wind away. I tried to get myself up by putting my hand on top of a piece of tin back of the drum and my hand slipped and fell on the drum." The evidence shows that there was an open space above the drum about 12 or 14 inches wide. Plaintiff's hand and arm passed into the drum and that he received serious injuries thereby is conceded.

Plaintiff testified that there was no guard on the machine and none on the cog wheels, although the evidence shows than an L-shaped fence extended along the side of the machine and about a foot and a half therefrom.

There is a direct contradiction in the evidence as to whether Boros was permitted or directed to remove material from the drum or rolls at such times as the machine became clogged. His testimony is to the effect that defendant's foreman instructed him how to remove the material when the machine became clogged and while it was in motion; that he had followed the directions given on several occasions and that at certain times when he requested the foreman to do this work he was told by him, with some show of anger, to do it himself. Derr, the foreman, directly

after he first went to work feeding the west to the conveyor pipe two or three men were engaged at or about the mec. incu that after they had quit work witages had to recove from the drum or rells material which had at different blace coused the readsine to become closued and to seem operating; that just before the time of the accident he, the witness, were to the left side of the eachine to pull out certain material union had became clopped therein: that he removed this an artial from 'hat alde of the machine and that then he went to the other aids and bent down, and as he did so his whire became caught between the con wheele: that at this time the machine was in operation; "it just clumer, or united, my shirt together and cook all my wind away. I trick to get myself up by putting my hand on top of a piece of tim back of the drum and my hand slipped and fell on the drum." The evi-Association of the state of the state state of the distriction of the state of the only wind resease with the final of Think Co. . whire assent Af to drug and that he received serious injusies thereby is conceded.

eligatile testified that there was no gourd on the machine and none on the cog wheels, asthough the evidence arounthan an i-abmost funce extends; element the side of the machine and about a foot and a half therefrom.

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contradicted Boros' testimony by saying that Boros' only duty was to feed the wool to the conveyor pipe and that he was cautioned not to go near or to meddle with the machine. Derr's testimony is to some extent corroborated by that of other witnesses, but it is our opinion that the evidence on this point, even if the question may be thought to be material, was one for the jury.

Boros testified that he had never produced a school certificate for defendant; that he was born in Austro-Hungary January 12, 1904. It is earnestly urged on behalf of the defendant that believable evidence introduced on the trial shows that Boros was in fact over the age of sixteen years at the time he was injured July 16, 1919. On this question there is much conflict in the evidence. Boros' father and mother both testified that he was born January 12, 1904, and a baptismal certificate was introduced in evidence, over defendant's objection, which also tended to show that he was born on that date. Certain Chicago public school records which are required to be kept by law. recite that he was born upon different dates, one of them giving the date as February 14, 1903, another as January 2, 1903, and another as June 2, 1903. There is some evidence that in August, 1911, Boros' mother had given his age to an officer of a steamship upon which she and he had embarked for America as eight years, and that the same age was given at the port of entry. It is argued that the record made by the steamship official was probably caused by the fact that in giving the age of Boros his mother used the Hungarian word M-A-T, which is pronounced with the long sound of a and which translated into English means seven. It is further shewn that one of the school records was corrected so as to give the date of Bores' bitth as January 12,1904, and there is evidence from which the jury might infer that this correction was made before he sustained his injuries. In any event, it is our view

contradicted Moros' testimony by saying that Moros' only duty was 10 feed the week to the neuveyer pipe and that he was emutioned not to go near or to meddle with the machine. Mapr's testimeny is to some extent corresponded by that or other witnesses, but it is our spinion that the evidence on this point, even if the question may be thought to be material, was one for the jury.

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that under the evidence the question of Boros' age was one which the trial Judge properly left for determination by the jury.

No attempt was made to show, except by the impeaching evidence referred to, that Boros was more than sixteen years of age at the time he was injured. Whether the school records were made in error, or whether the persons upon whose testimony the records were made consciously misinformed the school authorities for some ulterior purpose, or whether the records in fact speak the truth, were questions to be considered by the jury in determining Boros' age. Assuming than, as we do, that there is sufficient evidence in the record to warrant a conclusion that Boros was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years at the time he was injured, the question arises as to whether the defendant is legally liable for the injuries sustained by him.

In the case of American Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214

Ill. 509, the Supreme Court said:

"Appellant also questions the refusal of an instruction to the effect that if the appellee, knowing that he was under the age of fourteen years, obtained his employment by falsely representing that he was mixteen years of age, he cannot take advantage of his false statement and recover in this action, and it is said that this instruction should have been given, on the theory that the law will not permit a plaintiff to recover where his own unlawful act concurs in causing the injury of which he complains.

"This doctrine is not applicable for the reason that the statute under consideration is aimed at the master and not at the servant. The act of the child in accepting or entering into the employment is not unlawful. Moreover, if the child's statement to the effect that he was above the age of sixteen would constitute a defence, the law could never be enforced in any case where the child was willing to make a false statement in reference to his age for the purpose of obtaining the employment."

Testimony offered on behalf of the defendant is to the effect that Boros said he was nineteen years of age at the time of his employment by defendant; this testimony is directly denied by him; but whatever the truth may be in this matter, under the decisions of the Supreme court of this State it is immaterial what he may have said at the time of his employment by defendant

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if it be assumed that he was under the age of sixteen years at the time he was employed, and that defendant had not procured an employment certificate, as required by the act. Evidence for the defendant that its foreman had never instructed Boros how to take meterial from between the rolls in front of the drum; that he, the foreman, had ordered Boros to keep away from the machine and that Boros had said at the time of his employment that he was nineteen years of age, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, becomes immaterial.

In the case of Roszek v. Bauerle & Stark Co., 232 Ill. 561, it was held that it wasno more legal to permit a minor between fourteen and sixteen years of age to be employed in a factory without the permit required by law, then it was to employ a minor under fourteen years of age, whose employment, under the law, in mercuatile establishments is prohibited. In deciding the case the court said:

"In this case the plea did not aver that any permit had been obtained authorizing plaintiff's employment for any purpose, and, as we understand the record, the proof shows no such permit was obtained. Without such permit he was no more legally permitted to work in defendant's factory than would be a minor under fourteen years of age. In the one case a minor is not legally permitted to work at all, while in the other he is only legally permitted to work upon obtaining the permit required by the Child Labor Law."

An employer is not permitted to violate the law merely because an employee may have misrepresented his age. The duty imposed upon the employer not to employ minors between fourteen and sixteen years of age without first obtaining the necessary permit therefor is absolute. The salutary purpose of the law is to protect minors in circumstances such as appear to have caused the injuries to Boros.

The Child Labor Act also provides that minors under the age of sixteen years may not be employed in any capacity whatever in any employment that may be considered dangerous to their lives or limbs or where their health may be injured. The If it be masseed than he was under the age of sixteen years at the time he was employed, and that defendant had not promised an employed certification, as required by the sol. Syldence for the defendant i that its forest had never instructed beant how to take material from between the rolls in front of the iron; that he, the foreste, had endowed heres to here among from the unchine and that beree had said at the other of the amployment that he was nineteen years of ego, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, becames insuferial.

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evidence shows that the gears attached to the machine in question were unguarded; that an open space 12 to 14 inches wide extended above the drum and that the picker machine and another large machine were located within 48 inches of each other. It is true that Boros' work was in an adjoining room about 50 feet away from the picker machine. He was compelled, however, in passing to and from his place of employment to pass in the space between the two machines, and he insists that he was required in the usual course of his employment, under the directions of his foreman, to remove material from the drum and rolls when the machine became clogged. We think the evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the defendant was employed in a place that might be considered dangerous to his life or limbs.

In the well considered case of Stratford v. Republic Iron Co., 238 Ill. 373, it was contended that it was incumbent upon a miner to prove that he was in the exercise of due care, and that he could not recover if at the time of the accident he was doing work he was not authorized to perform or that he had been forbidden to do. In answering this contention the Supreme Court said:

"In the Armentraut case we held that an employer must know, at his peril, that children employed by him are of an age that he may lawfully employ them. *** Appellant, assuming the fact to be as contended by it, that appellee had of his own accord left the work he was employed and directed to do and engaged in work he was forbidden to perform when injured, argues that there is no more reason for saying his injury resulted from his employment than there would be if he had. while in appellant's employment, been struck by lightning. It is true, liability does not depend, alone, upon the employment, but the injury must be a consequence of such employment. The mere fact that a child employed in violation of the law receives an injury in nowise resulting from the employment, would not create a liability. But such is not the case here. The not create a liability. But such is not the case here. vital and distinguishing fact here is that appollee was emplayed by appellant to labor in its manufacturing establishment and while engaged in performing services for it in said establishment he was injured. He was in appellant's plant by virtue of his employment to work for it, and the fact that he may have temporarily abandened the work he was employed and directed to do and engaged in a forbidden line, we think does not destroy

ovidence where that the gears actsobed to the machine in questian were unguarded; that an open space IS to is inches wise extended above the drum and that the picker machine and another large machine were located within 48 hackes of and other. It is thus that Boros' werk was in an adjoining room chout 85 feet went from the picker meshine. He was compelled, however, in plantages and from and from his place of employment to pass in the space between the two machines, and he insiets that he was required in the usual course of his employment, under the directions of his appleading the drum; and rolls when the reading became classed. We think the evidence is sufficient to ascreak the comclassion that the defends a sufficient to account classical the defends of angerous to like or regleyed in a plant that the defends or him explayed in a plantage to like the less or limbs.

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iron Co., 220 117. 374, it was contented that it was incurbent upon a minor to prove that he was in the exercise of due care, and that he could not recover if at the time of the accident he was not cuttodire to erricus or that he had not asterized the somewhat the season to the source of the source said:

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the causal relation between the employment and the injury, and if it does not, contributory negligence of appellee would constitute no defense, and the court did not err in refusing to submit that question to the jury. It is imposing no harsh burden on appellant to hold that having unlawfully employed the appellee to labor in its plant it is liable to his for any injury received by his resulting from the performance of services for it, whether those services were in the line he was directed to perform or not. The law forbids the employment of children in any capacity in such establishments as appellant's, and it is contrary to the spirit of the law to say that the consequences of its wilful violation may be avoided by showing that the child left the work givan it to perform and negligently undertook to do something else, which resulted in the injury."

The case of McMally v. Standard Railway Equipment Co., 165 Ill. App. 371, is relied upon and some to be in support of defendant's position. We are inclined, however, to rest our decision upon later decisions by our Supreme Court.

We do not think the trial court erred in admitting the baptismal certificate. There is some basis for the argument that the objection made to the introduction of this certificate was too general in its nature. The point was not specifically made on the trial that the certificate was not duly certified as required under section 20 D of the Child Labor act. Paragraph B of that section provides that a baptismal certificate or transcript of the record, duly cortified, showing the date of birth, place of baptism, etc., is admissible as evidence of age. cate appears to have been executed by Sabon Cornell. Record Keeper and Rector, and bears a seal upon which is inscribed the name of the priest who performed the ceremony of baptism. The foreign law which purports to authorize the making of the baptismal record was introduced in evidence. The objections made to this proof are technical and, in our opinion, should not cause a reversal of the judgment. The foreign law as interpreted was read in the presence of the jury. This was not proper practice, as the question of the admissibility of the certificate was solely

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for the court, but we do not think this error could have influenced the jury in any degree for or against either party.

It is argued that the court erred in giving to the jury plaintiff's instruction No. 3 on the subject of damages. A part of this instruction told the jury that plaintiff might recover for

"his loss of time and inability to work and transact business, after he reaches the age of 21, if any, on account of such injuries, and such future loss of time and inability to work, if any, which the jury may believe from the evidence he will sustain on account of such injuries."

It is said that this instruction would permit the plaintiff to recover because of inability to work between the date of the trial and his 21st birthday. He was nineteen years of age at the time the case was tried. The objection made to the instruction, is, we think, sufficiently answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of American Car Co. v. Hill. 226 Ill. 236, where it is said:

"The suit was brought in the name of the father as next friend, and we are of the opinion if said instruction, which is not as broad as the instruction in the <u>Richardson</u> case, is held to permit a recovery by the appellee for the less of time and inability to work during his minority, that the father, by permitting the suit to be brought and prosecuted in his name as next friend and by procuring said instruction to be given to the jury, estopped himself from thereafter recovering damages from the appellant for the loss of time and inability to work of the appellee, occasioned by said injury, during the minority of the appellee,"

In the case of Chicago Serew Co. v. Weiss, 203 Ill. 541, the court held that:

"The parent; may relinquish his right to the earnings of his child, and that he has done so may be inferred from the conduct of the parent (21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd ed. 1059), and the prosecution of a suit in the name of the child by the father as next friend, for the recovery of the earnings of the minor, would be equivalent to a relinquishment on the part of the father of the authority to collect or claim such earnings in his own right."

West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 180 Ill. 286; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Gemmill, 209 Ill. 641.

Other objections made to the instruction are not

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Tast Chloard 3t. 2. 2. 400 v. Johnson, 13 711. 286; Gilang. Cliv Ky. 40. v. General, 200 711. 661.

Other objections made to the instruction was not

tenable. It is argued that there is no evidence in the record tending to show that Boros sustained, as a result of the accident, any injury to his health. It is conceded that he sustained serious and permanent injuries to his left hand and wrist, and it is a fair inference from the evidence that as a result of the injuries he has permanently lost a large part of the use of his arm and hand. This objection was raised and answered in the case of Kennedy v. Swift & Co., 234 Ill. 612, where the Supreme Court said:

"One arm of the appellee was broken and the wrist of the other severely sprained and the tongue of the appellee bitten through. He was a strong, healthy man, under thirty years of age at the time he was injured, and at the time of the trial, which occurred several months subsequent to his injury, as a result of the fall he was unable to perform manual labor. It is therefore apparent that there was evidence in the record upon which to base the said instruction."

No reversible error was committed in giving or refusing to give certain other instructions.

The point is made that the verdict and judgment are for an excessive amount. It is admitted in the briefs filed on behalf of defendant that the plaintiff sustained very severe injuries. The evidence tends to show that as a result of the accident plaintiff lost all of his left hand except the index finger and thumb as also part of his wrist. The jury were warranted in concluding that as a result of the accident the plaintiff's arm and hand were seriously and permanently injured.

While the verdict is large it cannot be said that it was caused by passion, prejudice or sympathy on the part of the jury. Other alleged errors are urged, but it is our opinion on the whole record that no such error is shown as would warrant a reversal of the judgment.

The judgment of the Superior court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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
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Modurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE DAVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

April 16, 1921, plaintiff, Edson Florsheim, was riding in an automobile in a northerly direction on Normal boulevard, in the city of Chicago. As plaintiff attempted to cross Fifty-ninth street his automobile was struck by defendant's truck, which was at that time being driven west on that street.

In a statement of claim filed in the Municipal court of Chicago the plaintiff set up that the car in which he was riding at the time of the accident was so damaged by the collision that he was compelled to expend \$546.25 for repairs thereon. On a trial judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for \$546.25. The defendant brings the case by appeal to this court. The evidence introduced on the trial shows that the collision occurred at the intersection of Fifty-minth street, an east and west street, and Normal boulevard, which runs north and south. At the time of and just before the accident the plaintiff was driving a touring car north on Mormal avenue, and defendant, by its employe, was operating a truck west in the northerly track of two street railway tracks in Fifty-ninth street. The plaintiff testified that as he approached the street to cross Fifty-ninth street his car was moving from 15 to 18 miles an hour; that he had a clear vision of the intersection, but that he did not see the truck until he, the witness, had passed the south curb line of Fifty-ninth street; that at this time the

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Sorperstion, Appellant,

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IC. JUSTICE DAVIH MALLYCARD THE OPIATON OF THE COURT.

April 16, 1921, plaintiff, Wason Floreheim, was riding in an automobile in a northerly direction on Morani boulevand, in the city of Unicago. As plaintiff attempted to cross Wifty-ninth etreet his automobile was struck by defendant's track, which was at that time being driven west on that etreet.

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truck was at the east curb line of the boulevard and driving west on the westbound car track; that when he, the witness, was six or eight feet from the truck he saw that the latter was not going to stop: that witness then turned his car toward the west, the direction in which the truck was moving, to avoid the collision; that the truck did not attempt to stop or to turn out of the track, but ran into plaintiff's car, striking it on the right hand side. The only testimony touching the speed of the truck is that of one Gunar, who was riding in plaintiff's car and who testified that "it was coming about the same speed we were going." The evidence then shows that both vehicles were approaching the intersection, each traveling at about 15 to 18 miles an hour. It appears from plaintiff's own testimony that just before and at the time of the accident he failed to comply with Section 33 of the Motor Vehicle Law. Defendant's motor truck was being driven westward on Fifty-ninth street at a rate of speed no greater than that at which plaintiff's automobile was moving. The truck was also approaching the intersection upon plaintiff's right, and it was the duty of plaintiff, under the law and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, to give the truck the right of way over the intersection.

The facts in the case are not disputed, and from plaintiff's testimony it appears that the damage to the car was caused by plaintiff's failure to comply with the law. In view of our opinion that on the admitted facts of the case there can be no recovery in favor of the plaintiff, it will be unnecessary to consider other questions presented in the brief filed for defendant.

The judgment of the Municipal court is reversed, with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACT.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

town mivit bas brevefued off to east due cast the east and driver went on the westbosed car track; that when he, the witness, was air or tient foot from the truck he caw that the latter was not going to step; that witness then turned bis car toward the west, the direction in which the truck was moving, to avoid the collision; that the truck did not attempt to utop or to form out of the track but you into plaintiff's car, striking it on the right The only tentinony tauching the speed of the truck . obte hund is that of one Cunar, who was riding is plaintiff's our and who testified that "it was coming about the came speed we were going." The evidence then chose time both vehicles were approaching the in bus around feet and including the feet bar surface for bar and and the time of the accident he islied to usaply with Septian 35 of the Motor Vehicle Law. Befordent's noter thunk was being driven westward on Fifty-ninth street at a rate of speed no grower than that at which whitefalls was made oblige was moving. The capel was also approaching the intersection agon plaintifflu right, and it vas the duty of plaintiff, under the law and under the atrouvationes as shown by the evidence, to give the truck the right of may ever the intersection.

The facts in the case are not dispused, and from plaintiff's testimony it appears that the damages to the ear was consed by
plaintiff's fathers to comply with the law. In view of our epiaten
that on the admitted facts of the case there can be no recevery in
favor of the plaintiff, it will be undecreasely to consider other
densitions presented in the brief filled for defendant.

The judgment of the Municipal court is reversed, with a finding of fact.

Confine of fact.

**Confine of f

MoSurely, P. J., and Marchett, J., concur.

FINDING OF FACT.

We find as a fact that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in his failure to give defendant's motor truck the right of way over the street intersection.

"We find as a fact that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in his failure to give defendant's motor truck the right of way over the street intersection.

402 - 27360

SAM COHEN,

Appellee,

Whberree

VS.

THE WESTESS COMPANY, a Corporation,

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 601

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought suit in the Municipal court of Chicago to recover the sum of \$285.00 which he alleged in a statement of claim was due him from defendant because of the alleged negligence of the latter, a warehouseman, in carting and storing certain rugs, statuary and cut glass, the property of plaintiff. A judgment was entered in the case in favor of the plaintiff for \$99.00, and defendant appeals.

Evidence introduced on the trial shows that March 21, 1919, plaintiff delivered eight rugs and certain statuary and out glass to the defendant for storage. In July, 1920, the property was delivered by defendant to plaintiff, and the latter testified that the rugs when delivered to him were not in the same condition they were in when delivered to defendant; that they were moth eaten to the extent that seven of them had become worthless. While there was some evidence of slight damage to the statuary and cut glass while in defendant's care, it is evident that the court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor on the theory that defendant, by entering into the contract with plaintiff for the storage of the goods, had become an insurer thereof, and in this we think the court erred.

There is no evidence at all in the record that the defendant in the care of the property Ead failed to exercise ordinary care. Defendant's assistant manager testified that all of

402 - 27560

DAK COKEEN,

Appelles,

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TO THE PRESENCE & Cornection, appeilants

APPAR ERON MUNICIPAL CECURE OF GRICAGO.

227 I.A. 601

WA. JUSTICS DEVIE DELIVED THE CRIBICA OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff prought suit in the Municipal court of Chicago to recover the sem of \$235... which he alleged in a statement of claim was due him area defendant because of the alleged negligence of the letter, a marehousensa, in carting and storing certain rugs, stetiany and out glass, the property of plaintiff.

A judgment was entered in the case in two. I the plaintiff for \$995.00, and defendant appeals.

Syldence introduced on the trial signs that direct 21.

1919, plaintiff delivered sight rugs and sertain statuary and cut glass to the defendant for starage. In July, 1930, the property was delivered by defendant to plaintiff, and the latter testified that the rugs shen delivered to its were not in the case condition they were in when delivered to defendant; that they were noth eaten to the extent that seven of them had become vorthless. While there was some evidence of slight casease to the statuary and cut glass while in defendant's care, it is evident that the court emplace if plaintiff is they the checky that the entered judgment in plaintiff's favor on the theory that defendant, by entering into the centract with plaintiff for the storage of the goods, had become an insurer thereof, and it this we think the court event.

There is no evidence at all in the proceed that the exercise ondidefondant in the care of the property had falled to exercise ondinary care. Defendant's assistant manager treatmed that all of the property received by plaintiff was separately kept in a room in defendant's warehouse and that during the time it was there defendant took every reasonable precaution to protect it from damage. An expert testiful for plaintiff said that tugs are eaten by moths; and it was stipulated on the mat an absent witness for defendant would testify if present that there is no way in the warehouse business to guard against moths; that in this particular case "every precaution known to the storage business was used to prevent it."

Section 261, chap. 114, Hurd's Revised Illinois Statutes, provides that:

"A warehouseman shall be liable for any loss or injury to the goods caused by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful owner of similar goods would exercise, but he shall not be liable in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, for any loss or injury to the goods which could not have been avoided by the exercise of such care."

exercised at least ordinary care to prevent damage to the property delivered to it by the plaintiff. There is some evidence of slight damage to the statuary and glassware delivered to defendant, but this damage is not by any means sufficient to account for the judgment rendered in plaintiff's favor. It is shown in the abstract of record that the trial Judge was of the opinion, in that it appeared that the rugs were delivered to the defendant in good condition, that the latter became an insurer thereof and was bound absolutely to restore the property to plaintiff in the condition it was in when received by defendant. This is not the law. The statute specifically provides that the defendant was required under the law to exercise only ordinary care to protect the property.

In the case of St. John v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 168
Ill. App. 599, it was held that a warehouseman is required to

the property redelved by plaintiff was separately kept in a room in defendant to warehouse and that during the size it was there defendant took overy reasonable pressuites so dietect it from damage. An expert testify, which if said that the patent of souths; and it was uniquisted on the very subjections witness for reference nould testify if present that there is no way in the warehouse ousiness to guard saiding testing that is this particular case "every pressuition known to the storage business was used to prevent it."

dection 351, shap. 114, Burd's Bevised Illinois

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exercised at least exidency care to prevent damage to the property delivered to it by the plantiff. There is come evidence of slight damage to the statusty out glassware is come evidence of slight damage to the statusty out glassware delivered to deficient function, but this damage is not by come sufficient to account for the judgment rendered in plaintiff's favor. It is shown in the abstract of record that the fruit followers of the colinion, in that it appeared that the frugs were delivered to the nefercient in good condition, that the latter because an insurer thereof and was beard absolutely to restore the property to plaints in the the law. The statute specifically provides that the frederic test of the front with the frederic the specifically provides that the front with the test out was required unior the law to exercise only addingly care to was required unior the law to exercise only addingly care to

In the case of St. John v. Ill. Cent. E. R. Jo., 148 Ill. App. 595, it was held that a warehouseman is required to

use ordinary care and diligence in the preservation of property committed to its care. <u>Miles</u> v. <u>International Hotel Co.</u>, 289 Ill. 320.

The judgment of the Municipal court will be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

use ordinary care and diligence in the preservation of property equalities to its care. Miles v. International Equal Sc., 289 111. 320.

The judgment of the Zanisipal court will be reversed and the cause remainded to that court for a new trial.

REVERSED AND ENGLISHED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., Concur.

415 - 27373

L. L. COOKE,

Appellee.

Vs.

WILLIAM E. COATS, JOSEPH LIBAL, Jr., and JOSEPH LIBAL, Sr., Defendants.

WILLIAM E. COATS. Appellant

APPEAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 602

. . . .

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant, William E. Coats, appeals from a judgment rendered against him in the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago in favor of the plaintiff, L. L. Cooke, for the sum of \$340. The case was tried by a jury and evidence was introduced on behalf of the plaintiff which tended to prove that a collision occurred at streets intersection in the City of Chicago between an automobile owned and operated by the plaintiff and one operated by Joseph Libal, Jr. The car operated by Libal was owned by the defendant.

No question is raised in the briefs filed in the case as to whether sufficient evidence was introduced to warrant a finding that the damage done plaintiff's car in the collision was not caused by the negligence of the driver of defendant's car. The only important question presented to us is whether on the evidence the court should have instructed the jury to find the issues for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's evidence failed to show that at the time the accident occurred defendant's car was being eperated by him or his agent. In defendant's brief it is

115 - 27373

L. L. COURGE,

Appelles,

ARV

WILLIAM R. COATO, JOSEPH LIBAL, Jr., and JOSEPH LIBAL, ST., Dofendants.

WILLIAM B. COATS, Appellant,

APPEAL PROM.
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

27 1.A. 602

MR. JUSTICE DEVER BELIVERED THE OFFICE OF THE COURT.

The defendant, William E. Gosto, appeals from a judgment rendered against him in the Wantelpal Court of the City of Coicego in favor of the plaintiff. L. L. Cooke, for the sum of \$340. The case was tried by a jury and evidence was introduced on behalf of the plaintiff which tended to prove that a collision occurred at atrects intersection in the City of Chicago between an automobile owned and operated by the plaintiff and one operated by Joseph Libal, fr. The car operated by Libal was caused by the descedant.

Me question is reject in the briefs filed in the case as to whether sufficient evidence was introduced to warrant a finding that the demage done plaintiff's car in the collision was not caused by the negligence of the driver of defendant's car. The only important question presented to us is whether on the evidence the court should have instructed the jury to find the issues for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's evidence failed to show that at the time the accident occurred defendant's our was being operated by him or his eacht. In defendant's brief it is

admitted that defendant was not operating the car himself at the time of the accident. It is asserted, however, that the accident occurred a short time after defendant had been using his car for the pleasure of himself and his family; that in accordance with his usual custom defendant had turned his car over to his agent, Joseph Libal, Jr., to take it back to the garage where it was kept. The undisputed evidence shows that defendant's car was not being operated by him or by any person authorized by him to operate it at the time and place where the accident occurred. The only evidence introduced by the plaintiff which tends to show defendant's ownership of the car or his participation in the accident is that of the plaintiff who said that one of the occupants of the car which collided with his gave the witness the name of William E. Coats. P. C. Reed, the only other occurrence witness, testified that Mr. Coats, the defendant, was not in the car or present at the time the accident occurred. On this showing the court at the close of plaintiff's case should have instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

The uncontradicted evidence on behalf of the defendant is to the effect that he lives at 631 Sheridan Read, Chicago, and that he kept his automobile at a garage at 3635 N. Halsted street, about four or five blocks south-west from defendant's place of residence. The accident occurred at the intersection of Magnolia and Wilson avenues at a point about one mile north-west from defendant's home. The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff's home is situated at a point between the garage and the place where the accident happened. Under defendant's contract with the garage owner the latter was to store defendant's car when not in use and through an employe to deliver it to defendant at his residence and to call for it to be taken to the garage when required. On the day of the accident Joseph

admitted that defendant was not operating the car himself at the time of the accident. It is asserted, bowever, that the adeldent occurred a short time after defendant had been using his cor for the pleasure of bisself and his family; that in accordance with his usual ousten defendant had turned his our over to his agent, Joseph Libel, Jr., to take it back to the garage where it was hopt. The undisputed evidence shows that defendent's our was not being operated by him or by any person authorized by him to operate it at the time and place where the confdent occurred. The only syldence introduced by the plaintiff which tends to show defendant's emerghip of the car or his participation in the accident is that of the plainbubliles detain the sat to straguese of the ent which collided with his gave the witness the nume of William F. Costs. F. C. Reed, the only ether occurrence witness, bestifted that Mr. Couts, the defendant, was not in the cer or present at the time the accident occurred. On this showing the court at the close of plaintiff's case should have instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

The uncontradicted systemes on behalf of the defendant is to the effect that he light at a garage et 3655 %. Halsted and that he kept his automobile at a garage et 3655 %. Halsted street, about four or five blocks south-west from defendant's place of residence. The accident occurred at the intersection of Magnelia and Wilson average at a point about one mile north-west from defendant's home. The undisputed avidence shows that plaintiff's home is situated at a point between the garage and the place where the accident happened. Under defendant's contract with the garage owner that latter was to store defendant's car when not in use and through an employe to deliver it to defendant at his residence and to cell for it to be taken to the garage when required. On the day of the accident Joseph

Libal, Jr., son of the owner of the garage called for the car in the evening to take it back to the garage in accordance with a usual custom. Instead of doing so, however, he drove a distance of a mile to a mile and one-half northwest of defendant's home and stopped at a garage to visit a schoolmate where he remained for about an hour. After this visit he drove west on Wilson avenue where he picked up his mother and father. He then proceeded one block west on Wilson avenue and was about to turn south on Magnolia avenue when the accident happened.

that Joseph Libal, Jr., without the authority or knowledge of the defendant drove the latter's car for a purpose in no way connected with the defendant's business. The accident did not occur while the driver was operating the car on the route back to the garage. On this record it was the duty of the court at the close of defendant's evidence to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty. Joseph Libal's, Jr., possession of the car was solely for the purpose of returning it to the garage and it became his duty in doing so to adopt the usual route thereto.

between Joseph Libal, Jr., and defendant at the time the accident occurred and the car was not being operated by the connected former in any business or work even remotely with defendant's business. The defendant had no control over the driver of the car at the time the accident occurred, nor did he direct him in any manner to use or operate the car except as stated to return it directly to the garage. It will not be necessary here to decide the point urged that the defendant was a bailor of the car at the time the accident occurred and that he would not be liable for an accident occurring while the car was in the possession of the servant of the garage owner, a bailee.

Libel, Jr., son of the emmer of the garage called for the car
in the evening to take it back to the garage in accordance
with a usual custom. Instead of doing so, however, he drove
a distance of a mile to a mile and onl-half northwest of
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west on Wilson avenue where he pieced up his mother and father.
He then proceeded one block west on Tilson evenue and father,
to turn south an magnelis avenue when the acotdant empresed.

The evidence shows without any question shakesover that Joseph Libal, Jr., eithout the authority or knowledge of the defendant wave the latter's our for a purpose in to way connected with the defendant's business. The accident did not occur while the driver was operating the car on the route book to the garage. On this record it was the duty of the court of the close of defendant's evicence to instruct the jury to find the defendant not gailty. Joseph Libel's, Jr., possession of the cur was salely for the purpose of returning it to the garage and it became us of court of the cur was salely for the purpose of returning it to the garage and it became its outer the thorses.

The relation of master and neurous did not exist between Joseph Libel. It., and defendent it the the accident occurred and the east was not being element by the connected former in any business or nork even remained with defendant's business. The defendant has no control over the driver of the car state the time the accident courred, nor did he alrest him in any manner to use or aperate independent and the intent to the grape. It will not be necessary return it directly to the grape. It will not be necessary here to decide the point urged that the enfandant was a bailor of the car at the time the sociount occurry and that he would not be liable for an accident occurry and that he would not be liable for an accident occurry, and that he would not be liable for an accident occurry, while the courry and that he would

As it is our opinion that even if it be held that the contract between the garage owner and the defendant did not constitute a bailment and that the driver of the car was in a sense the servant of defendant, the latter would not be liable where it appears as it does by this record that the alleged servant was at the time the accident occurred operating the car upon a mission in no way connected with the defendant or his business. Woods v. Bowman, 200 Ill. App. 612; Graham v. Page, 220 Ill. App. 431; Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

As it is our opinion that even if it be held that the contract between the garage owner and the defendent did not constitute a bailment and that the driver of the car cas in a sense the servant of defendant, the latter would not be liable where it appears as it does by this record that the sileged servent was at the time the accident occurred operating the car upon a mission in no way counceted with the defendant or his tusiness. Hoods v. Borney. 200 Ill. App. 613; Graham or his tusiness. Hoods v. Borney. 200 Ill. App. 613; Graham v. Pags. 237 Ill. App. 131.

The judgment of the Funicipal Court is reversed and the cause remanded.

REVESSED AND REMANDED.

McGurely, P. J., and hatchett, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

On a trial in the Municipal Court of Chicago before the court without a jury a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant for the sum of \$850.44 which defendant seeks to reverse in this court.

The evidence introduced on the trial shows that the plaintiff, an engineer, was employed by the defendant to observe and report upon the result of a test which was made of a process for rebuilding old automobile tire cases known as the Savold Process.

There is no dispute between the parties as to the amount due the plaintiff for services which it is conceded were rendered by him. The defendant's position is that at the time he employed the plaintiff to make the test, he, defendant, was acting as the agent of the Savold Tire Corporation. This is the only question in the case. Plaintiff's testimony is to the effect that he was employed directly by Goldberg; that the latter did not inform him that he was acting for the Savold Company. Plaintiff's testimeny is corroborated by a letter written by him to Goldberg on July 1, 1919. In this letter plaintiff stated that he was ready and willing to make the test upon terms indicated in the letter. The letter was addressed to Goldberg and no mention is made

124 - 27382

f. E. KDWARDS, Appelled

Cinita and

IOL H. GOLDBERG,

APPLAL PROM
MUMICIFAL COURT
OF CRICAGO.

227 T.A. 602

. WH. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

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therein of the Savold Tire Corporation. The test was to be made upon tires placed upon a car which plaintiff first saw at the office of the Hump Hairpin Company, of which Goldberg was president. Goldberg testified that at the time the contract was entered into he informed plaintiff that the Savold Tire Corporation wanted to make the test. This testimony is denied by plaintiff, who states that at the time the arrangement was entered into with Goldberg, he, plaintiff, did not know anything about the Savold Tire Company and that Goldberg did not at any time tell him that certain payments which were made to plaintiff had been advanced by the company. The evidence shows that an advance payment of \$250, demanded by plaintiff as a retainer was paid to him by Goldberg on July 3, 1919, and that the latter by his personal check on July 14, 1919, paid plaintiff \$470 and again on July 23, 1919, by check of the Hump Hairpin Manufacturing Company he paid plaintiff the sum of \$445.42.

what was said by the parties to the contract at the time it was entered into. The only witnesses in the case were the plaintiff and defendant and in this state of the record we must of necessity rely upon the judgment of the trial judge who had an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses. The defendant admits that he employed plaintiff to perform the services in question. Plaintiff says in effect that he dealt with defendant as principal. Whether he did so or not was a question of fact which could best be determined by the trial judge. It is not enough to show that after the services had been substantially completed by plaintiff that he become aware of the fact that his work inured to the benefit of the Savold Tire Company. We think the evidence shows that Goldberg failed to disclose the fact that he was in any way acting for another. Indeed, Goldberg's own evidence is to the

therein of the Savold Mire Corporation. The test was to be meds upon tires placed upon a car which plaintiff first new at the office of the Sump Mairpin Company, of which Goldberg was president. Goldberg testified that at the the centract was entered into he informed plaintiff that the Savold Tire Corporation wanted to make the test. This testimony is denied by plaintiff, who states that at the time the arrangement was entered into with Goldberg, he, plaintiff, did not know anything about the Saveld Tire Company and that Goldberg did not at any time tell him that certain payments which were made to plaintiff had been advanced by the company. The evidence shows that an advance payment of \$250, demanded by plaintiff us a retainer was paid to him by Goldberg on July 5, 1919, and that the latter by his personal check on Maly 14, 1919, paid plaintiff \$470 and again on July 23, 1919, by check of the Musp Hairpin Mamifacturing Company he paid plaintiff the sum of \$445.42.

There is some contradiction in the syldence as to just what was said by the parties to the southeat at the time it was entered into. The only withcomes in the case were the plaintiff and defendent and in this state of the record we must of necessity rely upon the judgment of the trial judge who had an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses. The defendent admits that he employed plaintiff to perform the services in question. Plaintiff says in effect that he dealt with defendent as principal. Thather he did so as not was a question of fact which could best be determined by the trial judge. It is not enough to show that after the services had been substantially completed by plaintiff that the services had been substantially completed by plaintiff that he became aware of the fact that his work immed to the benefit of the careful to disclose the that he evidence shows that acting failed to disclose the fact that he was in any may soting for another. Indeed, Goldberg's own sydemee is to the setter to the

effect that he was merely a stockholder of the Savold Company and when questioned as to whether he was an officer of the latter he answered "I had no connection with them whatever."

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

effect that he was merely a checkelder of the Savold Company and when questioned as to whether he was an efficer of the latter he enswered "I had no compation with them whatever." The judgment of the Municipal Sourt is affirmed.

AFFIRES.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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26940

CHARLES DUBAL.

Appellant,

AMELIA APPLEBY.

APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF

227 I.A. 602

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff, Charles Dubal, brought an action in assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against defendant, Amelia Appleby, his sister, to recover the sum of \$4,896.50, which plaintiff alleged in a bill of particulars filed in the cause was loaned by him to defendant "for a short time." A judgment was entered in the cause on a verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant, and plaintiff brings the case by appeal to this court.

The principal question of fact in dispute between the parties is as to whether the amount sued for constituted a loan from plaintiff to defendant, or whether, as asserted by defendant, the sum represented a balance due her out of \$10,000 which she asserts was delivered to plaintiff in October, 1916, and for which plaintiff delivered to her a receipt. There is an almost irreconcilable conflict in the evidence. The abstract of record only partially discloses the evidence introduced on the trial and we have been compelled, within the time at our disposal, to obtain material facts of the case as they appear in the record.

The evidence shows that on June 5, 1917, the plaintiff paid to defendant by eashier's check the amount sued for.

The evidence does not show that defendant promised to repay this sum to him, or that she had agreed to deliver a promissory note therefor, as stated in the bill of particulars. There is evidence to the effect that for some years prior to Ootober, 1916, 111-feeling of some sort existed between the parties to the suit.

CHARLES EVENE.

Appellpri.

AMELIA APPINEY.

Appelles.

APPRIL PROG CIRCUIT COURT OF

200 A.I.TS&

MM. JUSTICE BEVER DELIVERED THE GRIEION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff, Charles Jubal, brought an action in excurpait in the Circuit Court of Gook County against defendent, Ample Appleby, his sinter, to recover the mum of \$4.096.50, which plaintiff elloged in a bill of particulars filed in the cause was lowed by him to defendent "for a short time." A judgment was entered in the cause on a vardiet of a jury in favor of the defendent, and plaintiff brings the case by appeal to this court.

The parties is as to whother the accust such for constituted a loss from phaintist to defendant, or whother, as asserted by defendant, the sum represented a balance due her out of 910,000 which the asserts was delivered to plaintist in Cotober, 1916, and for which plaintist delivered to her a receipt. There is an elmost irreconcilable conflict in the evidence. The abstract of record only partially discloses the evidence introduced on the tracerd was have been compelled, within the time at our dispend, to obtain material facts of the case as they appear in the record.

The avidence shows that on June 5, 1917, the minintiff paid to defendent by eachier's check the account swed for. The evidence does not show that defendant premised to rappy this sum to him, or that she had agreed to deliver a premisencry note therefor, as stated in the bill of particulars. There is evidence to the effect that for some years prior to October, 1918,

Alexa wift is an amount and commenced and an

A receipt was introduced in evidence which, if genuine, shows that plaintiff received from defendant the sum of \$10,000. Plaintiff denied that he received this sum or that the signature to the receipt was his. Upon this question of fact the jury had sufficient evidence to support its finding against plaintiff. Other signatures, which we think the evidence shows were the genuine signatures of plaintiff, were introduced in evidence and the jury by comparison of these with the disputed signatures were authorized to conclude that plaintiff's denial of his signature to the receipt was untrue. The evidence shows that at or about the time of the \$10,000 transaction defendant's bushand was seriously ill and that she was compelled to take him to California, where they remained until about June 1, 1917. Defendant's husband during this time was the owner of a large amount of property, part of which consisted of a flat building in the City of Chicago, and defendant's position, which is supported by the swidence in the case, is that she gave the management of this property to plaintiff, her brother, pending the absence of herself and husband: that she also turned over the \$10,000 to him with directions to use it in the management and care of the property: that on her return from California to Chicago there was left in a bank in plaintiff's name the sum of \$4,896.50, the exact amount sued for in this suit, and that he, plaintiff, voluntarily paid this sum over to her as an undisposed of balance out of the \$10.000 delivered to him.

The conflict in the evidence involves so many other transactions between the parties that it will be spossible here to indicate only certain matters of fact which we think had an influence in procuring the verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant. For instance, in support of his contention that the amount sued for was his own private fund, the plaintiff sought to

A receipt was introduced in avidence which, if genuine, shows that plaintiff received from defendant the sun of \$10,000. Plaintiff edt er ernjamele ads tade en men utdi herioor en tode beineb receipt was his. Upon this question of fact the fury had sufficlear evidence to mappart its finding against plaintiff. Uther signatures, which we think the evidence whore were the gaugine signatures of plaintiffymere introduced in cridence and the jury by comparison of these with the disputed to mercane of expression with the Ladmon a Tridulated sade chalcones of beatreds the reasipt was untired. The swideness where that at or about the time of the 410.000 transaction defendant's numbered see seriously ill and that she was compolicated take him to California, where they remained until about June 1, 1917. Notendant's husband during this time was the owner of a large escent of property, part of which consists of a flat building in the Uity of Utloops, and defending position, which he supported by the evidence in the case, is that the gave the companies of the property to plaintiff, her brether, peading the absence of herealf and hasbend; of employed the mid of 0.0.00 the rate bound of a sale and such was it in the management win sare of the property; that on her mi wand a at their was steered oppoint or signothing work from the Plaintiff's ness the sea of \$4,006.50, the exact assurt such for in this suit, and that he, plaintiff, voluntarily puts this sur over to her as an abitioness of balance out of the 'A' and lkyumed to bim.

The conflict in the out is the character or access on many attacts transmoblems between the parties of fact which he excending the vertice of fact which he think had an influence in procuring the vertice and judgment in favor of the defendant. For instance, in support of his consention that the access the support of his consention that to

prove that he had saved from his wages as a plumber from \$500 to \$600 a year, and that he had received for overtime work \$10 to \$15 a week above the union scale. This evidence was introduced by him in support of his contention that he had daved a considerable sum of money, cut of which the sum sued for and other amounts had been leaned by him to defendant. Notwithstanding this, he filed an answer in a divorce suit to which he was a party, in which he denied that he had received as wages as a plumber as much as \$35 a week, and he stated in his answer that he had been out of work for two months during 1917, and that on August 4, 1917, he was employed as a machinist at \$20 a week. The receipt for the \$10,000 is as follows:

"Received of Amelia Appleby, \$10,000.00 to be paid to her when she calls for it, only as a loan to be placed on my bank account (Signed) Charles Dubal."

We think the preponderance of the evidence shows that plaintiff did sign this receipt, and defendant asserts that on her return; to Chicago about June 1, 1917, she and plaintiff checked up their accounts, at which time she discovered that plaintiff had spent all of the \$10,000 delivered to him except the balance of \$4.896.50, which was then on deposit in the bank. The avidence does disclose that a certificate of deposit of the National City Bank of Chicago for \$10,000 was executed in favor of John F. Appleby, defendant's husband, and that he had endorsed and delivered it to defendant. She asserts that she cashed this certificate and delivered the money to plaintiff, who admits that he was in charge of the large real estate interests of the Applebys while they were in California. The evidence further tends to prove that the plaintiff never kept a bank account at any time until October 1, 1916, the time, it is alleged, when he received the \$10,000. To say the least, plaintiff's testimony is not impressive, and while we have not attempted to indicate all the

prove that he had saved from his vapes as a plumber from \$500 to \$5000 a year, and that he had received for evertime verk \$10 to \$15 a veck above the union acute. This evidence was introduced by him in support of his soutentian that he had caved a considerable and of meney, out of which the sum out for and other acquists had been launed by him to defendent. Moterichatending this, he had been that the action with to which he was a purty, in which he desired that he had received as wages as a plumber as much as \$350 a week, and he tested in 1 a no meet that he had been out of work for two central dering 1917, and that an August 4, 1917, he was appleyed as machine at \$200 a week. The receipt for the sampleyed as machine at \$200 a week. The receipt for the \$1000 is an follower.

*Received of Amelia Ampleby, (16,000.00 to be maid to ber when the mails for it, only as a low to ac placed on my bank second. (Migned) Charles bibal."

We think the propositerance of the evidence and a Maint ev plaintiff ald righ this receist, and defendant asserts that on her reamm to Unicago about June 1, 1617, abount on united abecket up their accourts, at which than one discrepted that plaintiff had To some tell of the \$10,000 delivered to bin exampt the belunce of \$4.396.50, which was then on deposit in the brak. The weldence does disclose that a sortificate of deposit of the Backets City Fank of Cricago for \$10.0% an emercial in farer of loba F. Applacy, defer twicks busherd, and that he had endersed and delive ered it to definitions. The concepts that in control of the marrillicate all age ad lady stimes ode, littling of gance eds baryellab bas charge of the large real estate interests of the Applebra while ther were in Collicinia. The evidence forther tente to erowe that the plaintiff never kept a bonk never at any time part October 1, 1916, the time. It is alloyed, when he received in-\$10,000. Fo ear the least, plaintiff's westmany is not hapressive, and while is bare not attempted to instante all the evidence introduced on the trial, it is our epinion that the jury were well authorized in finding the issues of fact in favor of the defendant.

It is said that a certain transaction involving the execution of a chattel mortgage to plaintiff by defendant pledging certain personal property, was done for the purpose of preventing conservators appointed for the estate of defendant's husband from obtaining possession of the property. Whatever may be said of this transaction, we are unable to see how it has any important bearing upon the question involved in the present suit.

The first two of three given instructions tendered by the defendant informed the jury that if upon the whole case the jury were in doubt from the evidence as to whether defendant was indebted to him, or if the evidence introduced on this question was evenly balanced, or if the jury were unable to say on which side the evidence preponderated, the plaintiff could not recover. The first of these instructions was somewhat informal: the second given instruction states correct principles of law. An instruction given on behalf of the plaintiff, however, stated the law somewhat too favorably to the plaintiff. In this instruction the jury were informed that if they believed that the money sued for had been delivered by cashier's check to defendant, the jury were to return a verdict in plaintiff's favor, unless the jury found from the evidence that the money was the property of defendant and that the burden of establishing a title to the money was placed by law upon the defendant. It is our opinion that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff to prove not only that he had delivered the check to defendant, but that it constituted, as he claims, a loan to her which she, defendant, had not repaid. In any event, the questions raised in connection with the giving or refusing to give instructions are not properly presented to us.

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Neither the record nor the abstract of record filed in this court shows that such instructions as appear therein constitute all that were given or refused on the trial.

It is charged that counsel for defendant was guilty during the trial of making unfair and prejudicial statements in argument to the jury and during the course of the trial. This charge is met by the assertion that counsel for plaintiff used in the presence of the jury epithets and language quite as offensive as that indulged in by defendant's counsel: That counsel for both parties were guilty of improper conduct in the presence of the fury is certain, and had plaintiff's counsel been satisfied with making his objections to opposing counsel's conduct at the trial. this court would have been compelled to reverse the judgment notwithstanding our opinion that the evidence preponderates in defendant's favor. Bisel v. Kerens-Dennewald Coal Co., 159 Ill. App. 8. The words "vamp, " "schemer" and "blackmailer" were bandied about between counsel. Counsel for plaintiff charged defendant and her counsel with being "a villianous pair of vamps;" that defendant's counsel was playing "the double game, and he is as guilty as she is guilty of the meanest, cowardly conduct known to a lawyer and against all legal ethics and too low for any self-respecting member of the bar to even associate with or to try a case with on the other side of it." Other language of plaintiff's counsel tends to charge defendant outside of the record, with the crime of forgery. While it is true that these charges and epithets were met by defendant's counsel with language quite as offensive as that employed by plaintiff's counsel, we do not think that on the record before us, and in view of the equally objectionable remarks made by plaintiff's attorney that the latter's error should cause a reversal of what appears to be a just

Meither the record nor the abstract of record filed in this court shows that such instructions as appear therein constitute all that were given or refused on the trial.

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verdict and judgment. Kenna v. Calumet H. & S. R. Co., 206 Ill.

App. 17; Peyton v. Village of Morgan Perk, 172 Ill., 102.

The judgment of the Circuit court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Medurely P. J, and Matchett, J., concur.

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Verdict and judgment. Kenng v. Caluget H. & S. H. Co., 206 111.

App. 17: Ferton v. Milsen of Morney Perk, 178 211., 102.

The judgment of the Utroudt court is affirmed.

Arritand.

Mederaly P. J. and Matchett, J., cancur.

2006

468 - 27426

WILLIAM HAGLEY.

Appellee

TE.

CHICAGO WET WASH COMPANY, a corporation,

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 6021

MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought an action in the Municipal Court of Chicago to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of a collision which occurred on December 13, 1919, between automobiles owned respectively by plaintiff and defendant. A judgment was entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of \$338.20. Defendant brings the case here by appeal for review.

The principal reason urged here for a reversal of the judgment is that the court erred in admitting improper evidence on the trial. To prove the damages which plaintiff asserted he was entitled to, he sought to prove that his automobile as a result of the collision was injured to such extent that he was compelled to pay the sum of \$281 in repairing it.

The driver of plaintiff's car testified that as a result of the accident the whole rear end of the car, an Overland Roadster, was torn out and "also the running board and the fender;" that both rear wheels were broken, one tire cut and the windshield smashed.

One Abrahams, testifying for the plaintiff, stated that he was manager of the White Garage where plaintiff's machine was repaired after the accident; that he, the witness,

468 - 27426

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a corporation.

Appellee

Appellant.

VS.

CHICAGO WET WASH COMPANY.

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MUBICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

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MR. JUSTICE DEVER DELLVERED THE CHINCE OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff brought an action in the Numicipal Court of Chicago to recover desagns alleged to have been mustained by him by reason of a collision which courted on December 15, 1919, between automobiles owner respectively by plaintiff and defendant. A judgment was entered upon the vertict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of \$238.20.

Defendent brings the case here by appeal for review.

The principal remeen anged here for a reversal of the judgment is that the court erred in admitting impreper evidence on the trial. To prove the damages watch violatiff asserted he was entitled to, he was the prove that his automobile as a result of the collision was injured to such extent that he was compelled to pay the sum of 8.81 in repairing it.

The driver of plaintiff's car tectified that es a result of the accident the whole rear end of the car, an Overland Roadster, were torn out and "also the rurning board and the fender;" that both cour wheele were broken, one tire cut and the mindahield reached.

One Abrahams, testifying for the plaintiff, stated that he was manager of the Phite Garage where plaintiff's machine was repaired after the accident; that he, the witness,

saw the repairs made and that he had rendered a bill to plaintiff therefor. The witness further testified that was unable to state specifically what repairs had been made on the car without referring to this bill. He testified that the charges made were the fair and reasonable charges for similar work, labor, parts and material in the City of Chicago at the time the work was done. We think the court was right in permitting the witness to testify as to what work was done on the car by reference to the bill which he had rendered for the services performed. The court also admitted the bill in evidence, and it is asserted that this ruling was error. As we read the evidence as it appears in the abstract of record, it is apparent that the witness was unable to testify as to the work done or as to the parts furnished without refreshing his recollection by reference to the bill which he had made and which was rendered for the work done for and material furnished to the plaintiff. Clearly 1t was not error to permit the witness to refresh his recollection by referring to this bill. The work on the car was done under the witness' direction.

In the case of <u>Diamond Glue Company</u> v. <u>Wietzychowski</u>, 227 Ill. 347, the Supreme Court held that a writing may be used for the purpose of refreshing the memory of a witness even where it appears after inspection of the writing that he has no independent recollection of the facts stated therein where the witness is able to state that he correctly reduced the facts appearing in the instrument to writing at the time of the occurrence, or within such a time afterwards that he then had a perfect recollection of them. In the case of <u>Richardson Fueling Co.</u> v. <u>Seymour</u>, 235 Ill. 323, a witness testified that he had no independent recollection of the amount of coal delivered to a vessel outside of what is stated in the books,

cam the repairs made and that he had rendered a bill to plaintiff therefor. The witness further tootified that was unable to state specifically what repairs had been made on the our without referring to this bill. He testified that the charges made were the fair and reasonable charges for sixilar work, labor, parts and material in the City of Chicago at the time the work was done. We think the court was right in passitting the witness to testify as to what work was done on the our by reference to the bill which he had rendered for the services performed. The court also admitted the bill in evidence, and it is asserted that this rolling was error. As we read the evidence as it appears in the abstract of record, it is apparent no one kine wit to the tilfy as the death and the sent is the as to the parts furnished without refreshing his recollection by reference to the bill watch he had made and which was rendered .Ministo sit of beatfactial funtarial one to the date Clearly it was not error to permit that without to refresh bis recollection by referring to this bill. The work on the car wes done under the witness! direction.

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but he knew he put it down there at the time and that it was true. The Supreme Court said that "The delivery tickets or receipts it was admitted, had been turned over to counsel for defendants and were lost. The witness was then permitted to read from the book the enteries showing the dates and the amounts of the deliveries. In this we think there was no error." In the present case we have an instrument admitted in evidence made by the witness himself. We do not think it was error under the facts shown to admit the bill in evidence.

It constituted error to permit Abrahams to testify that the "repair was caused by the collision." It is not argued, however, in the brief of counsel that the defendant was not guilty of the negligence charged and that it was not legally liable for the damages resulting to plaintiff from the accident. There is no dispute in the evidence as to the injuries done plaintiff's car and while the court erred in permitting the witness to make the statement referred to, we do not think this error was sufficiently serious to warrant a reversal of the judgment.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

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car and while the court erred in permitting the witness to make
the statement referred to, we do not think this error was
sufficiently serious to warrant a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFFIRED.

McSurely, P. J., and Matchett, J., concur.

RALPH R. BRADLEY et al., Doing Business as Goodrich, Vincent & Bradley,

Appellees,

YS.

W.McMILLAN AND SON, a Corporation,

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I A. C. 95 5

ER. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case is now pending on a rehearing which has been granted.

The plaintiffs sued for money expended at defendant's request, amounting to \$35.10, and for the further sum of \$1,000 claimed to be due to them from the defendant for atterney's fees. Liability for the money expended was admitted, but as to the claim for legal services defendant denied that it had employed plaintiffs. It also averred that it had no knowledge whether the amount claimed for attorney's fees was ressonable. The cause was tried by a jury. and the court instructed that it was necessary to a recovery for plaintiffs to prove by a prependerance of the evidence, the fact of their employment by defendant and the rendition of the services by them. The jury were further instructed that if these facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence, then the jury should find the issues for the plaintiffs, and assess the damages at the sum of \$1,000 for the services performed, and the further sum of \$35.10 for the money advanced.

The only assignment which we have regarded us worthy of consideration is that the court erred in directing the jury, in case of a finding for the claimtiffs, to allow \$1,000 for the legal services performed. It is to be noted that the statement of claim does not alloge that the sum charged for the services is reasonable. However, evidence was received without objection on that

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v Menteraci and the Corporation.

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The plaintiffe with for concy exceeded at the chique request, something to 235.10. and for the further was of 11.000 claimed to be due to them fire defondant for attended a feas. Lightity for the money executed was admitted, but no the mining for long learning defendant for tod thut it in amployed whateiris. bankais tungan off radgraffy antolixable on hed it tadd borrovs offe il for abborney's fees was releasable. The course was evised by a jame, TOR TOWN THE ENDING WE THE CAN DEPOS OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR plaintiffs to prove by a precenterance of the evidence, the fact that amployment by defend at the condition of the services The fary ware further imperioded to the tree facts ow them. were askallished by a prepardurance of the est oace. The the jury should find the torace for the pleintiffs, our amora: the dammer at the sum of \$1,000 for the services perf red, at the firther sies of \$55.10 for the money advanced.

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subject, and there is uncontradicted evidence tending to show that the sum charged was not only a reasonable amount, but less than the usual charges at that time and place for such services.

We stated in the former spinion that an there was evidence from which the jury might conclude that the damages were unliquidated, the court should not have named a specific amount to be allowed for services rendered in case the jury found for plaintiffs on the other issues.

In their potition for a rehearing the plaintiffs strenuously argue that this court minunderstood the record, but after a consideration of the arguments pro and con we are still of the opinion that it was technically an error on the record for the court to name an express amount as due for the legal services, in case defendant was liable. We are, however, further of the opinion that while technically an error, it is not one which would justify us in reversing the judgment. The services rendered concerned a very important matter, namely, the reorganization of a corporation, and the issuing of bonds secured by its assets, which bonds, it was expected, would be sold to the public.

In view of the importance of the services, the complications which it was necessary to meet, etc., as well as the time and attention given to the same, should a jury find for a lesser amount and judgment be entered therefor, this court, upon appeal or writ of error by plaintiffs, would be obliged to reverse for the reason that the verdict would be against the prependerance of the evidence.

The question before us, therefore, is whether, for a mere technical error, we ought to reverse and remand for another trial, where a different result, if obtained, by the defendant, would not be allowed to stand. Since we are of that opinion,

subject, and there is uncentralisted evidence tending to show that the survived was not only a reasonable essent, but less than the usual charges at that the end place for men corriaes.

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hardly seems fair to either party to send the case back for a new trial. For this reason we affire the judgment.

AFFI IMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J. concur.

hirdly seems lair to cities party to send the case beak for a new trial. For this reason were efficient.

Reddirely P. J. and Daver, J. coulear.

MAE BURR et al., Appellees,

VS.

OLGA V. ROSSLER et al. On Appeal of Olga V. Rossler, Appellant. APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

4.7

227 I.A. 603

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a decree in chancery. The case was heard upon the issues as made up by an amended and supplemental bill filed July 21, 1920, the answer of the defendant thereto, which answer defendant asked might be taken as a crossbill, and the answer of complainant under oath to this cross-bill.

The supplemental bill alleged in substance that the defendant, Mrs. Rossler, also known as Mrs. Dooley, was the owner of certain premises; that on or about October 15, 1918, complainant loaned to her the sum of \$2800, upon the express promise that defendant would make certain notes therefor and execute a trust deed conveying the premises in question as security for the indebtedness; that \$34 of the loan was immediately repaid; that thereafter defendant Rossler made in her own handwriting and delivered to complainant 83 principal notes, numbered 1 to 82 respectively; that the note numbered 1 was dated October 15, 1918. and the other notes of the series, numbered consecutively thereafter, were dated the 15th day of each month succeeding October 15, 1918, and that the notes matured monthly upon the dates which they respectively bore: that defendant Rossler executed and delivered a trust deed conveying to the complainant N. LaDoit Johnson the premises in question, to secure the payment of the indebtedness; that the trust deed was not acknowledged, and after its delivery was mislaid and lost; that the abstract of title was delivered to complainant Mae Burr; that notes numbered 1 to 9

MAN BURN et al., Appelless,

ST.

OLGA V. ROSSIMR et al. On Appeal of Olga V. Rescler, Appellant.

APPRAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

22711.603

MR. JUSTICH KATCHETT BELLVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a decree in chancery. The case was heard upon the issues as made up by an ascuded and supplemental bill filed July 21, 1920, the answer of the defendant thereto, which answer defendant asked might be taken as a crossbill, and the appwer of complaint upder outh to this cross-bill.

The supplemental bill alleged in montance that the defendant, Mrs. Rossier, also known as Mrs. Dooley, was the owner of cortain premises: that on or about Corober 15, 1918, complainant leaned to her the sum of \$2800, upon the express promise that defendant would make cortain notes therefor and execute a trust deed conveying the premises in question as security for the indebtedmess; that \$54 of the loan was immediately repaid; that thereafter defendant Hoseler made in her own handwrichn; and delivered to complainant 33 principal notes, numbered 1 to 82 respectively; that the note murbered I was dated October 15, 1918, and the other notes of the seniou, numbered consensively thereafter, were dated the 15th day of each north succeeding betober 15, 1916, and tent the notes makined monthly upon the dates which they respectively bore; that defendant Rossler executy bord dalivered a trunt deed conveying to the complainant !. unDoit Johnson the premiees in question, to secure the sagment of the indebtedness; that the trust deed was not acharmed and after its con sills to standard that that the abstract of title rem delivered to compleinant five Burr; that notes numbered i to 9 inclusive, representing \$300 of the amount of the indebtedness, were paid and that default had been made in payment of the other notes and performance of the covenants of the trust deed. A trust deed alleged to be substantially in the form of the lost one was attached to the bill.

The bill also set up alleged facts by reason of which, it was claimed, Mrs. Burr was subrogated to the rights of the holder of a prior trust deed, and it prayed for the restoration of the lost trust deed, the foreclosure of it, subrogation, and general relief.

The answer and cross-bill denied the execution of the trust deed and the promise to execute it, but said that the defendant did berrow from the complainant October 15, 1918, \$2,500, and thereafter gave therefor 75 of the notes mentioned; that the other 8 notes were given for the purchase price of a barrel of alcohol, amounting to \$266, which complainant promised to deliver to defendant for use in a perfumery establishment in which the defendant, Mrs. Rossler, was a partner, but which alcohol the complainant never delivered; further, that as security for the payment of these notes, she turned over to Mrs. Burr diamonds of the value of \$6,500.

The answer and cross-bill denies that the defendant Rossler ever delivered the abstract of title to Mrs. Burr, but says that Mrs. Burr secured access to Mrs. Rossler's apartment and took the abstract, for the purpose of lending color to her claims.

The answer further alleges that Mrs. Rossler has paid 9 notes, and that on July 15, 1919, she tendered to Mrs. Burr the amount due on note number 10, but that the tender was refused.

The answer denies other material averments of the bill and prays that Mrs. Burr may be decreed to hold the jewelry

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as security for the loan, and that the notes for \$266, representing the purchase price of the alcohol mentioned, may be surrendered and cancelled.

The verified answer of the complainants to the crossbill denied its material averments, including the alleged sale of the alcohol, the alleged receipt of the diamonds as security, and the tender of payment on note number 10.

The decree, after finding the facts substantially as set forth in the supplemental bill and answer to the cross-bill, ordered that the cross-bill be dismissed for want of equity and finds that while Mrs. Burr had established her right to subrogation, she had waived the same; that there is due and owing to complainant the sum of \$2,466, with interest at 6 per cent. from June 15, 1919, making a total amount of \$2,715.06, for which complainant Mae Burr has a valid lien. The decree further ordered that in default of payment the premises should be offered for sale by a master, and that if the bid was not in excess of \$1,000 (the amount of defendant's homestead) the same should not be sold, but if it was in excess of that amount a sale should be made, and Mrs. Rossler paid \$1,000 for her homestead out of the proceeds.

In her statement of the case appellant Rossler specifies 36 respects in which it is claimed the court erred. Some of these refer to the alleged hostile attitude of the court. It is claimed that the chancellor at times took the examination of the witnesses into his own hands, and we are cited to a number of cases where this practice has been condemned, which cases, however, were suits at law tried before juries. That the rule does not obtain in chancery, where the chancellor tries both the facts and the law, is, we think, apparent. Moreover, it does not appear that the chancellor in this case prevented the attorneys upon either side from making full and complete inquiry as to the issues.

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Appellant also urges that incompetent evidence was admitted over appellant's objection, and this is probably true; but since the issues were tried without a jury, the chanceller will be presumed to have discredited such evidence, provided there is other competent evidence on which the finding might be based. Goelz v. Goelz, 157 III. 33; Richardson v. Eveland, 126 III., 37.

complaint is also made that the court refused to permit questions to the trustee, Johnson, as to alleged conversations with him, out of the presence of the complainant Mae Burr. He was asked, "Did Mrs. Dooley say to you in the presence of this lady, 'If I get my papers back and jewelry I would settle?'" Objection was sustained to this question and, we think, properly, for the reason that it was not shown that the trustee, Johnson, was representing Mrs. Burr or had any right to speak for her at that time. We also think the chancellor properly struck out the statement of a witness for defendant, who testified that Dr. Johnson said he could do nothing with Mrs. Burr, as she was "absolutely jewelry crazy." This alleged statement was not said to have been made in the presence of Mrs. Burr, nor was it made to appear that Johnson was acting for her.

It is also contended by appellant that the evidence fails to show - as the decree finds - that note number 10 of the series was, in fact, due at the time of filing the suit; but we think there is no merit in this contention, as no time for payment is expressed in any of the notes. The statute provides that such instruments are payable on demand, and such is the general rule. See section 7, chap. 98, Cahill's Ill. Stats., 1921, p. 2382; Carnall v. Duval, 22 Ark. 137; Kabebian v. Shinkle, 26 R. I. 505, p. 508; Jones on Mortgages, vol. 2, sec.

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1174; Eaton v. Truesdale, 40 Mich. 1, p. 6; Jackson v. Grosser, 218 Ill. 494, p. 499.

Appellant further makes the point that the averments of the bill, the evidence and the decree do not correspond, and in support of this contention refers to the copy of the trust deed attached to the bill as an exhibit. The bill did not allege that the copy was a true one, but only that it was substantially correct, and exhibits as described in other parts of the bill correspond with the proof and the decree. We think this was sufficient. Price v. Solberg, 269 Ill. 459, p. 462; Dempster v. Lansingh, 244 Ill. 462. Nor do we think there is any merit in appellant's contention that the bill is framed on different and inconsistent theories. 21 Corpus Juris, 415; Henderson v. Harness, 184 Ill. 520.

The controlling question in the case is whether the findings of the chancellor, made from the conflicting evidence, are clearly and palpably erroneous. If so, the decree should be set aside; if not, it should be affirmed. That such is the rule to be applied is elementary and so well settled that the citation of authorities would seem to be unnecessary. Upon the controlling questions of fact - whether the trust deed was executed and delivered, whether the loan was to be secured by it, as complainant averred, or by jewelry as defendant claimed, whether the story of the promised delivery of a barrel of alcohol was true or untrue, whether the defendant delivered the abstract of title to Mrs. Burr, or Mrs. Burr surreptitiously took the same away there is a direct conflict in the evidence. Moreover, it is such a conflict as makes it impossible to believe that one or the other of the parties might be mistaken. The unpleasant duty of determining which of the witnesses testified falsely devolved upon the trial court; and, as already said, the question here is 1174; Katon v. Truesdale, 40 Mich. 1, p. 6; Jackson v. Grosser, 218 III. 494, p. 499.

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whether the chancellor was clearly and palpably wrong. In such a case we may not disregard the undoubted advantage which the chancellor has in seeing and hearing the witnesses.

Uncontradicted evidence tends to show that Mac Burr became acquainted with the defendant Mrs. Rossler April 22, 1918. Mrs. Rossler conducted a rooming house at 3171 Ellis avenue, the premises here in controversy. Mrs. Burr lived there with Mrs. Rossler from April 22, 1913, until June 19, 1919. On that date she left the house after an altercation, on account of which Mrs. Rossler took out a warrant, charging her with the violation of a city ordinance, and Mrs. Rossler claimed upon the hearing of that case that Mrs. Burr had struck her with a club. Judge Newcomer of the Municipal court, who heard the case, fined the complainant one dollar for her offense. Mrs. Burr was a widow, who, prior to taking rooms with Mrs. Rossler, lived at Morrison, Illinois. She was the manager of the Memorial Hospital, an institution controlled by Dr. Johnson. This hospital was situated at 460 East 32nd street, in the neighborhood in which Mrs. Rossler lived. In addition to keeping roomers Mrs. Rossler was the part owner of a business in toilet articles, perfumery, etc. was conducted by one Hishakawa, who lived in her house. Rossler's home was incumbered by a mortgage or trust deed in the sum of \$2.800, which was held by Mead & Coe. This loan matured October 2, 1918. At the request of Mrs. Rossler Mae Burr secured from the bank at Morrison a cashier's check for \$2,238.96, dated October 10, 1918, and endorsed the same to Mrs. Rossler, who turned it over to Mead & Coe in part payment of the indebtedness: \$2,300 was paid on this indebtedness October 11. 1918, the difference between that amount and the check being paid in currency.

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October 14th another payment was made, in which the check of Mrs. Burr for \$404 was used and, the loan being paid, the abstract of the property, which had been held by Esad & Cos, was delivered to Mrs. Rossler. Mrs. Eurr testifies that she advanced this money at the solicitation of Mrs. Rossler after consulting with her relative, Mr. Norish, who was connected with the bank at Morrison, Illinois; that he advised her to have an attorney handle the matter for her; and she says that she told Mrs. Ressler she would losn the money to her if Mrs. Rossler would give a first mortgage on the property and make notes payable one each month, with interest at 6 per cent; that Mrs. Rossler sareed that complainant's attorney should draw the papers; that thereafter the complainant Burr was taken down with the flu, and while she was ill Ers. Rossler represented to her that the mortgage would be foreclosed, and that upon Mrs. Rossler's promise to execute the papers afterwards, she, complainant, turned over the checks; that when the last check for \$404 was given she also turned over to Mrs. Rossler currency to make up the balance of the loan, and that Mrs. Rossler afterwards returned to her the sum of \$34, which was not needed; that defendant said she would make different notes in groups of three, the first two of each group being for the sum of \$33 each and the third for the sum of \$34 making \$100 of the principal, which she would pay every three months; that on either the 18th or 19th of the month Mrs. Rossler came to complainant's room and laid the abstract and notes on witness' desk and said that she had fulfilled that part of her promise; that just as soon as she was able she would go to the attorney's office and have the trust deed made out. It is undisputed that the notes which are in evidence are in Mrs. Rossler's handwriting. The first one is dated October 15. 1918, and the first nine of the series were paid.

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Mrs. Burr testifies further that on October 28, 1918, when she was sitting at her table in the sitting room, Mrs. Rossler came in and handed to her a paper, saying, "There is your trust deed." She also testifies that the abstract was handed to her with the notes on the 18th of the month, when Mrs. Rossler brought the notes and left them with her. She says that she looked the trust deed over; that it was in Mrs. Rossier's handwriting; that the words "trust deed" were written at the top, and that the amount, \$2,766, was also written in it and also Dr. Johnson's name as trustee, and that it contained a description of the notes. She says that she compared the description of the real estate as it appeared in the trust deed with the description of the same as it appeared in the abstract, and that these corresponded. She further says that she called the attention of Mrs. Rossler to the fact that the deed had not been acknowledged, and that Mrs. Rossler said there was a notary public just about a block away, and that she could have it acknowledged if desired.

Mrs. Burn further says that she then put the deed in an eprelepe and placed it in her deak and the next day took it over and showed it to Dr. Johnson; that she took it back home in the evening and put it in the envelope with other papers and put it in her deak; that the papers remained there two or three days; that when Dr. Johnson called she went to her room, got the notes and the abstract and gave him the envelope. She says that she sealed the envelope as she went down the steps, and gave it to Dr. Johnson, and that she has never seen it since. She further says that she gave it to him to take and put in his safe down town, because she could not lock her deak, and she took the notes and the abstract and put them in the safe at the hospital.

Mrs. Burr also describes how in January, 1919, she asked Dr. Johnson for the trust deed, and that later he called

Mrs. Murr testifies further that on October 28, 1918. when she was sitting at her table in the chiting room, Mrs. Bessler asse in and handed to her a paper, seying, "There is your trust deed. " She also tectifies that the abstract was handed to her with the notes on the 18th of the month, when hire. Mossler brought the notes and left them with her. She says that she looked the trust deed over; that it was in Mrs. Roseler's handwriting; that the words "trust deed" more written at the top, and that the amount, \$2,700, was also written in it and also Dr. Johnson's name as trustes, and that it contained a description of the notes. She says that she compared the description of the rest estate as it appeared in the truck dead with the description of the seme as it appeared in the abstract, and that these corresponded. She further says that she called the attention of dra. Rossiar to the fact that the desk and not been schooledged, and that Mrs. Moshier said there was a notary public furt about a block away, and that she could have it acknowledness if desired.

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back and told her that the deed was not there; that a search was made for it without avail; that she told Mrs. Rossler of the loss and that Mrs. Rossler said that if it was not found she would execute a new one; that repeated dates were set for doing this, but that Mrs. Rossler each time made some excuse: that after six or eight different appointments, Mrs. Rossler eng June 19th came to complainant's room just as she was about to leave. and complainant then told her that this matter could not be put off any longer; that they must go either that day or the day after: that Mrs. Rossler then told her that she and Dr. Johnson were hiding the trust deed; that complainant replied that this was absurd, when Mrs. Rossler flew into a rage and said that she had called her a thief; that when complainant thereupon started to leave the house, Mrs. Rossler grabbed hold of her, pulled her back, called for Noshi, meaning Hishikawa, who came out of the basement, and while Mrs. Rossler was telling him that she had been called a thief, complainant walked out and over to the hospital, and next saw Mrs. Rossler at the Clark street police station, where she appeared in response to the charge made against her.

Wrs. Burr further testifies positively that there was no mention of diamonds or jewelry given as security for the money in fact, and that no such allegad fact was claimed to be true upon the trial of that case.

On the contrary Mrs. Rossler testifies that Mrs.
Burr came to her home the last of August and said that she
wanted a store room in the basement to put in \$5,000 worth of
alcohol, the price of which she said she thought was going up;
that Mrs. Rossler told her she would rent the room for that
purpose, but would not be responsible for what happened to the

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liquid; that Mrs. Rossler then said that they would be getting alcohol for use in their business, and she had a mort gage that was coming due; that Mrs. Burr asked her how much, to which defendant replied, "Why, \$2,500 will do," and that Mrs. Burr then said that she would let her have a barrel of alcohol at wholesale price, which they agreed would be \$5.32 a gallen: that about the 1st of September Mrs. Rossler told Mrs. Burr that the Globe Insurance man had offered a loan of \$2,500 on monthly payments of \$25 a month; that a Mr. Hoy of the Insurance company was there negotiating the loan, and Mrs. Burr made a motion to Mrs. Rossler indicating to Mrs. Rossler that she would like to have Mrs. Ressler go out, which she, Mrs. Rossler, did, when Mrs. Burr said to her. "Don't make a loan with that man; I will let you have the money;" that on the evening of that day Mrs. Burr came to her and said that she would let her have \$5,000 if she would take her in as a partner in the toilet business: that Mrs. Rossler said she would have to talk it over with Noshi: that Noshi and Mrs. Rossler and Mrs. Burr talked it over. and then informed Mrs. Burr that they would not have a partner at that time; that Mrs. Burr then said, "Well, I will let you have the money and I will trust you;" that the witness then told Mrs. Burr \$5,000 was too much, that \$2,500 was enough, and further said she would like to pay back \$100 every three months, and that the notes were therefore drawn in series of \$33. \$33 and \$34 a month.

Mrs. Rossler testifies, "So she said, 'We will make the notes out, and you make 75 notes for the loan and eight notes for the alcohol," and the notes were to be made in series of two \$33 notes and one \$34 note. About the last of September I asked her if she would let me have \$2,500. It was just before the lean became due. She said yes, she will be ready.

liguid: that Mrs. Rossler then said that they would be cattlen algohol for use in their business, and she had a mortgage that was coming due; that Mrs. Burr asked her how much, to which defendant replied. "Thy, \$2,500 will do," and that Mrs. Burr then said that one would let her have a barrel of slookel at wholesale price, which they agreed would be \$5.32 a gallen; that about the lat of September Mrs. Reseler told Mrs. Burr that the Globe Insurance man had offered a loan of \$2,500 on monthly payments of \$25 a month; that a Mr. how of the Insurance company was there negotiating the loan, and krs. Burr made a motion to Mrs. Resuler indicating to Mrs. Resuler that she would like to have Mrs. Rossler go out, which she, Mrs. hossler, did, when fire Surr said to her, "Don't make a loon with that man: I will let you have the woney;" that on the evening of that day Mrs. Emrr came to her and said that abe would let her have \$5.000 if she would take her in as a partner in the trilet busimess; that are. Rossler said she would have to tank it over with Moshi: that Moshi and Mrs. Hossier and Mrs. Murr talked it over. and then informed Mrs. Burr that they would not have a partner at that time; that Wirs. Burn then made, "Well, I will let you have the money and I will trust you:" that the withous them teld Mrs. Barr \$5,000 was too mach, that \$2,500 was enough, and further and she would like to pay back \$100 every times months, and that the notes were therefore drawn in serios of \$23. \$35 and \$34 a month.

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There was nothing about security, she let me have the money without security; she said I should clear my house. She says she has money in the bank which is not bringing her one cent of interest and she would like to get six per cent. interest on her money." She further says, "Mrs. Burr gave me no cash either the first or second time. I gave the second check for \$404 to Mr. Bennett at Mead & Coe's and paid him cash at that time: enough to make up the \$2,800 - I think it was \$158. I paid him in cash from my own money." She says that on that day she returned to Mrs. Burr \$75 in currency and \$143 on the next day. She says that Mrs. Burr got the forms of the notes and the amount of these was all figured up before; that she then made out 75 notes for \$2,500 and 8 notes for the alcohol. She says it took her nearly a month to make out the notes, and that there was no mention of security during that time; that October 14th she brought the abstract home and that she placed it on the table, and that Mrs. Rossler and Noshi and Mrs. Burr locked it over: that she then put it in a box with other papers in the side-board, and that before she got the notes finished Mrs. Burr told her that Dr. Johnson was as "mad as a wet hen" because she did not have security for the notes, and that she must get security for them. She says, "I said to her, 'Do you think I want to best you out of your money? and she says, 'Not that. but you have jewelry which you could let me have, ' and I asked her, 'What kind of jewelry do you mean?' and she says, 'That yellow amber set that you showed me a couple of weaks ago.' and I says, 'I' you think I am dishenest, I will let you have the jewelry.' She said, 'Yes.' The next talk about the loan or the notes or the jewelry was not until the 11th day of November. 1918. " She remembers this date because it was Armistice day. She says that Mrs. Burr asked her if they could settle up that

There was nothing about eccurity, she let me have the money without security; she said I should olear my house. She says als has money in the bank which is not bringing her one cent of interest and she would like to get six per cent. Interest on her money." She further says, "Mrs. Burr gave me no cash either the first or second time. I gave the second wheek for \$404 to Mr. Bennett at Mand & Coe's and padd him cash at that time; enough to make up the \$2,900 - I think it was \$158. I paid him in cash from my own money." She says that on that day she returned to Mrs. Burr \$75 in currency and \$145 on the next day. She says that Mrs. Burn get the forms of the neter and the smount of these was all figured up before; that the then made out '75 notes for \$2,600 and 8 notes for the alechel. She cays it fool her courly a month to make out the notes, and that there was no mention of security during that time; that October Lith and brought the abstract cone and that she blaced it on the table, and that Mrs. Wosnier and Woshi and Mrs. Burr looked the it over; that she then put it in a box with other papers in the side-board, and that before she got the notes finished Mrs. Burr told her that Dr. Joincon was as "nul as a wet hen" because she did not have security for the notes, and that she must net security for them. She cays, "I said to her, 'De you think I what to bout you out of your money? and she says, 'Yet that, but you have jevolry which you oculd lot me have, ' and I awast hat, What kind of jewelry do you mean?! and she saye, That yellow smber ect that you showed me a couple of weeks ago,' and I says; 'II' you think I am dishensat, I will let you have the jevelry.' She said, 'Yes.' The next talk shout the load or the notes or the jewelry was not until the lith day of November, 1918. W She remembers this date because it was Armintice day. She says that Mrs. Burr asked her if they could settle up that

little matter if she got the notes and the jewelry ready, and that she, Mrs. Rossler, said "Yes;" that she came and got a tray and put the jewelry on it - eight pieces of transparent amber, a rose in the center of the necklace, with a two carat diamond, and a bracelet with fourteen stones, and a rose in the center with two carat diamonds, and a brooch and a rose of twelve small leaves and two carat diamonds, a ring and a smaller rose, with two carat diamonds, two earrings of the same size like the ring, and two hairpins with roses as large as the roses in the center of the necklace.

Mrs. Rossler says she told Mrs. Burr to make her a receipt for the jewelry, but Mrs. Burr said she had left her glasses in the hospital, so she called up Noshi, the chemist, she rapped on the radiator for him: that Noshi wrote out two receipts with ink, which Mrs. Burr signed; that one of these was handed to Mrs. Burr; that Mrs. Rossler kept the other paper, which, however, she has lost, but Noshi kept a copy of it. She says that this receipt for the diamonds disappeared at the same time that she lost her abstract to the premises; that she put the receipt in a box back in the side-board and has never seen it since, but that she missed it between Christmas and New Year in 1918. She says that between Armistice day and Thanksgiving in 1918 she had a conversation with Mrs. Burr in the presence of Neshi, in which Mrs. Burr said she had been down town and had the jewelry appraised, and was surprised to find that it was worth more than Mrs. Rossler had said it was; that it was in fact worth \$6.500.

She further testified that the jewelry was purchased Christmas week in 1883 in Paris; that 6,500 francs were paid for it; that it was bought by her uncle, who has been long dead. She says that she told Mrs. Burr after her return from

little matter if she got the notes and the jewelry ready, and that she, Mrs. Ressler, said "Yes;" that she came and got a tray and put the jewelry on it - eight pieces of transparent ember, a rose in the center of the necklace, with a two corat dismond, and a bracelet with fourteer stores, and a rese in the center with two carat dismonds, and a braceh and a rose of twolve small leaves and two deret dismonds, a ring and a small-eross, with two carat dismonds, two sarrings of the same size like the ring, and two hairpins with roses as large as the roses in the center of the necklace.

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Morrison, after Christmas, about the loss of the abstract, deed, etc., and that Mrs. Burr said, "That is too bad; have you any idea who got it?" Mrs. Rossler further says that on June 12th she paid two of her notes to Mrs. Burr, and that Mrs. Burr had promised to bring her six more notes which she was to take up, and that instead of that Mrs. Burr brought her only two notes; that she asked her why she did not bring all the notes and settle the matter that she owed, "and she says she wont give me anything; she went give me no notes any more, and I told her, why she owed me the room rent and I paid her the difference. and I would get the first piece of jewelry back as a treat, and then she got very sore and told me she would take everything away from me, and not give me any notes, nothing any more. We had a few words and I told her that I must have the notes back. I will say something, and she says, 'You would?' and then when I turned around to make the bed and spread up the bed, then she struck me here on the head with a walking cane; and when I turned around she struck me across my lips and here is my lips still scarred where she split them and knocked two teeth loose and bleeding. "

Such are the conflicting accounts given of this transaction by the principal parties to it. Mrs. Burr is correborated by Dr. Johnson, who testifies that he received the trust deed from her and lost it. She is further corroborated by the fact that she has possession of the abstract, and in some particulars seems to be corroborated by the testimony of Henry C. Bennett, who acted for Mead & Coe in the transaction whereby the first mortgage was paid.

Mrs. Ressler's testimony as to the amount of the loan and the jewelry and the alcohol is denied in every particular by Mrs. Burr. Mrs. Rossler is corroborated by her partner, Hishikawa,

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and in part by a roomer named Frank Dunn as to the jewelry and by a real estate agent named Stricklin as to the possession of the abstract. The testimeny of both these witnesses is also denied material in every/particular by Mrs. Burr.

As we have already said, the only question before this court is whether the chancellor palpably erred in the matter. Without further discussing the evidence, which would require the extension of that opinion to an unwarranted length, there are several respects in which, considering all the evidence. which we have carefully done, we find ourselves unable to say that the chancellor erred. In the first place, the complainant gives the more probable account of the transaction, an account which better harmonizes with the undisputed facts in the case. second place, Mrs. Rossler's account of the transaction is, we think, very much discredited by certain of her own pleadings which appear in the record. She filed an answer to the original bill, in which she admitted that the amount of the original loan was \$2.800. and that in the transaction she returned to Mrs. Burr \$34 in cash. as alleged in complainant's bill. It is true that when the case was practically ended she claimed that this was an inadvertence on the part of her attorneys; but this claim is hardly credible in view of the fact that it was only in her answer and cross-bill. filed more than four months thereafter, that she alleged a loan of \$2,500 instead of \$2,800, as charged in the bill.

The recollection, too, of Judge Newcomer, who appears to have been a fair and disinterested witness, is to the effect that the controversy between these women arose about a trust deed; and while he thinks some mention was made at that hearing about a diamond, it is clear from his testimony that no such transaction in diamonds or jewelry as has since been claimed was mentioned at that time.

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The defendant's story as to the alcohol transaction is also most improbable. Why should she give notes for alcohol not yet delivered? Why include these notes with the notes given for the loan? And why pay the same without demanding the delivery of the alcohol?

We have carefully read all the evidence but can not conclude that the findings of the chancellor are "clearly and palpably" erroneous, and the decree will therefore be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

The defendant's story as to the alcohol transaction is also most improbable. Why should she give notes for alcohol not yet delivered? Why include these notes with the notes given for the loss? And why pay the same without demanding the delivery of the alcohol?

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Mesurely, 2. J., and Deven, J., concur.

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HENRY J. EARSTENS & CCMPANY, a corporation.

Appeldee.

APPEAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

LAWRENCE C. O'BRIEN.

Appellant.

227 I.A. 603

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in the sum of \$825.04, entered upon the finding of the court. The plaintiff sued for a balance of the amount claimed to be due for goods sold and delivered. The defense was that on October 21, 1920, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of \$1,825.04 in full of all demands to that date.

The defendant testified that he had been doing business with the plaintiff for five or six years; that during that time he paid monthly statements from time to time. He testified: "On October 21, 1920, I paid the account due them by check and \$825.04 in cash. The check was for \$1,000. I brought it to the office of the plaintiff. and saw John Karstens. Had no conversation with him at that time, only paid the bill. They were pressing me for payment. The bills I paid with were \$100 bills, five of them, I think. I bank at the Cosmopolitan State Bank. I have not the sheck I paid the \$1,000 with. Nobody was in the office at the time the bill was paid. I suppose I received the check back from the bank. I received a statement from the plaintiff after October 21, 1920." The defendant further testified that he could not tell exactly when he received the statement; that it was after he paid the bill; that the balance shown was \$825.04; that when he received the statement he looked for the

HERRY J. KARBYERB & COMPRAY. corporation,

Appeller

LANGESTE C. O'BRIES.

OF CHICARD.

227 I.A. 603

WHICHPAL COUNTY

APPKAL FROM

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OFFERDE OF THE COURT.

Appellant.

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The defendent textified that he had been doing business with the pinintiff for five or eta years; that during that time he paid monthly etstements from time to time. He testified: "On votober 21, 1920, I paid the account due them by check and 9818.01 in cash. The dwok was for \$1,000. I brought it to the office of the plaintiff, and say John Karetens. Had no conversation with him at that time, only paid the bill. They were pressing me for payment. The bills I paid with were flow bills, five of tham, I taink. I beek at the lessopolities otete Bank. I have not the check I paid the \$1,000 with. Hebedy was in the effice at the time the bill was said. I suppose I received the check back from the bank. I raceived a statement from the plaintif; after October 81, 1920.º The defendent further tentified that he could not tell exactly smen he received the states ant; that it was after he paid the bill; that the balance shown as a 3825.04; that when he received the utatement he looked for the eriginal bill and dreve down to Karstens', who was not in; that he did not get any statement after that, that he remembered; he thought Mr. Mitchell, a salesman for the plaintiff, called on him with reference to the balance claimed to be due; that when Mitchell asked him how about the balance defendant replied:

"What balance?" Mitchell answered "\$825.04" and that defendant said "I guess you must have been drinking or something;" that he showed Mitchell the bill which Mitchell wished to take down to the store, but defendant would not let him have it. The witness further testified that at the time he made payment of the account he received a receipt in full, and this receipt was offered in evidence.

Mr. Karstens for the plaintiff testified that defendant made a payment of only \$1,000 on account on October 21st; that this payment was by check, and that the witness received the check in a letter addressed to the plaintiff; that by mistake he marked the bill as paid and mailed it back to the defendant. He says positively that defendant was not in plaintiff's place of business on Occeber 21, 1920, and did not pay any cash on account of the bill on that day. The testimony of Mr. Karstens is corroborated by the memorandum made on the stub of the check book and by the bank book, showing the deposit made by plaintiff on that day. Karstens further testified that he met the defendant about two and a half months later and talked with him about the balance; that defendant then said he did not owe it, and that he had a receipted bill. The witness says "I said I understood he had but you know that ain't right. 'Well, I am going to look it up' he says, 'if I owe it to you, I will pay it.' " Karstens further says that he went over to defendant's house afterwards and had a talk with him about the bill, and defendant again said he was going to look it up, and that he had just come back from Springfield. Defendant, however, original bill and drove down to Karatens', who was not in; that he did mot get any statement siter that, that he remembered; he thought Mr. Mitchell, a salesmen for the plaintiff, called on him with reference to the bulance claimed to be due; that when Mitchell asked him how about the balance defendent replied; "What balance?" Mitchell answered "\$825.04" and that defendent said "I guess you must have been drinking or searthing; " that he showed Mitchell the bill which Mitchell wished to take down to the store, but defendant would not let him howe it. The witness further testified that at the time he made payment of the account he received a receipt in rull, and this receipt was offered in evidence.

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never came back to see the witness or talk about the matter.

The usual custom of the defendant was to pay sometimes in currency and sometimes by check.

Mr. Mitchell testified that he had been a salesman for plaintiff for twenty-one years and knew the defendant; that he, the witness, made out and personally mailed to the defendant statements from plaintiff's books; that afterwards he called on the defendant about January 1, 1921, and asked him to pay the balance, and that defendant said he would look it up, but that he had paid it; that after two or three calls, defendant showed the witness the receipt. The conversations to which this witness testified are not denied by the defendant.

There is no dispute as to the law applicable. The burden of proof is on the adverse party to overcome the recitals of a receipt by clear and unmistakable evidence. Fitzgerald v. Coleman, 114 Ill. App. 25; Ennis v. Fullman Palace Car Cd., 165 Ill. 161. The law as laid down in these decisions was the law which it was the duty of the trial court to apply to the facts in the record. In this court, however, the decision of the trial court on a contradicted issue of fact is binding, unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Rinehart v. Shedd. 207 Ill. App. 138; Pirola v. Fladmark, 190 Ill. App. 57; Mason v. Kraig, 191 Ill. App. 1.

The testimony of defendant is correborated by the receipt, but defendant's evidence is denied, and the receipt is explained by the evidence of Karstens, which is correborated by the books mentioned. There are also certain improbabilities in the testimony of defendant. It appears that he had a bank account, and the question naturally arises, in view of that fact, why he should carry on his person over \$800 in currency. It

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trading at plaintiff's place, although he had been buying from
plaintiff continuously for five or six years prior thereto. The
statements which he made from time to time that he "would look
the matter up" are hardly the statements of one who had made full
payment.

We realize that an appellate court is at a great disadvantage in passing upon a matter of this kind. The opportunities of the trial judge for getting to the truth of such a matter are far superior to those of an appellate tribunal. Upon the whole record we are unable, we think, to say that the finding of the trial Judge, who saw these witnesses, is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., conour.

appears that repeated statements for the balance were received by him without protest or derived for explanation. It appears too that after positing the receipt in full he at once quit trading at plaintiff's place, although he had been busing from plaintiff continuously for five ex six years prior therefore. The statements which he made from time to time that he "would look the matter up" are hardly the statements of one who had hade full payment.

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APPY HERE'S.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

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MARY W. MULCARY, Appellee,

VS.

BOARD OF TRUSTRES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ... ADDELLANT. APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 603

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the Trustees of the Police

Pension Fund of the City of Chicago from an order entered upon

the petition of Mary W. Mulcahy, directing that a writ of mandamus

issue requiring the trustees to pay to her arrears of pension

found to be due, and to also pay to her thereafter a pension

equal to one-half the amount appropriated to the office of

police patrolman in the City of Chicago, not, however, exceeding

the statutory limitation. The facts are in most respects prac
tically undisputed.

The petitioner is the surviving wife of William H. Mulcahy, to whom she was married more than two months prior to H. his death on February 19, 1913. William/Mulcahy was appointed a police operator in the City of Chicago May 14, 1890, and held the position continuously until the time of his death. He faithfully performed the duties of his office, and no charges were ever preferred against him. January 22, 1903, he took the oath of office of a probation sub-operator police patrolman, which eath was in effect that he would support the Constitution of the United States, "and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of such police patrolman according to the best of my ability."

When the police pension fund went into effect

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HARF W. MULCÄRK. Appolles,

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NOARD OF THUSTRIZE OF THE POLICE PRINTION FORD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ADDITION.

Lubrat buch miberia court

227 I.1. 603

AR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE GETEIGN OF THE COURT.

This is an arread by the Trustees of the Police Femiles Sund of the City of Chicago from an order entered upon the petition of Mary W. Mulcahy, directing that a writ of mandams issue requiring the trustees to pay to her arrease of pension found to be due, and to place pay to her thereafter a pension equal to one-half the enough appropriated to the office of police patrolman in the City of Chicago, not, however, exceeding the stautory limitation. The facts are in most respects practically undisputed.

The petitioner is the surviving wife of William II. Muleshy, to whom whe was married more than two months puler to his death on February 19, 1913, Filliam Muleshy was sepeinted a police operator in the City of Chicago May 14, 1890, and held the position continuously until the time of his death. He faithfully perferred the duties of his office, and no charges were ever preferred against him. January 12, 1903, he took the oath of cifice of a probation sub-operator police patrolaum, which oath was in effect that he would support the Constitution of the United States, "and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the affice of such police of the Constitution duties of the affice of such police of the Mulifer of the Ability."

Mulcahy offered and tendered to the trustees the percentage of his salary provided by the Act to be paid by those desirous of becoming beneficiaries, but the defendant trustees refused to receive these payments on the ground that "a police operator" was not a policeman within the meaning of the Act. The court, in granting the prayer of the petitioner, deducted, with the petitioner's consent, from the amount of money which she was to receive, the sums which the trustees had refused to accept from her husband.

It was the theory of the defendant in the trial court, and it now contends here, that police operators became eligible to the benefits of the police pension fund only by virtue of the enactment by the City Council of Chicago of an ordinance passed March 18, 1913, which, it is said, cannot affect the status of the petitioner, since her husband died, as already stated, on February 19th, prior to the enactment of the ordinance.

The question raised is not a new one in this court, nor in the Supreme Court, which, reversing a judgment of this court and of the trial court in People v. Foreman, 296 Ill. 487, held that the Police Pension Fund Act of 1887 included every member of the Police force who was duly appointed and sworn in, irrespective of the kind of services performed. The court said:

"It is quite clear, as we have already seen, that the Act of 1987 included every member of the police force by giving a right to a pension to every person duly appointed and sworn, and who should serve for the specified term upon the regularly constituted police force, regardless of the nature of the services.

In conformity with the law as thus expressed by the Supreme Court, the judgment will be affirmed.

AFF IREED.

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inleshy effered and tendered to the trustees the percentage of his salary provided by the less to be paid by these destrous of becoming beneficiaries, but the defendant trustees refused to receive these payments on the grand that "a police equator" was not a police operator" the granting the prayer of the nearing of the last. The court, in granting the prayer of the petitioner, deducted, with the petitioner's concept, from the smount of money which the was to receive, the curs which the trustees had refused to accept treather marks her implant.

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"It is quite clear, as we have already seen, that the Act of 1889 included every member of the policy force by giving a right to a persion to every person duly appointed and even, and who should serve for the speakifed tour upon the regularly constituted policy force, regardless of the netwices.

In confordity with the Law as thus supressed by tas Supress Court, the judgment will be will med.

McGurely, P. J., and Daver, J., concar.

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103 - 27577

JOSEFA SIMEK.

Appellee,

YS.

VACLAY NOVY, ANNA NOVY and JOSEPH C. PISHA Individually and as Trustee, Appellants. APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 6034

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the defendants from a decree of foreclosure. The case was heard by the chancellor upon exceptions to the master's report, which were overruled and a finding entered that there was due to the plaintiff the sum of \$1988.02 with interest from June 28, 1921. In default of payment of this amount the decree directed that the premises be sold. It also found that the interest of J. C. Pisha as trustee in a second trust deed was junior to the lien of complainant.

pal defendants were not indebted to the complainant, although they neither admitted nor denied that they executed the principal and interest notes. The execution of the trust deed was, however, specifically denied. The answer further averred that August 22, 1916, complainant, pursuant to an agreement to that effect, directed one Josef Tuma to pay certain builders who were erecting a building on premises belonging to defendants, the sum of \$1500, but that no such sum was ever paid by Tuma, nor by anyone representing the complainant; that this payment was the only consideration for the execution of the notes; that Tuma died insolvent, and that defendants by an arrangement with the complainant filed a claim against his estate, which was allowed as a claim of the seventh class, and that a divident of \$150 thereon had been paid, which defendants brought into court for complainant's benefit.

JOHNEY BENDE

Appallee

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VACLAY HOVY, ATHA KOVY and FORSTE C. PISHA Individually End as Truston, Appellence.

APPEAR PROB CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK SCRIFT.

227 I.A. 603

ME. JESTICE MASCHETT MELLYSHED THE OFFICER OF THE SOURT.

This is an appeal by the defendants from a decree of foreclosure. The case was heard by the chanceller upon amoptions to the master's report, which were everabled and a finding entered that there was due to the plaintirf the sum of \$1980.02 with interest from June 20, 1921. In default of payment of this amount the decree directed that the premises be sold. It also found that the interest of J. C. Picha as trustee in a second trust deed was funder to the lish of complainant.

The defense set up in the sugger was that the princiand defendants were not indebted to the completant, although they neither admitted nor denied that they executed the principal and The execution of the trust land wan, however, interest motos. The suswer further everred that August 22, mpecifically dented. 1916, complainant, pursuant to an agreement to that effect, directed one Josef Tumm to pay cortain builders who were erecting a building on premises belonging to defendance, the sum of \$1500, but that no such sum was bror paid by Time, nor by anyone representing the constanue; that this payment was the only consideration for the execution of the notes; that Tues died inscivent, we that defound-Suchage while a belie snautalones set that themangeres an believed his estate, which was allowed as a claim of the seventh class, and that a dividend of \$150 thereon had been paid, which defendants

brought into court for complainant's benefit.

The matters argued in appellants' behalf are based upon the second exception to the report of the master. The complaint is that the master found that the trust deed securing the complainant's note was duly acknowledged on August 22, 1916, by Vaclav Novy and Anna Novy, his wife, before Joseph J. Zarobsky, a notary public, whereas, it is said, the evidence shows it was not in fact so acknowledged.

It is also urged that under the evidence a homestead was involved and that, even as between the parties, this homestead could not be released without acknowledgment in due form. Hence it is concluded the later trust deed, executed on June 20, 1919, and which, without dispute, was duly acknowledged, should be preferred as to the homestead.

A copy of the trust deed to Josef Tuma appears in the record, and attached thereto is the certificate of the notary, which under his seal certifies that "Vaclav Novy and Anna Bovy, each in their own right and as husband and wife, appeared before me in person on the day named, and acknowledged that they signed, sealed and delivered the instrument as their free and voluntary act." It also includes release and waiver of the right of homestead.

The evidence tends to show the following additional facts. Vaclav Novy was a bricklayer and owned the premises in question, on which he had begun the erection of a building. He desired to obtain a loan thereon to complete this building. Josef Tuma was a banker, with whom at that time Vaclav Kovy had an account. Through a brother of Vaclav, one Thomas Novy, negotiations were opened with the complainant, Josefa Simek, for a loan by her of \$1500, to be secured by a mortgage on the premises. She agreed to make the loan, and by previous arrangement she and her sister August 22, 1916, accompanied by Vaclav and Thomas Novy, went to Tuma's bank, where the papers were drawn and signed by Vaclav

The matters argued in appellants' behalf are based upon the second exception to the report of the master. The ocasplaint is that the master found that the trust deed securing the complainant's note was daly enknewheled on August 22, 1916, by Vaelar Nevy and Arms Novy, his wife, before Joseph J. Sarohaky, a notary public, whereas, it to each, the avidence above it was not in fact so acknowledged.

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The epidence tends to may the foliating additional facts. Vaclay Bory was a bricklayer and consection of premises in question, on which he had began the exection of a building. He desired to obtain a loss that consider this building. Josef Tura was a conker, who whom at that the Value hovy had an acquust. Through a brother of Vaclay, one Thomas Bory, negotiations were opened with the complain int, Josefe Stack, for a loss by her of \$1500, to be secured by a mortgage on the presiden. She agreed to make the loss, and by previous arrangement she and her sister to make the loss, and by previous arrangement she and her sister forms 32, 1913, accompanied by Vaclay and Thoman Bory, went to Turas beact, where the pepers were drawn and signal by Vaclay

Novy. At the same time complainant turned over to Tuma \$1500 in cash, which was placed to the credit of Vaclav Novy. Anna Novy, wife of Vaclav, was not present at that time, but later she went to the bank alone and signed all the papers, and a few days thereafter the notes were delivered to the complainant.

September 18th following Tuma committed suicide and the bank was closed. Josefa Simek then took the notes to Frank Zajicek & Son, who were engaged in the real estate business, when it was discovered for the first time that the trust deed was missing. A search in the Recorder's office disclosed that it had not been recorded. May 14, 1917, it was found in the possession of the Chicago Title & Trust Co., administrator of the estate of Tuma. It was then delivered to Frank Zajicek, who at once and prior to the execution of the second trust deed placed it on record.

Before his death Tuma had paid to one of the contractors working on the Novy bailding the sum of \$250. Novy filed a claim against the Tuma estate for \$1250, being the remainder of the loan. The claim was allowed and a dividend of \$150 paid thereon, which defendants tendered complainant in full satisfaction of her mortgage, but which she refused to accept.

The original exhibits have not been certified to this court, and there is nothing in the copies which appear in the record tending to discredit the trust deed.

Vaclar Novy testifies that when he signed the trust deed, "It was pretty empty. I think the note was empty; nothing on the note; wrote something on it, and let me sign it up. It was just a little while. I signed exhibit 12 that time. It had nothing on then. Mr. Tuma, Thomas Novy and Mrs. Simek were there when I signed. Tuma took them. Signed in the back room. I do

Novy. At the sume time complainess turned over to Tune \$1500 in dash; which was placed to the dradic of Vacley stoy. Ama Novy, wife of Vacley, was not present at that the, but later she went to the bunk alone and signed all the papers, and a few laye thereafter the notes were delicated to the complainant.

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not know Joseph J. Zarobsky.*** Did not see him on the 22nd of August, 1916." On cross-examination he said, "My name was not on complainant's exhibit 12; no trustee signed on it. Can't say exactly what was in and what was not. About the first 7 inches were in and the bottom with my name on it. Rest was only printed stuff."

Arma Novy testifies that about a week after the time when her husband was there, she went to the bank alone, where she saw Mr. and Mrs. Tuma; that Mr. Tuma called her to the room, and that she signed some papers; that the signatures on the papers are hers, but that the papers were "empty" when she signed; that no one was there; that she does not know Zarobsky; that siter Tuma's death the papers were brought to her by Zajicek, and that the signatures only were on them at that time.

Pauline Kordik, sister of complainant, testifies that she, the witness, was at Tuma's August 22, 1916, with her sister and the two Novys; that she saw Zarobsky at Tuma's place at that time, but that she was not in the same room.

Thomas Novy testified for defendant that he was at Tuma's bank at that time; he says, "The only thing I saw was that Ers. Simek gave Tuma the money. I do not know anything more. I was standing in front; they were writing some papers in the back, but I was not there; I did not see the papers; I know of nothing else that was said there. We stayed about a half hour. I don't know anything else that transpired at Tume's bank on that occasion."

Joseph J.Zarobsky, who has since by court proceedings changed his name to Profant, testified that he was a son-in-law of Tuma and employed as a clerk in his bank at the time in question; that the trust deed is partly in his writing and partly in Tuma's; that the interest notes are all in his writing, but he had nothing to do with preparing the principal note. He says all of the mortgage in writing above the signature on the trust deed

not know Joseph J. Zarobuky. ** Fid not see him on the 22nd of August. 1910. * On cross-examination he wais. * Ty name was aut on complainant's exhibit is; no tructer algued on it. Ostit say one actly what was in and what was not. About the first 7 inches were in and the better with my mass on it. About the only printed staff. *

Anna New Line that a was there, who went to the bank alone, where she saw Mr. and Mrs. Ture; who went to the bank alone, where she saw Mr. and Mrs. Ture; what are the less that the signed some revers; that the algustures on the payers are berg, but that the papers were "expen" when the ulse signed; that he does not know Sarebuky; that also does not know Sarebuky; that also the brought to her by Lafleck, and that the papers were brought to her by Lafleck, and that the signatures only were an how, if the time.

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Joseph J. Drebeky, who has since by count proceedings obserged his new of the count of the his head of the count of the country of the his heavest and exployed as a clear in the horse at the time in the artificial the time in the same in the first and the partie of the country of the country of the country of the country of the same all of the mortgage. In ording above the arrest of the street of the country of the country of the treet of the

was completely written in before it was signed. He also says that he took the acknowledgment on the 22nd day of August, 1916, by the date in the acknowledgment, and "my name signed to it and seal." He says that he does not remember the circumstances under which the note was made; that he made several sets of notes and trust deeds every week, and that it is pretty hard to remember five years ago. He says: "Don't remember seeing Novy at the bank; wouldn't know his wife by sight; don't recollect seeing her; don't recollect circumstances under which I took acknowledgments; can't recall any part of it; don't remember any of the circumstances of the signing of the trust deed."

(the notes) when the same were brought to his office October 16, 1916; that the notes were then in the same condition; that when he failed to locate the trust deed he asked the makers to sign new papers, which they refused to do. He then filed in the recorder's office a paper which appears in evidence as defendant's exhibit 1, this being an affidavit of complainant alleging that the Novys had executed a trust deed "not fully written out so that it could be recorded." He says that he does not know why this statement was made in the affidavit; that he used the phraseology perhaps without considering.

We are satisfied the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the statement was not true. The question for the trial court was whether the evidence submitted was sufficient to everceme the certificate of the notary. The question for this court is whether the finding of the chancellor is, in that respect, clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. There is no dispute as to the rule of law to be applied, which, as stated in Kostureka v. Bartkiewicz, 241 Ill. 604, is:

was completely written in before it was eigned. He also cays that he took the acknowled, went on the Stud day of August, 1916, by the date in the acknowled, and "my news algued to it and seal." He says that he does not remember the circumstances under which the note was made; that he made soveral rets of notes and trust doeds overy week, and that it is pratty hard to remember live years ago. He says: "Don't remember seeing Nevy at the bank; wouldn't know his wife by night; don't recollest weeked har; don't recollest siroumstances under which I took mekareled, ments; can't recoll any part of it; don't remember may of the circumstances of the signing of the trust doed."

Frank Sailesk testified than he ass exhibits 1 to 11 (the notes) when the same were brought to him office October 16.

1916; that the notes were then in the suce confition; that when he failed to locate the trust doed he saken the sakens to signare papers, which to they refused to do. He than fits in the research coffice a paper which aspears is evidence as defend at a corder's office a paper which aspears is evidence as defend at a capital 1, this being an office, the openalminant all-gling that the Roys had executed a trust tend "not folly written out so that the Sovys had executed a trust tend "not and anow why tilly statement was made in the super State a capital the unor the phrasectory paramet was made in the afficavit; that he used the phrasectory

The are walked the oregonism of the eventual of the evention for the trial court was whether the evidence substituted was sufficient to everouse the continies of the nether. The court is sufficient to court is whether the first in of the nether. The court is that the first in the first in the summerium is, in that respect, electly and mentioneily amoins the weight of the evidence. There is no dispute at the first rule of law to be 2 ties, a ter, as stated in features, v. Sarrhiegier, 341 111. Oct. 12:

"The certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed in the manner provided by law, cannot be overcome by the unsupported testimony of the granter. While, as between the parties to the deed, such acknowledgment may be impeached for fraud, collusion or imposition, it cannot be otherwise attacked; and the evidence upon such issue of fraud, collusion or imposition must, 'by its completeness and reliable character, fully and clearly satisfy the court that the certificate is untrue and fraudulent.' Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 100 Ill. 385; Maraton v. Brittenham, 76 id. 611; Watson v. Watson, 118 id. 56; Calumet & Chicago Ganal & Dock Co. v. Russell, 68 id. 426; Menroe v. Poorman, 62 id. 523; Lickman v. Harding, 65 id. 505; Graham v. Anderson, 42 id. 514; Oliphant v. Liversidge, 142 id. 160. In the cases cited are fully set forth the reasons of public policy which make the rules stated imperative. Under them the certificate of acknowledgment was not successfully impeached."

Appellant has cited a number of cases and we have examined all of them. These cases are, however, in every instance distinguishable on the facts from the instant one. We think the evidence insufficient to impeach the certificate. In the first place, the recitation of the certificate is probable. In the next place, the testimony of the Novys on material points is not, we think, credible. It does not ring true.

Mrs. Novy was not present at the execution of the deed, and cite cases which they claim sustain the contention that this fact alone brings the case within an exception to the general rule - Parlin .

de Orendorff Co. v. Hutson, 198 Ill. 396, and Bouvier v. Sypher,
186 Fed. 644. It is true that the undisputed evidence shows that she was not present on August 22, 1916, but the evidence shows that there was a direction at that time that she should come afterwards, and the evidence shows that she came, and it is undisputed that her genuine signature appears on the notes and on the trust deed. That the notary did not remember the transaction except as his memory was refreshed by the papers, carries little weight in view of the large number of transactions of this kind to which he was a party. The trust deed, as acknowledged, conveyed the right of homestead, if there was any, and the view we have taken of

The certificate of the acknowled, means of a deed in the meaner provided by law, cannot be overcome by the unexported tentimenty of the granter. This, as between the parties to the deed, much acknowled and the granter. This, is between the parties to the or imposition, it cannot be observing astecked; and the covidence upon such issue of fraud, colly sten or imposition and; by the completeness and reliable character, fully and elersty satisfy the court that the certificate is untrue and fraudulent. This proving 76 id. 611; Taison v. Takenes, 165 Ill. 585; Maraten v. Maraten v. Maraten v. Acknow. 65 id. 611; Taison v. Maraten de dat Montae-v. Lower Cent. 1d. 586; Montae-v. Lower Cent. 1d. 586; Montae-v. Lower Montaen. 65 id. 506; Caham v. Maraten dec dat dat Cital College v. Maraten dec dat dat dat dec public v. Maraten dec date date the copes cited are fully set forth the reasons of public policy which make the rules stated twentitive. Under thesethe."

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Appellants say that the undisputed evidence shows that Mrs. Novy was not present at the uncention of the deed, and ofte capes which they claim suctain the content on that that the fact alone brings the case within an exception to the general rule - Parlin T. demander Co. T. Hutson, 198 INI. 386, and Bouvier v. Sycher, 186 Fed. 644. It is true that the unsitenced evidence chows that she was not present on August 52, 1910, but the oridence shows that there was a direction at that that the chart she should come efforwards, and the evidence shows that the redence shows that the redence shows that the redence shows that the redence shows the the national constitution of the first deed. That the ortary did not remember the transaction except us his mamory was refreshed by the papers, carried little well, the transactions of the large number of transactions of the kind to with he of homestead, if there was any, and the view shave bakes of

the evidence makes it unnecessary to discuss the disputed question of whether the Novy family had an estate of homestead in the premises at the time in question.

The decree is affirmed.

AFFI REED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

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JOSEPH GRUDZIEN.

Appellee,

TS.

CHICAGO RAILWAYS COMPANY.

CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, CALUMET AND SOUTH CHICAGO APPEAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT.

COOK COUNTY.

RAILWAY COMPANY and SOUTHERN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, doing business as CHICAGO SURFACE LINES.

Appellants.

227 I.A. 603

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment for \$937.50, entered upon the verdict of a jury. The declaration alleged that about February 10, 1919, at the intersection of Wells and Oak streets, in the City of Chicago, defendants negligently and carelessly ran one of their cars "at a high rate of speed and without any warning or signal of the approach of its said street car * * * and in consequence thereof then and there caused and permitted its said cars to run into and against the plaintiff's automobile in which the plaintiff was then and there riding," by means whereof the plaintiff's automobile was wrecked and destroyed. Due care on plaintiff's part was also alleged. Defendants pleaded the general issue.

The appellants assign and argue alleged error in the giving of an instruction, and also urge that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence as to defendants' negligence and also as to due care upon the part of the plaintiff.

The undisputed facts in evidence are that Wells street is a public highway extending north and south and Oak street is a public highway extending east and west. Two parallel

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 railroad tracks were laid in Wells street by the defendant companies; on the easterly track, northbound cars were operating while southbound cars ran over the west track. Oak street intersects Wells street at right angles and the evidence tends to show that the width of Oak street from curb to curb is about 30 feet; about 300 feet south of Oak street and parallel with it runs Whiting street. At the time of the accident a saloon stood on the southeast corner of Oak and Wells etreets, on the northeast corner a dry goods store, and on the northwest corner a drug store. The accident occurred between twelve and one o'clock at the noon hour on February 11, 1919. The plaintiff at that time was driving a six passenger Cadillac automobile in a westerly direction on the north side of Oak street and across its intersection with Wells, when his sutomobile was struck by a northbound car and the sutomobile practically demolished.

due to the negligence of defendants in running their street car without warning across the intersection at an excessive rate of speed, which witnesses testify was from twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. The evidence on this point is conflicting, and while the defendants argue that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the car was not moved at the excessive rate of speed, but on the contrary with due caution, we are not disposed to set aside the verdict of the jury on that ground, although we are inclined to think that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the bell was rung as the northbound car proceeded to cross the intersection, and that the speed of the car was not so excessive as plaintiff contends. We think this is apparent from the distance which the street car ran after the collision.

The controlling question in the case is whether the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due

railread tracks were leid in wells street by the defendant compenies; on the ensterly tracks, northbound cars were operating while southbound cars ran over the west track. Oak street intersects Wells street at fight angles and the evidence tends to show that the width of Cak street from ourh to carb is about 30 feet; about 300 feet panth of Oak street and parellel with it runs whither etreet. At the time of the socident a salson stood on the southeast corner of Cak and Wells streets, on the northeast corner a dry goods store, and on the northwest corner a drug store. The accident occurred between twelve and one e'olock at the nean hour on Wabmary 11, 1919. The plaintiff at that time was driving a six passenger Cedillac automobile in a westerly direction on the sorth side of Cok street and screen its intersection with walls, when his entomobile was struck by a northbound car and the su tomobile practically demolished.

due to the negligence of defendants in running their street car without warning across the intersection at an excessive rate of speed, which witnesses testify was from trenty-five to thirty miles per hour. The evidence on this point is conflicting, and while the defendants argue that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the car was not moved at the excessive rate of speed, but on the contrary with dus contion, we are not disposed to not acide the think that a preponderance of the evidence indicates the think that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the series of the syldence indicates that the section, as the northbound car proceded to cross the intersection, and that the speed of the crydence indicates that the section, and that the speed of the crydence to crossive as section, and that the speed of the crydence to crossive as which the street car ran after the apparent from the distance which the street car ran after the collision.

The controlling question in the cone is whether the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was in the exercise of one

care, which the verdict indicates it must have found, is against the manifest preponderance of the evidence. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the evidence bearing on the care exercised by plaintiff at and just prior to the occasion in question. McCarthy, plaintiff's first witness, says that he, the witness, was standing at 171 Oak street, about thirty feet east of Wells; that he saw the street car 50 feet down Wells street, and that the automobile was then probably 10 feet east of the tracks. and that the automobile was then moving west at a speed of twelve or fifteen miles an hour. Lutz, another witness, who says he was standing in front of the drug store, testifies that he saw plaintiff's automobile going west at a speed of about eight miles an hour: that the machine slowed down to the street car track: that the street car did not slacken up speed at any time: that it came through at a speed of about twenty-five miles; that when the witness first saw the automobile, it was about two doors east of the corner of Wells street, and the street car at that time was about the middle of the block between white and Oak streets; that the automobile was running about eight miles an hour and slowed up "when he came to the car track and he slowed up, and he started to cross the track." The witness further says that the street car kept going ahead at full speed. Zucker. another witness for plaintiff, says that he was driving a Ford truck, following the street car; that it was going 25 to 27 miles per hour; that the street car slacked up just when he had the machine right in front of him. The view which this witness had of the accident was obstructed by the street car. He says that when he first saw the man driving the automobile, plaintiff was on the street driving the machineand slowed down and then kept on going west; that he slowed down and then tried to cross. The witness could not say how fast, about eight, and then he slowed down, and then shot ahead; that when he slowed down, he

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We think on any theory of the case under the evidence submitted in his own behalf, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of fact. The accident happened at about moon, the street was clear of traffic, plaintiff could see the street car coming several hundred feet away. He could have avoided the accident either by increasing his speed or by waiting until the street car passed by. Although he was the first to enter the intersection. this did not give him, necessarily the right of way, nor excuse him from the exercise of due care. He admits that he saw the street car coming, and his own evidence and that of his witnesses fail to disclose any circumstances which would prevent him from giving his undivided attention to the matter of making a safe passage of the crossing. There is only one fact in the case which would possibly have a tendency to excuse his conduct. There is evidence tending to show that as the street car approached Oak street, a lady, apparently a prospective

hells atreet he was driving about eighteen miles an hour, and that he alacked up, and that us he came to the street car he storted up; that as he came to 'ella strect he as the street that it wen on the other side of the coet. coming alony: about 50 or 50 feet away. He says. "I stopped my car briore I ment on the track, I stopped it about 10 feet from the car track, and I saw the street our coming, it was se for from me, about blos day went went. I stopped. " . wheel why he did not stop when he naw the der coming stong he replied: reached the street car track the atreet our was should tilly feet away from ms. I do not knes for sare how long my Antiquebile was, phase le feet, by . I did not massure it. I den't know I bard the bell ringing, but the cer weaten for avay from my yet." These efthouses were all called by the Dinintall.

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passenger, held up her hands to indicate her desire that the ear stop. But when asked on cross-examination if he had started across because he thought the car would stop for the lady, his counsel objected, and the objection was sustained by the court. The occupants of the automobile were not seriously injured, and the evidence shows that both sides at once began diligently to gather the names of witnesses. The lady who held up her hand was not produced, however, nor was Miss Helson, the young lady riding in the automobile, who (the evidence for defendant tended to show) at the time of the accident severely criticised plaintiff for his carelessness. The absence of these witnesses was not accounted for by plaintiff.

The judgment will be reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACT.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

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MeSurely, D. J., and Dever, J., conour.

FINDING OF FACT.

We find as a fact that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence at the time and place of the accident in question, proximately tending to bring about the injury stated in plaintiff's declaration.

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PURE OF FACE.

We find so a fact that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence at the time and place of the socident in question, proximately tending to bring about the injury stated in plaintiff's declaration.

HARRY DUNNILL,

Appellee,

VS.

THE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY
OF AMERICA et al.,
Appellants.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

27 I A. 604

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this case, the plaintiff, who is appellee in this court, filed an amended statement of claim in which he alleged that on October 21, 1920, at the special instance and request of the defendants' duly authorized agent, he subscribed and paid to the defendants the sum of \$110 for a certificate evidencing two shares of stock in defendants' business, which certificate was to be delivered within a reasonable time; that although often demanded, defendants had refused and neglected to deliver the same, whereby they had become indebted to him for the money so advanced. The case was tried by the court without a jury. At the close of plaintiff's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, the defendants made a motion for a finding in their favor, which was denied. The court made a finding in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment thereon. It is argued here that the court erred in these rulings, and appellants ask this court to reverse the judgment with a finding in their favor.

The evidence tends to show that appellants are trustees of the Co-operative Society of America, an express trust under the common law, created by an agreement and declaration of trust dated February 20, 1919, and recorded in the Recorder's Office of Cook County. Interests in this trust were represented by certain certificates issued by the defendant trustees. The

Appallac.

THE CO-CPERATIVE SOCIETY OF AMERICA et al.,

APPRAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

- 6060

MR. JUSTICE HATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this case, the plaintiff, who is appalled in this court, filed an amended statement of claim in which he alleged that on October 21, 1930, at the special instance and request of the defendants' duly authorized agent, he subscribed and paid to the defendants the sum of \$110 for a certificate evidencing two shares of stock in defendants' business, which certificate was to be delivered within a reasonable time; that although often demanded, defendants had refused and neglected to deliver the same, whereby they had become indebted to him for the money so advanced. The case was tried by the court without a At the close of plaintiff's evidence and again at the .vzut. close of all the evidence, the defendants muche a notion for a finding in their favor, which was denied. The court made a finding in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment thereon. It is argued here that the court erred in these rulings, and appollants ask this court to reverse the judgment with a tinging in their favor.

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October 21, 1920, Lund sold to plaintiff two shares in this trust for \$110, which sum was paid in cash. Lund, as he was authorized to do, received the payment and issued a receipt in the usual form. With other things it stated that the subscription was received subject to rejection by the trustees, and that if it was not accepted for any reason, the payment made should be promptly returned. December 1st thereafter defendant wrote plaintiff asking him to inform them whether he had had any dealings with "Mr. Peter Lund." and stated that any information would be treated as strictly confidential. December 5, 1920, plaintiff replied, giving information as to the purchase of his own and other shares by members of his family. In this letter he said, "If there is anything wrong with the transaction, please let me know at once so I may take the necessary steps to protect myself. " Flaintiff did not receive a reply to this request. He then in February, 1921, got Mr. Giersch, as he says, to go and see these people. Giersch testified that he called up the offices of defendants about February 1. 1921; that he went to their main office and told them his business and presented the receipts. He was told they could not do anything for him unless he left the receipts there. He says he told them he had been sent to find out whether they were going to issue the certificate; that he was finally referred to Mr. Shea. who told him that he was pretty busy, but that plaintiff would get the certificate in a week or ten days. He says that he called again at plaintiff's request, about the 1st of March, 1921, and

Great Western Security Company was a brokerage concern, and the defendants had a contrar, with it whereby it was to cell beneficial interests in this trust. The brokerage concern in carrying out the terms of this contrast employed an agent named land, whose outnority to act for the defendants under the terms of the contrast is not disputed.

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again saw Shea, and was told by Shea to tell plaintiff not to worry, that he would get the certificates as soon as possible, in a week or ten days. The witness says that about april 1st thereafter he again called upon Mr. Shea upon the same errand; that he told Shea plaintiff desired him to send either the certificates or the money, to which Shea replied that he had been a little busy, but that he would send then out in a week or ten days, and said, "We will give him the certificates."

Plaintiff then employed an attorney, who on May 6th wrote the defendants, insisting on a return of plaintiff's money. May 11th this attorney again wrote at length, to the effect that if he did not hear from them he would be compelled to resort to other means. May 14th defendants replied to the letter of May 6th that the writer was investigating the subscriptions. "and we will let you hear from us as soon as possible." May 23rd defendants again wrote: "Mr. Robinson has informed me about the conversations with you regarding subscriptions of Harry, Burt and Selma Dunnill, and states that due to the action of one creeked member of our organization, they have lost confidence in our business. This matter has been put through for the issuing of certificates, and I believe your clients will realize the wisdom of retaining same, and we are making no change in this arrangement." June 15th thereafter defendants delivered the certificates by registered mail with a dividend check, both of which were returned by plaintiff's attorney in a letter dated July 7th.

The question to be decided is whether the plaintiff has a right to recover the purchase money. No definite time was named in the contract for the delivery of the certificates, and the law would therefore imply a promise that the same would be delivered within a reasonable time. The defendants contend that

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under the circumstances the delivery was within a reasonable time. There was testimeny which the defendants contend would excuse deferred delivery. This testimony was given by Kessler, attorney for the defendant Society, and his evidence is not contradicted. He says that his connection with the matter commenced in November. 1920, and that at that time he received word from Fox Lake that Lund had taken subscriptions and failed to turn in the money; that Mr. Lund had been employed by an organizer, Mr. Shea; that the witness called Shea in and told him to investigate the matter, which he did, and defendants' letters to plaintiff followed: that when he received plaintiff's letter on December 5th, "Mr. Shea came in to me about it, and we heard, I believe, that was all the transaction on which Land had collected money. * * * I investigated and checked up, and tried to find Peter Lund and was unable to do it; he had skipped, and that subscription was not reported to the office until April, 1921." The witness further says that he explained to the attorney for the plaintiff that there was delay in issuing the certificate due to the fact that the defendants had increased the par value of their stock, and that they were substituting a new form of certificate for the older ones, and that it would necessitate sending out about 20,000 certificates, and that would slow up the current business, and that it took from the lst of April until the first part of June until the certificates were sent out.

We do not think the facts testified to would excuse the delay in view of the undisputed evidence that defendants had full knowledge of plaintiff's rights on December 5, 1920. We do not hesitate to say that the delay was unreasonable. Appellants cite Beaunisme v. Scholz, 182 Ill. App. 338, but that case is not at all like this one on the material facts.

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Appellants argue, citing authorities, that plaintiff's rights and status as a stockholder were in no way interfered with by reason of the delay in delivering the certificate; that the certificate was only evidence of the property right, which had already in fact been conveyed. Majors v. Girdner, 159 Pac. 826; Gallatin County Farmers Alliance v. Flannery, 197 Pac. 996. These cases hold that this/rule with reference to the subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation. But there are many facts in each of the cases cited distinguishing them from this case. The rights of the parties here are controlled by the written contract and, we think, according to its terms the plaintiff was not to take an interest in the trust until the certificate should be issued. Defendants had the right to refuse to accept the subscription within a reasonable time. Not having done so, the plaintiff, according to elementary principles, had the right to withdraw his offer and demand the return of the money paid. While the case of Kinzer v. Cowie, 235 Ill. 383, is in many respects different upon the facts, the opinion there lays down rules which we regard as applicable and controlling here.

The judgment will be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

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AFFIRMED.

Medurely, P. J., and Dever, J., consur.

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RELIABLE STORE FIXTURE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee,

YS.

ELLA WILLARD, Doing Business Under the Name of Masonic Temple Lunch,

Appellant. APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 6042

MR. JUSTICE MATCHETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in the sum of \$90, entered upon the verdict of a jury. The claim of plaintiff was based upon a written contract made April 20, 1921, whereby plaintiff agreed to supply to defendant "One combination buffet, with silver display case, to be built out of birchwood or whitewood, white enamelled as per drawing, to be 0. K.'d by you. Terms, \$380.00, \$100.00 with order, \$100.00 C. O. D. Balance in six payments of \$30 per month." The evidence shows that the buffet was made pursuant to a drawing 0. K.'d by the defendant, was delivered to her, and that she paid upon the purchase price thereof the sum of \$200.

mamufactured according to the details provided for in the contract and directions of the plaintiff. The balance claimed was \$180; the amount allowed by the jury was only \$90. Appellant argues that it is apparent that there was a breach of the contract by plaintiff, and that plaintiff therefore could not recover at all in the suit upon the contract. It is apparent that appellant has misapprehended the law applicable to the facts appearing in the record. The transaction was a sale by description of a specific article to be manufactured for the plaintiff, and upon a breach of the warranty (which from the verdict

FELLABLE STORM FIXTURE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appalled,

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MLLA WILLAMD, Doing Business Under the Mane of Masonic Youple Lunch, Appellant.

APPNAL FROM MONICIPAL OCURT OF CHICAGO.

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207 I.A. 604

MR. JUSTICE MATCHCETT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in the sum of \$90, entered upon the verdict of a jury. The claim of plaintiff was based upon a written contract made April 20, 1921, whereby plaintiff agreed to supply to defendant "One combination buffet, with silver display case, to be built out of birchwood or whitewood, white engaelled as per drawing, to be 0. K.'d by you. Torms, \$380.00, \$100.00 with order, \$100.00 c. K.'d by you. Torms, \$380.00, \$100.00 with order, \$100.00 dence shows that the buffet was made pursuent to a drawing 0. H.'d by the defendant, was delivered to ber, and that she paid upon the purchase price thereof the sum of \$200.

The ostence was that the article 'elivered are not manufactured according to the details provided for in the contract and directions of the plaintiff. The halance claimed was 180; the smount allowed by the jury was only 300. Appallant argues that it is apparent that there was a breach of the contract by plaintiff, and can plaintiff therefore could not recover at all in the mult upon the contract. It is apparent that appallant has misapprehended the law applicable to the facte appearing in the record. The transaction was a sule by decription of a specific article to be manufactured for the plaintiff, and upon a breach of the warranty (which from the verdict

of the jury we must presume there was), the rights of the parties were determined by section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act, Cahill's Revised Statutes 1921, p. 3048.

put to her election. She could rescind the sale, return the article to the vendor and sue for the return of the purchase money, or she might retain the goods and, when sued, recoup the difference between the value of the article contracted for and the value of the article which was in fact delivered. Plaintiff chose to keep the article, and when sued recoup. She cannot maintain inconsistent positions. Healy Ice Machine Co. v. Clow & Son, 148 Ill. App. 421; Allen v. Henn, 197 Ill. 486; Williston on Sales, section 604.

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

of the jury we must presume there was), the rights of the parties were determined by section 30 of the Uniform Sales Aut, Cahill's Revised Statutes 1931, p. 3048.

Upon the delivery of the article the defendant was put to her election. She could rescind the sale, return the article to the vendor and ene for the return of the purchase mency, or she might retain the goods and, when sued, recoup the difference between the value of the article article contracted for and the value of the article which was in fact delivered. Plaintiff chose to keep the article, and when and recoup. She cannot maintain inconsistent positions. Nealy Ice Machine Co. v. Clow asintain inconsistent positions. Nealy Ice Machine Co. v. Clow as for, 148 Ill. App. 421; Alien v. Henn, 197 Ill. 486; Willisten on Sales, section 604.

The judgment is affirmed.

AMERICANS.

MeSurely, P. J., and Dever, J., concur.

WILLIAM T. BRUECKNER et al., Appellees,

YS.

SAMPSON CASE, Annellante

APPRAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 6643

UR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This appeal is from a verdict for possession of premises in an action of forcible detainer brought in the name of the successors in trust to the trustees of the estate of Wm. H. Godair, deceased, against the defendant under a lease dated May 9, 1916, purporting to be an indenture by and between "The estate of Wm. H. Godair, deceased, by its agents E. E. Baldwin & Co. as parties of the first part, and said defendant. party of the second part. It was signed by defendant and in the name of said estate by said agents. While the instrument was informally executed, nevertheless the defendant entered into and took possession of the premises under it and paid rent according to its terms until December 19, 1918, since which time he has paid no rent. He was in possession when the suit was instituted, and on May 19, 1921, when he was served with a five days notice in the name of said trustees, at which time he owed. according to the terms of the lease, \$1180. Defendant offered no evidence, and the court gave an instructed verdict for the plaintiff.

The complaint names the plaintiffs as successors in trust to the trustees of said estate, as did also the five days notice. It is appellant's contention that the proof did not show the relationship of landlord and tenant between said.

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successors in trust and defendant. While there was no direct proof that they were such successors, yet the point is not raised by any specific objection. On the other hand, it is clear that defendant undertook to deal with the trustees of said estate in entering into the lease and acquired his tenancy through agents acting for them, and the evidence tends to show that the same agents continued to act for them and their alleged successors in collecting the rent from defendant. Defendant's contentions, therefore, may be summarized as an attempt to question his landlerd's title, which, of course, he cannot do.

Accordingly the judgment will be affirmed.

AFFIRED.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., cencur.

ancessers in trust and defendant. Thile there was no direct proof that they were such supersours, yet the point is not raised by any specific objection. On the oblice hand, it is also that defendant underpook to deal with the trusters of each obtained that defendant into the lease and wind acquired his tenuncy through agents acting for them, and the evidence tends to about the industing the them of the evidence to about the industrial that the same agency acting the set for them and their alliged ancesnors in action the rout from defendant. Defendant's contentions, therefore, may be summerized as an attempt to question his lander's title, which, of course, he enable do.

Accordingly the Judgment will be affirmed.

Mortill and Sridley, Mr., Jonese,

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JOSEPH ROLLINS et al. Appellants.

YS.

ROBERT DORTCH.

RANDALL H. McGAROCK, Intervening Petitioner,

Appellace.

APPEAL FROM MUSICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 6044

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

transferes: of the property attached interpleaded, claiming ownership thereof. The issue of ownership was tried without a jury and from the court's finding against plaintiffs they have appealed, and urge that the finding was not warranted by the evidence. We need not discuss the evidence, for as appellants failed to prove that the relation of creditor and debtor existed between them and the defendant in the attachment they were in no position to question the good faith of the transfer under which appelles claimed title. Nor could they rely on the attachment affidavit and bond or other papers in the case to supply such proof. (Springer v. Bigford, 160 Ill. 495; Yout Mfg. Co. v. Alton, 168 id. 564; Campbell & Zell Co. v. Ross, 187 id. 553.)

Accordingly the court's order will be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., concur.

FORTER MOLLINS at al.,

P. 1

ROBERT BORYCH.

RANDALL H. McC. 2008; Intervening Petitioner, Appelled.

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NR. PERSIPLIO JUSTICE BANGGE DILLYSRED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

transferred of the property attached intemployment, cludaing emporably thereof. The issue of ownership was tried wittent a jury and from the court's firting against plaistiffs they have appealed, and arge that the finding was not partuned by the expealed, and arge that the finding was not partuned by the evidence. We need not discuss the sythence, for as appointed failed to prove that the raintion of creditor and debter exteted between them and the defendent in the attachment they were in no position to quantien the good faith of the standard train of the attachment transfer under which appoints along a long or other papers in the entering affice of another to unpply such period. (Applicate 'Administ', 160 131.

The case to unpply such proof. (Applicate 'Administ', 160 131.

Accordingly the cours a order will be affirmed.

Merrill and Gridley, JJ., concur.

HUGRO MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Corporation,

Appellee,

VS.

ADOLPH STURN COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 605

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This suit was brought September 30, 1920, to recover \$2,935.40, a balance claimed to be due for dowels sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant in October and November, 1920.

The record shows the following proceedings in the case, all in the year 1920: October 10, entry of defendant's appearance; October 18, filing of its affidavit of merits; November 21, striking of same pursuant to motion and due notice thereof, and leave given to file an amended affidavit in five days; November 29, order defaulting defendant for want of affidavit of merits or defense, and for judgment; November 30, order assessing damages in the sum of \$2436.40; December 2, order overruling defendant's motions to vacate default and judgment, for leave to file amended affidavit of merits, and to strike plaintiff's counter affidavits, from which appeal was allowed.

In support of the motions so overruled were three affidavits, one by each of defendant's atterneys Laranie and Linaweaver, and one by Adolph Sturm, defendant's president. Laranie's was to the effect that after filing the affidavit of merits on October 18, an agreement was entered into between plaintiff and defendant for a dismissal of the suit, the terms of which are not set forth in the affidavit, that the suit was

RUGRO MANUPACTURES SONPARY, a Corporation,

erlingen;

ADULER ETUEN COMPAST. a.

. spallage.

APPEAL PROM MUNICIPAL COUNT OF CRILADO.

22: I.A. 605

MALTERSTOIRS JUSTICE BARGES DELIVERAD THE CETATOR OF THE COURT.

Figure 150. 10, a balance elected to be due for downles and delivered by plaintiff to defandant in Detabat and accessing 1930.

The recent sheet in Selleving proceedings in the
case, all in the year 1930: tereber 15, ertry of callering in the
appearance; botober 16, filling of the affiderit of vertica; Noreader 21, etriling of them to file an accessing and the notice
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days; however 28, order defaulting defendent for ant of airficevit of marite or defaulting defendent for ant of airstands assembly defaultence, and for judgment; November 2,
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etter plaintiff a counter affidering or animal was
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An support of the mutters of overruled were third affiderits, one by each of desentes is attentional learnment, and one by adoled brune, defendantle president, burnante's west to the effect that after fitting the enfidantle of merits on Cotober 18, an agreement was enforced the between plaintiff and defendant for a Cumberli of the outs, the ferm of which are not estimated for a first out the outs, the cure

not dismissed, that he was surprised in view of the agreement to receive notice of the motion to strike the affidavit of merits on November 21, that "during that period" he was "negotiating with plaintiff's attorneys for payment of one installment under said new agreement," and that plaintiff's attorney told him that nothing further would be done without notice to him, and that relying thereon he was absent from the city November 29. when the case appeared on the trial call of the court. weaver's affidavit was to the effect that he appeared in court November 29 to look after the motion for default in Laramie's absence, and that he told the court he had just come into the case. The amended affidavit of merits sworn to by said Sturm. which defendant requested leave to file and which was offered in support of said metions, set forth the agreement presumably referred to in Laramie's affidavit as shown by correspondence between the attorneys for the respective parties, and stated what was done under it. The agreement as so shown consisted of an offer by defendant addressed to plaintiff's atterney October 19, to pay \$500 by an enclosed check "on account." with the understanding that the balance as claimed by plaintiff should be paid in three equal installments, 30, 60 and 90 days thereafter. Acknowledging the same on October 20, plaintiff's atterneys agreed to return said check unless plaintiff agreed to the plan of extended payments of the balance amounting to \$2446.15 in three equal installments as proposed. The check was paid and applied, but the installment falling due Movember 19 was not paid, which was presumably the one that Laramie was "negotiating" about before steps were taken for default, and presumably negotiations for a further extension failed and plaintiff proceeded as above stated because defendant did not keep its agreement.

mot dismissed, that he was susprined in view of the agreement to reserve agains of the motion to strike the affidavit of morita on Movember 21, that "during that pariod" he was "negotiating with plaintiff's attorneys for payment of one installment under wid blod werecome and that plaintiff's attorney teld him that nothing further would be jone atthough action that, and that relying thereon he was absent from the city Movember 29. when the ense appeared on the trial coll of the cent. Iliafruen at banacon od test foolis was of ear fluchtin at rever Movember 20 to look after the metian for default in Larunie's absence, and that he told the court he had just come into the case. The assudes affidavit of marite avery to by sold Sturm, which defendant requester loave to alle at which was effered in support of acid wetlons, sat forth or agrees ht presumbly referred to in lurante's affilavil as a our by correscondeups became the attentions for the respective parties, and atated That were done under it. The error est as so crown enough the of an offer by defendant addressed to picintiff a attentity October 13, to pay \$500 by an oblined check "on account." with the understanding that the balance as claimed by plaintiff should be said in three equal invalinants. To 60 and 90 days thereafter. Adinowled the cone a cotober 3 , which is Resure Yillinless seefan Soods then muser of beerge agencedie the slam of extended payments of the full occumulating to \$2645.15 in three equal installments an proporty. It a thock was gaid and applied but the installation falling due torement 19 was not paid, which was presumally the one that incomis was "negethating" about before theps were town for defailt, ton life several as above stated because definitely Thistiely keep its agreement. The defenses set forth in the affidavit of merits, so offered and rejected, were predicated upon the delivery of defective goods, (notwithstanding defendant had made two payments on account of \$250 each, the last payment six menths after delivery of the goods) and upon a claim of ultra vires in making the sales, (of which, nevertheless, defendant got the benefit) and upon the agreement to accept the terms of the adjustment (which defendant breached) and to give due notice of taking a default against defendant.

It clearly appears, therefore, from Laramie's affidavit and said amended affidavit of merits that defendant had not lived up to its agreement upon which it claims the case was to be dismissed. It does not appear that any arrangement was made for an extension of time for the payment of said first installment, with respect to which defendant was in default before any motion was made to take a default against him in the case. Nor does it appear that plaintiff was to dismiss the suit before the installments were paid. Defendant having breached its agreement was not in a position to insist on plaintiff's carrying out its part by dismissal of the suit or further extension of time granted, as no steps were taken to have defendant's affidavit of morits stricken until after such breach, and defendant even then took no steps to file an amended affidavit of merits for which the time had not expired, and during which Larasie was negotiating without success for a further extension of time to pay the first installment. As defendant received due notice of taking a default and judgment and neglected without legal excuse or due diligence to take the ordinary steps to protect his right to make a defense, we think the court was justified in considering the proffered affidavit of merits as lucking in the elements of

oreffored and rejected, were predicated upon the delivery of defective goods, (notatinatending defeated upon the delivery of on account of \$250 each, the last payment eix mentile after delivery of the goods) and upon a claim of initial viven in making the mater, (of which, nevertheless, defeadant put the henefit) and upon the agreement to useapt the rerms of the adjustment (which defendent breached) and to give due method of taking a defendent defeatent.

It clearly appears, therefore, trom Lanuale's affilest t and and amended affilestit to not use that defendent had not lived up to its agreement upon water it elains the onse was to be diemissed. It does not up the arrangement was made for an excension of them to: the passes to all each first tare stallment, with researc to which telen. wit was in default before tary motion was under to take a default applicable his in the ease. proposition wit wat wan of and litturely and unoque it sook toll the installments were paid. Jefersont haring broached ats agreeand therefore a finitely to infinite the little of the property and the same fine tts gart by the data to the main to the colour extension of the To directlin a digitary, h and of market area agence of as hadden warits ofricken until after oned breath, and refundant even then ed to dide yet estrage in dividite as nearly at the stands on Aces time had not respired, and during wish Luca it was napotisting ingle and the the property of the contract of the property of the contract of in a galling to selfer out for each two over turbuston of . . favelingent The second field the transfer and the second for the fact the diligance to take the seciency steps to protect his post of gapetto, on at heithigh saw bure odd bittet ew . case and a same the preffered efficients of merito as I willed the the olements of

sincerity and good faith. We also think the affidavits in support of the defendant's motions were insufficient and that there is no abuse of discretion in denying the motions.

The judgment will be affirmed.

AFFIREED.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., concur.

sincerity and good faith. We also think the affiderite in support of the defendant's motions were insulficient and that there is no cheef of discretion in despite the contons.

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APPEAU FROM MURICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

Appellee.

JAMES COAL CO., a Corporation,

LUCY C. CATHERWOOD.

227 I.A. 6052

HR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is a suit to recover the price of coul sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant. The amount claimed is \$1900.94. In defense defendant claimed a shortage in the delivery and a failure to deliver the kind of coal plaintiff agreed and warranted to deliver, and that, therefore, defendant was entitled to recoup \$1527 demages for breach of warranty. Judgment was thereupon rendered for the difference of \$373, and as to the amount in dispute—the case went to the jury, which rendered a verdict for \$1527.94 in plaintiff's favor. From the judgment thereon this appeal was taken.

The contract was an oral one entered into between the president of the plaintiff and the husband of the defendant as her agent. The contract was for the delivery of Pocahontas Mine Run Coal to be delivered in certain quantities at certain apartment buildings owned by defendant. There was no material dispute as to what the contract was except as to the terms of payment and the time it was entered into.

The first point for reversal argued is that the court erred in withdrawing from consideration of the jury the issue as to whether the coal was of the kind or quality sold, and the issue as to the time of payment. Appellant's counsel meets

Jists COAL CO., a Comporation,

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LUCEFC. CATHARDOOR, ACROSLAND,

Appaul The Militar Court of Chicago.

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The contract was now in the anterest potential the process of the securious the president of the plant of the plant of the contract was for the tellinery of socuronity named for the contract was for the contract of the securious to be delivered to over the contract to be defined by defendance. These is an excepted dimente of the the contract was easient to the time if the contract was easient to the time if the action of the time is the obstract was easient.

The first point for several argued in the case and service of the case source error in the first considerables of the last source as to assist the volume as to assist the volume of the line that are the line view of the last of the line view of the line view of the line view of the line view of the view of the line view of the view of the line view of the view of

ject. Of course, it is fundamental that if there is any evidence tending to establish the issue of the case it should be submitted to the jury regardless of its weight, which is for the jury and not for the court to determine. As there was evidence by one of defendant's witnesses to the effect that the coal delivered at defendant's buildings was not Pocahontas Mine Run Goal the court errod in withdrawing the issue from the jury as to the quality of the coal by instructing them that they were not concerned with it, and that it was insufficient to warrant submitting it to them.

Appelles contends that defendant accepted the coal and that as her jamiters receiving the same had the opportunity to inspect it she waived the right to object to payment. But where the centract is executory, like this, the claim for damages on account of the breach of warranty will survive the acceptance of the property. (See <u>Underwood</u> v. <u>Wolf</u>, 131 Ill. 425, and cases there reviewed.)

tickets for deliveries of coal to defendant, some of which were receipted for by her janitors. Each of these tickets had written on it: "P. M. R.," meaning Pocahontas Mine Run Coal. They were received in evidence to show that the coal delivered was coal of that kind or quality. We think their competency for such purpose would depend on whether defendant's janiters had authority to reject the coal. If hot, and defendant's attention was not called to them, we think they were incompetent evidence as to the kind or quality of coal and amounted to a mere declaration by the plaintiff in its own behalf.

Appellant also urges that it was error for the court to refuse certain so-called "acceptances." which were mailed by

these points by it over an the religion of the evilonce on the whelest, of course, it is funds is although it the factor of the result that is all evilone tending to establish the factor of the result whould be religiously for the shart to be return. As every example, at the first pose of defendant's military as the religious of the religious of defendant's military was not be returned to defendant's military was not because the first of the court of the religious the less of the first they are not count the religious of the theorem in the count of the first they are not collapsed with the could be instructed in the count of the first them there are not collapsed to the first that they are not collapsed with the

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plaintiff to defendant, purporting to acknowledge the receipt of a verbal order for a certain amount of "Poca. N. R. Coal."

These written acceptances contained conditions that do not appear to have been discussed at the time of entering into the oral contract, which, according to the testimony of defendant's president, was entered into five days before the mailing of such acceptances. There is nothing in plaintiff's evidence to indicate that the contract was not complete at that time or that there was an arrangement for a written confirmation of the same. While defendant contended, and plaintiff denied, that defendant's husband, who entered into the contract for her, informed plaintiff that such acceptances were not in accordance with the contract already entered into, yet without other evidence on the subject we think these acceptances were not properly admissible in evidence.

In view of these conclusions it is unnecessary to discuss other points raised on this appeal. Accordingly the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMARDED.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., concur.

picintiff to defendant, perpenting to meknowlooks the receipt of a vertal erder for a certain amount of "Peca. R. R. Coal." Inese written acceptances convelued conditions that do not appear to have been discussed at the time of entering into the oral contract, which, according to the tentianry of defendant's president, was outered into live days before the weightene to authorate the contract was nothing in plaintiff's avidence to indicate that the contract was not complete at that the extence to that there was an arrangement for a written confirmation of that defendant's husband, who entered and picintiff denied, that defended, and picintiff denied, her, informed plaintiff that such accordinger were not in according with the contract clarater with the contract clarater according with the subject alternate and properly admissible to evidence.

In view of these conclusions it is unnecessary
to discuss other points rated un this enough. Accordingly
the judgment will be reversed and the cause rescuised for a
new trial.

REVENIEND AND HISMANDER.

Merrill and Gridley, JJ., concer.

HILDA PAIMER.

Plaintiff in Egror.

WO.

JAMES PERCY STRICKLAND, Administrator of estate of RUFUS K. TABOR, deceased, and MULLEN BREWING COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendants in Error.

ERROR TO
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

2 7 T.A. EUL

MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

On Karch 25, 1909, plaintiff commenced a fourth class tort action in the Municipal Court of Chicago against the City of Chicago, R. K. Tabor and the Eullen Brewing Company, a corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her on the evening of September 21, 1907, by falling into a hole in the sidewalk on the north side of 63rd street, just west of Sangamon street, in the City of Chicago. Plaintiff further alleged that at the time of the accident R. K. Tabor was the owner of the property, in front of which was the sidewalk in question, and that the Mullen Brewing Company was in possession of said property as lessee of Tabor. On May 17, 1916, the death of Tabor was suggested, and James Percy Strickland, administrator of Tabor's estate, was substituted as one of the defendants. On April 3, 1918, on plaintiff's motion, the case was dismissed as to the defendant, City of Chicago. On June 8, 1918, the court entered judgment "on the verdict herein" against the plaintiff for costs, and she was allowed 60 days within which to file a bill of exceptions. On September 23, 1918, more than 60 days after the entry of said judgment, the judge who had tried the case signed the bill of exceptions or stenographic report and ordered that it be filed as a part of the record, and it was so

RILLDA PAINLA.

Plaintiff in Error,

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James Pieter Strickland, Administrator of ostate of RUFUS K. TABOR, decembed, and BUILDE BREEING CUMPARY, a corporation.

Defendants in Spror.

BURICIPAL CUBT
OF CHICAGO.

AR. JUNTICE ORINLEY DELLYSTRED THE DELEION OF THE COURT.

de Esrob 25, 1800, plaintiff con enged a fourth class tort action in the Municipal Court of Whicago sealand the City of Chicago, R. R. Tabor and the Mulling Arenday yougeny, a corporation, to recover duringes for personal injuries alleged to have been susteined by her an the eventes of haptester 21. 1907. by falling late a hele in the videwelk on the north side of dord street, just west of hangamen street, in the lity of out to emit sat to faut homelia tadrot Thistiga . on wold southent R. E. Tabor was the commer of the susperty, in front of which was the sidewalk in question, and that the Mullen Frewing Company was is possession of eath property as lesson of Tabor. On May 17, 1916, the death of Tebor was supposted. and Jenes Percy Strickland, udministrator of Tebor's estate. was substituted . . one of the defendence. On suril 2, 1816, on plaintiff's motion, the case was dismined as to the defendant, City of Chicago. On June 8, 1918, the court entered judgment "on the vortion harein" against the plaintiff for fird a sit of dolde nittle age to bestin and who has afect of exceptions. On neptember 24, 1818, nore then 80 days efter the entry of ania judgment, the judge who had tried the case signed the bilk of exceptions or stenographic report and ordered on now at how became not to twee a new toolst and at south

filed.

On June 3, 1921, the present writ of error was sued out from this appellate court, returnable to the October, 1921, term. On December 6, 1921, the cause was continued for service to the March, 1922, term. On April 28, 1922, the motion of the defendant in error, Mullen Brewing Company, to strike said stenegraphic report from the transcript was allowed, and its further motion to affirm the judgment was recerved to the hearing. On June 6, 1922, the motion of plaintiff in error to vacate and set said order of April 28, 1922, was denied.

It appears from the stemographic report that on August 7, 1918, the 60th day after the entry of the judgment, plaintiff's attorney presented said report to the Honorable Harry Olson. Chief Justice of said Municipal Court, and he wrote thereon above his signature the following:

"In the absence of Judge Harry P. Dolan, who tried the within entitled cause, from the City of Chicago, this stenographic report was presented to me this 7th day of August, 1918, the attorneys for Strickland, adm'r., and Mullen Brew. Co. being present."

It further appears that under date of September 23.

1918, (47 days after the time for filing said report had expired)
the said judge who had tried the cause, Harry P. Dolan, certified
ever his signature that the foregoing was a full, true and correct
stenographic report of all proceedings had before him on the
trial, that final judgment was rendered on June 8, 1918, and
that "this report was presented to me for signing upon my return
to judicial duties after my vacation period, during which I was
absent from the City of Chicago, and held by me for examination
until September 21, 1918, on which day, after notice to the
parties, it was signed and directed to be filed as a part of the
record of said cause."

filed.

On June 3, 1921, the present writ of error was engagent from this appellate court, returnable to the October, 1921, term. On December 5, 1921, the cause was continued for aeryice to the Merch, 1923, term. On April 23, 1922, the motion of the defendant in error, bullen Brewing Company, to excite said stemagraphic report from the transcript was allowed, and its further motion to affirm the judgment was reserved to the hear-ing. On June 5, 1922, the motion of plaintiff is error to vacate and set weids made ariser of April 28, 1922, and denied.

It appears from the essungraphic report that on August 7. 1913, the 60th day ofter the entry of the judgment, plaintiff's attorney presented build report to the fountable Harry Olson, Chief Juntice of ould Bushelpel Court, and he wrote thereon above his signature the rollowing:

"In the absence of Judge Herry F. Folus, who tried the within emittied comes, from the City of Chicago, this stenegraphic report was presented to me this 7th dry of August, 1916, the atterpays for Strickland, sawir., and Stillem Brew. Co. Deing present.

It further appears the under date of consenser 23.

1913. (47 days after the time for filling asid report had aspired)
the said judge she had irise the cause. Herry R. colen, certified
ever his signature that the foregoing sas a full, true and correct
stenographic report of all proceedings and before the on the
trial, that final judgment was rendered on June 3. 1910, and
that "this report was presented to see for electing upon y return
to judicial dusted effer my vacation period, during which I see
to judicial dusted effer my vacation period, during which I see
chasant from the with of Chisago, and held by see for exemination
that I deptember 21, 1918, or which day, after notice to the
pertical, it was signed and derested to be filed as next of the
record of said oscase."

It does not appear why Judge Dolan, who tried the case, was absent from Chicago, and none of the reasons mentioned in the Statute (Sec. 81 Practice Act) excusing the presentation of the stenographic report to such trial judge are shown. Such stenographic report, not being signed by the trial judge within the time required, is not properly in the record, (People v. Resenweld, 266 Ill. 548; Thomkinson Riley Company v. Peinberg & Kahn, 220 Ill. App. 442), and we find nothing that can be construed as a waiver or as estopping defendant in error from moving in this court that said stenographic report be stricken.

We have examined the common law record, and find no error therein. Furthermore, no ground for a reversal of the judgment, based upon that record, is here urged.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

It does not appear why Judge Dolon, who tried the case, was absent from Chioago, and mens of the reasons mentioned in the statute (Sec. Sl. Fraction Act) excusing the presentation of the statute (Sec. Sl. Fraction Act) excusing the presentation of the state graphic report, not being signed by the trial judge within the time required, is not properly in the record, (Secolar v. She incompald, 266 Ill. 548; Thomlinean Miley Cospany v. Peinberg & Kahn, 280 Ill. App. 442), and we find nothing that can be construed as a waiver or as estopping defendant in error from moving in this court that anid stenographic report be etricked.

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The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

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114 - 27588

CHARLES HAGEMAN,

Appellee,

YS.

HARRY H. CAVIN.

AVIN.

AFPEAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is sought by this appeal to reverse a judgment for \$305.20 rendered after verdict against defendant by the Municipal Court of Chicago on October 15, 1921, in a fourth class tort action for property demage to plaintiff's automobile, alleged to have been occasioned by defendant's negligence.

The accident happened on August 24, 1919. On that day plaintiff was driving his five-passenger Podge car in a southerly direction on the west side of Western avenue, a north and south street, near 110th street, in the City of Chicago. About 25 feet in front of plaintiff's car there was a Ford truck, also moving in a southerly direction. On the east side of Western avenue defendant was driving his Apperson car in a northerly direction, and moving at a moderate rate of speed. Suddenly, and apparently without any warning, the driver of the Ford truck, to avoid hitting a motorcycle then on the west side of the street, turned the truck to the east and collided with defendant's Apperson car with such force that its steering gear was broken. Plaintiff, observing this collision, stopped his Dodge car. Almost instantly thereafter defendant's Apperson car, its steering gear being broken, crossed, or was thrown across, the street in a northwesterly direction and collided with plaintiff's Dodge car, causing

CHAILES HAGERAM,

Appelles

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HARRY H. CAVIN.

APPRAL PACK RUBICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

HA. JUCTICE CHIDLEY DELIVERED THE OFICIEN OF THE COURT.

It is sought by this appeal to reverse a judgment for \$205.20 rendered after verdict eguinet defendant by the Municipal Court of Chicago on Cateber 15, 1921, in a feurth class tort cotion for property denset to plaintiff's oute-mebile, alleged to have been accessioned by defendant's negligence.

The socident happened on August 24, 1919. On that day plaintiff was driving his five-passenger Jodge car in a southerly direction on the west side of lastern avenue, a north and south street, nour 120th street, in the City of Chicago. About 25 feet in front of plaintiff's car there was a ford truck, also moving in a southerly direction. On the enst side of western avenue defendant was driving his Aprovaca our in a northerky direction, and moving at a moderate rete of apeed. Suddenly, and apparently without any warming, the driver of the Ford stuck, to avoid hitting a motorogole then on the west side of the street, turned the truck to the const and collided with defendant's appearen cer with mich force that its steering gear was broken. Finintiff, observing this collision, stopped his bedge car. Almost instantly thereafter defendant's Apperson our, fte steering gear being broken, erossed, or was thrown across, the atmost in a northresterly direction and collided with plaintiff's Dodge our, couring the damage thereto for which plaintiff sued. Western avenue at the place of the accident was "a kind of a country road," approximately about 15 feet wide.

The principal ground urged by counsel for defendant for a reversal of the judgment is that there is no evidence showing that defendant was guilty of any negligence preximately causing the damage to plaintiff's automobile. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict in his favor. but the motions were denied. After examining / testimony in the present record, we are of the opinion that there is no evidence showing that defendant was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused the damage complained of. "There there is any evidence fairly tending to show the negligence charged was the proximate cause of the injury that question is one of fact for the jury, but whether there is any such evidence is a question of law, which is raised by motion for a directed verdict." (Jenkins v. Laballe County Coal Co., 264 Ill. 238, 240.) The judgment must be reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH A FINDING OF FACT.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., cencur.

the damage thereto for which plaintiff and. "estern arenne at the place of the souldest was "a kind of a country road." approximately about 15 feet wide.

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REVERDAD WITH A FINEIRO OF TACT.

Burnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

FINDING OF FACT.

We find as an ultimate fact that at and before the time of the accident in question the defendant, Harry H. Cavin, was not guilty of any negligence proximately causing the damage to plaintiff's automobile.

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FINDING OF FACE.

We find as an ultimate fact that it and before the time of the socident in queution the defendant, Marry H. Cavin, was not quilty of any negligence proximately smaller the damage to plaintiff's automobile.

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HARRY M. ENGLESTEIN and LOUIS ENGLESTEIN, copartners doing business in HARRY M. and LOUIS ENGLESTEIN,

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

YS.

JAMES P. MONAHAN,

Appellant

7 I.A. 6055

MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

By this appeal defendant seeks to reverse a judgment for \$769, rendered against him by the Municipal Court of Chicago on September 26, 1921, in a fourth class action tried before the court without a jury, in which plaintiffs sought to recover certain commissions as real estate brokers.

It is alleged in plaintiff's statement of claim, in substance, that prior to July 31, 1918, the parties entered into a verbal agreement by which defendant listed with plaintiffs certain premises in the City of Chicago for leasing, and agreed to pay to plaintiffs the "usual and customary commissions charged by real estate brokers for consummating leases;" that on July 31, 1918, through the instrumentality of plaintiffs, a lease was negotiated and consummated between defendant and Frank Shepera and Christopher Buckles upon the premises for ten years at the aggregate rental of \$48,300 for the term; and that plaintiffs thereby earned as commissions the sum of \$819, which are the usual and customary charges made by real estate brokers for the services rendered.

The defendant in his affidavit of merits denied that he had agreed to pay to plaintiffs the usual and customary commissions charged by brokers for consummating leases, and set up as defenses, in substance, (1) that Shepera, prior to

HARRY M. INCLASTRIN and LOUIS ANGLESTRIN, CORRIGORS doing business in HARRY M. and LOUIS MEGLESTEE.

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JAMES P. HOHAMAN.

Appollant.

ER. JUNYICE CRICIES DELIVERED THE OPERIOR OF THE COURT.

Sy this appeal defendant seeks to reverse a judgment for \$769, rendered against him by the Eunicipal Court of Inioage on September 26, 1921, in a Saurth class socion tried before the court without a jury, is which plaintiffs eought to recover cortain seemissions as real exusts brokers.

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The defendant in his affidavit of merits denied that he had agreed to pay to plaintiffs the neural and contoursy commissions charged by brokers for consumenting leases, and set up as defenses, in substance. (1) that Shapers, justor to

worthless, of which fact plaintiffs had knowledge yet failed to so advise defendant, and that defendant, had he so been advised, would not have executed the lease; and (2) that, had plaintiffs not been guilty of "fraudulent suppression of the fact of Shepera's irresponsibility," and had Shepera and Buckles taken possession of the premises and paid rent under the lease, plaintiff would have been entitled to a commission of not exceeding 2-1/2 per cent of the rent collected, by virtue of a verbal agreement made by plaintiffs and defendant about June 1, 1918, to the effect that plaintiffs would endeavor to obtain tenants for the premises and collect the rents thereof for a commission of 2-1/2 per cent of the rents collected.

On the trial, the employment of plaintiffs by defendant to negotiate a lease of the premises, and defendant's signing of a ten year lease to Shepera and Buckles, was admitted. The dispute concerned the terms of the verbal contract of employment as to commissions. Plaintiffe, who were licensed real estate brokers, tried their case on the theory that defendant made an express verbal contract with them whereby he agreed, in case they negotiated a lease of the premises to parties acceptable to him, to pay them the "usual and customary commissions" charged by real estate brokers for consummating leases; that they presented Shepera and Buckles as prespective tenants and that after full investigation defendant accepted them as tenants and executed the ten year lease to them; and that thereby they had carned as commissions the sum of \$819, less a credit of \$50 to which defendant was entitled. Harry M. Englestein, a member of the plaintiff firm, testified on direct exemination, in substance, that he told defendant that in case plaintiffs succeeded in securing a tenant for the premises they

end at the time the lease was negotiated, was financially porthions, of which fact plaintiffs had knowledge yet fulled to so advice defendant, and he so been advised, would not have executed the losses; and (2) that, had plaintiffs not been guilty of "freudulent suppression of the fact of Shepers's irresponsibility," and had thepers and machies taken possession of the premises and put a rest under the lease, plaintiff would have been smittled to a commirsion of not exceeding 2-1/2 per cent of the rest collected, by ifring of a verbal agreement made by plaintiffs and defendant about June 1, 1218, the offset that plaintiffs and defendant about June 1, 1218, the offset that plaintiffs and defendant about June 1, 1218, the offset that plaintiffs and defendant there is obtain tenents.

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would expect defendents to pay them the usual "board rate commission;" that the "board" rates for the renting of preperty such as defendant's in the year 1918 was 5% of the rental for the first two years of the loane and 1% of the rental for every year thereafter, which under the lease in question amounted to \$819; and that the "Sook County Real Estate Board" rates were "the usual and customary rates" during said year. On crossexemination the witness testified that during said year there were two real estate beards in the city of Chicago - the "Cook County Real Estate Board" and the "Chicago Real Estate Board;" that when a person speaks of the "Board" it is understood in common parlance to mean the "Chicago Real Estate Board;" that he is a member of the "Cook County Real Estate Board;" that during the year 1918 he received a printed notification from the last mentioned Board giving rates of commission, purporting to be its authorized rates; and that his testimony, as to what were the rates of the last mentioned Board during said year. was based entirely upon said printed notification. Plaintiffs did not show what were the rates of the "Chicago Real Estate Board" during said year, and introduced no further testimony as to what were the usual and customary commissions charged by real estate brokers for consummating leases. The defendant testified that Englestein never said that plaintiffs would charge him the usual "board rate commission:" that he (defendant) never told Englestein that he would pay such commission; and that he did not know what was meant by the term "board commission."

Upon a review of the evidence, we fail to find sufficient proof that any express verbal contract was made whereby defendant agreed, in case plaintiffs negotiated a lease to parties acceptable to him, to pay them the usual

would expect defendants to pay them the usual "board rate commission: " that the "board" rates for the renting of property anch as defundant's in the year 1918 was 5% of the rental for the first two years of the long and la of the renant for every year thereafter, which under the laune in quartion onequated to 2019; and that the "Cook hounty Real Entete Board" rates were *the usual and ourtomary rates" during seld year. On groupexemination the witness testified that during said year there were two real satate beards in the city of Unicego - the "Cook County Merl Botate Beerd" and the "Chicage Heal Betate Beard;" that when a person spenis of the "Board" it is understood in common parlance to moun the "Chicogo Heal Retate Board;" that he is member of the "Gook county Seal Tetate Board; " that during the year 1915 no re-raived a printed actification from the last mentioned Board giving rates of cammistion, purporting to be its authorized rates; and that his testimony, as to what were the reten of the last mentioned heard during unid year, was besed entirely upon said printed notification. Plaintiffs esasta Last ogaplan. cuis to cesar eds erem sade wade sen bid Board during unid year, and introduced no further tantisony as to shut wors the venel und curtom ry essenterions charged by real estate brokers for cosaurmating lease. The defendant tontified that inglubenin never and that ; inintiffs would charge bis the usual "board rate comission;" that he (defendant) never told neglected that he would pay such considerion; and that he did not know wind was meant by the " notes toman brands mans

Upon a review of the evidence, we fail to find outficient proof that any express verbal contract ver made entereby defendant agreed, in onso planntiffs negotiated a lease to parties acceptable to aim, to pay them the usual

and customary commissions charged by brokers for consummating leases. We are satisfied, however, that defendant impliedly agreed, in case a lease acceptable to him was negotiated, to pay to plaintiffs the usual and customary commissions. But, for the reason that plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish by competent evidence what those usual and customary commissions were, we are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. We think that defendant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, his two special defenses contained in his affidevit of merits above referred to.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

end contemary consistence charged by brakers for consumrating leases. We are satisfied, however, that defendant implicity agreed, is case a long satephable to him was negotiated, to pay to plaintiffs the usual and customary consistence. But, for the reason that plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish by occapitant evidence what those usual and customary cosmissions were, we are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed end the cause remanded for a new trial. We think that defendent failed to establish, by a preparternant of the evidence, his two special defenses contained in his affidavit of merits above referred to.

The judgment of the Manietyal Court is reverend and the cause remanded.

. CHURANEN CEA CHURSIVER

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., cancer.



MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action in forcible detainer commenced in the Municipal Court of Chicago on October 13, 1921. There was a jury trial and at the conclusion of all the evidence the court instructed the jury to return a verdiet finding the defendant, Resenthal, guilty of unlawfully withelding from the plaintiff the possession of the premises described in the complaint, viz, the third apartment at No. 3130 Palmer Square in the City of Chicago, and that the right to the possession thereof is in the plaintiff. The jury returned such a verdict and on November 7, 1921, judgment was entered on the verdict and it was ordered that a writ of restitution issue. The defendant appareled.

The undisputed facts are in substance as follows: On August 3, 1920, a written lease of the premises was executed by the then owner. Leo Greenburg, to the defendant, commencing October 1, 1920; and expiring September 30, 1921, at a monthly rental of \$80 payable in advance at the office of the lessor's agents, F. E. Lackowski & Co., Chicago. On July 30, 1921, said Lackowski & Co. wrote defendant to the effect that, if he desired to renew the lease for another year, his rent for the premises, on and after October 1, 1921, would be \$90 per month. On August

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APPOLITOR,

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AN THE PACK MUSICIPEL COURTS.

13. JUNEOU BALLO GENERAL IN CHARLE OF THE COURSE

This is an action in foreign devotes: seeminged in the neutropeal in the neutropeal court of the neutropeal of the neutropeal of the court of the section of the court is the particle of the court is the particle of the court is the particle of the section of of the section

30. 1921. Greenburg sold the premises, and assigned the lease and the rent secured thereby, to plaintiff. On September 3, 1921, before the expiration of the term of the lease, one Benjamin Harris, agent of the new owner (plaintiff), called on defendant and collected from him 280 as rent for the last month of the lease. At this interview Harris called attention to the Lackowski letter to defendant of July 20th, and again notified defendant that if he desired to remain as a tenant in the premises for another year the rent would be \$90 per month, instead of \$80. Defendant them voiced his objections to Harris as to paying the increased rental and said that he would move out. He did not however move, but remained in possession after September 30th. On October 3rd. Harris, acting for plaintiff, again called on defendent and demanded \$90 for rent for the month of October, but defendent refused to pay that sum and tendered \$80 to Harris. which the latter refused. On October 6th plaintiff caused the usual landlord's five day notice to be served on defendant, in which it was stated that \$90 was due her as rent for the premises and that, unless payment theref was made on or before October lith. defendant's lease of the premises would be terminated. Defendant did not pay the \$90, and on October 13th the present action was commenced, at which time defendant was still in possession.

We are of the opinion that the trial court was right in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff and in entering the judgment appealed from. We think that under the facts disclosed plaintiff had the right to elect to hold defendant as a tenant for another year at the new rental of \$90. In <u>Missins</u> v. <u>Balligan</u>, 46 Ill. 173, 180, it is decided in substance that.

20. 1921. Grounders and one pres and, and analyzed the land and the rest seemed thereog, to plaintiel. On Replanter 2, 1921, before the excitation of the torm of the inner, one heafmin Exric. energ of the new sener (plaintiff, onlied on telement end oblicated from him \$80 as yent for the leat month of the legge. At this interview Regris colled attention to the Laskowski letter to defendent of July 20th, and again notified defendant Tel tesimone saf mi Jamist e am misser of beriess ed hi fait. sauther your the rens would be 800 per march, instead of 800. Perfendant than volume all objection to hearts as to paying has ses 61% oh . Our own, bloom so Ind of so bus infact becoveri .dfC non of a next to the good of heatgran the good norseed On Coupler Sad, Rannie, satiry for plat tite, earls allied on ind and demonstrate out tot the for the description of welcome, and defendant of the dereshed and said they of leaviet teaminet els no rec fils. Iniq die mesto ni ... assibur Tessel eds duide manel lendlord's five day mutice to be served on Sefent ot. in medicut, and tel inter on test sub and test franci defente our fi delige end time, unless paysone tweetal are ands on as have a bate or lith, dufondert's lease of the graning well by tarellerel. Server to the server of the following the contract of the fire the server of the serve eation was commissed, at which the neterance were notice . acheses

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where a landlord duly notifies a tenant, who is holding by the year, and before the year is out, that if he occupies the premises another year he must pay a certain increased rent, and the tenant does not surrender the possession of the premises but continues to occupy them, such act of the tenant will be construed as an implied agreement that he holds the premises on the new terms. (See also, Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411, 417). And we think that, defendant having failed to pay the October rent at the new rate, plaintiff was warranted, after giving defendant due notice, in seeking to obtain the judgment for possession.

The judgment of the Municipal court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED .

Barnes P. J., and Morrill J., concur.

where a landlere duly motifies a terema, who is bolding by the year, and before the year is out, that if he escupies the president much year is and the pertula inspected rent, and the tennal dead not wereaster the necessary than acreaty the possession of the remain to comply than, and her of the remain will be constructed as in-piled agreement that he helds the presides on the new terms. (Not also, drifting that he helds the presides on the new that the defendent having failed to per the foreber race at the new rate, plaintiff are warranted, after fiving defendent due the new rate, plaintiff are warranted, after fiving defendent due notion, in

The judgment of the bungetpel court is attirued.

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Bernes 2. J., end strill 1., occurs.

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C. M. EILLIDS.

LOUIS SCHNEIDERMAN.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

On October 10, 1921, a complaint in fercible detainer, in the name of Louis Schneiderman as plaintiff, was filed in the Municipal Court of Chicago, in which it was alleged that Schneiderman was entitled to the possession of "the store known as No. 1421-1/2 East 67th Street" in the City of Chicago, and that C. M. Billids unlawfully withheld possession of the same from him. There was a trial without a jury resulting in the court finding defendant guilty and that the right to the possession of the premises was in plaintiff. Judgment on the finding was entered on October 25, 1921, and defendant appealed. No printed brief and argument on behalf of plaintiff has here been filed.

The bill of exceptions discloses that the plaintiff did not appear on the trial, that the sole witness for him was one Alvin L. Wagner, and that defendant testified in his own behalf. It appears that Wagner, as owner of the premises, leased them by written lease dated September 18, 1919, to defendant for a term of two years, ending September 30, 1921, at a rental of \$32.50 per month for the first year, and \$35 per month for the second year. This lease was introduced in evidence. Wagner testified that he leased the premises by another written lease to plaintiff for a term of two years commencing October 1, 1921, at a rental of \$65 per month,

. BOILLIDE . M . D

Appellant.

APPRAL PROM MUBICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

HR. JUSTICE CRIPLAY DELIVERED THE CRIPTON OF THE COURT.

On October 10, 1921, a complaint in fercible detainer, in the name of Louis Schneideman as plaintiff, was filed in the Municipal Court of Chicago, in which it was alleged that Schneidermen was entitled to the personation of "the store known as No. 1421-1/2 Mest 67th Street" in the City of Chicago, and that C. M. Millias unlawfully withheld possession of the mune from him. There was a trial without e jury resulting in the court finding defendant guilty and that the right to the possession of the premines was in plaintiff. Judgment on the finding was entered on October 25, 1921, and defendant appealed. We printed brief and ergument on behalf of plaintiff has here been filed.

The bill of exceptions discloses that the plaintiff did not appear on the trial, that the sole witness for him was one Alvin L. Magner, and that defendant testified in his own behalf. It appears that Magner, as evace of the premises, leased them by written leans dated September 18, 1919, to defendent for a term of two years, ending Suptember 50, 1021, at a rental of \$32.50 per month for the first year, and \$35 per month for the eccond year. This leads was introduced in oridence. Wagner testified that he leased the premises by another written lease to plaintiff for a term of two years consending October 1, 1921, at a rental of \$66 per month.

but this lease was not produced. He further testified that plaintiff was a tailor, but that he did not remember his address or place of business; that, as regards negotiations with defendant for a continuation of defendant's tenancy, he did not see defendant "until just before the lease was up." when he told him that he (defendant) "could take a new lease at the new rental (\$65 per month) or leave it alone, just as he pleased. Befendant testified in substance that he was in the business of rug and carpet cleaning; that he first moved into the premises in question in 1917 and was occupying them. under the lease introduced in evidence, in September, 1921; that during that month he received a letter from Wagner notifying him that said lease would expire on September 30th. but that no mention was made in the letter of any increase in the rent; that about September 25th he called on Wagner and told him that he was "going to take the store," and that Wagner said nothing about any raise in the rent; that between September 25th and 30th he several times called at Wagner's office but was unable to see him; that on October 3rd he saw Wagner, who then for the first time said that the rent would be "\$60 per month for the first year and \$75 for the next year, and that if I didn't like it I could get out; " and on that day, October 3rd, Wagner "put a 'For Rent' sign in the store window; and that he (defendant) "does not know any Schneiderman."

We have reached the conclusion that the finding is not supported by the evidence and that the judgment must be reversed. It is well settled that "one suing under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act must show a right to possession in himself, and he cannot rely upon the lack of right in those whom he seeks to dispossess." (Fitzgerald v. Quinn, 165 Ill.

but this lease was not produced. He further testified that pinintiff was a tailor, but that he did not remember his address or place of business; that, as reache mendeletations with defendant for a continuation of defendant's tenancy, be did not see defendant "until just before the lease was up." when he told him that ha, (defoudant) "could take a new lease at the new rental (\$65 per month) or leave it alone, just as he pleased." Defendant testified in substance that he was in the business of rug and corpet cleaning; that he first moved into the premises in question in 1817 and was occupying them. under the lease introduced in evidence, in September, 1981; that during that mouth he goested a better from somer notifying him that eatd lesse would expire on reptember 30th. but that no mention was said in the letter of any increase in the rest; that about september 28th he called on segmen and told him that he was "going to take the cture." and that Vaguer seld nothing about any raise in the rent; that bothern September 25th and 20th he several times called at tanner's office but was unable to see him; that on belover and he saw Wagner, who then for the first time said that his rest would be "\$60 per month for the first year and 872 for the next year, and that if I didn't like it I nowld get out; a and on that day, Cotober 3rd, Anguer 'jast a 'For Kent' aign in the store window;" and that he (defendant) "does not know any Schnotdurmen."

We have reached the conclusion that the finding is not supported by the evidence and that the judgment must be reversed. It is well wettled that "one using under the Forcible antry and Detainer Act must show a right to possession in himself, and he cannot rely upon the lack of right in these whom he seeks to dispensest." (Fitzgoruld v. suine, 165 lil.

354, 366.) The plaintiff did not show that he was entitled to the possession of the premises. Assuming that Wagner signed a written lease to plaintiff for a term commencing October 1, 1921, it does not appear that the latter accepted the lease or made any attempt to gain possession of the premises, or, indeed, that he in his own person claimed the right of possession. The uncontradicted testimony that on October 3, 1921, Wagner placed a "For Rent" sign in the store window at least suggests that at that time he had not leased the premises to plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to make the necessary proof that at the time of the commencement of the action defendant was in possession of the premises and withholding the same. (McClusky v. Melson, 179 Ill. App. 182, 185.)

The judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACTS.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

184, 366.) The plaintiff did not show that he was entitled to the possession of the premises. Assuming that Arguer signed a smitten lance to plaintiff for a term demonsing October 1, 1921, it does not uppear that the latter accepted the lease or made any attempt to gain possession of the premises, or, indeed, that he in his own person elaimed the right of pessession. The uncentradicted testimony that on Cotober 5, 1921, Wagner placed a "For Hent" sign in the store window at least suggests that at that it the premises to placed a "For Hent" sign in the leased the premises to placed a "For hent time he had not fessed the premises to placets that fire he plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff commencement of the nacessary proof that at the time of the occasion of the premises and withholding the same. (Modlusky v. Melsen. The 111. App. 183, 183.)

The judgment of the Sunisipal Court is reversed.

HAVERED WITH FINDING OF PARTS.

Burner, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

FINDING OF FACTS.

We find as ultimate facts that at the time of the commencement of the present action the defendant. Rillids, was not unlawfully withholding possession of the premises in question from plaintiff, and that at said time plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of said premises.


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FINDING OF PACTS.

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We find as ultimate facts that at the time of the commendament of the present action the defendant, fillide, was not unlawfully withholding possession of the premises in question from plaintiff, and that at said time plaintiff was not estitled to the possession of seld premises.



MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Appellants.

HENRY SCHRIK & CO.

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$494.65, rendered against defendants by the Municipal Court of Chicago on January 28, 1922, in a fourth class tort action tried before the court without a jury.

In their statement of claim, filed June 21, 1920, plaintiffs claimed damages as the result of defendants' act of filing for record on April 10, 1919, in the recorder's office of Cook County, a purported contract of sale by plaintiffs to one Tony Biondo of certain premises owned by plaintiffs in Cook County, Illinois, which said purported contract was afterwards removed as a cloud upon their title to said premises by decree of the Circuit Court of Cook County. entered March 5, 1920, in Chancery cause No. B-52247, instituted by them as complainants and in which the present defendants and said Binndo were defendants. Plaintiffs alleged in substance that shortly prior to the recording of said instrument a real estate broker, whom they had employed to sell the promises, obtained a buyer for the same and had procured a contract of sale to be signed, but that on account of the recording of said instrument by defendants said sale to said buyer was not consummated, yet plaintiffs were obliged to and did pay said broker his commission of

HARRY HANDORS and CARRIE HANDORS,

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HMMRY SCHRIK and John Schrik, copertners deing busishes as HMMNY SCHRIK & OF. Appellants.

APPEAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 606

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This is an appeal from a judgment for \$494.65, rendered against defendents by the Eunisipol Court of Li Chiengo on January 25, in a fourth class tort action tried before the court without a jury.

In their statement of claim, filed June 21, 1920. plaintiff's claimed demages we the result of defendants' act of filing for record on April 10, 1919, in the recorder's office of Cook County, a purported contract of sale by plaintiffs to one Year Biondo of dertain premises award by plaintiffs is Cook County, Illinois, which sold surported contract was afterwards removed as a cloud upon their title to said premises by decree of the Circuit Court of Cook County. entered March 5, 1920, in Grancery cause No. H-BERAT. instituted by them as complainants and in which the present defendants and wald blands were defendants. Flaintiff's alleged in substance that shortly prior to the recording of said instrument a real satute breker, whom they had amployed to sell the premises, obtained a bayer for the same and had procured a contract of sale to be utgoed, but that on account of the recording of anid instrument by defendants said sale to said buyer was not consummented, yet plaintiffs were obliged to and did pay said broker his commission of

\$100, and suffered other damages, as itemized, making an aggregate of \$739.65.

Defendants, in their affidavit of merits, admitted the filing of said instrument in the Recorder's effice on April 10, 1919, stated that they caused it to be filed without malice or wrongful intention and simply to protect the interests of the purchaser therein named, and denied that plaintiffs were entitled to recover from them any sum as damages.

At the conclusion of the trial the court found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and allowed them the following items of damages, as contained among other items in plaintiffs' statement of claim;

The main contentions of counsel for defendants are

(1) that the finding and judgment are contrary to the evidence;

(2) are contrary to the law; (3) that the court admitted certain improper evidence on behalf of plaintiffs; and (4) that the damages awarded are excessive.

No useful purpose will be served in detailing the evidence introduced at the trial. Suffice it to say that after a careful review of the evidence we are of the opinion that, as to the first four items of damages above mentioned, aggregating \$394.65, the finding is amply supported by the evidence and justified in law (Philpot v. Taylor, 75 Ill. 309, 311.) We do not think that any error prejudicial to defendants

\$100, and maffered other damages, as itemized, making an aggregate of \$759.65.

Defendants, in their efficients of merits, admitted the filing of said instrument in the Precessor's effice on April 10, 1919, stated that they ensend it to be filed without malice or erongial intention and simply to protect the interests of the purchaser therein nessed, and denied that plaintiffs were entitled to recover from them any uses damages.

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was committed in the court's rulings on evidence, but we are of the opinion that the allowance of the last item of damages, vis: "Attorney's fees for prosecuting the present tert action, \$100," cannot be sustained. (Washburne v. Barke, 84 Ill. App. 867, 589; Jones v. People, 19 Ill. App. 300, 302; Bickerson v. Babceck, 29 Ill. 497, 499.) In the Washburne case it is said: "An action at law is based upon the state of facts existing when the suit is begun, and claims act then due cannot be properly included in the judgment. When this suit was begun no attorney's fees in it had been earned, and there could be no recovery for such as might be subsequently earned."

finding and judgment is one that may be remedied by a remittitur. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs within ten days will file a remittitur in the sum of \$100, the judgment will be affirmed for the sum of \$394.55; otherwise, it will be reversed and the seuse remembed.

AFFIRMED ON REMITTITUR.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.


of the opinion that the allowance of the lest team of damages, vist "Attorney's fees for presenting the present test team of damages, fire 'Attorney's fees for presenting the present test motion. 200. commot be surtained. (Spablarra v. Marke. 64 111. App. 369. 569. 569; Jeney v. Recyle. 19 111. App. 369. 569. 505; Bickuraph v. Habcock. 25 111. 467, 499.)

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The error in including said item of \$100 in the finding and judgment is one that may be remedied by a remittitur. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs within ten days will file a remittion in the case of \$100, the judgment will be affirmed for the sum of \$394.25; otherwise, it will be revered and the couse veneraed.

AUFITTIURE NO CENTERIA.

Barnes, P. J., end Worrill, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE GRIDLEY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

On August 16, 1922, the complainant, Gray Newart & Company, an Illinois corporation, filed its verified bill in the Superior Court of Cook County for an injunction against the defendant and gave notice to him of the application for a temporary injunction. On the hearing of the application on August 18, 1922, defendant was present but he merely objected to the sufficiency of the bill. After reading the bill the court entered the injunctional order appealed from, wherein defendant was enjoined

"from soliciting installment clothing business from any person or persons who are or were customers of the complainant herein at any time up to and including the first day of May, 1922, and from making use of, for his own information or benefit, or calling upon any of, the customers of the complainant in the City of Chicago, in so far as same pertains to the installment clothing business, and from soliciting the business, trade or custom of any of the customers of the complainant in the City of Chicago for a period of two (2) years from May 1, 1922; and from giving to any person, persons, firms or corporations directly or indirectly the names and addresses of any persons who were or are customers of the complainant up to and including the first day of May, 1922, for a period of two (2) years thereafter, and from doing or performing anything calculated to directly or indirectly violate the covenants and agreements of the contract dated May 1, 1922."

It appears from the allegations of the bill in substance that complainant is in the business of selling clothing on the installment plan; that in January, 1921, defendent was in the same business and acquainted with many persons

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FROM SULFRIOR UCURE
OF COUR COUNTY.

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MH. JUSTICE CRIPLAY BELLVESIGN THE OFFICE OF THE COURT.

On August 16, 1982, the sceplainant, Grey Hemrt & Cempuny, an Illinois corporation, filed its verified bill in the Superior Saurt of Gook Saunty for an injuration against the Superior Saurt of Gook Saunty for an injuration against the defendant and gave notice to him of the application for sceparary injunction. On the Desartag of the application on August 18, 1887, defendant and present but he merely objected to the sufficiency of the bill. After reading the till the court entered the injunctional order approach from who calculated defendant one enjoined

From solioiding installment olo wing business from ony perroun ar persons one are or vere customers of the complainant harein at any time up to and including the first day of sing, 1938, and from melitag now of. for his own information or benefit, or calling upon any of, the oretoners of the compliment in the City of Chicago, in so far as suce partains to the installment elething business, on from soliciting the lo greens to and to que. To messes or allow, as subset the completion of the vity of the completion of the vity of of two (2) yours from May 1, 1922; and from giring to any permon, permons, tirms or corporations directly or instructly the mames and addresses of any persona who were ar are one to me of the complained up to bold on not . "SQL , and to got sent's ads gathelpat bas of two (2) years therestiar, and iron doing or purforming anything entended to directly or indicertly violate the covenents and opposite of the contract dated May 1, 1922."

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(purchasers of clothing) over a certain so-called trade route in Chicago: that during that month he sold to complainant the "route" and the good will thereof, purchased certain shares of stock in the complainant corporation and entered into its employ as a solicitor for business and so remained until May 1. 1922; that he sold said shares of stock to complainant for \$3000, and by written agreement with it, entered into on May 1. 1922, agreed, in consideration of said sale and other valuable considerations, that he would not for a period of two (2) years from date make use of, for his own information or benefit, or call upon any of, the customers in said route in Chicago, or any other of complainant's customers in Chicago, and would not solicit their business, trade or custom during said period, and would not give to any person, firm or corporation a list of their names and addresses; and further agreed that upon any vielation of said covenants complainant might file a bill in equity to enjoin him from further violations: that since Eay 1, 1922, defendant has solicited, and taken away from complainant, the business and patronage of certain of complainant's customers on said trade route, and certain other regular customers of complainant in Chicago, and has made known to other persons, firms and corporations the names and addresses of many of complainant's customers in Chicago, and in still soliciting their trade and assisting others to do so; that the injuries which have thus been sustained and are being sustained by complainant cannot be adequately recompensed by a recovery of damages; and that said injuries and damage to complainant will be cumulative and continuous unless relieved and remedied by an injunction, etc.

(purchasers of clotiding) over a certain so-called trade route in Chicago; that during the meanth he said to complainent the "route" and the good will thereof, purch, ed certain shares of atosk in the completern: corporation and entered into its employ as a solicitor for lusiness and so remained until May 1, 1923; that he sold usid skepes of whock to complainant for \$5000, and by written agreement with it, entered into on Mur 1. 1922, agreed, in consideration of said unie and other valuable. considerations, that he would not for a partial of two (2) years from date make use of, for his own info mesting or begulit, or call upon eny of, the quatomers in eald route in Thiongo, or any sther of completence's energie of whitege, and would not and sit that business, trude or outsing tend period, and would not give to may person, firm or derpotation a list of their names and addreamen; and far that egreed that upon any ni filid s alit inigim templelemen stmameros bine to melicitin equity to exist him from further violations; that these rev 1, 1927, defendant has solisited, and taken away from cooplainant, the business and patronage of certain of compleinent's mutomore on said trade route, and curtain other romel : quatomore of complainant in Unicago, and has made known to other persons. firms and compositions the nesses and addresses of many of complete a mintenders in Color, and in a distribution of mediate trade and applications to do so; that the industrial witch have thus been casteaned and are bring matained by completacat campat be mieruetely recompensat by a recovery of if the them is not opened but seiting t bine toth his ; sequent be cumulative and continuous unlear relieved and rangeled by an injunction, otc.

After a careful reading of the verified bill we are of the opinion that the court was warranted in issuing a temporary injunction, substantially in accordance with the order above mentioned, but only "until the further order of the court." As issued the order permanently enjoins defendant from doing the things mentioned for the two year period ending May 1, 1924. On the question whether defendant should be permanently enjoined for said period, he is entitled after issues formed to a hearing upon the merits. In 22 Cyc. 740, it is said:

"Freliminary or interlocutory injunctions are those granted prior to the final hearing and determination of the trial, and continue until answer, or until the final hearing, or until the further order of the court. They do not conclude the rights of the parties. Their object is to maintain the status que, to maintain property in its existing condition, to prevent further or impending injury - not to determine the right itself. Therefore, where the issuance of a preliminary injunction would have the effect of granting all the relief that could be obtained by a final decree and would practically dispose of the whole case, it will not be granted."

The order appealed from must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded with directions that the order be so modified as to disclose on its face that the injunction is only in force until the further order of the caurt.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

After a carroful reading of the verified bill we are the opinion that the court was warranted in issuing a temporary injunction, substantially in accordance with the order above mentioned, but only "until the further order of the court." As issued the order paramanently enjoins defendant from doing the things mentioned for the two year period ending fay 1, 1924. On the question whether defendant should be permanently enjoined for each period, he is entitled after issues formed to a hearing upon the merits. In 22 Cyc. 740, it is said:

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The order appealed from mist therefore be reversed and the comes remanded with directions that the order be so medified as to disclose on its face that the injunction is only in force until the further order of the court.

REVERSED AND REMARDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Barnes, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.

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HARRY S. STEWART.

Plaintiff in Strer.

ERROR TO
MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO.

EMILY H. JUNKIN,

Detendant in Error.

227 I.A. 607

MR. JUSTICE MORALL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Court of Chicago to recover on a note for \$10,000 dated July 26, 1910, executed by defendant in error, payable on demand to Emily 5. Mutchinson, with interest at 5½ per year and bearing endorsements showing an interest payment of \$200 and a transfer of the note to plaintiff in error. There was a former trial of the case, resulting in a judgment in favor of defendant for costs, which was reviewed by this court under a writ of error. The former judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the reason that the trial court had committed reversible error in receiving evidence tending to show payment of the note in the absence of any allegations in defendant's affidavit of defense, making payment a ground of defense. Stewart v. Junkin, 209 Ill. App. 186.

Plaintiff's statement of claim alleged the execution of the note, plaintiff's ownership thereof, demand and refusal of payment and an indebtedness in favor of plaintiff for the principal amount of the note and accrued interest thereon.

After the reinstatement of the case in the Municipal Court and prior to the second trial, defendant filed an additional affidavit of merits, which in substance set up as grounds of defense that the note was executed with the express understanding between defendant and Smily S. Butchinson, who was her mether,

HARRY S. BIRWART.

Plaintiff in Error.

SHADE TO MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

EMILY H. JUHEN.

Defendant to herox.

MR. JUSTICA MORNING DELIVERED THE CRIMICS OF THE CAURT.

Flaintiff in error brought suit in the Nanispal Court of Chicago to recover on a note for \$10,000 dated July 26, 1910, excepted by defendant in error, payable on demand to Ently 2. Matchinsen, with interest at 56% per year and bearing endorsaments showing an interest payment of 1200 and a transfer of the rote to plaintiff in arror. There was a former trial of the case, resulting in a judgment in favor of defendent for costs, which was reviewed by this court tonder a writ of error. The former judgment in under a writ of error. The former judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the remean that the trial ocurt had the case remanded for the remean that the trial ocurt had committed reversible error in receiving evidence tending to show payment of the note in the absence of any uliventions in the show payment a ground of defense. Eterrity, 200 111. .pp. 186.

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that it should not be a valid obligation during defendant's lifetime, and was never delivered; that the advance of \$10,000 to defendant by her mother, was repaid by defendant to her me ther before plaintiff obtained possession of the note, and further allegations to the effect that plaintiff paid no consideration for the note; that the transfer thereof to plaintiff was without good or valuable consideration, and that plaintiff did not acquire said instrument and is not a holder thereof in good faith. It is contended by plaintiff in error that it was error to permit defendant to plead the defense of payment upon the retrial of the cause. The authorities cited by plaintiff in error in support of this contention do not sustain the proposition. No motion was made in the Eunicipal Court to strike the affidavit of defense. The trial was by the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment in favor of defendant.

The evidence shows that Emily S. Hutchinson was the mother of defendant and that plaintiff is her nephew and defendant's cousin. Defendant was formerly the wife of B. T. Crane, now deceased. At the time of the making of the note the Chicago Orchestra Association, in which defendant was interested, needed funds to reduce a mortgage and applied to defendant for a contribution for that purpose. Defendant's husband, Mr. Crane, was unwilling to wance the money but did not object to the contribution being made by his wife out of her own funds. Defendant proposed to give the Association certain bonds of the value of \$10,000, but in the course of a conversation with her mother, the latter suggested that it was unnecessary to cash the bonds, which were bearing four per cent interest, in view of the fact that she, Mrs. Hutchinson, had funds lying idle in the bank, upon which she was receiving

that it should not be a valid obligation during defundant's lifetime, and was never delivered; that the advance of \$10,000 to defendant by her mother, was repute by defendant to her me ther before plaintiff obtained postession of the notes, and further allegations to the effect that plaintif paid no consideration for the note; that the transfer thereof to plaintill was without good or valuable consideration, and that plaintiff did not acquire unid incircuent and to not a holder thereof in good faith. It is contended by plaintiff in exper To sanstab said healy of december of the said to said the december of paragratus upon the celulal of the course. The sutmorthies eited by plaintiff in orms in support of this denterline do not ewatch the proposition. In motion were under in the Manicopal Court to attails the afficavit of detense. The trial see by the court without a jury and reculted in a juigment in feror of defendens.

The evidence shows that built . Hatchinsen was the mother of defendant's consin. Islandant van formerly the with of the defendant's consin. Islandant van formerly the with of the Marine, new decensed. At the time of the making of the note the Chicego Orchestra Accounties, in which defendant was interested, needed funda to reduce a mortgage and applied to defendant for a contribution for that purpose. Assaurant's hasband, Mr. Crane, was unwilling to grunne the money but did not edget to the contribution being and by his wife out did not edget to the contribution being and by his wife out or her can hade. Defendant proposes as give the accounce of a convergation with her mether, the levier maggested that it was unmonsurary to could the bands, which here bearing terms per cent interest, in view of the test that edge had the one receiving the finds lying idle in the bank, upon shich she was receiving

only two per cent. At this time she had over \$16,006 in various bank accounts. Thereupon, on July 26, 1910, the contribution for \$10,000 was made by a cashier's check on the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, in which defendant's mother had an account. Frier to this transaction defendant had given her mother from time to time various sums aggregating about \$25,000. These donations had extended over a period of several years, so that practically all the money that Mrs. Mutchinson had in her bank accounts represented gifts made to her by her daughter. Defendant supported her mother up to the time of her death in March, 1915.

The centribution to the Orchestra Association was made in July and nothing was said at that time concerning a note, but in September, 1910, Mrs. Hutchinson asked defendant to sign a note for \$10,000, which she presented to her, stating that she wished the note to be executed and placed among defendant's papers so that in case of the daughter's death and her mother's survival there might be some record of the transaction. Defendant mildly protested against doing so. telling her mother that she was leaving her everything by her will, and that the note was unnecessary. The mother replied that wills were uncertain things and that the note was not for her to have anyway, but she merely wanted it found among defendant's papers to show the transaction. Defendant then executed the note as requested by her mother and placed it in one of the compartments of her safe which she kept in her closet. These facts are shown not only by the testimony of defendant but by that of another witness who had knowledge of the transaction through statements made by Mrs. Hutchinson.

Defendant testified that the next time she saw the note was at the first trial of the case and that she never delivered the mote to her mother or anyone else. She further

only two per cent. At this time the had over \$16,000 in various bank accounts. Thereupon, on July 26, 1911, the contribution for \$10,000 was made by a cashier's check on the illinois Trust and Savings Bank, in which defendant's mother had as account. Frier to this transaction defendant had given her mother from time to time various sums aggragating about \$35,000. These donations had extended over a period of several years, so that practically all the money that hrs. Suttohinsen had in her bank seconds represented gifts sade to her daughter. Defendant supported her mother up to the her daughter. Defendant supported her mother up to the her death in March, 1915.

The contribution to the Orchestra reconstitution was meds in July and nething was said at that time concerning a note, but in September, 1910, ars. Autobinen esked defuncant to sign a note for \$10,000, which she presented to her, stating that she wished the note to be executed and placed among defendant's papers so that in case of the daughter's death and her mother's survival there night be some record of the Defendent milely protested sectort deing so. transaction. colling her mether that she are larving her everything by her will, and that the note was unnecessary. The nother replied that wills were uncertain things and that the note was not for her to here asymay, but she morely cented it found means defendent's papers to show the transection. Pefendant then executed the note as requested by her mother and placed it in one of the compartments of her safe which she kept in her closet. There facts are chown not only by the testimony of defendant but by that of another witness who had knowledge of the transaction through statements made by Frs. Futchingon.

Persondant tectified that the next time she new the note was at the first trial of the cove and that she never delivered the note to her mether or anyone size. The further

testified that in November, 1913, when she was in Virginia, she received a letter from her mother asking for the combination of the safe in question and stating that she wished to open it in order to obtain her trunk keys which were in the safe. Defendant thereupon caused her kusband to write to her mother giving the combination and suggesting that she get her nephew. the plaintiff, to assist her in opening the safe. Mrs. Butchinson and the plaintiff thereafter opened the safe and took therefrom the trunk keys and the note in controversy. This explanation as to the manner in which the note came into the hands of Mrs. Mutchinson is corroborated by the testimony of another witness. Plaintiff claims that he received the note in question as a gift from Mrs. Hutchinson on or about June 23. 1914. The record does not show that any demand for payment of the note was ever made by Ers. Butchinson or by plaintiff prior to the commencement of the action.

During the same year defendant began repaying to her mother the sum of \$10,000, the first payment being a check for \$2,000, on November 11, 1910. These payments continued through the years 1911 and 1912 and were made in amounts of \$2,000 each, approximately six months apart. All payments except the last were made by defendant's checks, which were produced in court. The last payment was made in Paris, France. by a traveller's check of the American Express Company for \$1.005, about which there is no dispute. Several of these payments were accompanied by the statement from defendant to her mether that they were made as payments on the advance of \$10,000. This was particularly emphasized on the occasion of the last payment. Defendant subsequently expended large sums of money in caring for her mother during the latter's last illness, for doctor bills, murses and various trips taken for the benefit of the mother's health. Frs. Hutchinson died

testified that is, sevember, 1913, whon ahe was in Virginia. she received a letter from bur methor meking for the combination of the cafe in question and stating that the wished to open it in erser to obtain her trunk keys which were in the safe. Defendant thereupen deseed her husburd to write to her sother giving the combination and suggesting that ohe get her nephew. the plaintiff, to sanist her in opening the safe. Mrs. in toninson and the plaintiff thereafter appred the sufe and took therefrom the trunk keys and the note in controversy. This explanation as to the manner in which the note auge into the hends of Mrs. Matchines is componented by the tentiment of another witness. Alaintiff claims that he received the note is question as a gift from Era. Enterinson on or about June 23. 1914. The record does not show that any demand for payment of the note was ever muie by Fro. Antohianum or by plaintiff prior to the connencement of the aution.

During the same year defendent began repoying to her mother the sum of \$10,000, the first payment being a check far 28,000, on Movember 11, 1910. These payments continued through the years 1911 and 1912 and were made in amounts of \$2.000 each, approximately win menths apart. All payments except the last were made by defaudant's checks, which were produced in court. The last payment was sade is Faris, France, by a traveller's check of the warteen Sapress Company for \$1,005, about which there is no dispute. Several of these payments were accompanied by the statement from defendant to her mether that they were made as payments on the advance of \$10,000. This was particularly aspharized on the operator of the last payment. Definident subsuguently expended large arms of money in earling for he ther during the lighter's lest illacus, for touter bills, marses and warious trips taker for the benefit of the mother's health. Mrs. Autoblance died in March, 1915. While the evidence as to the manner in which plaintiff obtained possession of the note is conflicting, it is apparent that he acquired the note surreptitiously so far as defendant was concerned and that the latter never knew that he had it in his possession until after her mother's death.

The evidence fully establishes the repayment of the \$10,000 advanced to the Orchestra Association by Mrs. Entchineon on behalf of defendant long before plaintiff obtained the note. Plaintiff was not a holder for value in due course and took the note subject to all defenses existing between the original maker and payee. The evidence shows that the subsequent payments made by defendant to hor mother were intended by her to be a repayment for this advance. Defendant's testimony upon the subject is undisputed and is to some extent corroborated. It is presumed that payments made by one who is indebted to another are intended to liquidate the existing indebtedness. Pope v. Dodson, 58 Ill.

360; Kinahan v. Butler, 133 Ill. App. 459; Miller v. Pratz.

It is contended by plaintiff in error that the court improperly admitted evidence of the parol agreement between defendant and her mother to the effect that the note was not to become operative during defendant's lifetime. Parol evidence is admissible to show that a purported written contract never had any existence as a valid and binding agreement. Belleville Savings Bank v. Bornman, 124 Ill. 200; Black v. W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 111 id. 352; Robinson v. Bessel, 86 Ill. App. 212; Burke v. Delansy, 153 U. S. 228. In construing section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has been frequently held that evidence may be introduced to show that a note was not to be come valid except upon the happening of a condition precedent. Straus v. Citizens State Bank, 254 Ill. 185; Maxwell v. Brown, 186 Ill.

in March, 1918. While the evidence as to the manner in which plaintiff obtained peacession of the note is conflicting, it is apparent that he acquired the note surrepsitionaly so far an defendent was conserved and that the latter nover knew that he had it in his peacession until ofter her pother's death.

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14 juidate the existing indebtedness. Ince v. lockson, 68 lil.

150: Minerally v. intier, 133 lil. App. 459; Miller v. Fratz.

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App. 273.

It is well established that upon the trial of a cause by a judge without a jury the admission of incompetent evidence is not reversible error where competent evidence sustains the judgment. Kreiling v. Hortrup. 215 Ill. 195; Grand Pacific Hotel Co. v. Pinkerton. 217 id. 61; Pratt v. Davis, 224 id. 300.

The payment of the note was conclusively established by the evidence and the other defenses already mentioned were also proved by uncontradicted testimony. There was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the judgment. It was certainly not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFVIRUED.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

ADD. 375.

It is well established that upon the trial of a ocune by a judge without a jury the adminsion of incompetent evidence is not revereible array where assume evidence austains the judgment. Emilling v. Northy. 215 111. 185; Grand Emilia. Shelling it finite to the finite to the finite of the finite

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The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

Bernou. P. J., and brishey, J., ceneur.

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2758/

AMERICAN BONDING AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

¥6.

CHICAGO BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation. at al.

On Appeal of

ROBERTS & WHATH, Inc. , Appellant.

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AFFIAL FIOR

SUPPRIOR COURT.

COCK COUNTY.

Va.

LEONARD A. BRUNAAGE, Zooelver.

Appelles.

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BR. JUSTICE BORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Tuperior Court of Cook County disposing of the claim of Roberts & Reath, a corporation, against the American Bonding and Casualty Company for \$62,502.55, being the amount of sertain uncarned premiums upon policies of insurance of various kinds alleged to have been issued by that company, and the Chicago Sonding and Insurance Company, which had been rendered null and void by the insolvency of both companies and consequent inability to meet obligations. There is no dispute as to the amount of the claim or the breach by the insurers of the contracts of insurance in question or as to the cleimant's right of recovery. The case was consolidated for hearing with case number £7560, in which car Opinion has this day been filed and to which we refer for a statement as to the issues involved in the original case, not deeming it necessary to restate them in detail.

The decree from which the present appeal is taken, entered on the same day as the final decree, reviewed in our opinion in case number 27580, found substantially the same facts that are set forth in the said final decree as to the consolidation of the Chicago Bonding and Insurance Company, an Illinois

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terms of the Object of the State of the Stat

corporation, with the American Schaing and Casualty Company, an lows corporation, and that the said Consolidated Company is justly indebted to claiment in the sum of \$52,302.53; that the Illinois company prior to March 2, 1920, executed sundry insurance policies of various kinds under which the insured paid premiums: that the lowe company prior to January 84, 1921, executed and delivered aundry other policies of insurance of various kinds on which similar premiums were paid. The decree resited the appointment of the various receivers mentioned in said final decree, the insolvency of the lowa company on and after January 24, 1921, and its inability to meet its obligations: that as a result of the consolidation the Consolidated Company became indebted to the claiment for the unexred portion of said premiums on policies issued by both companies, computing from January 24, 1921, of which amount \$50.014.14 was the uncarned premium on policies issued by the Consolidated Company and \$2266.39 was the unearned promium on policies issued by the Illinois Company in cases wherein the holders of said policies had not recognized the Consolidated Company as their debter. decres further found the breach of all of the said contracts of insurance and obligations connected therewith by the Consolidated Company and the reinsurance of the risks covered by these policies and the assignment to the claimant of the respective claims arising therefrom; that the Illinois company is indacted to the claiment for uncarned promiuma under policies issued by it, whose holders have not recognized the Consolisated Company as their debter, in the sum of \$2286.39; that under the final decree entored in this cause, the capital stock deposit of the Illinois company, made pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Surety lot, is not subject to the payment of claims against either

serperation, with the American Sunsing and Unevalty ompany, an love corporation, and that you cold Computibated Son any Lajugily indebted to claimant in the rea of pos. 200. 35; th t the liliants adopted prior to make 2, 1920, elecated access thanbing beaught will ficked about about asolver to swintles come promiums; that the lare company prior to Jamery 24, 1921, ereented and dalivered numer, other policies of lunwence as to the standar and the standard processes and almost the standard to the stand regised the appointment of the various receivers mentioned in said final decree, the involvency of the acta copyrig on and efter Jendery 74, 1921, and its traditity to seek its chingsbeantifument out actignifunces and be dissen a secretification test nog heartene ind to the militable out of optimal among the medical of said promine on rolling a bornel to take correspond on animore ing from drawary ve. ivil, of which assembly only the ter the unrealist preside to relicate land of him and interest temperature and passed was two case runed promise on antifer the and of the likroin Company in sense beeroin the spirit se if well policies 80. 100 to genera a manager totallooms, and analogopar "on har to first the fact that he was the forest and the first the forest beautiful a condition in the general properties and the ann administration and at a bear to have a bit to community and and magnet wait' is in the series of the angles of the well and the us's of it we was limit, and that conferred thinks, amigin to the dicions for the erood gramming well, this is not be the well are the contract of the work and the work and the state of th Soul and death to the chart of the state of the state and deserte entere de tot beite eligion oge, entere etas est Britation announce Illinois company, read arms at the part of and a land the ಇಂಗ್: ಶಿ. ೧೯೯೯ ಕಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾರ್ಯ ಕರ್ಮಕರ ನಿರ್ವಹಣ ತಿರುವ ಕಿಕ್ಕಿ ಕೊತ್ತುಗಳಿಗೆ

the American Bonding and Casualty Company or the Consolidated Company until payment has been made of all claims against the Illinois company, in which the claimants have not recognized the Consolidated Company as their debtor.

It was therefore ordered by the court that the claim of Roberts & Beath, Inc., to the amount of \$50,014.14 be disallowed and that its claim to the amount of \$2286.39 be allowed, to be paid in full or to the extent of such <u>pro rate</u> amount as it shall be entitled to receive upon a distribution of said capital stock deposit among other claims of a similar character.

This order was in strict conformity with the final decree entered in the case, which we have affirmed in our opinion in case number 27560. It therefore follows that the decree upon the claim of Roberts & Reath. Inc., herein involved must be affirmed.

APPIRMED.

BARRES. P. J., and GRIDLEY, J., concur.

the American Souding and Councily Company or the Compositated Company antil payme. I have been and of all claims eggivet the Illinois commany, in which the claimants have not recognised the Company of their action.

it wes therefore ordered by the court that the chilm of loberts & House, we the emeuns of \$60.014.14 to rimilate and that the olain to the emeuns of \$2000.38 to allowed, to be puid in tail or to the entent of major of the emeuns of the metal of the state of the emetal of the children of the child where the similar observed of the state of the children of the similar observer.

This eries to the strict conformity with the final degree of the final degree ontered in the water, which we intro efficient in our cylistem in sast analyst of the colore fallons that the claim of acceptant the claim of acceptant the final involved salet be affirmed.

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AMERICA, J. J., each Talubar. d., torower.

129 - 27603.

ALFRED ELINGBEIL, a minor, by Fred Elingbeil, his father and next friend. Appellant

THE LEDERN COMPANY,

APPRAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF CGOM COUNTY.

227 I.A. 3073

MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OFINIOR OF THE COURT.

The appellant, a minor of the age of eight years and five months, brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against appellee to recover damages resulting from a fall from a platform at the base of a door opening into an elevator shaft to the concrete floor at the base of the shaft. Appellee owned the premises in question. The door opened upon a public alley.

The emended declaration in substance alleged the facts above stated with other details, and further charged that the opening into the elevator shaft was barred by a chain and that the opening was dangerous; that it was the custom of appellee for a long time prior to the accident to distribute kindling wood and waste food to children at this opening; that they were attracted to climb upon the platform, to swing on the chain and to look down the elevator shaft, with the knowledge and permission of appelles; that it was the duty of appelles, under such circumstances, to properly guard the opening so that children while upon the platform and leaning against the chain would not fall into the elevator shaft through the door; that appellant negligently permitted the chain to be improperly fastened, by reason whereof it slipped or broke from its fastening while appellant was upon the platform and swinging on the chain, resulting in appellant's fall and consequent injury.

There was a trial before the court with a jury. At the

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Above abelow with other astalls, and further designed that the opening iste the electron and the the opening was dangerous; that it so the curted of special that it so the curted of special for a large time giver to the equident that interior tending good and whole flow it is to obtain the collision of the collision of appealant to obtain the obtained of appealant to obtain the observable of appealant that the collision is the collision of appealant that it was the collision while obtained and the platform and leading applies the collision of appealant the above the collision of appealant the collision and the day to be described the day of the collision of appealant the collision of appealant the collision of appealant the collision of the collision.

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conclusion of plaintiff's case the court instructed the jury to find defendant not guilty, and after denying a motion for a new trial entered judgment, from which this appeal has been prosecuted.

As the case must be tried again, we do not doem it advisable to discuss the evidence in detail. It is sufficient to state that in our opinion it tended to prove the allegations of the declaration.

The authorities applicable to this kind of a case were reviewed extensively in Rost v. Farker Washington Co., 178 Ill. App. 245, in which the City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, was cited as stating the general rule to the effect that the law does not require the owner of land to keep his premises in safe condition for the benefit of trespassers or those who go upon them without invitation, either express or implied; yet there is on exception to this rule in favor of young children "if the things causing the injury have been left exposed and unguarded and are of such a character as to be an attraction to a child. appealing to his childish curiosity and instincts." Under the euthorities in this state, unguarded premises supplied with dangerous attractions are regarded as holding out an implied invitation to children, which will make the owner of the premises liable for injuries to them even though the children be technical trespassers. Stellery v. Cicero & Provisc Street Ry. Co., 245 Ill. 290, citing numerous authorities. This exception has been qualified in some cases by holding that the attraction must be upon premises adjacent to a public street or other public place where children of tender years may rightfully go, and the situation must be such as to charge the owner of the premises with knowledge of the danger to children if left unguarded or unproteoted. Rost v. Barker Sashington Go., supra. The question of

conclusion of plaintiff's sense the court instructed the jury to find defendent not guilty, and efter denving a motion for a new trial entered judgment, from sules this appeal has ceen proneutied.

As the once much be trief again, we do not deem to our out to the vision to of sample to tradition to the things the trief that the contraction of the declaration.

over past a to bail widt of elimality and trouble will reviewed extended to here v. lerker danhagton by 176 ill. App. 245. in which the vity of call v. penchup, ile ill. 141, was diffed of obsting the recent rule to the entwes our one law does not rectified the course of hint to know hit frankers in sole apply on the teneral to treatment to the the the teneral and to the teneral billion then without (mairelon, sinher any mess of incline; for there is will lit merifice jardy to here's at east wind of noisynous so things orwains the injury have been left and ord and ungranded and are of much a canemaker to it be an a struction so colle. appealing to his willels nearly it; and lunciantes to be the gribborithes in the the the ingranded promises on the Appropriate the appropriate residence and the propriate and appropriate and the propriate appropriate and the propriate appropriate approp noning and to hear you are little notifier and the area areas and areas and areas I limited of contains and the even and of limit to eldell ८. ... : इत्तर्वे प्रतिकार के उद्वाहरी के प्रतिकार करण्या III. 190, dittar ormarone anthoritizes. It ages " an a cour and the contract of the contra opportises adjagant to a mount of the contract of the contract of what's is a first and the state of the state নাইছা ২০ টুলালাছ চল্ড হিচ হল, ২০ এইই অনুহাটত তথা এই এই শাসাত হুই ইপুলার নাইটো - or all to come of the state o the series of the rest of the series of the series of

what is or is not an attraction is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Stollery v. C. S. Ry. Co., supra; Rost v. carker Washington Co., supra; City of Pekin v. McMahon, supra; Cglesby v. Metropolitan R. S. E. Ry. Co., 219 Jll. App. 321.

The directed verdict for defendant in this case was improper, as there was swidence in the record from which, had it stood alone, the jury could, without seting unreasonably in the eye of the law, find that all of the material averments of the declaration had been proved. Under such circumstances, the case should go to the jury. Libby, McKeill & Libby v. Cook.
223 Ill. 206.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the case remanded.

HEVERSED AND REMARDED.

Gridley, J., concurs; Barnes, P. J. dissents.

what is or is not an attraction is ordinarily a quantion of fact for the jury. It illess to do the jury and the jury of jury of jury and an expression of the jury of jury o

The directed verdict for defendent in this owner was imprepar, as there was relicated in the resert from which, and it exceed shone, the fury could, without mutical autometacity in the eye of the law, that this is the meterial greenests of the deal arables bed here i much. The deal arables bed here, inved. The relicit to the fury. Alber, samell & livey v. Jock.

The judgment of the Cirquit Court is reversed and the

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
Writtley, J., wordwire: Barnes, P. J. dissents.

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES DISSENTING.

I cannot concur in this conclusion. The action is predicated, and was tried, upon the theory of an attractive muisance. But in my opinion the evidence has no tendency to sustain it. There is scarcely any limit to a child's curiosity, and a mere attempt to gratify it is not of itself sufficient to make the attractive thing an attractive muisance. Every dangerous situation a child may go to from a public place is not necessarily an attractive nuisance because of its accessibility. It must possess features or elements that naturally and generally excite a child's curiosity and induce its gratification, usually by handling or playing with or on it. While the doctrine has received considerable extension of late without any very clear line of demarcation I am unprepared to carry it to the extent sought in this case. If the admitted state of facts here present a case for its application it is difficult to conceive of the limits of the doctrine, and would seemingly require every place of business to be constructed or guarded with reference to insuring the safety of children who may come near it from a public street or place.

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I commet con our in this conclusion. The action is prodicated, and was tried, upon the theory of an attractive mitance. But in my opinion the evidence has no tendency to sustain it. Thore is correctly any limit to a child's curiosity, and a more attempt to gratify it is not of itself sufficient to make the attractive thing an attractive mileence. Every dangerous situation a child may go to from a public place to not necessitly an attractive nutrance because of ite accessibility. It must possess features or elements that neturally and concrally excite a child's curicalty and induce its gratification. usually by hendits; or playing with or an it. while the destrine has received someleareble extension of late without any very clear line of demarcation I am unprepared to carry it to the extent sought in this case. If the simitted state of facts bere present a case for its application it is difficult to coacetre of the limits of the court of the lifting secularly require every place of businers to be constructed or guarded with reference to tunuring the unfety of children who may come near it from a public street or place.



MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

tained by plaintiff, who is appelled, as the result of an accident which occurred while plaintiff was working as a farm laborer for John V. Steger, since deceased, on the latter's farm. The defendants are the executors of the last will and testament of said decedent. The accident occurred November 15, 1915. There was a jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of plaintiff for \$10.750, from which \$7750 was remitted. After the denial of motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, the court entered judgment for \$3,000, from which this appeal has been presecuted. He evidence was offered on behalf of defendant, but after the close of plaintiff's evidence a motion for an instructed verdict in favor of defendant was denied.

The undisputed evidence in the case shows that plaintiff, who was experienced in farm work, was employed on the farm of said decedent prior to and at the time of the socident, during all of which period he used a three-horse team and the hauling apparatus attached thereto, which he was using at the time of the socident. On the morning of November 15, 1915, he was directed by the foreman to assist with his team in filling a ditch on the farm where tile had been placed. In doing this work two teams of herses were employed, one being hitched at each end of a hickory log, called an evener, plaintiff's team being hitched

CARL SILAND.

CARL SILAND.

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CHRIS G. STEGAR, et al.

Superlance.

ARRAM PROM SINGUIT COURT OF BOOK SCURYY.

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AR. JUSTICA MOLICIAL DESIRAGE FOR SPINION OF THE COURS.

This is a personal injury suit to recover descept austained by piciatiff, who is appelled, as the result of an accident which constraint which constraint which constraint which constraint which constraint shows a farm laborar for John V. Singer, since is accounter of the last will and testimate of the cascuators of the last will and testimate of each decrease. The socident occurred more active this is in the cast of picturist for \$10,750, from which 27750 was resited in favor of picturist for motions for a new trial and in carried of judgment, the court antered independs for \$2,000, from which the py was been proceeded. The calcade of judgment, the court and tered independs of side of calcade of active of active on interpretation of active of out was active and another the close of pictuality a calcade on beingin for an interpretate of active of defende a motion for an interpretated.

The unitarited evidence in the energices on the tent pinistiff, who experiences in form work, were employed on the tent of and said decedent arior to and at the time of the conditions, during all of which ported he used a threadern tent and the hulling apparatus sitzened therefor which he cannot be the line of the acoident. On the scending of acceptant in, 1915, he are alreaded by the forman to raided with its tenm in first with on the farm where tile hed been placed. In acid, while well the tenter of here were suployed, one being hitches of the seasons. In acid, the seasons of herese were suployed, one being hitches of the said on the bickory log, and log of herese, plaintiff's tente tenter of herese were suployed, one being hitches of the said on the bickory log, and log of herese, plaintiff's tente tenter of herese were suployed, one being hitches of the said on the bickory log, and log of herese, plaintiff's tenter tenter of herese.

to the left end thereof by means of a chain fastened around the evener and attached to a hook on the double-tree of his team. A team of two horses driven by another farm hand was hitched to the other and of the evener. A plow was attached to the middle of the evener, which was guided by the foreman. One team was on each side of the ditch, into which the plow threw the dirt. The evener was the trunk of a young hickory tree from 20 to 24 feet in length and from 7 to 8 inches in diameter, and had been continuously used for about two manths up to the time of the accident. Its use was continued thereafter. In driving his team plaintiff walked about four feat behind the end of the evener. Just before the accident, the plow encountered a piece of frozen ground, causing the horses to settle down and pull hard, as they had done on similar occasions the same day. The accident was due to the breaking of the hook attached to the double-tree of the three-horse team driven by plaintiff, to which the chain from the evener was attached. The team on the other end of the evener continued to pull so that plaintiff's end of the evener was swung back, striking him with great force on his legs and causing the injuries of which he complains.

old, rusty, cracked, weak or insufficient in any respect, as charged in the declaration, or that the hook was defective in any way. Plaintiff had not worked at this particular job prior to the day in juestion, but on the morning of the accident and prior thereto, he had been working steedily for two hours, during all of which time he walked directly behind the evener. The evidence shows that under the strain caused by the pulling of the horses, the evener bent somewhat in the center. The bending was obvious and seen by plaintiff. Shortly prior to the accident plaintiff's foremen suggested that he walk outside of the

the left out thereof by means of a chair leafoned around the evener and attgoned to a book on the double-tree of his team. A teem of two horses driven by emother form hend wo hitohed to the other end of the evener. A gios estended to the middle of the evener, abign was galded by the forement. One toem was on each side of the ditch, tute wiles the plow three the dirt. AS of OS most work groups, many a to anost and som tempe edifoot in leasth and from V to b inches in dismeter, and had been ead to enid rat with a same on the tree and the ening the its as one confined there the ... In driving the .inobloce ad: lo but ad: buldes too! That force builds litingale mad design the radioset, the elow radioses of englad of frozen ground, coupling the former the cut and pull hard, as they had done to claidly equistions the east der. ent of Ladestin made out to primeral bis of and any inablese double-tree of the three-horse went driven by phelotiff, to wilch The that a transfer of the standar of the sense of the standard and the standard of the standa To him a "Middle he it on ift, or beintings remove and to bus oli an eprot feer. Milk mid million liest miche ese tempe ediinfogoon a tida to entratil od: outsuep tra eset

e find no ordered beauther to those tank and respect as all, energy respect, as oberged in the dedicables, or the officer in the energy, are described in the dedicables, or their time end were endorshed in the dedicables, or their time end of the control of at this control of at the end of the en

end of the evener, in order to avoid any socident through possible breaking of the apparatus. Plaintiff apparently appreciated this danger, because the chain to which the hook was fastened slipped a short time prior to the accident and he then warned the driver of the team at the other end to keep watch, as the chain might become loosened again. After this warning the driver of the other team walked outside the end of the evener. As defendant introduced no testimony, the above facts as shown by plaintiff's witnesses are uncontradicted.

We find no evidence in the record tending to show that defendants' testate. John V. Steger, was guilty of any negligence which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff, and no evidence tending to sustain the charge that the book, the breaking of which caused the accident, was in any way defective. The fact that the hook broke, thereby releasing the strain upon the end of the evener to which plaintiff's team was attached and thereby causing the secident, does not show that plaintiff's employer was guilty of negligence. It has been held frequently by the reviewing courts of this state that the mere breaking of the instrumentality employed is not sufficient to prove negligence on the part of the employer. Sack v. Dolese, 137 Ill. 189; Chicago Edison Co. v. Moren, 85 Ill. App. 152; Medley v. American Car Foundry Co., 140 id. 284; Colfex Coal & Mining Co. v. Johnson, 52 id. 383. The burden was upon plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of defendant and was not discharged by mere proof of the accident. Diamond Glue Co. v. Wietsychowski. 227 111. 338; Geraghty v. Grace Co., 157 111. App. 309.

Plaintiff was an experienced farmer and had been working with the team in question for a considerable time, during all of which period he had used the apparatus other than the evener to which the hook in question was attached. The evidence

end of the evener, is order to sveld any souldest through possible breaking of the apparatus. Finistiff apparently appresished this denger, because the chain to would the hook was fastened alipped a short time prior to the sacident and he then samed the driver of the team at the other and to keep watch, so the chain might become loveened again. After this warning the driver of the other team walked outside the end of the evener. As defendent introduced as teatiment, the above facts as shown by plaintiff's witnesses are uncentradicted.

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Pleintiff was no experienced farmer and torus corning with the tesm in question for a considerable time, doring wit of which period he the agent the agreeits other than the swamer to which the hook in question and theused. The syldence

shows that he was fully informed of the dangerous features of the work in which he was employed. This appears from the warning given him by the foreman and the warning which plaintiff gave to his fellow worker. There was nothing complicated about the apparatus with which he was working at the time, and from his experience, it is apparent that he was as well informed regarding double-trees, hooks and other farm appliances as the owner. He was fully aware of all of the conditions under which he was working. He was of mature years and more than ordinary experience, endowed with his natural faculties, and must be held to have been fully informed as to conditions under which he was working. He was able to comprehend the mature and probable resulta following from the use of such an appliance. Under such circumstances, he is chargeable with knowledge of the ordinary conditions under which the work was being conducted, and its ordinary risks and hazards, and will be presumed to have assumed all such risks, which to a person of his experience and understanding should have been obvious. C. & Z. I. R. R. Co. v. Heerey, 203 Ill. 492; McCormick Machine Co. v. Zackzewski, 220 id. 552; Jeneo v. Illinois Steel Co., 233 Ill. 301.

No negligence on the part of the employer having been shown and it appearing that plaintiff assumed the risks of his employment, it follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed with a finding of facts.

REVERSED WITE FINDING OF PACTS.

Barnes, F. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

shows that he was fully taronmed of the dangerone features of the work in which he was ancheped. This appeals from the worning given him by the foremen and the murning which plaintiff gave to his fellow negger. There was mothing complicated about the apparates with which he was sorthing at the thie three, and from bis experience, it is apparent that he was well informed regarding dauble-troot, hooks and other fare applicates as the owner. He was fully seare of all of the conditions under which he was working. He ews of maters years and core than ordinary emperiones, estended with hits antered inquities, see must be held age of dolds rebox encillanes of an bouretni glist need evad of working. He was a Le to comprehend the meture and probable rasalts following them the was of our an appliance. Under such offender, he is obsequently with and lacks of the orderoppdiblens amen which the work was welny a saucket, one the ordinary class and because, and all be presented to have assumed all sees ricks, which to a percent of his equalities and under-Beerey, 208 111. 492; woodrade, and line be. v. askeenel, 220 id. bbb; Jazen v. Illiquis "tool Co., Lbb lil. . Cl.

ye neglicans on the part of his empirer negligible of his above above of his above and it appearing that plaiduiff erran state of the ordinate of the official court and to reverse that finding of that a

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Bernac, . J. sal (x) leg, J., coment.

138 - 27613.

FINDING OF PACTS.

We find as ultimate facts in this case that plaintiff's employer was not guilty of the negligence charged in the declaration and that plaintiff assumed the risks of his employment.

158 - 27615.

FIRELIAG BE PASTA.

Pe find as ultimese facts in this case that plaintiff's employer was not sailty of the angligance cherged in the declara-tion and that plaintiff assumed to ricks of his amployment.

179 27655

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. JOHN B. HITTELL.

Appellee.

APPEAL PROM

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, PERCY B. COFFIE, JOSEPH P. GEARY and ALEXANDER J. JOHNSON, as Civil Service

Commissioners of the City of Chicago, and MICHAEL J. FAHERTY. OSCAR WOLFF. DAVID W. CLARK. IRENE PEASE MAYTONA, L. WITHAL and EDWARD J. GLACKIN, as Board

of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago, and JULIUS GABLEMAN,

CIRCUIT COURT.

COOK COUNTY.

I.A 631775

Appellants.

MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPISION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue in substance directing the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago and the Board of Local Improvements of said city to forthwith restore the petitioner to the position of Chief Street Engineer for the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago, said position being also designated as Chief Engineer of Streets for the said Board of Local Improvements, to the end that said petitioner may enter upon and discharge the duties thereof.

General and special demurrers to the amended petition were filed on behalf of the various respondents. all of which were overruled on July 16, 1921, and thereupon said respondents elected to stand by their demurrers. It then became the duty of the court to enter judgment as prayed in the amended petition. On September 13, 1921, the case was brought to the attention of the court upon the motion of the attorney

PROPERTY OF THE STATE OF LILLIEUR ox rel. John S. Birrigi. . wallingga

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Suntainal Corporation, Pancy M. CorpyH. ETERAXRIA BUA TRANO . T HUBBOT J. Johnson, as Civil Bervice Commissioners of the City of Chicago, and withhat J. FARRITY. oscar yolff. bayed v. clark THERE EMASS MAYTOWA, L. SITHA and RDVARD J. CLACKIN, as Roard of Lauri Improvements of the City of Chicago, and JULIUE CARLESTAN Appellants.

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CIRCUIT COURT.

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. di. 607

MM. JUSTICS MURRILL DELIVISIED THE OFFELOM OF THE SCURY.

This is an appeal from a federate of the Circuit Court of Cook County Circular that a paramptery writ of mandames taken in substance directing the Civil corvice Commission of the City of Chicago and the Board of Local Improvements of anid ofty to forthwith restore the settitioner to the pasition of Chief Street angineer for the Sound of Local Improvements of the City of Chique, said position being also designated an Chief mainear of nirects for the sold Board of Legal laprovergate, to the end that said politioner may enter upon and discharge the duties thursels.

denoral and appearant deservate to the emended petition were filled on behalf of the various respondents. all of which were aversuled an July 16, 1931, and thereupon enid respondents elected to stand by their depurrers. It then became the duty of the court to enter judgment as prayed in the emended position. On keptember 13, 1821, the cone was brought to the attention of the court upon the motion of the attorney

for the relator for a peremptory writ of mandamus and upon a counter-motion of the respondents for leave to answer the smended petition and was set for hearing on October 1, 1921, on which date the Circuit Gourt denied the motion of the respondents for leave to answer the smended petition and entered the judgment order above mentioned.

It is urged by appellants that the court erred in overruling their motion for leave to answer the amended petition, citing authorities to the effect that almost as a matter of course a respondent should be allowed to plead over upon the overruling of a demurrer to the amended petition. This is undoubtedly the general rule, but is not applicable to the present case, in which the respondents elected to abide by their demurrer and sought, when the case was called for trial some months later, to change their position and thereby cause further delay. The trial court was vested with discretionary power in passing upon respondent's motion. It does not appear from the record that any draft of the preposed answer was presented with the motion. He showing as to any disputed facts was made and no argument is addressed to this court indicating any intention on the part of respondents to raise any questions of fact on the issues tendered by the mended petition. Therefore, we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion by the respondents for leave to answer. Berry v. Turner, 279 Ill. 338; Ricker v. Boofield, 28 Ill. App. 32. The record in the present case shows no reason why the Circuit Court should have allowed the respondents to answer after they had elected to stand by their demurrers.

It is also urged by appellants that the proceeding is fatally defective by reason of the fact that the City of

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for the relator for a peremptory writ of mendamin and upon a counter-motion of the respondence for leave to answer the amonded polition and was set for hearing on October 1, 1921, on which date the Circuit Court denied the motion of the respondents for leave to answer the amonded polition and entered the judgment order above mentioned.

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It is also urged by appellants that the proceeding is fatally defective by reason of the fact that the City of

Chicago, a municipal corporation, and Julius Gableman were made parties respondent thereto against whom no relief was granted. and that by reason of this misjoinder of parties the peremptory writ of mandamus cannot issue. That both of these respondents were within the jurisdiction of the trial court is shown by the fact that they were both personally served with summons in this cause. Both of them had an interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, that is collaterally determined by the judgment rendered in this case. Gableman is the incumbent of the position in question and the City of Chicago pays his salary. The right to restoration and reinstatement in the position to which relator claims he is entitled carries with it the right to the salary attached thereto. The emission of a necessary party to a petition for a writ of mandamus appearing on the face of the record would have been grounds for reversal. Powell v. The People, 214 III. 475; People v. O'Connell, 252 Ill. 304; People v. Blocki, 203 id. 363.

The principal contention of appellants that a reversal should be granted in this case is based upon the theory that the allegations of the amended petition are insufficient to warrant the relief granted. Owing to the length of this document, we shall undertake to furnish only a brief summary of its allegations, referring only to the salient features thereof. It alleged, in substance, that at the time of the amexation of the City of Lakeview to the City of Chicago in 1869 the relator held the position of Assistant Engineer of the Eureau of Streets in said City of Lakeview and became, by reason of said annexation, an employee of the City of Chicago, being assigned to duty as Assistant Engineer of the Eureau of Streets under the Superintendent of Streets of said City of Chicago in the Department of Public Works thereof; that on or about Jenuary 1, 1899, the Civil

Chiesco, a municipal corporation, and Julius Cableman were made parties respondent thereto equinat sine no relief was granted. and that by reason of this misjoinder of parties the peromptory will of mandanus cannot laune. That he th of those respondents were within the jurisdiction of the trial court to shown by the fact that they were both personally served with summons in this estion. Noth of them had an interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, that is solimicrally determined by the judgment rendered in this case. Cableman is the incumbent of the pestiton in question and the City of Chicago pays his The right to restoration end reinstatement in the position to which relater chains he is entitled carries with it the right to the walers : binded thereto, The contentes of a nocessary purty to a published for a welt of mondemun appearing on the fage of the record would have been grounds for reversal. Foundly v. The Foople, 814 Ill. 475; Augale v. O'Connell, 252 Peaple v. Blacki, 205 18, 363. 111. 304;

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Service Commission of the City of Chicago classified that position and place of employment as "Assistant Engineer of the Bureau of Streets;" that on May 9, 1901, the position was placed under the central of the Board of local Improvements of Chicago. and on December 1, 1901, the title of the position was changed to that of "Assistant Engineer in Charge of Streets;" and again. on December 1, 1903, to that of "Chief Street Engineer" and "Assistant Engineer in Charge of Streets," and again on January 1, 1905, to that of "Chief Street Engineer of the Board of Local Improvements: " that after said original classification the said Civil Service Commission gave notice of an examination to be held for the said position and place of employment known as Assistant Engineer of Bureau of Streets, and thereafter posted an eligible list of those who had successfully passed said examination, upon which the relator stood second; that the person standing at the head of said list refused to accept said position. and thereafter, on May 23, 1899, the relator was regularly and properly certified from said list of eligibles to the position of Assistant Engineer of the Bureau of Streets, and thereupon accepted said position and entered upon the performance of said duties and continued therein until December 31, 1913, when he was promoted by the said wivil Service Commission as hereinafter stated.

The amended petition further alleged that prior to December 5, 1913, the said Civil Service Commission gave notice of a promotional examination to be held of applicants for the position known as Chief Street Engineer of the Board of Local Improvements; that in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission adopted in pursuance thereof, three members of the next lower rank took said promotional examination; that

service commission of the City of "Il ups classified that out to receipt instalace a improvedume to souly bue unitious Barema of treets;" that on May , 19cl. the position was placed under the easternl of the se out of aug. Topen rements of Chiefe, and on December 1, 1901, the title of the continued in banket to that of "Audetant and anathan targeter" to feeler, en December 1, 130. on the tent "Chilis ot was a maineast and "Touteties again of the toute and again and angulary is arrow of to restly to the to the form of the form of and mais affice to fenighto bit to the Jen' " joinem's orqui Iso on and Civil Lervice Commission gave no tice of on exemination to e sword inarrely as the said was nellined then elf tot bled ed desistant Angineur of Barnau of creeks, and thereafter posted hise been a will' out out any weads to full slitchis an roans our suit ; wood was bear told the first age, and a lames standing at the bond of neid litt refuged to accept said portions, and there of ter, on May 25, 189 , the releter een repairably and To notation out of saidintly to dail this amit belitten afrecom Assistant interest of the care and tracts, and transport stapped to ad position of ent red upon the perf recover of seld duties and continued therein until land of 1913, when in run Togligation of activities of the fits class off of before to . 453 82 0

The spended pellinon inther allows the prior to December 5, 1910, the said livil errice to mincion juve notice of a presentional access to the to beld of an ileast. For the position known at this tract a inter of the 'ord of oral laprove' ents; that in co. founday with the rollino or the late to the living the said the miles one regal than or the late or in late one regal than or the late of the said the providence thereof, three restination as at lower relation of the said the maxine that the provotional at wheation; the target the saxt lower relations well provotional at wheation; the target the saxt lower relations.

petitioner was one of them and that thereafter the Civil Service Commission posted an eligible list of those who successfully passed said exemination for the said position of Chief Street Engineer of the Board of Lecal Improvements, and that relator passed said examination and stood first upon said eligible list, and thereafter, on December 31, 1913, was certified to the position of Chief Street Engineer of the Board of Local Improvements and was immediately appointed to such position by said Board; that relator accepted said position, entered upon end remained in the performance of the duties thereof until December 10, 1915; that the relator faithfully, efficiently and honestly discharged and performed all the duties of said position in its various forms as above stated up to and including December 10. 1915, when he was suspended from said office by the said Board of Local Improvements as the result of a letter from the Civil Service Commission to the said Board, directing that the relator, the respondent Gableman and one Norton be suspended pending an investigation to be held as to mehtods employed in awarding paving contracts: that no investigation was ever conducted relating to the conduct of the relator in his said position by said Civil Service Commission or said Board of Local Improvements. It is not shown whether or not the respondent Gableman, who is the present incumbent of the position, was actually suspended at that time.

The amended petition further alleged that the relator performed the duties of the various positions mentioned from June 20, 1899, until December 10, 1915, when he was suspended by said Board of Local Improvements, and rendered good and efficient service to the said City of Chicago and that during said period he had never violated any provisions of the Civil Service Act or any rules or regulations of the Civil Service

potitioner was one of them and that thereafter the Civil Service Commission posted an cligible lips of those who successfully passed said examination for the suid squition of Chief Direct Magiacer of the Beard of Lezel Improvements, and that relater passed said examination and utook first upon said shinkle list. and thereafter, an incomber 31, 1913, was certified to the position of Chief Street Amgineer of the Board of Local improvements and was issediately appointed to such position by sold Board; that relator assepted and position, entered upon and remained in the performance of the duties thereof until December 10, 1916; that the relator faithfully, efficiently and honostly discharged and performed all the duties of and popition in the verious forms so shove stated up to and including December 10. 1915, when he was suspended from anic office by the said Search of Local Improvements as the rought of a letter from the Civil Ferrice Commission to the said board, directing that the relator. the respendent Cableson and one Merton be enspended pending an investigation to be hald as to melande supplyed in avarding -er beteinder: that an investigation one rest continue the laring to the sendest of the relator in his said position by eath Civil Service Commitming or said house in Local Improvements. It is not shown whather or not the respondent Cabloman, who is the present incumbent of the position, ass setunlly suspended at that time.

The smended petition further nileged that the relator partiamed the duties of the various positions mentioned from June 20, 1899, until December 10, 1815, when he was suspended by onid Board of Leesl Improvements, and rendered good and efficient service to the said Oity of Chicage and that during estimation had never violated any provisions of the Civil Service Act or any rules or regulations of the Civil Service

commission or of the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago; that on December 20, 1915, he sent his resignation to the President of the Board of Local Improvements, which was subsequently withdrawn and cancelled pursuant to the rules of said Commission; and that in conformity with his request contained in said withdrawal of said resignation, a leave of absence was given said petitioner by the said Civil Service Commission for a period of one year from Jamuary 19, 1916.

The amended petition further states that on January 19, 1916, before said leave of absence was given relator by sadd Civil Service Commission, he was informed by them that before they could grant such leave of absence for a year, it would be necessary for relator to file with the Commission a written resignation from the position and place of employment of Chief Street Engineer of the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago, the same to be held by said Commission in conformity, as they stated to him, with Rule VIII of said Commission, but that as a matter of fact, said Rule VIII did not so require and that said Commissioners concealed and withheld the knowledge thereof from relator; that said Civil Service Commission then and there informed him that they could not lawfully and would not under any circumstances grant relator said leave of absence unless he tendered his resignation immediately: that relator protested and objected to tendering such resignation and stated that he merely desired a leave of absence for one year and that he intended to return to work in his said position and place of employment before the expiration of said period of one year, but that said commission again refused to grant said leave of absence for one year unless said tender of resignation was forthcoming from relator immediately, and stated to relator that the tender of such resignation was merely in

Commission or of the Bourd of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago; that on December 29, 1915, he sent his recignation to the Fresident of the Board of Local Improvements, unich was subsequently withdrawn and cancelled purcuent to the rules of seld Commission; and that is confermity with his request contained in said withdrawal of said resignation, a leave of absence was given asid selftimer by the said Stril Lervice Commission for a period of one year from Johnsky 19, 1915.

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19, 1916, before said leave of absence was given relator by sudd Of vil bervice deuminaton, he was informed by them that before they could grant such loave of absence for a year, it would be necessary for relater to file with the Commission a written realgnation from the position and place of employment of thief Street Sagineer of the Searc of Local improvements of the City of Chisago, the sense to be held by said Commincion in conformity, as they stated to him, with Tale Vill of said Cosmission, but that we a nutter of fact, and make VIII did not so require and that wid Commissioners sencesled and withheld the knowledge thereof from relator; that anid Ulvil service Comminster then and there informed his the they rould not lawfully and would not under any circum tences grant reluter said leave of absence unless be tendered his reviewstian immediately; thet relater preceded and abjects? to tendering authorismetion and stated that he werely dealest a leave of .. beener for one year and that he intended to rewer to verk in his anit position and place of employment altered the explantion of suits partice one year, but that said commission upsin refused to grant acid levve of apacace for one year unions seld tonder of resignation was fortacentary from relator immediately, and what d to relator that the torder of such restignation wir marely in

conformity with the custom of the Civil Service Commission and that it would not affect relator's right to be immediately restored to his said position and place of employment if he made application for reinstatement to said commission at any time before the expiration of said leave of absence.

The amended petition further states that at said time relator was totally ignorant of the provisions of said Rule VIII of said Commission and said Civil Service Commission being his superior and having complete jurisdiction over the granting of leave of absence and reinstatement of him in said position, and acting in a position of public trust, relater placed full confidence in and believed to be true the statements made by the said commission as to the necessity of tendering his resignation as a condition precedent to obtaining his leave of absence. and that relying upon the statements of said Civil Service Commission, he tendered his resignation Jamary 19, 1916, and was thereupon granted a leave of absence for one year from January 19. 1916: that relator never intended or desired at any time to leave his position as Chief Street Engineer for the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago, but on the contrary desired to continue in his work; that at the time he made said application for said leave of absence it was well known by said Civil Service Commission that said Rule VIII did not require the resignation of said relator before said leave of absence could be granted; that said resignation has been in the possession of said Civil Service Commission since Jamuary 16, 1916, but has never been filed.

The amended petition further alleged that relator's suspension on December 10, 1915, by said Civil Service Commission and the demand and coercion by said Commission in obtaining relator's resignation contemporaneously with the

conformity with the cautem of the Civil Bervies Commission and that it would not affect relator's right to be immediately restored to his said position and place of employment if he made application for reinstatement to self commission at any time before the expiration of suid loave of absence.

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The emended position further alleged that relator's enopenaton on becamber 10, 1015, by anid Civil service Commission and the demand and coordies by anid Commission in obtaining relator's resignation contemporaneously with the

granting of said leave of absence on Jamuary 19, 1916, were not in good faith, but were fraudulently made to the prejudice of relator's rights in the premises and not for the purpose of investigating the conduct and action of relator in his said position, but were merely pretexts and the beginning of other fraudulent and unlawful acts and doings in attempting to deprive relator of his said position in order that they might fill the same contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the rules of said Commission; that on and since December 10, 1915, there has never been any lack of funds with which to pay the salary of relater in said position; that each year since January 1, 1905, inclusive, when the title to relator's said position was changed to that of "Chief Street Engineer for the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago," the City Council of said city has in its annual appropriation bill appropriated money for the payment of the salary incidental to said position. except in the year 1916, when no appropriation was made, for the reason that relator was on said leave of absence, the last of these appropriations being on March 31, 1920, whereby the City Council appropriated the sum of \$4200 as salary for said position; that on September 19, 1916, the relator made written application to said Civil Service Commission and said Board of Local Improvements for reinstatement and requested them and each of them to restore his name to the eligible list as provided by the rules of said Civil Service Commission, which gave to relator precedence for reinstatement; that in response to his communication the President of the Board of Local Improvements on September 23, 1916, informed him by written communication that his application for reinstatement had been referred to the Civil Service Commission; that in addition to his written rerequest for reinstatement he made numerous requests of the

grenting of said leave of absence on Jenuary 19, 1916, verenot in good futth, but more fraudulently made to the prefudice of relator's rights in the promises and not for the purpose of investigating the concluct and action of relator in his suid position, but were merely pretexts and the beginning of other from delent and unlawful acts and doings in a tionpting to deprive relator of his soid position is exder that they wink fill the same contrary to the previsions of the Civil cervice Act and the rules of said Commission; that an and since December 10, 1915. there has never been any lank of funds with which to pay the salary of relator in soid position; that comb your since Jamuary 1, 1905, inclusive, when the title to reinter's wait position was changed to that of "Chief Street Engineer for the Beard of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago," the City Council of anid city has is its ammal appropriation till appropriated money for the payment of the enlary incidental to seld position, except in the year 1916, when no appropriation was made, for the reason that relator was on said leave of absence, the last of these appropriations being on March 11. 1986, whereby the City Council appropriated the sens of eddit on calury for unid position; that an deprember 10, 1910, the relator m. - written application to said Civil pervise Commission and said board of Local Improvements for reinstatement, and requested them and each of them to restore his name to the cligible list as provided by the rules of unit wivid ... ervice Commission, which gave to relator procedures for relawintenent; that in response to his communication the President of the Board of Local Jugarements on September 25, 1816, this proced him by written communication that his application for reinchatement had been referred to the Clyil Jervice Jegmiesten; that in addition to his written to request for reinsh test at he made numerous requests of the

Civil Service Commission and the Board of Local Improvements personally from that time until filing the petition herein for reinstatement in his said position, approximately ten times and upon an average of at least two times every year, but that the Civil Service Commission refused to reinstate him, with the fraudulent intent of preventing relator from performing the duties of said position and place of employment and from earning the salary he would thereby receive for which the appropriation had been made.

The relator further alleged that ever since September 19, 1916, continuously, up to the time of filing his petition, personally and through his attorney he has had numerous conferences relative to his reinstatement in said position with said Board of Local Improvements and with said Civil Service Commission, wherein the right of the relator to said position was discussed, but that he could never obtain from said Commission the statement of any definite reason for the refusal to so reinstate him, and he was led thereby to believe during all of said period that he would be reinstated to his said position, by reason whereof the relator refrained from filing his petition for a writ of mandamus prior to this time; that it was understood and agreed by and between him and said Civil Service Commissioners that said meetings and conferences were held for the purpose of obtaining a settlement and satisfaction of the matters before mentioned without resorting to litigation and that during the pendency of said negotiations the said Civil Service Commission did not at any time deny the right of relator to be reinstated in said position, but on the contrary, at all times recognized relator's right to reinstatement and informed him that they would repair the wrong and injury suffered by him and cause him to be reinstated and compensated therefor, but that finally becoming

Civil Service Commission and the Board of Local Improvements personally from that time until filing the potition berein for reinstatement in his said position, appreximately ten times and upon an average of at least two times every year, but that the Civil Service Commission refused to reinstate him, with the fraudulent intent of preventing relator from performing the duties of said position and piece of employment and from earning the selery he would thereby receive for which the appropriation had been made.

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uneasy and fearing that his rights might be jeopardized by the delay, the relator became convinced that he could obtain reinstatement in his said position only by process of law and commenced this action.

It further appears from the smended petition that immediately after a leave of absence was granted to the relator as above stated, the Civil Service Commissioners designated the respondent Julius Gableman, whose suspension was directed by the letter of the Civil Bervice Commission of December 10. 1915, to perform the duties pertaining to the position of Chief Street Engineer for the Board of Local Improvements: that the appointment of Gableman was temperary, but that ever since said time he has been performing the duties of said position to the prejudice of relator's rights with the knowledge and consent of both the Civil Service Commission and the Board of Local Improvements and in fraud of relator's rights and interest in and to said place of employment and the compensation therefor and in violation of the rules of said Civil Service Commission. and that the said Commission and said Board are paying said Gableman for performing the duties of said position out of the fund appropriated by the City Council for the salary pertaining thereto; that said Gableman is not entitled to said position and is performing the duties thereof in violation of the provisions of the Civil Service law and the rules of the Commission; that on September 19, 1916, being the date on which relator made application for reinstatement and prior thereto, no requisition had been made for certification to fill the alleged vacancy in the said position or place of employment; that said Gableman was merely a temporary appointed under the rules of said Commission, and that the present Civil Service Commission and the present Board of Local Improvements have refused to permit relator to perform the duties of said

uneasy and fearing that his rights might be jeepardized by the delay, the relator neame convinced that he could obtain reinstatement in his unid position only by process of law and commenced this action.

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position and have continued in such refusal ever since September 19, 1916, although relator has been at all times willing, able and anxious to perform the duties thereof in conformity with the Civil Service Act and the rules of said Civil Service Commission and said Board of Local Improvements.

The prayer of the petition is that the present Civil Commission and the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago be directed to forthwith restore relator to the said position of Chief Street Engineer for the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chicago, to the end that relator may at once enter upon and discharge the duties thereof and that his name be entered and placed immediately upon the proper rester and payrell of said City of Chicago, with the same right to continue in the performance of the duties of said position and receive the salary therefor as he would be entitled to receive had he not been denied reinstatement in the said position on and since September 19, 1916, and subject to the laws, rules and ordinances pertaining to said position and without prejudice to the relator's right to seek in other appropriate legal action, proper remedy for the recovery of all salary due him from said city for failure to reinstate and permit him to enter upon and discharge the duties of said position since September 19, 1916.

In support of its contention that the allegations of the amended petition are not sufficient to justify the relief granted, appellants rely upon pertain fundamental propositions, contending that the writ of mandamus will be awarded only in case the petitioner shows a clear right to the writ and a clear neglect of duty on the part of defendant to perform the act sought to be enforced, citing People v. City of Chicago, 280 Ill. 576, People v. Brentano, 259 id. 359, and other cases of similar import; that a person seeking reinstatement to a position in the classified service by a writ of mandamus must

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position and have continued in much refusal ever since captember 15, 1916, although relator has been at all times willing, able and suxious to perform the duties theseef in conformity with the Civil Service Commission and said Bervice Commission and said Beard of Local Improvements.

The prayer of the potition is that the present Civil Commission and the Board of Local Improvements of the City of Chiange be directed to forthwith restore relator to the said position of Chief Street Farineer for the Board of Local Exprovements of the City of Chicago, to the end that relator may at once enter upon and discherge the dustes thereof and that his made be entered and placed threadfately upon the proper restar and payroll of eald City of Chicage, with the same wight to continue in the performance of the dution of waid position and receive the malary therefor as he would be extitled to receive had be not been dealed reinstatement in the said position on and since September 19, 1816, and cobject to the laws, reles and ordinances pertaining to said position and without prejudice to the relator's right to seek in other appropriate lagal action. proper remedy for the recovery of all animy due him from ent eity for railure to reinstate and permit him to enter upon and discharge the duties of said position since deptember 18, 1916. 1 6 4.

In support of its contention that the clicyclions of the ameaded petition are not sufficient to justify the relief granted, appointment wely upon certain fundamental propositions, contending that the writ of sundamen will be swarded only in case the petitioner shows a clear right to the writ and a clear neglect of duty on the part of defectant to perform the act sought to be enforced, citing Propie v. City of Unitary, 180 intiff to be enforced, citing Propie v. City of Unitary, 180 ill. 576, Propie v. Hentang, 289 is, 250, and other cames of similar import; that a person sesking reinerstands to a position in the clearified service by a writ of a andome must

show the legal existence of the position and his right thereto de jure as distinguished from de facto, citing recople v. Ceffin.

282 Ill. 599, Feople v. Coffin, 279 id. 401, and Gersch v. City.

250 id. 551, which discuss the distinction to be observed between an effice and a place of employment and the relative rights of de jure and de facto officers. There is no dispute about these general principles, but we are of the opinion that the case made by the amended petition herein fully complice with the conditions stated in the foregoing authorities, so far as they are applicable to the present case. The emended petition shows that the relator refers continually to his employment as a position or place of employment and not as an effice. The legal existence of the position of Chief Street Engineer was fully shown by the smended petition, which prayed for reinstatement to a position and not an office. People v. Coffin, 282 Ill. 599.

sufficient and it was not necessary to plead probative or evidentiary facts. The claim that the relator was guilty of laches in asserting his rights cannot be sustained, in view of the fact that he was prevented from discovering the fraud perpetrated upon him through his confidence in the Civil Dervice Commission. In such case laches begins to run only from the discovery of the fraud when it becomes known to the party instituting the action. Keithly v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 271 Ill. 594; Ware v. Law, 214 Ill. App. 8. The relator delayed filing his petition on account of the clusive assurances given by the Civil Service Commission as to his reinstatement. Under such circumstances, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to deprive relator of the protection afforded by the Civil Service Act.

nhow the legal existence of the position and his right thereta de jure as distinguished from de facte, esting jeople v. Coffin. 202 Ill. 509, Reaple v. Coffin, 279 id. 401, and Gersch v. City. 200 id. 551, which discuss the distinction to be observed between an office and a piace of employment and the relative-rights of de jure and de facte officers. There is no dispute about those general principles, but we are of the opinion that the case made by the amended petition herein fally complies with the conditions stated in the foregoing authorities, acfor so they are applicable to the present same. The amended petition whow that the relator refers centimally to his employment as a position of phase of employment and not as an office. The lagal existence of the position of Chief Street Engineer as fully about by the smented petition, which prayed for reinstances willly about by the smented sensition. Prople v. Coffig. 288 111. 599.

The planding of michaete facts in the potition was sufficient and it was not necessary to pland probutive or swidentiary facts. The claim that the colator was guilty of laches in essenting his rights cannot be constained, in view of the fact that he was provented from discovering the fraud perpetated upon him through his confidence in the tivil cartice Commission. In ruch case lights begind to run only from the discovery of the freud when it becomes known to the party incitivating the cotion, daithly v. Surval life inc. to. 271 incitivating the cotion, daithly v. Surval life inc. to., 271 filling his petition on eccunnt of the charter relator delayed fill therefore the decirate of the charter securences given by the Civil therefore, the decirate of his calment terms. Under the degrive relator of the protection after connect be invoked to degrive relator of the protection after denote by the invoked to degrive relator of the protection after denote by the invoked to degrive relator of the protection after denote by the invoked to degrive relator of the protection after the point by the invoked

We are of the opinion that the material allegations to the amended petition summarized above, which are admitted to be true, show that relator is entitled to reinstatement in his said position as directed by the writ of mandamus issued herein.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

AFFIRED.

Barnes, F. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

We are of the opinion that the meterial allegations to the assended position numerical above, which are admitted to be true, show that relater is entitled to reinstrument in his anid position as directed by the writ of mandemus found herein.

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The judgment of the Circuit Court is effirmed.

Bernen, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

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T. BARRETT SMITH.

Appellee

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JOHE RODGERS and HARRIS, co-partners, doing business as HARRIS & RODGERS. Appellants.

APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT
OF COOK COURTY.

227 I.A. 6081

MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County upon a verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff. who is appellee, and against defendants, who are appellants, in the sum of \$1200. The action is based upon the sale by defendants to plaintiff of a second hand automobile. It is charged by plaintiff that the sale was produced by means of false representations made by defendants to the effect that the automebile in question was a current model, a \$10,000 Locomobile Sportiff and in perfect mechanical condition. The declaration contained twenty-one counts, which in substance alleged that defendants fraudulently and falsely warranted the automobile in question to be an absolutely perfect current model \$10,000 Locomobile Sportiff: that defendants knew the felsity of said warranties and made the same for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to purchase; that plaintiff relied upon said warranties in his purchase of the automobile in question. A plea of the general issue was filed.

A reversal is sought upon the ground that the verdict and judgment were contrary to the law and the evidence; that the court made improper remarks in the presence of the jury which were prejudicial to defendants, and that the court erred in refusing to give certain instructions requested on behalf of defendants.

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 The question as to whether or not the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict is not open to review in the present case for the reason that the bill of exceptions does not show a motion for a new trial, an order overruling the motion and an exception to such ruling. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Haselwood, 194 Ill. 69. Before an appellate court can consider any question of the sufficiency of evidence, it is necessary that a motion for a new trial should have been made and overruled and an exception preserved to the order overruling that motion.

Yarber v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 235 Ill. 597, citing numerous authorities.

Appellants contend that the judgment is contrary to the law, for the reason that the declaration and each of its counts charges defendants with having deceitfully sold the automobile in question to plaintiff, while the evidence tends to show a breach of warranty only. In other words, appellants say that there was a variance between the declaration and the proof. This contention was waived by defendants, so that it cannot now be considered as a ground for reversal, for the reason that the bill of exceptions contains no objections to the admission or exclusion of evidence on the ground of variance (City of Joliet v. Johnson, 177 111. 178; Probst Construction Co. v. Foley, 166 id. 31), and no motion to exclude swidence on that ground. Gascoigne v. Metropolitan West Side Elevated Co., 239 Ill. 18. The declaration sufficiently charged a breach of warrenty, so that there was no variance between it and the proof regardless of the fact that no objections to the admission of evidence and no motion to exclude were made upon that ground.

The written contract between the parties was immaterial, and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Consequently the rulings of the court as to the legal effect of certain of its provisions cannot be urged as grounds for a reversal. The action

The question as to whether or not the evidence was enforced to substitut to substitut to substitut is not open to review in the present was for the reason that the bill of exceptions does not show a metion for a mostion for a mostion. O. S. S. J. J. J. Co. v. Received. or the file ab. Defero an appointe court was consider any question of the settioisary of evidence, it is prosessary that a motion for a near trial should have been mass due everyabed and settion for a near trial should have been mass of the court court of the settion trassered to the order overralies and an everytion preserved to the order overralies that a substitut v. Ontead & allow by. Co., Edd Ill. 387, citing numerous extherities.

Appellents contend that the judgment to contrary to the lew, for the region that the declaration and each of the counts elicomes aclosis will never decomposition as a line standard segundo in question to whatatiff wills the evidence leads to show s treads of acreaning and read to the same and their there was a variance tolyeou the doclaration and the runof. This contesting was waived by lefacesate, so tast it equal to see or considered as a ground for reversal, for the responding the bill -Biore in abitation of the citarian and actional contraction and the contraction of the c sion of evicance on the gramma of variance ! 16g of foliat v. Johnson, 177 111. 178; erebet construction de. v. Poley, 166 ld. 31), and no motion to exolute withour on birt grippi. Convolute v. Metropolites lest ilde leveted do., 489 ill. 13. Pro ucclaretion aufficiently charged a creaty of warranty, so that to see man ford stricted to seelbarage foote and but if weeking conceiner on - as of following mer complient to molecular of of of anotheride on olulo were mide upon that groups.

The arithm contract between the perties of tensterial, end therefore install ations. One count, the rulinge of the court of the legal erfort of certain of its provisions cannot be arged as grounda for a reversal. The marion

was not brought upon the contract but upon the false representations and warranties which were employed to induce plaintiff to make the purchase whereby he was damaged. But an action will lie, even though the parties may have entered into a written agreement containing a stipulation upon the point covered by the misrepresentations. The fraud is not merged or extinguished by the covenant, but affords additional and more complete remedy to the party. Antle & Bros v. Sexton, 137 Ill. 410.

Our attention has not been called to any specific remarks of the court which were improper and prejudicial to defendants. The general statement is made that the words employed by the court concerning the effect of certain provisions of the contract were prejudicial. As we have already indicated, the contract in question was immaterial to the issues raised by the pleading. The defendants could not have been prejudiced by any remarks of the court with reference thereto.

Appellants have assigned as error that certain instructions offered by defendants were refused, without indicating in any way the particular instructions to which reference is made. While this point is made in the brief, it is not argued by counsel and is therefore waived under the rules of this court. The instructions which are attached to the record are not made a part of the bill of exceptions and therefore cannot be considered. C. B. & Q. R. B. Co. v. Haselwood, supra; R. St. Louis El. Rwy. Co. v. Stout, 150 Ill. 9.

For the reasons above indicated, the judgment of the Superior Court is effirmed.

APPIRMED.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

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Sl. May. Co. v. Clout. 150 111. 9.

Nor the reasons above insidetee, the judgment of the Superior Court is efficient.

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Barman, .. J., and C. Liley. J., secour.

216 - 27692.

CHARLES SORGE, et al., Appellees,

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JOHN E. TILLOTSON, Appellant.

APPRAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. JOST

MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Cook County directing that a certain lease purporting to have been executed by one Mary Leavitt, now deceased, to the appellant, John E. Tillotson, of the premises Bumber 4513 Indiana Avenue in Chicago, be surrendered and cancelled as a cloud upon the title of complainant, who is appelled here, and for the surrender of possession of said premises to one susie May, the cross-complainant.

The record shows that on May 24, 1919, complainant purchased from the executor of the last will and testament of Mary Leavitt, deceased, the premises above mentioned, subject to leases expiring April 30, 1920. He acquired title by executor's deed and a warranty deed from the sole heir of said decedent. At the same time, the executor delivered to complainant three leases from Mary Leavitt to the appellant, Tillotson, two of which expired April 30, 1920, being respectively for the first and second flats, and the other expiring September 30, 1920, for the third flat in said building; also an order on the tenant Tillotson to pay rent to complainant under the three leases above mentioned, commencing July 1, 1919. The complainant exhibited these leases and the above mentioned order to Mrs. Tillotson, the wife of appellant, who thereupon paid to complainant the rent, amounting to \$122.50, for the month of July, 1919. Subsequently com-

CHARLES SORGE, et al.,

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JOHN N. TILLOTTON, .. WHOLL of

ARPRAL WROM CLASUIT COURT.

227 I.A. 108

MR. BU TICH MOUNTLE MELLYPRICE THE OFFICER OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Olrouit Court of Gook County directing that a certain lease purporting to have been executed by one dary Leavitt, now deceased, to the appealant, John S. Milloteon, of the premises Number 4613 ludians avenue in Vilosoo, to surrendered and centelled as closed upon the title of complainent, who is appealace here, and for the surrender of possession of seld premises to one waterlay, the cross-socylainent.

The second shows been of the less will and besterant of knips learest from the exacutor of the less will and besterant of knips leares expiring upril 20, 1920. He sugained title by executor's dead out a merranty deer from the sole hard of unif ascedent. At the same time, the executor delivered to complains a three lease from Pary Leavitt to the appealment, Tilletion, the of which expired April 20, 1920, being respectively for the first and expired April 20, 1920, being respectively for the first and expired April 20, 1920, being respectively for the first and expired April 20, 1920, being respectively for the first and expired April 20, 1920, wor the second flats, and the other expiring Reptember 30, 1920, nor the third flat in and building; has an order on the tenant Tallotton to put rest to complete and the shore monthless order to has antitled those lease and the shore monthless order to has like the rate with the shore monthless order to has like the rest, amounting the to have least, amounting the to have least, and the last to have least, and of appellant, who chereupon peld to occupational ine rest, amounting the halfs. See the sure of the the month of July, 1919.

plainant sold the building to Susie May, subject to leases expiring April 30, 1920, and upon the delivery of an agreement for a deed of the premises, he assigned and delivered to her the above mentioned leases. There is evidence in the record tending to show that Susie May, the new owner, exhibited the leases to Mrs. Tilletson, who paid rent to Susie May for the months of August and September, 1919, at the rate of \$122.50 per month, being the amount of rental specified in the three leases.

Thereafter, on August 7, 1919, the appellant, Tillotson, caused to be recorded in the office of the Recorder of Cook County, Illinois, a document purporting to be a lease of the entire premises for a term commencing May 1, 1919, and expiring April 30, 1922. Said lease bears date May 1, 1919, and purports to have been executed by said Mary Leavitt, who died April 1, 1919. The rent reserved is \$122.50 per month, being the same amount specified in the three leases above mentioned. but made payable in three inetalments of \$35. \$45 and \$42.50 respectively on the 5th. 15th and 22nd of each month in advance. Commencing with October 1, 1919, Tillotson claimed to be holding possession of said premises under the last mentioned lease. Thereafter the complainant having been zerved with a notice by Susie May, the purchaser, to fulfill the terms of his contract for a warranty deed, filed the bill of complaint herein to cancel the said lease expiring April 30, 1922, as a cloud on his title, alleging as a ground for the relief sought that the purported signature of Mary Leavitt attached thereto was a forgery and that as against the complainant and his purchaser. Susie May. the appellant Tillotson was estopped to assert the validity of said lease by reason of his payment of rent under the three leases above mentioned. Subsequently Susie May, who was a defendant in

plainant sold the building to Sunie way, subject to lenses expering April 20, 1820, end upon the delivery of an agreement for a deed of the gresiese, he nusigned and delivered to her the above mentioned leases. There is evidence in the record tending to show that laste way, the new error, orhibited the lending to show that laste way, the new error, orhibited the leases to Mrs. Tillstoom, who poid ront to susic May for the months of August and September, 1819, at the rate of \$128.50 per menth, being the amount of reats is specified in the three leases.

Thereafter, on Augus 7, 1919, the eppellent, Filletson, daysed to be recorded in the effice of the Recorder of Cook Cousty, Illianty, a Council purporting to be a Lease of the autire premises for a turn commencing May 1. 1919, and exsid leads bears date bay 1, 1817, and piring April 66, 1982. purports to have been unvented to sold Mary Leavitt, who died april 1, 1979. The rent covered is 5122. 50 per lenia, being the same apout speak it on as the same about the approximation of but ands payable in three instalments of 455. has sud land but in respectively on the Stu, list and SEnd of such which in advance. Commencing with October ! 1919, Hillarson claimed to be beliing pos. araida of arid prom. or mover the last wentloned large. Thereafter the complainant levity bean served with a notice by Jasia May, the perabarer, to telfill the terms of the contract for a varrants doed. Tiled the bill of complaint hora to cenoul the said lease .weiring 'pril 30, 1922, as a class on his title, allegia, as a ground for the rolled and it that the parwith the transfer of the will be desired and the state of the same and that as section the unaplainest and his craiming an and bas the appoiltant illiction and cetopped to never the validity of search corne of rome from to them you at the number go earsh bles above mentioned. Subsequently Eusie Mig. who sees a defendant in

the original bill, filed her oross-bill asking the same relief as the original bill and for an injunction against the forfeiture of the contract and for the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents pending the termination of the controversy. The injunction was granted and a receiver appointed. The allegations of the bill and cross-bill were denied by the appellant Tillotson. A further review of the pleadings is unnecessary.

The case was referred to a master in chancery to take proofs and report his conclusions. The master's report was filed, which was subsequently approved by the chancellor. The final decree, entered December 19, 1921, found the facts substantially as above stated, and further found that the appellant Tillotson is in possession of the premises under the three leases first above mentioned and that the cross-complainant. Susic May, is entitled to the immediate possession of the entire premises; that the document purporting to be a lease of the entire premises for the period beginning May 1, 1919, and expiring April 30, 1922, under which Fillotson and his wife claim possession of the premises, does not beer the genuine signature of Mary Leavitt, the lessor therein named; that the same was not signed at the time or under the conditions claimed by appellants, and that said last mentioned document is a cloud upon the title of complainant and the interests of the orosscomplainant. The decree ordered that said last mentioned lease be delivered up and cancelled as a cloud on complainant's title; that the defendant Tillotson immediately surrender possession of the premises to the erose-complainant, Susie May, and in default of so doing, that a writ of assistance issue.

Appellant has assigned numerous errors, many of which are not argued in his brief, and therefore must be regarded as waived under the rules of this court. Lorenzo v. Hunter, 185

the original bill. filed her orese-bill saking the same rolled se the original bill and for an injunction realist the forfeiture of the seatrast and for the appointment of a reselver
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Appellant has mastyped ammerous error, orme of which are not argued in blu brief, and therefore and the termination of the rained of their court, poremis v. number, 188

Ill. App. 574; Deeker v. Braverman, 196 id. 387. It is contended by appellant that the finding is contrary to the evidence, but he has failed to indicate the facts shown by the evidence upon which he relies, and has made no reference to the pages of the abstract on which they may be found. The court cannot be required to search the record to determine whether or not the conclusions of counsel as to the weight of evidence are correct. Town of western Nound v. Loper, 185 Ill. App. 60. The same is true as to certain alleged erroneous rulings of the court, which for the same reason cannot be reviewed. Note to Ellison, 201 Ill. App. 28.

In this case there was a finding of facts by the master which was approved by the chancellor, and therefore must be regarded as conclusive upon the appellant, unless it can be said that the decree was clearly and palpably contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Silliams v. Lindblom, 163 Ill. 346; Siegel v. Andrews & Co., 181 id. 350; Treloar v. Hamilton, 225 id. 102; North Side Sash and Door Co. v. Recht, 295 id. 515. The evidence as to the alleged forgery was conflicting, but we cannot say that the findings of the master, which were approved by the chancellor and set forth at length in the final decree, were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

If it had been the intention of the appellant fillotson to rely upon the purported lease of May 1, 1919, he should
have made known the fact at the earliest possible opportunity.

Instead of doing so, he elected to recognise the three prior
leases as being in full force and effect by paying rent in accordance with their terms to two different assignees of said
leases. In doing so he attorned to both complainant and cross-

Ill. App. 674; Decker v. Braverson. 196 id. 387. It is contended by supellant that the familing is contrary to the evidence, but he has failed to indicate the facts about by the evidence upon which he relies, and has made no reference to the pages of the abstract on which they may on found. The court cannot be required to search the record to determine whether or not the devaluations of sensel as to the weight of evidence are uperson. Your of vertern Mound v. Loper. 185 ill. App. 60. The same is true as to pertain slieged erromeous ralings of the court, which for the sense reason grance of reviewed. 1811. App. 60. The same is true as to sertain slieged erromeous ralings of the court, which for the sense reason grance of reviewed. 1811. App. 60.

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complainant, and cannot be permitted to assert as against them, any rights claimed to have been acquired under the alleged lease of May 1, 1919. Having failed to speak when equity and good conscience required it, he should not be heard now.

Lloyd v. Lee, 45 Ill. 277.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

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Lloyd v. Lee. 45 Ill. 277.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
AFFIFMED.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.



MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPISIOS OF THE COURT.

Hamilton, plaintiff and appellee here, against Fred W. Upham and others to recover damages for injuries sustained while plaintiff was working upon a lumber pile belonging to two of the original defendants located in a lumber yard in Chicago and leased to a third party. The suit was originally brought against Fred W. Upham and Oliver O. Agler, doing business as Upham & Agler, and William C. Schreiber and Frank J. Swec, doing business as William C. Schreiber & Company. Prior to the trial the suit was dismissed as to the defendants Schreiber and Swec. The death of defendant Agler was suggested and the trial proceeded against the defendant Fred W. Upham, who is appellant here. There was a verdict and judgment of \$5,000 in favor of plaintiff, from which defendant has appealed.

The amended declaration consisted of three counts, to which defendant pleaded the general issue and a special plea of non-ownership, operation and control. The declaration charged, in substance, that on May 11, 1914, the date of the accident, defendant was the owner of a pile of lumber located in a lumber yard at Throop and Twenty-second streets in Chicago, which was being removed from the yard, and that

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ALEXABISM BALLLACE.

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PRED W. UPHAM.

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spellant.

SUPERIOR COURT.

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MR. JUSTICE MORNIEL DELLVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is a personal injury suit brought by Alexander demilton, plaintiff and appelles here, against Fred s. Upham and others to recover dawages for injuries sustained while plaintiff was working upon a lumber pile belonging to two of the original defendants located in a lumber yard in Chicage and lassed to a third porty. The mutt was originally brought against Fred S. Upham and Cliver C. Agier, doing business as Upham & Agler, and William C. Schreiber and Frank J. Jawe. doing business as william C. Schreiber & Company. Prior to the trial the suit was alsonised as to the defendants Schreiber and Ewee. The death of defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham, and the trial proceeded against the defendent Fred v. Upham.

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while plaintiff was working for defendant in measuring the lumber, pursuant to the direction of defendant's foreman, another pile of lumber next to the pile on which plaintiff was working suddenly gave way and fell upon plaintiff by reason of the negligent manner in which it had been piled; that defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the pile of lumber was likely to fall and injure plaintiff while in the performance of his work, thereby rendering the place in which plaintiff was working dangerous and unsafe; that while plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety and ignorant of the dangerous or unsafe condition of the adjoining pile, the latter gave way, thereby causing the injuries upon which the action is based.

The evidence shows that plaintiff was an experienced lumber yard man who had worked for defendant in the same yard where he was hurt for a period of five or six years; that he had done all the various kinds of work incidental to employment in a lumber yard, including the kind of work in which he was engaged at the time of the accident, and was thoroughly familiar with the general conditions prevailing in the yard and the handling of lumber. The lumber yard in question originally belonged to the firm of Upham & Agler, who had leased it to William C. Schreiber & Company prior to the accident: xbeekx thereafter the lumber belonging to Upham & Agler was from time to time sold and removed from the yard and Schreiber & Company piled their lumber in the yard, as vacant space became available. At the time of the accident defendant had only three piles of lumber remaining in the yard. These piles were of hardwood lumber and ran east and west. The pile farthest north was about five feet high, eighteen feet long and several feet in width. Immediately south thereof but separated by a space of three or

while plaintiff was working for defendant in measuring the lumber, pursuant to the directley of defendant's foreman. Emother file of lumber part to the pile on which plaintiff was working enddenly gove way and fell upon plaintiff by reason of the negligent manner in which it had been piled; that defendant knew, or in the exercise of ardinary cars should have known, that the pile of lumber was likely to fall and injure plaintiff while in the performance of his work, thereby rendering the place in which plaintiff was working dangerous and useafe; that while plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own while plaintiff whe in the exercise of due care for his own safety and ignorant of the dangerous or useafe condition of the adjoining pile, the latter gave way, thorway constant the latter gave way, thorway constant the

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four inches, was another pile of lumber belonging to defendant, on which plaintiff was working at the time of the accident. This pile was eleven feet high and six feet wide and was made up of pieces of birch lumber six to eight feet long, two lengths being piled end to end. South of this pile was a single tier pile eighteen feet long and of about the same height, composed of lumber three inches thick by twelve inches in width. This pile belonged to William C. Schreiber & Company and is the pile that feel causing the injury to plaintiff. Defendant had nothing whatever to do with the construction of this pile.

It was parallel to the pile on which plaintiff was working, but separated from it by a space of three or four inches. The third pile belonging to defendant was south of the pile that feel. All of these piles were parallel but no two were touching.

At about nine o'clock in the forenoon of the day of the accident plaintiff, with two laborers, was instructed by defendant's foreman to unpile and load upon wagons the lumber above mentioned. No other instructions were given by him and he was not present while the work was being done. Plaintiff went to the top of the pile and commenced to measure the lumber and to record the measurement upon a tally sheet. The boards were then pushed from the pile by one of the laborers upon the top of the pile to another laborer on the wagon.

As this work proceeded plaintiff was facing to the south during a portion of the time and observed the pile located to the south of him. The pile of lumber on which plaintiff was working was properly piled with cross pieces, but the pile that fell had no cross pieces. After the work had proceeded for nearly three hours, the pile of burch

four inches, was another pile of lumber belonging to defendant, on which plaintiff was working at the time of the accident. This pile was eleven freet high and fix feet wide and wen made up of pieces of hirch lumber six to sight feet long, two lengths being piled end to end. South of this pile was a single tier pile eighteen feet long end of about the name height, composed of lumber three inches thick by twelve inches in sidth. This pile belonged to William C. Schreiber & Company and is the pile that fell cousing the injury to plaintiff. Defendant had nothing whatever to do with the construction of this pile. It was parallel to the pile on which plaintiff was sorking, but apparated from it by a space of three or four inches. The taird pile belonging to defendant was south of the pile that fail. All of theer piles were parallel but no were touch-

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timber was so far removed that the remainder of the pile was less than two feet high. At this time half of the single tier pile to the south belonging to William C. Schreiber & Company suddenly fell, toward the north, striking plaintiff on his shoulders and knocking him against the five foot pile of lumber to the north of the pile on which he was working, partly covering him and causing the injuries for which suit was brought. At the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence in the case, written motions were made on behalf of defendant to instruct the jury to find for defendant, which were denied. A verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for \$5,000 and judgment entered thereon.

As grounds for reversal defendant contends that notwithstanding the pile of lumber that fell may have been unsafe, defendant and his foreman had no better opportunity to know its condition than the plaintiff, who worked only three or four ifect of from the face of the pile for approximately three hours and had every opportunity to observe its condition, and that plaintiff assumed the risk of his employment and is therefore precluded from a recovery.

In the case of <u>NaCormick Machine Co.</u> v. <u>Zakzewski</u>, 220 Ill. 522, the facts were almost identical with those involved in the present case. In that case the plaintiff was working in a lumber yard assisted by two fellow workmen in removing stacks of lumber separated from each other by a space of less than three inches. These piles, like those involved in the case at bar, did not touch each other and one did not act as a support for the other. The plaintiff in the Zakzewski case was an experienced lumber yard employee and was injured by the falling of one of the neighboring stacks of lumber.

We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in that case as conclusive in the present case.

timber was so far removed that the remainder of the pile was less than two feet high. At this lime half of the single tier pile to the south belonging to William C. Schreiber & Company suddenly fell toward the north, striking plaintiff on his shoulders and knocking him against the five foot pile of lumber to the north of the pile on which he was working, partly covering him and smucking the injuries for which outt was brought. At the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence in the case, written motions were made on behalf of defendant to instance the jury to find for defendent, which were defendent entered the returned in favor of plaintiff for \$6,000 denied. A verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for \$6,000 denied. A verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for \$6,000

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The conditions under which plaintiff was working were obvious to him or to any person of ordinary intelligence, and therefore the law charged him with knowledge of these conditions. He was old enough to comprehend the danger and was familiar with the place of his employment and the surrounding conditions. His duty to exercise ordinary prudence and care would charge him with notice of these. L. E. & W. R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 189 Ill. 89. Plaintiff was bound to prove that defendant had or ought to have had knowledge of the alleged dangerous conditions and that plaintiff did not have such knowledge and did not have equal means of obtaining it. Proof of this character is wholly lacking in the case at bar.

tering or continuing in an employment, knowing or having means of knowing its dangers, is deemed to have assumed the risk of his employment and to have waived all claims against his employer for damages in case of personal injuries resulting from such danger. <u>McCormick Machine Co.</u> v. <u>Zakzewski</u>, 200 Ill. 522; <u>Cichowicz</u> v. <u>International Packing Co.</u>, 206 id. 346; <u>Jenco</u> v. <u>Illinois Steel Co.</u>, 233 Ill. 301. The same authorities hold that such an employee assumes not only the ordinary risks incidental to his employment, but also extraordinary risks and dangers which are obvious and apparent.

It is contended by appellee that it was the duty of the employer to use ordinary care in providing a reasonably safe place to work. This is the general rule, but is not applicable to the case at bar, where the employee was engaged in doing work the nature of which was destructive to the lumber pile upon which he was employed. Westen W. & L. Co.

v. O'Dennell, 101 Ill. App. 492, and cases therein cited. The evidence in the case, with all the legitimate inferences that

The conditions under which plaintiff was working were obvious to him or to any person of ordinary intelligence. And therefore the law charged him with knowledge of these conditions. He was old snough to comprehend the danger and was femiliar with the place of him apployment and the surrounding conditions. His duty to exercise ordinary pandence and assequent oberge him with notice of these. he see Rene and assequent oberge him with notice of these. he see Rene and that defendent had or ought to have had knowledge of the alleged dangerous conditions and that plaintiff did not have such dangerous conditions and that plaintiff did not have such dangerous conditions the wholly lacking in the checkets in the cree of bar.

It is well satisfied that an employment, knowing or having means of knowing its dangers, is doesned to have account the risk of his employment and to have solved all cinima against his employment and to have solved all cinima against his employer for decages in case of personal injurious resulting from mob danger. McConside Hashing Co. v. Addrewski, 220 111. 582; Sidhosier v. Intermetional Puchims to., 506 is. 360; Jenge v. Illinois Steel Co., 233 III. 391. The case surherities hold that much an employer accumes not only the ordinary risks incliental to his employers accumes not expressed included adapters which are obvious and apparent.

It is confused by appeller that it was the duty of the capleyer to use or innry dure in providing a restonably sufe place to nork. This is the general rule, but is not applicable to the case at ber, where the capleyer sen sugared in doing mork the unture of which was destructive to the limber pile upon which he was employed. Terion is the total v. of once in the case, with all the legitimate inferences that

can be legally drawn therefrom, was insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff. It does not show any negligence on the part of defendant and discloses such circumstances with reference to the conditions surrounding the accident that plaintiff must be considered as having assumed the risks of his employment, thereby precluding him from a recovery.

The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed with a finding of facts.

REVERSED WITH PINDING OF FACTS.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

can be legally drawn therefrom, was insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff. It does not show any negligence on the part of defendant and discloses such circumstances with reference to the conditions surrounding the scattlest that elaintiff must be considered as having assumed the risks of his employment, thereby precluding him from a recovery.

The judgment of the superior Court is reversed with a "limitag of facts.

REVERSED WITH PINCING OF WACTE.

Berner, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

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FINDING OF FACTS.

We find as ultimate facts in this case that plaintiff's employer was not guilty of the negligence charged in the declaration and that plaintiff assumed the risks of his employment.

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is find as altimate facts in this care that plaintiff's employer was not suilty of the negligence observed in the declaration and that plaintiff essumed the risks of his employment.

CONTINENTAL AND COMMUNICIAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, as administrator of the estate of HAROLD S. KNEWAND. deceased.

ppellee,

APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, COOK COURTY.

CHICAGO AND WEST TOWNS HALLWAY

Appellant.

MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Cook County upon a verdict of \$8500 in an action brought by the administrator of the estate of Harold S. Kneeland, deceased, against the Chicago and West Town Railway Company, appellant, for the alleged wrongful causing of the death of said Harold S. Kneeland. The pleadings consist of a declaration of four counts and a plea of the general issue. In the course of the trial the fourth count of the declaration, which charged defendant with wilful negligence, was withdrawn. The remaining counts charged defendant with negligence in the operation and management of its car, whereby the decedent without fault on his part was fatally injured.

The evidence shows that the accident occurred at about six o'clock P. M. on December 3, 1918, at or near the corner of Stanley and Irving avenues in the City of Berwyn in this county. Stanley avenue is a street running in a general easterly and westerly direction, although its course is slightly diagonal, inclining to the northeast and the southwest. It is a half street, on the northerly portion of which defendant operated a double-track street railway, the east bound cars running on the south track and the west bound cars

CONTINUESTAL AND COMMERCIAL THRUST AND SAVINGS DARK, so administrator of the cotate of HABOLD S. KHELDAMS, deceased.

Appellee.

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APPEAL PROM SUPPRIOR COURT. COOK TOURTY.

CHICAGO AND WEST TOWNS HALLWAY COMPANY, a corporation,

Appellant.

RA. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE GETRICH OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superiar Court of Cook Sounty upon a vertice of Scott in an action brought by the administrator of the sature of Harold 2.

England, deceased, against the Universe and Scot Town hallway Company, appellant, for the alleged wrongful sausing of the death of sold Harold S. Enseland. The pleadings consist of a declaration of four counts and a plea of the general issue. In the course of the trial the fourth count of the declaration, which charged defendant with stifful negligence, was withdrawn. The remaining counts charged defendant with negligence in the operation and senagement of its car, whereby the decedant without fault on his part was futally injured.

The evidence whom the accident occurred at about six o'clock P. M. on December 3, 1915, at or near the comez of Stanley and Irving areanse in the vity of bereyn in this county. Stanley avenue is a street running in a seneral aasterly and mesterly and mesterly and mesterly discount, olikowith the course is slightly discount, inclining to the northeast and the scuthwest. It is a half street, on the northerly portion of which defendent spersted a double-track street rullway, the east bound cars running on the south track and the west bound ones

on the north track. The street railroad tracks run parallel to the tracks of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, which occupies the southerly portion of the street. Irving avenue is a north and south street, which runs into Stanley avenue but does not cross the latter street. At a point practically opposite the mortheast corner of these streets there is a cross-walk leading from the south side of the pertion of Stanley avenue occupied by defendant's tracks, across the railroad tracks to the north side of another street called Windsor avenue, which is parallel to Stanley avenue and to the tracks above mentioned. This sidewalk is five feet, four inches in width. A fence on the north side of the Chicago, Eurlington & Quincy Railroad Company's tracks prevents any crossing of the street by teams. The decedent was a passenger on a west bound car operated by defendant on the night of the accident. dark, but the scene was illuminated by an electric light at the northwest corner of the two streets.

The evidence as to the circumstances under which the accident occurred is conflicting. One of the witnesses for plaintiff, Agnes S. Webster, testified that just before the accident, she was at the rear door of the car preparatory to alighting; that the decedent stood there in conversation with the conductor; that she get off the car first and was followed immediately by another passenger, Miss Hagstrom; that Mr.

Kneeland alighted from the car after Miss Hagstrom; that the car stopped a little west of the cross-walk above mentioned. Mrs.

Webster testified that she get off the car first and passed around its rear end and that when she reached the middle of the east bound or south track, she suddenly heard a geng, which caused her to look up. She saw an east bound car approaching and gave a quick jump to safety on the south side of the rail,

on the north track. The atmeet railroad tracks run parellel to the trucks of the Chicage, Saviscon & Quincy Railrand. whitch socupies the enutherly parties of the street. Irving evenue is a north and south attect, which runs into Stanley avenue but down not cress the latter street. At a point procionly opposite the partheest corner of these streets -reg and to able drawn and mort gathend Histores a si eredt tion of Stanley Svanue compled by affoudits tracks, across the railroad tracks to him north bids of another street called Vindsor avenue, which is paralled to stenley avenue and to the tracks above mentioned. This sidewalk is five feet, four inches in width. A fence on the north side of the Chicago, Burlington & Ariney Kailroad Company's teache prevente any proposing of the street by term. The deading war a parcentar on a west bound our operated by defendent on the alcht of the sectiont. It was dark. but the sease was illusinated by an alstanic light at the northwest corner of the two streets.

The evidence on to the struck ander which the estimated estimated is sentitioning, one of the element for element for alternation the plaintiff, equen 3. The termitial that furt before the socident, was not the rear door of the our preparatory to simplify; that the dependent stood there is converantion with the conductor; that ohe yet off and our first and was followed inschingly by another passenger, him the land was followed inschind alighted from the car element that the terminal that the early per our off the our first and passen stopped a little scat of the another testified that also not fire our first and passen stough that the said that when the width of the early that the said the said the said the said of the early bound or continued for to look up. the next on the sould car appropriately to be up to look up. the underly on the sould car appropriately.

and as she jumped, she looked over her shoulder and saw decedent on the north side of the north rail of the east bound track.

The car passed her immediately afterwards. She did not see the ear strike decedent, but after the car had passed, she saw him lying near the south rail of the west bound frack.

contradicted Mrs. Webster's testimony as to the circumstances under which the accident occurred. The other passenger, Miss Hagstrom, testified that when she alighted from the car she did not look around but proceeded in a northerly direction; that as she stepped on the sidewalk of the northeast colmer of the two streets, she looked to the left over her shoulder and saw the east bound car coming about midway down the block and west of Irving Avenue. She had no difficulty seeing the car, which was lighted. After she had proceeded a distance of about fifty feet north on the east side of Irving Avenue, she heard Mrs. Webster call to her. She came back immediately and caw decedent lying upon the track.

that decedent did not hear the gong of the east bound car; that the west bound car was standing on the crossing at the time of the accident and that decedent got in front of the east bound car and was run down. Assuming that the version of the affair as given by Mrs. Webster is correct, it is apparent that decedent, after alighting from the west bound car, passed around its rear and was struck by the front of the approaching east bound car. There was no reason for assuming that the east bound car would or did stop at the point where Mrs. Webster says the accident occurred. Decedent must have seen the approaching east bound car and must have seen Mrs. Webster when she jumped from the track in order to

and an sic jumped, the locked over her absulder and sew decedent on the narth side of the next of the area bound track.

The ear passed her immediately afterwards. The tid not see the ear strike decedent, hat after the our had passed, ohe saw him lying near the sawth reil of the west bound frack.

substantially all the educate of the case control of the case control of the sead of the seaffield that when the slighted from the off of the office had that and look around but proposed in a mortherly direction; that and look around but proposed in a mortherly direction; that as also stepped on the sidewalk of the morthernet on our of the two streets, she looked to the left over ber shoulder and senting of laving about the bad as difficulty seaing the car, which of laving avenue. The had no difficulty seaing the car, which was that lighted. After whe had proceeded a distance of about fifty feet north on the event side of leving verse, who here decodent lying upon the teach.

The case was tried by plaintiff upon the theory that decedent did not been the gong of the cont bound car; that the west bound car; that the western did not been starting on the encesing at the time of the sections and and and about gut in first of the east bound car and was and and. Assuming that the version of the affair as given by sow, achairs is correct, it is apparent that descion, after alighting from the set brind car, passed around its rear and was struck by the front of the approaching cast bound car would are did stop at the paint where were the reat bound car would are did stop at the paint where were some the control of the set the control of the set the spendantag cast bound car would are did stop at the mass have soon the spendantag cast bound car would are not the the spendantag cast bound car would are not repeat the same that spendantag cast bound car and the the spendantag cast bound are not the the spendantag cast bound are not the the the spendantag cast the account of the theory account to see the the spendantag cast the account of the track in order to

avoid being run down. He was not in the exercise of due care if he immediately stepped in front of the east bound car under the circumstances stated. Where a person alights from a street car and passes behind such car and is struck by another going in an opposite direction, there can be no recovery if such person does not exercise care commensurate with the obvious danger of the surroundings. He must stop, look and listen.

Devine v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 203 Ill. App. 411; Burke v.

Same, 153 id., 388; Myhre v. Same, 216 id., 128. Under such circumstances, decedent was plainly guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident.

The conductor and motorman of the west bound car testified that they stopped at a point opposite the east side of Irving Avenue to allow passengers to alight and thereafter proceeded in a westerly direction; that they passed the east bound car near the center of the block, approximately 150 feet west of the east side of Irving Avenue. The east bound car was then lighted and traveling at the usual and customary running speed of a car between blocks. A passenger who was standing on the rear end of the west bound car, being the car on which decedent was riding corroborated this testimony as to the place where the west bound car stopped and that when the car was about sixty feet west of the west line of Irving Avenue, he noticed a man running for two or three steps and that he seemed to fall. This testimony as to the point where the cars passed each other was corroborated by the crew of the east bound car. The motorman of the east bound car testified that he saw Mrs. Webster pass in front of the car but that he saw no one else approaching the car and that no one else came in front of the car. If the circumstances existing/prior to the accident were as testified by all the other witnesses, with the exception of Mrs. Webster,

avoid being run down. No was not in the exercise of due core if he ismediately stepped in front of the east bound ear under the circumstances stated. There a person alights from a street car and passes bealth such cor and is atruck by another going in an opposite direction, there can be no recovery if such person does not exercise care connensurate with the obvious danger of the surroundings. He must stop, look and listen. Devine v. Chicago City My. Co., 203 111. App. 411; Surke v. Chicago City My. Co., 203 111. App. 411; Surke v. Same, 153 id., 336; Wyhre v. Same, 216 id., 128. Under auch circumstances, decedent was plainly guilty of negligence which

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the conclusion necessarily follows that the decedent failed to see the east bound car and placed himself in such a position that he was struck by it. The bruise on decedent's head was on the left side, indicating that he was not struck by the front of the car while attempting to pass before it, as Mrs. Webster had done. No reason is shown why he could not have seen the approaching car. It was lighted, it was making the usual amount of noise, it was plainly within the scope of his vision, all of the other witnesses in the case saw it. The view was unobstructed. If decedent had properly exercised his powers of vision he must have seen it. If he looked and saw the car coming and placed himself in such a position that he was struck by the car, he was plainly guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident. Hauk v. Peoria Ry. Co., 154 Ill. App. 473; C. P. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. DeFreitas, 109 id. 104; C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 135 id. 380; Dearing v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 196 id. 129. No negligence on the part of defendant was shown. There is no evidence in the record which standing alone was sufficient to sustain the material averments of the declaration. It is obvious that under either version advanced by the various witnesses as to the circumstances under which the accident occurred, decedent was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident.

A considerable portion of appellant's brief is devoted to a criticism of various instructions given by the court, which we do not deem it necessary to discuss, in view of our conclusion that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. We have carefully considered these instructions and are of the opinion that, taken as a series, they fairly state the law applicable to the case.

the conclusion accountly follows that his tenedent falled to see the east housed our shaped airsuelf to ouch a position that he was struck by it. The bruiss on decount's has the on the left eide, indicabing th. the rea mot count by the front of the ent while attempt to pase orions the ent. Tobetter had done in reason to chora why ha could no . seem the operoxoning dar. It was lighted, it was making the wid To agone and middly willial ; w tit, actor to tanona inwan Tiston, all of the other witnessess in the case saw it. The when wend transfer if denodent had properly exercised his powers of vision to must have seen it. If he looked and saw the car coming and glaced timerals in each a paint of the same struck by the car, he was plainly guilty of mouligrace wideh contributed to the sections. Link v. February. Co., 154 11 .. . cp. 473; C. P. & At. L. Sw. Co. v. Fraitam, 100 id. 104; C. s. i. a F. Ty. Co. v. Jones, ila id. 350; Youring v. Secria & forth Union Ey. Co., 198 id, 199. is neplicence on the part of defendant was shown. There is no cridings in the reader witch standing sions and militations of animalities and anothe paintents of the declaration. It is nowledge that ander either version advenced by the regions witnesses of the the circumstance of the correct of which the accident encurred, document was wilty of negligace enich contributed to the rections.

A monthly portion of appoints to the is devoted to a extitation of various in the time doveted to a exitation of various in the court, which we are not deem it opened by the discus, in the eff our conclusion cout devotes an equility of the later of the application of the court of the applicable of the court of the c

The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed with a finding of facts.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACTS.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

The judgment of the appertur Sourt in reversed with a finding of facts.

REVERSED WITH PIPELED OF FACES.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

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
FINDING OF FACTS.

We find as ultimate facts in this case that defendant was not guilty of negligence and that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident resulting in his death.

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PINDING ON FACES.

We find as withmate facts in this case that defendant was not guilty of negligence and that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident resulting in his death.



MR. JUSTICE MORRILL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The appellee, Mary Griffin, sued the appellant, the National Council of the Knights and Ladies of Security, in the Municipal Court of Chicago, and in her statement of claim set out the execution of a benefit certificate to Catherine V. Griffin on March 12, 1918, for the sum of \$1,000, payable to appellee, alleged the death of the insured September 25, 1920, and that notice and proof of death were furnished in compliance with the terms of the contract. An affidavit of defense was filed by defendant, and upon a trial by jury, there was a verdict for \$953. Judgment for that sum and costs was entered, and this appeal has been prosecuted therefrom.

the affidavit of defense alleged that the contract between Catherine V. Griffin and the Society consisted of the benefit certificate, the application and the constitution and laws of the Society all construed together; that the insured in her application falsely stated that her father had died of pneumonia, whereas he had died of consumption; that her brother had died of pleurisy, whereas he also had died of consumption; that she falsely stated in her application that neither of her parents nor her brother had been afflicted with consumption, whereas both her father and brother had been afflicted with that disease; that she falsely stated in her

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HARY GRIEFILM

Appellee

THE MATIGNAL COURSEL OF THE KNIGHTS AND LANGUAGES.

APPEAL FROM

WENICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. 609

.MR. JUSTICE MORALLE BELLVERED THE CRIMICE OF THE COURT.

The appelles, Mary Griffin, sued the syrallant, the Mational Council of the Mational Council of the Mations, and Ladies of Security.

In the Municipal Court of Cricage, and in her statement of claim set out the execution of a benefit cortificate to Catherine V. Criffin on March 15, 1915, for the sum of \$1.000, payable to appelles, alleged the death of the invared isptember 25, 1960, and that mation and proof of death were furnished in compliance with the terms of the contract. An affidavit of defense was filed by defendant, and upon a trial by jury, there was a verdict for \$000. Judgment for that our end one was entered, and this append has been proceed therefrom.

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application that no member of her household had during the last year suffered from or died of consumption; but that a brother, who was a member of the household during the year preceding the application, had suffered from consumption and died of that disease and that all of said statements were warranties.

The benefit certificate in question was introduced in evidence and showed that it was issued to the members upon certain express warranties, conditions and agreements. It was therein agreed that the application executed by the member is made a part of the benefit certificate and that it is true in all respects and is held to be an express warranty and to form the basis of the liability of the insurer the same as if fully set forth in the certificate and that the application, the benefit certificate and the by-laws shall be construed together as forming parts of the contract. It was stipulated in the certificate that if the application was not true in each and every part, then the certificate should be absolutely mull and void and that it was issued in consideration of the warranties and agreements made by the person named in the certificate, and said member's application and medical examination.

that the applicant had stated that her father had died at the age of sixty and the definite cause of his death was pneumonia; also that she had one brother dead, who died at the age of sixteen years and that the definite cause of his death was pleurisy; that he died September 10, 1917. There was a further statement in the application that neither of her parents nor any brother or sister had been afflicted with consumption and that no member of her household during the last two years had died or suffered from cough, consumption or lung disease. The application further agreed that the answers and statements therein contained should

application that no member of her household had during the last year suffered from or died of concumption; but that a brother, who was a member of the household during the year preceding the application, had muffered from consumption and died of that disease and that all of sets statements were warranties.

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The application was introduced in vyidense and showed that the applicant had stated that her her has father had at the second of aixty and the definite cause of his death was passented also that and had one brother death, who also at the second of sixteen years and that the critation cause of his death was advartaged for he died September 10, 1717. There was a further at tempet in the application that neither of her passents nor any araber or sister had been afflicted with consumption only that we seaher of her household during the last two years and that we seaher from consumption or into an earlier from consumption of the the answers and attention that the answers and attention contained chat the answers and attention there are there of that the answers and attention there are recritated or that the answers and attention there are contained chart the answers and attention there are contained chart of that the answers and attention there are contained chart and chart and

form the basis of the agreement with the insurer and constitute a warranty.

The evidence showed that appellee was the mother of the insured and that the cause of the death of the insured was pulmonary tuberculosis, which was in an advanced stage when the physician concenced his treatment of the insured in June, 1920. The evidence also showed that Thomas Griffin, the father of insured, died in Chicago December 20, 1913, of pulmonary tuberculosis and that John J. Griffin, a brother of the insured, died at Chicago September 10, 1917, from pulmonary tuberculosis. The evidence showing these facts is practically undisputed, the only attempt at a denial of them being contained in the testimony of appellee, who stated that the insured was not treated for consumption, and that neither her husband nor her son were treated for consumption.

relating to the risk and declared by the policy or any other instrument incorporated with it to be a condition of the insurance must be regarded as warranties. The truth of such a statement is in the nature of a condition precedent and it must be literally true to create any liability. Such statements will be deemed to be material, and if shown to be false, there can be no recovery on the contract even if the statements were made innocently. Crosse v. Knights and Ladies of Honor.

254 Ill. 80; Hancock v. Knights of Security, 303 Ill. 66.

It is well settled that the application for insurance constituted a part of the contract, (Crosse v. Knights and Ladies of Honor. supra) and that the statements made in the application were warranties and material to the risk.

These statements which have been mentioned as to the cause of death of the father and brother of the insured were false

form the banis of the agreement with the incurer and constitute aurrenty.

The evidence showed that appelles was the mother of the insured and the insured and the insured and pulmonary tuberculouis, which was in an advanced stage when the physician commenced his treatment of the insured in June, the physician commenced his treatment of the insured in June, 1920. The evidence also showed that Thomas Griffin, the Sather of insured, died in Chicago December 20, 1913, of pulmonary tuberculouse and that John J. Criffin, a brother of the insured, died at Chicago September 10, 1917, from pulmonary taberculouis. The evidence showing these facts is presidently undisputed, the only attempt at a denial of them being centuined in the testimony of appelles, who stated that the insured was not treated for consumption, and that neither has hard nor her were treated for consumption, and that neither has hard nor her went were treated

The statements and by the applicant for insurance relating to the cisk and declared by the policy or may other instrument incorporated with it to be a condition of the insurance must be regarded as worthaties. The truth of such a statement is in the nature of a condition preceient and it must be literally true to create say liability. Such statements will be deemed to be meterial, and if shown to be false, there can be no recovery on the contract even if the authorstate made inno cently. Grosse v. Anights and Ludies of Menor.

254 III. 80; Hancock v. Enights of receiving 205 III. 65.

It is well wottled that the application for insurance constituted a part of the contract, (Organs v. Ininhte and Ladies of Honor, supre) and that the atstements made in Regers, 119 Ill. 474; Enright v. National Council Knights and Ladies of Security, 253 Ill. 460; Hancock v. Knights and Ladies of Security, supra. Therefore there can be no recovery upon the benefit certificate involved herein.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERSED WITH FINDING OF FACT.

Barnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.

end rendered the contract void. <u>Continental life ins. Co. v.</u>
Regers, 119 Ill. 474; "nright v. Hational Council Enighte and Ledies of Security, 285 Ill. 460; Mandod v. Laights and Ladies of Security, supra. Therefore there on he me recovery upon the benefit estiticate involved herein.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed with a finding of fact.

REVERBELL STRUCTURE OF FACT.

Barnes, 2. J., and oridley, J., cencur.

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
FINDING OF FACT.

The court finds as an ultimate fact in this case that the application for insurance contained false statements which were material to the risk.

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PLYDING OF PACT.

The court finds as an ultimate for in this case that the application for insurance contained false statements which were material to the rink.



Opinion filed Nov.

MR. PRESIDES JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, Glickerman, brought this action of the fourth class in the Municipal Court of Chicago against the defendent, Sullivan, claiming that the latter was indebted to him for certain plumbing work, covering both labor and material furnished by the plaintiff, in connection with an apartment building owned by the defendant. The bill for the work in question amounted to \$179.30. The evidence was heard by the court below, a jury being waived, and the court found the issues for the plaintiff and entered judgment for the mmount of the bill. By this appeal the defendant seeks to reverse that judgment.

It is not denied that the defendant is the owner of the building in question and that the work and materials furnished by the plaintiff, which form the basis of his claim, were in fact furnished. It is also uncontroverted that the plaintiff never had any negotiations about this work with the defendant nor did he ever see the defendant, or know who owned the building in question, until some time after the work had been done.

done.

JACOB I. BLICKSPRAN, dolog Cusiners so the interschere Plucking C.,

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APPEAL FROM

THE OF INTENTAL

OF CHIPAGO.

DANIEL I. SULLIVAN.

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

en. Plishids liggist tensols activered the opinion of the court.

The piriotiff, blickerss, brought this action of the fourth class in the contessal tent of Chicago agraest the defendant, builiven, cloiming that his latter was andobted to himifor certain plumbing work, covering both labor and material furnished by the claiminff, in convention with an agarteent building exact by the defendant. The bill for the west in ruestion sammed to fire. The widener was beauted to court below, a fact to follow which and the exact found by the court below, a fact the same alived, and the exist found the issues for the same that for the same what for the same that for the same that for the same that find the bill. By this appeal to the fact the same that find the bill. By this appeal the defendant same to the bill.

It is not defined that the definition of the order of the building in questies and test the rook and materials furntiated by the plaintiff, which is not the hasts of the defin, were in fact furnished. It is else uncontroverted that the laintiff never had any negatiations about this arch eith the defication and are the arch to the defeatint ner aid an ever has the arthur. Or rook who owned the bailding in question, antil some the after the nork one been

It appears from the evidence that one Hahn, was the defendant's agent in looking after this building up to October 1, 1920, and after that date the defendant's agent, having charge of this building, was one, Holm. The plaintiff testified that Hahn engaged him to do the work sued for, in October of that year. Both Hahn and Holm were originally made parties defendant in this case. Hahn was served with summons but Holm was not. Neither filed his appearance in the case. Both, however, were subpoensed as witnesses and appeared at the trial. They were called as witnesses by the plaintiff, under Section 33 of the Municipal Court Act. Hahn testified that he ceased to be the agent of the building in question on October 1, 1920, at which time he turned it over to Holm; that at the time he told Holm it was necessary to make some repairs, and he suggested that they be made before the cold weather came on, as the repairs involved the steam heating plant: that he told Holm he had known the plaintiff for some years and that the plaintiff had done work for him, and he would recommend him: that Holm said: "Go ahead and do whatever necessary repairing is to be done": that following this, he directed the plaintiff to do the work, and that after the work was done, the plaintiff asked him to whom he should mend the bill and he told him it should be sent to Mr. Holm, who was the agent. When Holm was put on the stand by the plaintiff, under section 33, he testified that at the time Hahn turned the building over to him, in October 1920, he mentioned the fact that a plumber was needed to fix some pipes. and stated further that he would send him (Holm) a plumber that had been doing work for him (Hahn) for reveral years, whereupon he told Hahn to bring him in and "end we will find out what is to be done and take it up with the owner." There was some evidence in the record tendingto show that during the time Hahn was

oft mew . and the evidence that our Mahn, was the defendant's sgent is looking after this building up to Cotober 1. 1920, and after that date the defendant's agent, having charge of this building, was one, Holm. The plointiff textified that Makes engaged him to do the orrk audd for, in Cataber of that year. Both dafa and Bois serectifically made parties defendant in this case. Askn was cerved with summons but Wolm was not. Beither filed at anyourance in the once. - Soth, however, were subpoensed se witnesses and appeared at the trial. They were onlied as witnesses by the plaintiff, under Section 35 of the Municipal Court Act. Timbu trutified that he ceased to be the agant of the building in question on duteber 1, 1920, at which time he turned it ever to delug time at the time her told Bels it was necessary to make some repairs, and he ductonied that they be made before the cold wentling sense on, as the repairs involved the storm beating plant; that he teld field be had known the plaintiff for some years and that the plaintiff is done work for him, and he would recommend him; that liche sold; "Go sheed and de whatever accesency repeating is to be done": that following this, he directed the plaintiff to de the work, and that after the work wer done, the maintiff same him to when he should send the bill and he teld him it enough be sent to Mr. Helm, who was the egent. When bolm was jut on the stand by the plaintiff, under cection 33, he testified that at the time Mains turned the building over to him, in Cotober 1920, he mentioned the fact that a plumber was needed to fix some pipes, and stated further that he would read him (Holm) a plumber that and been doing work for him (dahm) for several rears, sherelyon at take the ball lite or buse but at min at mind of adah blot of to be dese and take it up with the owner. " There was anne evidence in the record tendingto show tout during the tire lake was the agent of the building, the custom was for him to take care of at least the minor repairs, and deduct the cost of such repairs from the monthly collections in the way of rents, and also deduct the jamitor's salary and the agent's commissions and remit the balance to the owner, and that the same custom prevailed while Holm was the agent.

The plaintiff has not filed any brief in this court. In support of his appeal the defendant first contends that the plaintiff failed to establish his contention that Hahn had been directed by Holm to employ him to perform the work sued for, by that prependerance of evidence which the law requires. On that point Hahn's testimony was favorable to the plaintiff, and that of Holm was not. These two witnesses are the only ones who testified on that point, and the argument seems to be that in that situation it cannot be said that the proper authority in the agent has been established by the preponderance of the evidence, citing Hilwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Monnahan, 217 Ill. App. 647, (Memorandum opinion) which is based on Peaslee v. Glass, 61 Ill. 94. We have previously had occasion to say, and here repeat, that in our opinion it is not the law in this State. that, where two witnesses contradict each other, one testifying in the affirmative on a given proposition and one in the negative, that it necessarily follows that the proposition has not been established by a prependerance of the evidence. Even where there are two such contradicting witnesses and some correboration of the witness maintaining the negative of the given proposition, it may properly be held that the affirmative of the proposition has been established by a prependerance of the evidence. It may be clearly apparent to the court or jury that the witnessfor the affirmative is telling the truth, whereas the witness for the defendant is not, and that such apparent corthe agent of the building, the custom wer for his to take ourse of at least the sinor repairs, and deduct the next of such repairs from the mosthly collections in the way of reute, and also deduct the jamiter's sulary and the agent's commissions and remait the balance to the esser, and that the seme custom prevailed while helm was the agent.

The plaintiff has not filed ony brist an this cours. In support of his appeal the defendant first ocutends that the plaintiff failed to establish his contention that Mahn had been directed by Holm to employ blue to perform the cork sund for, by that prepared or and dence which the law requires. On that point Balin's tentimosy was taverable to the plaintiff, and that of Holm was not. Those two witnesser are the enly ones who testified as that point, and the argument seems to be that in that estuates it cannot be said that the proper authority in the agent has been entablished by the prependerance of the evidense, eiting Milwarkee Gerrageting Co. v. Monnaham, 217 111. App. 647. (Memorandum opinion) which is based on France v. clear. 61 ill. 94. We have proviously had occertoo to any, and here researt, that is ear opinion it is not the law in this State. that, where two witteeses contradict even caner, one testifying in the affirmative on a given propertion and each in the magative, that it areasemilly follows that the proposition has not been sateblished by a prepandernere of the estacher. where there ere two ough contradicting attenders and come ourroberation of the witness eathericing the negative of the given proposition, it may manually be half that the effirmative of the proposition has been actablished by a preponderage of the evidrace. It may be olverly apparent to the court or jury that the situensfor the affirmative is telling the truth, thereas the without for the defoudant is not, and that such apparent cor-

reboration as the latter may have, is equally unworthy. Numbers alone cannot determine the question. First State Bank of Plane v. Isance, 221 Ill. App. 658 (Memorandum opinion) and cases there cited. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mears, Slayton Lumber Co. App. Ct. First Dist. Case No. 27128. Opinion filed Cetober 18, 1922. There is another reason, however, why the judgment recovered by the plaintiff cannot stand. On his own theory of the case, he was directed to do the work which is the basis of his claim, by Hahn, at a time when the latter admittedly was no longer the defendant's agent. But the plaintiff seeks to fix liability on the defendant, by reason of the fact that the employment of the plaintiff by Hahn was authorized by Holm, who was then the defendant's agent. That Holm was the agent of the owner of this building at the time in question is not denied. There is some controversy over the extent of his authority, as to whether it was limited to collections of rents or included the making of repairs. But, if we assume that his authority was broad enough to include the making of repairs, it would not follow that he could delegate that authority to another and that this delegated authority could be exercised by the latter and the principal be bound .- especially where, as in the case at bar, the one to whom the delegated authority was alleged to have been extended, was one who had formerly been the defendant's agent but whose services the defendant had recently dispensed with. Where an agent has charge of an apartment house for an owner and is given authority by him to have repairs made as they may become necessary, the owner reposes necessarily his personal confidence in the judgment and honesty of his agent. And, where that is the situation, the agent may not delegate the authority to another. Anyone assuming to act for the owner under such delegated authority, cannot bind the principal. In

reberetion we the latter may have, in equally uncertify. Numbers alone caunet determine the question. Hiret State Bank of Plane v. Innage, 321 111. App. 658 (Wesserendum opinion) and cases there at ted. Seers Rosbuck & Co. v. Mears, Clayton lumber de. App. 6t. First idet. Case No. 27128. Opinion filmd Ceteber 18. 1922. There is auditor reason, bewerer, why the judgment recovered by the plaintiff earnet stand, on his own theory of the case, he was directed to do the work shich is the hasis of his claim, for Hape, at a time when the latter admittedly was ms langer the defendant's ogent, but the plaintiff seeks to fix limbility on the defendant, by reason of the fact that the employment of the plaintiff by lishe was authorized by Folm, who wen then the defendent's agent. That the sam the agent of the ewner of this building at the time is greating is not degled. There is some controversy over the extent of his authority, as to whether it was limited to callections of reals or included the making of repairs. But, if we secue, that has cuthority mas broad enough to include the earling of repairs, it sould not follow that he could delegate thet authority to enciner and that this delegated authority ocald be exercised by the latter and the principal be bound .- especially share, as in the case at bar, the one to when the delegated sutnerity age alleged to have been extended, was one who had formarily been the aefendantie agent but whose services the defendant had recreity dispensed with. Chere an agent has charge of an americant house for an evner and is given subnotity by his to have repeirs sude as they may become revesery, the owner reponer aronesarily his personal conflicted in the judgment and hencely of his rejout. And, where that is the situation, the agent may met delegate the authority to ampliant. Anyone uncoming to pat for the owner under much delegated sutportty, connect bind the principal.

Eldridge v. Halway, 18 Ill. 445, a principal appeinted an attorney in fact to not for him in recovering possession of certain property and to take any proceedings at law or in equity necessary to accomplish the desired object. The attorney in fact employed an attorney at law, to make demand for possession, and serve a written notice. The trial court excluded the evidence of the service of the notice and the making of the demand for possession, on the ground that the authority extended to the attorney in fact, by the principal, could not be delegated. In reversing the judgment the court observed, that, "in performance of a general or special agency, many acts are to be performed, of an indifferent nature, which may as well be done by one person as another, and which an agent might find it extremely inconvenient to perform personally. The maxim withhelding the power of subdelegation of authority only has place when there is an object, an and to be gained -- where the interest of the principal may be neglected or injured by substitution. When, from the nature of the act to be done, there can be no difference, the principle cannot apply. Such is the case here. There is neither confidence, skill, discretion or judgment required to deliver a written notice, and make eath of it, which could prevent the employment of any one by an agent." The court held that the act there involved, fell strictly within the class of acts which could be delegated to another, by a duly authorized agent. In Grosier v. Reins, 4 Ill. App. 564, this court held that the general agent of an owner of a building. vested with judgment and discretion in the employment of an engineer for the building, could not delegate that authority to others, so as to make the acts of the latter binding upon the principal.

Midridge v. Halvey, 18 111. 605, a principal appointed an atterney in fact to not for him in recevering peasespies of pertain property and to take any proceedings at law or in equity necessary to annemption the desired object. The attormay in find employed an attorney at law, to make demand for ponnession, and serve a written noting. the trial court excluded the evidence of the erryhee of the notice and the makeing of the demand for possession, on the ground that the sutherity extended to the atterney in fact, by the principal, could set be delegated. In reversing the judgment the court observed, that, "in performance of a general or special agency, meny acts are to be performed, of an indifferent nature, which may as well be done by one percen as another, and which an egent wight find it extremely indopendant to perform personally. The maxim withholding the power of subdelegation of authority only has place when there is an object, angend to be gained -- where the interpost of the primeinal may be neglected or injured by substatestion. Then, from nature of the act to be dese, there can be no difference, the principle cannot apply. Such is the case here. Thore is neither confidence, adill, discretion or judgment required to deliver a written notice, and cake eath of it, which ocaid prevent the explayment of any one by on squat. The court hald that the sot there involved, fall stately within the class of sote which a nid be delegated to unciner, by a duly authorized agent. In Greater v. Beine, 4 111. Apr. 564. this court held that the central agent of an cemer of a bulluing. vested with judgment and discretion in the exployment of an engineer for the building, could not inlegate that sutmortty to ethers, so we to make the dots of the latter binding upon the principal.

In our opinion the agent of a building, whose authority includes the making of necessary repairs, may not delegate that authority to another and make the principal liable for the acts of the latter. Necessarily, in making the authority of his agent broad enough to include the making of repairs, the principal is reposing confidence in the judgment and honesty of his agent, and for that reason such authority may not be delegated.

In the case at bar, therefore, even if we assume that Holm was authorized, not only to collect the rents but to make repairs whenever necessary, he could not delegate that authority to Hahn. And, even if Hahn's testimony is correct, and Holm told him, on the first of Soteber, to go shead and do whatever necessary repairing was to be done, the principal would not be bound by anything Hahn did in carrying out those directions. It is apparent from the record that the plaintiff knew he was dealing with the agent. When the work was done, he asked Hahn to whem the bill should be sent, and the latter told him it should be sent to Holm. One deals with an agent at his peril, and in so deing it is incumbent upon him to satisfy himself, not only of the fact that the one with whom he is dealing is the agent, but that his authority is sufficiently broad to include the matter in hand.

For the reasons stated the judgment of the Municipal Court is reversed.

REVERSED.

TAYLOR AND C'CCHNOR, JJ. CCHCUR.

In our spinion the agent of a building, whose authority includes the making of necessary repairs, may not delegate that authority to another and make the grindpal liable for the usin of two latter. Messaurily, in acking the authority of his agent broad enough to include the asking of repairs, the prinotpal is reposing confidence in the judgment and scheety of his agent, and for that reason such suthority may not be delagated.

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Far the reversed etained the judgment of the Feriological fourt is reversed.

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TAYLOR AND E'COURCE, IT. COLOUDS.

196 - 27152

ANDERSON & LIND MANUFACTURING CO., a corporation. Petitioner.

W.

CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL, et al. Defendants.

APPRAL FROM

CIRCUIT COURT.

WOCK TOURTY.

THOMAS F. CHURCH,

Appellant.

PROPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al.

Appellees.

227 I.A. 6093


Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

AR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THE MOUNT delivered the epinion of the court.

By this appeal the respondent Church seeks to reverse a decree of the Sircuit Spurt of Sook Sounty, whereby he was found guilty of contempt of court, for which he was fined \$500.00 and ordered to pay certain ocets incident to the taking of evidence before a Master in Chancery. The alleged contempt, which had been complained of by the petitioner Anderson & Lind Mfg.

Co. consisted of certain acts upon the part of the respondent Church, which were held to be in violation of the terms of a permanent injunction decree which had previously been secured by the Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. against Church, the Carpenters District Council, their agents and representatives, and others.

The issues involved in this proceeding are the same as the issues involved in Case No. 27151, which is based upon the same injunction decree and the same patitions to show cause. We are this day filing an opinion in the case referred to. In



Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

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that epinion we have fully set forth the facts involved, and the law which in our opinion is applicable to these facts, and for the reasons which we have there set forth, we are of the opinion that respondent Church was properly found to be incontempt of court, and, therefore, the decree of the Circuit Court, from which he has appealed, is affirmed.


AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND C'CONWOR, JJ. CONCUR.

that aptains we have fully use force the facts involved, and the law which is easy epities in applicable to these frate, and for the reasers within we have there eat forth, we are of the opinion that respondent there are evenient found to be incoment of the court, and, therefore, the decree of the direct Court. from which he has appended, in affirmed.

APFIRDRY.

TAYLOR AND C'OCKFOR, IV. SCHOOL.



MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant seeks to reverse a judgment recovered by the plaintiff in the Municipal Court of Chicago, in the sum of \$1200.00, which judgment followed the verdict of the jury, finding the issues for the plaintiff and assessing his damages at that amount.

It appears from the record that the plaintiff owned an automobile which he had purchased for the use of his daughter; that the automobile was kept in the defendant garage, and whenever the plaintiff's daughter wanted to use it, she would call up the garage and ask that it be brought over to her home by one of the defendant's employees, and when she was through using the car she would call up the defendant and ask them to send one of their men to take it back to the garage. It also appears that there were occasions on which an employee of the defendant drove the plaintiff's daughter to some designated place and then returned to the garage with the car. At other times she directed the defendant to deliver the car to her at places other than her home.

RUWARD 2, PAURING,

Appelles.

APP IN THE M

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. PRESIDENC JUBILON THORACE delivered the opinion of the dourt.

By this appeal the defendent neets to reverse a Judgement recovered by the plaintiff in the Sudicipal Court of Chicaga in the run of Alace. (C. which judgment followed the verdict of the judgment followed the verdict of the damages at the issues for the plaintiff and assessing his damages at that oncunt.

It appears from the recent the the claimits owned in automobile which he had purchased for the use of his doughter; that the automobile was kept in the defendent gerage, and whenever the plainiff's caughter weated is use it, and actid call ever the plainiff's caughter weated is use the constant of the defendant's employers, and the same through the mas through the same of the same to the end of their sen to there it back to the employers it has a present them to the same of their sen to the end of their sen to the end of their sen of their the plaintiff's day, have to come declinated of the plaintiff's day, have to come declinated place of the garage with the car. It also but to the different the defendant to the garage with the car. It also there then the the defendant to deliver the car. It also there there have home.

It further appears that on the evening of June 21. 1919, someone called up the garage and directed that the car in question be sent to 808 Tower Court, which was not the residence of the plaintiff nor that of his daughter; that one of the defendant's employees took the car to the place designated, but found no one there to receive it; that he then drove the car to the plaintiff's residence, which was about a half mile from the Tower Court address; that upon arriving at the plaintiff's home, he was advised by the plaintiff that the car had not been ordered out of the garage and the plaintiff directed the man to take it back there. The evidence further shows that the plaintiff immediately telephoned the garage and talked with one Bain, the manager, and told him about the occurrence just referred to, and stated that apparently some one must be trying to steal the car. He told Bain that he had instructed the defendant's employee to return the car to the garage and keep it there, and in this conversation, the plaintiff testified, he told Bain that under no circumstances was he to let the car go out of the garage, until he first telephoned the plaintiff's house, and that Bain assured him he would not let the car go out unless he first telephoned the plaintiff.

minutes after this talk he had with the plaintiff over the telephone, some man called up the garage and again asked that this
car be sent to 808 Tower Court, and that he, Bain, told the man
that he could not have the car without an order from the plaintiff. It is Bain's testimony, further, that about three minutes
later the telephone rang again and the person on the telephone
said: "This is Mr. Pauling talking again"; that he was very sure
it was the plaintiff's voice, and that he told the witness it
would be all right to let the young man have the car, and that,

It further appears that on the evening of June 21, 1919, schools solled up the garage and directed that the sar in question he sent to 608 Yewer Court, which was not the realdence of the plaintiff nor that of his daughter; that one of the defendant's employeen toek the dar to the place designated, but found no one there to receive it; that has then drove the car to the plaintiff's residence, which was about a helf sile from s'Thismin!; eds so goivints meen hads ;esembla shuot revel eds home, he was advised by the platents that the car had not been ordered out of the garage and the piniotiff directed the man to take it buck there, The evidence further shows that the plaintiff immediately relephoned of a garage and tribed with one Bain, the manager, and told him about the edourreast just referred to, and clated that apparently some one must be trying to wiend the der. He wild daily that he had thotenesed the defondant's employee to return the car to the garage and been it there, and he bis on beiting the class out mountains and at hen to the our ne circinatencer was no te let his ner ac cut of the gerege, until he first tolephoned the planeiff's house, and that lain assured him he reals as for the bar go out unless he first telephoned the planeiff.

Is appears from the testimony of Rais hast a few minutes with this tail the plaintiff over the telephone, sews man online us the garage and spain naked that this san be sent to SeS lower fourt, and that he, him, tole the wan shat he could not have the car without as order from the claimlike he could not have the car without as order from the claimliker the baim's tentinony. Turiber, that about three minutes laker the talephone wang sprin and the person on the telephone said: 'This is Mr. Rauling thirten araken to the very euro
it was the picintiffs voice, and then he teld the vitness it weld be all right to be the our, and then our, and then.

thereupon, he sent one of the employees of the garage to the Tower Court address with the car, and it was left there with a young man who was there to receive it. The cer was never seen after that and it was, presumably, stolen. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant seeking to recover the value of the car on the ground that its loss was due to the defendant's negligence.

In support of the appeal, the defendant contends that on the occasion in question the car was delivered pursuant to a custom that had existed from the time the car had been first brought to the garage; that the arrangement made by the plaintiff's daughter was that it was to be delivered to her house or such place as she might order, from time to time, and that the defendant had been delivering the car pursuant to such orders for some weeks and it is the contention of the defendant that in delivering the car as it did, on the occasion in question, ordinary care was exercised.

In our opinion this contention is not tenable. A mere recitation: of the facts, as they are above set forth, is sufficient to indicate that after what had occurred within a few mements, the defendant could not be eaid to have exercised ordinary care in sending the car to the place designated pursuant to the second request, without calling the plaintiff back on the telephone to make sure that the authority that purported to be coming from the plaintiff, was really coming from him. It appears from the evidence that the person who was asking to have the car sent over to the Tower Court address, told Mr. Bain that he was Mr. Pauling. Jr., but when Bain was called up by the person claiming to be Mr. Pauling, Sr., the plaintiff, Bain made no mention of this fact.

thereupon, he sent one of the employees of the parage to the fower dourt address with the car, and it was left there with a young man who was there to reselve it. The ear was nover neem after that each it was, presumbly, stoles. The plaintiff brought this cotion applies the defendent neeking to recover the value of the ear on the ground that its less wan due to the defendant's megligence.

In support of the appeal, the defendent contends that on the contends that a distantion in question the car was delivered pursuant to a civeta that the circumstant that the the sar had been first browght to the garage; that the arrangement made by the plaintiff a daughter that the sale to be delivered to nor nouncer much place as she sight order, from that to time, and that the defendent had been delivering the cententian of the defendent of the defendent to such arders for some weeks and it is the cententian of the defendent had been and it is the cententian of the defendent that are the sentential of the defendent of the defendent that that is defendent that a delivering the car as it.

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from the evidence that the person who was asking to have the car
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sent over to the fower fourt address, told Mr. tain that he can
ing to be Mr. Fauling, Sr., the plaintiff, dain ands no mention

special contract had been made with Miss Pauling with reference to defendant's liability in the case of loss, by theft, among other things; that Bain told her that the garage would assume no responsibility for the car in delivering it; that he called her attention to the signs about the garage, saying that they would not be responsible in case of thefts, and that he wanted her to understand that this was the case, and that she replied that they need not worry about that as they were having the car insured. It is the defendant's position that this conversation relieved the defendant from liability for the theft of the car, under the circumstances testified to.

Assuming that the conversation referred to took place. and amounted, as the defendant contends, to an agreement that the defendant should not be liable in case of theft, it could not be held that such an agreement covered a situation such as the one disclosed by the evidence in the case at bar. By such a contract the defendant could not relieve itself from the consequences of its own negligence. Such an agreement as is relief upon, could only refer to situations involving the theft of the car from the garage under circumstances showing no negligence on the part of the defendant, or a theft of the car from the place designated for its delivery after it had been delivered by some authorized person, or circumstances similar to those. further contention that the plaintiff, who was the only witness as to the value of the car, was not qualified to testify on that This witness testified that he bought the car a little over a month before it was stolen: he was familiar with automobiles and had owned several different cars; that he had no experience in buying and selling automobiles, except as an owner;

npocial continet had been made with dies immling with reference to defendant's liability in the case of leas, by theft, emeng other things; that this told her that the darage would escure as responsibility for the same the delivering it; that he called her eitentien to the signs about the delivering it; that he called her eitentien to the signs about the deriver eaving that they would not be responsible in one of thefts, and that he wented her to undersiand that this one of thefts, and that he vented that they need not worry about that here, and that eite resided that they need not worry about that, he they, were having the cartinustics that this converse-tion and the defendant from liability for the theft of the car, under the circumstances teatified to.

. Deal to the tien ocarotist or rolled to the to the to the to the to the terms of and emounted, on the definitions overland, to be negreened that the defendant should not be lively in case of the? L. it could mak be had that such an agreenent covered a situation unah as the con disclosed by the evidence in the case of bar. By wish a contract the defendant nould not relieve little from the consequences of the own negligerose. Auch an agreement se te relief upon, sould only refer to editable lavolving the theft of the est from the carage under clicameterance chowing no negligence on the part of the defendant, or a theft of the ear from the plane some with the revision that the training appropriate the particular seasons and the revision that the seasons are the seasons and the seasons are the seasons authorized person, or otruspances ciallar to those. It is the further contention that the plantiff, who was the witness me to the value of the cor, who not qualified to trailing on that question. This witness towelling that he bought the car a little ever a menth before it was etcles; be was fundlish with musemedicas and had camed covered different core; that an 'wed reexperience in buying and selling autolobales, eac op es en comer;

that the car in question was worth around \$1500.00; that it was a new car when he purchased it and had been used about six weeks when it was stolen, and that it had been run about 2000 miles. He was asked what he paid for the car, but objection to the question was sustained. In our opinion, the witness was shown to be qualified to answer the questions he did answer and, furthermore, that he should have been permitted to answer the last question referred to, to which the court sustained an objection. The price actually paid in a bons fide sale is admissible to prove the value of the property involved. and, in the absence of further testimony, is sufficient proof of such value. Johnson v. The Canfield-Swigart Co., 292 Ill. 101; Barenass v. Hetel LaSalle Co., Ill. App. Ct., First District. case No. 27123. Opinion filed October 18, 1922; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mears, Slayton Lumber Co. Ill. App. Ct. First District. Case No. 27128, opinion filed October 18, 1922.

It is further urged that the verdict should not be permitted to stand, inasmuch as it is not responsive, there being no evidence in the record to justify a verdict of \$1200.00. This contention also cannot be sustained. If the car in question was worth \$1500.00 when it was new, and it had been driven approximately 2000 miles, over a period of six weeks, the jury were entirely justified in concluding that it then had a value of \$1200.00. Or if in the opinion of the witness Pauling, it was worth \$1500 when stolen, the jury were equally justified in concluding that in view of the other evidence as to the extent of its use and the fact that when stolen, it was a used car, it should be considered of the value of only \$1200. Complaint is made of certain remarks made by the trial judge in the course of the trial. In our opinion no reversible error is shown in that respect.

that the car in question was north around \$100.00; that it was a new car when he jurcheed it and had been used about six weeks when it was stolen, and that it and been tun shout 2000 miles. He was asked what he hald for the anr, but objection to the question was sustained. In our ofinies, the vitaess was shown to be qualified to amover the questions he did andwer and, furthermore, that he execut have been persitted to answer the last question referred to, to wish the pourt surtained an objection. The price actually paid in a bone fide sale is admissible to prove the value of the property involved, and, in the obsence of further testimony, is sufficient proof of such value. Johnson v. The Counted deduct do. . 292 111. 101: Barrange v. Hotel handle Co., Ili. App. 10., Pirst Stratet. esce No. 27125. Opinion filed Schober 18, 1922; dearn harmage \$ 90. v. Meers. Mayton lamber Co. Ill. Aps. Ct. Miret admirice. Care No. 27128, opinion files Cerober 18, 1854.

It is further urged that the verdict should not be permitted to stand, incommon as it is not responsive, there being no evidence in the record to justify a verdict of \$1200.00. This contention also cannot be emittined. If the sar is question was worth \$1800.00 when it was new, and it had been driven approximately 2000 miles, over a pariod of six weeks, the jury were entirely justified in conninding that it then had a value of \$1200.00. Of if it is the optains of the witness rauling, it sue worth \$1500 when steles, the jury were equally justified in somelading that in view of the siner evidence as to the entent of its use and the fact that when winter, it was a used car, it should be considered of the value of only \$1200. Complaint is should be considered of the value of only \$1200. Complaint is should be considered of the value of only \$1200. Complaint is that that in our epinion no reversible error is shown in that respect.

We find no error in the record and the judgment of the Municipal Court is, therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND C'COMMOR, JJ. CONCUR.

We find no error in the record and the judgment of the Municipal Court is, therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRESD.

TAYLOR AND C'COMMOR, JJ. COMBUN.

MINNIE WOODS, ABERAL PHOM Appellee. MUNICIPAL COURT Y. OF CHICAGO. AUGUST KHICKELS. 227 I.A. 6101 Appellant

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of forcible entry and detainer by which the plaintiff sought to recover possession of an apartment occupied by the defendant in a building of which the plaintiff was the owner. The defendant perfected this appeal from a judgment entered by the court in favor of the plaintiff.

In support of the appeal the defendant centends that the record does not contain proper proof of the plaintiff's demand for possession or of a sufficient notice to vacate.

It is clear from the testimony appearing in the bill of exceptions, that the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant the last of February, 1921. He had had a lease on the apartment in question, expiring April 30, 1920, and he held over after that day, apparently without any formal renewal of the lease. While the notice was not introduced in evidence, nor is the substance of it given in the record, sufficient appears to show that it was a sixty day notice to vacate. The plaintiff states, at one point in her testimony, that the defendant did not think he could comply with her wishes to get out in sixty days, and, at snother point in her testimony she said: "I gave him notice to get cut." But, apart from this, it

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MINNIE MOUNT

Appeller

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THE DE GARLOLAUR

CF CHICAGO.

AUGUST KRICKELS,

OLD VILLER

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. PRESIDING SUCTION THOUSER delivered the opinion of the court.

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should further be noted that in the trial court the defendant did not question the sufficiency of the notice, either as to the substance or the time of its service. While it is true that this was an action of the fourth class in the Municipal Court of Chicago, where written pleadings and other formalities are not required, as the defendant points out, it is also true that even in such a case one may not adopt a theory, on appeal or writ of error, which is not consistent with the theory contended for in the trial court.

It clearly appears from the record that the defendant resisted the action below on the theory also contended for here, that the plaintiff had waived her right to terminate the defendant's possession, by accepting the rent for the month of April. In our opinion that theory is not tenable. The defendant was, of course, under obligation to pay the plaintiff the rent for the premises in question, notwithstanding the service of the notice in February, until April 30, 1921, assuming the notice to have been a sixty day notice, which, in our opinion, is a proper assumption to make in view of the evidence in the record to which we have referred.

It was further apparently contended by the defendant in the trial court, that the plaintiff had agreed with the defendant that he might remain in possession after April 30, 1921, notwithstanding the notice which had been served on him. But that point does not appear to be argued by the defendant here, and, in our opinion, it could not be successfully urged. The defendant testified to a conversation he says he had with the plaintiff in April, on which he based his right to continue in possession. The plaintiff denied having any such conversation with the defendant. But whether there was any such conversation with the defendant.

should further be noted limb in the irial court the defendas to the substance or the time of the service. While it is
true that this was an nation of the ferrice class in the hundcipal Court of Unions, where written placitude and other formalities are not required, as the defendance points out, it is
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It was for a court, there exists non-section the constant in the total court and the the total court and section the section of the court and the section of the court and the section of the court and the court an

sation or not, even on the defendant's theory of it, there was no binding agreement made, extending the defendant's term.

At the conclusion of the hearing the court stated that he thought he would permit the defendant to remain in possession until August 31, 1921, upon condition that he pay rent after April 30, 1921, at the rate of \$50.00 a month. This resulted in some further discussion, the defendant contending that the premises were not worth that emount. Ultimately the court ended the matter by rendering the judgment, from which the defendant has appealed.

Under the statute, it was entirely within the discretion of the court to permit the defendant to remain in possession for a certain period, and the record is not such as to lead us to conclude that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in not affording the defendant such relief under the statute, even though he was at first disposed to do so.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

TAYLOR AND O'CONNOR, JJ. CONCUR.

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SATURE ACT CONTROL ST. 134YAR



LOUIS MEDER AND ROSE MEDER.

Appellees.

Appellees.

Appellees.

Appellees.

Appellees.

OF CHICAGO.

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of the fourth class brought by the plaintiffs in the Municipal Court of Chicago, by which they sought to recover from the defendant \$250.00, which had been deposited by them as earnest money in connection with a contract, entered into between the parties, involving the purchase by the plaintiffs of a two flat building from the defendant. The evidence was heard by the court without a jury and a judgment was entered in fevor of the plaintiffs, for the amount claimed, to reverse which the defendant has perfected this appeal.

In the statement of claim the plaintiffs allege that they had contracted to buy a two flat building from the defendant for \$11,000.00, "same to be ready for occupancy May 1, 1921"; that a deposit of \$250.00 had been made under this contract; that the defendant failed to complete the premises, so as to have the second apartment ready for occupancy, within the time specified in the contract. The defendant filed an affidavit of merits, in which he set up as a defense, "that the defendant was willing, able, and ready to perform said contract, but that

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Appalleed. YAPPIAL PRIN

MURICIPAL COURT

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EREST A. LABOUR

Appellant.

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICS THEREIN Selivered the opinion of the court.

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The merita, in which he set up as a defendant filed on affidient of merita, in which he set up as a defendant that the defendant was said which the defendant that the defendant that the defendant that the defendant that the defendant was willing, able, and ready to perform which contract, but that

the plaintiffs refused to complete purchase of said building, and did not keep appointments to close said contract." It will be noted that in his affidavit of merits the defendant made no denial of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in their statement of claim, to the effect that the contract in question had been executed; that the earnest money had been deposited; that under the provisions of the contract the defendant was to have the premises ready for occupancy May 1, 1921; and that he failed to perform that provision of the contract. These facts are established by the allegations in the statement of claim and the failure of the defendant to deny them in his affidavit of merits.

Beyond this, the evidence introduced in behalf of the plaintiffs was such as to sustain these allegations. It is the position of the plaintiffs that the building in question was not completed when they examined it on the afternoon of April 30. 1921, and that the defendant's failure in this regard was a substantial one, whereupon, they announced they would not go ahead with the transaction and demanded the return of the amount they had deposited as earnest money. It was the contention of the defendant, and he introduced some evidence tending to show that whereas the building was not fully completed, it was practically so, and that the various things remaining to be done, could have been finished within another day's time. If the decision on this appeal rested solely on the question of whether the finding and judgment of the trial court were against the manifest weight of the evidence, we would be obliged to hold that the evidence in the record is not such as to warrant us in reaching that conclusion.

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

TAXLOR & O'CONNOR.JJ.CONCUR. AFFIRMED.

the plaintiffe rerused to ecopiese purelment of each building, and did not keep appayationned to olose said centrect. It will be noted that in the affinant of merries the defendent mede no denial of the inste wileyed by the classiffs in their statements of claim, to the effect that the appiration that the appreciated to governt the previous the consernt and made the previous of the consernt the creation the previous of the consernt the creation the previous for a upancy of the appenited have the previous of the consernt the creation the failed the previous for a upancy of the earth of the consernt of the consernation of the are established by the allegantions of the earth of the conservant. The of the conservant of the conservant of claim and the feathers are established of the allegantions on the conservant of constitutions.

Payond this, see each arm, armaded in beids became and at it commission, in a circlett of an announced artificial position of the plaintiffs that the building in giossion ass not ocaspicted when they eracted a c. tor a remove of this St. 1991, and that fin telegrapt's by some the take super out a the industrial fact into four bild their section and Initialists Syriget for to right mend ago, right and gold manage at it is been been To go the damp of the best transfer of the best book and the transfer to the transfer of the t ಕಿಸಿದ ಬರ್ಕಾಸನೆಗಳು. ಇಬರೆ ವರ್ಷಿಕ್ಕಾನೆ. ಇ. ಬರ್ಕಾ ತಿ. ಗಣ್ಣ ಅತ್ತಿಗಳು ಕ್ರಾರ್ತ್ ಕ್ರಾರ್ಗ್ that whereas the building was as I alp coephase. I was resulted ally de, and that the training thingen remained of the cont. of the mayor been fortaled wheren eacement day a time. If the a circum on bris antenil reservice toles an its annerit of the three care the die of the second of the s weight of the evidence, we all the oblined to inter any the interest to the or view and the second of account of the second of the second of . Ne kentence suds

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GEORGE SUTTER, et al.

Appellees

APPRAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT.

COOK COUNTY.

V.

CARL CHRISTIANSEN, et al., On appeal of Carl Christiansen.

Appellant.

227 I.A. 6103

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE O'COMECR delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiffs brought suit against Carl Christiansen and Samuel Laietzky to recover damages claimed to have been custained by them by reason of a well of defendants' building falling over on and damaging plaintiffs' personal property. Plaintiffs dismissed as to Laietzky and there was a verdict and judgment against Christiansen for \$2,000.00, to reverse which this appeal is prosecuted.

three-story building about 48 feet wide, 103 feet in depth and 35 feet high in which he conducted his business; that immediately adjoining this building on the east was a one-story building having a frontage of about 25 feet and a depth of about 16 feet; that back of this on the same lot was a shed and open space extending to the alley, the lot being about 108 feet deep; that this lot and building were exmed by defendant Laietzky; that he had rented these premises to plaintiffs who were in the coal and feed business at that place; that between four and five o'clock on the morning of November 24, 1919, a fire started in Christiansen's building and totally destroyed and west walls remained standit except that part of the east

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Research that does at the selection of the Research mend want of the property was the fall of the contract of the property of the emetained by them by remove at a vell of infradacta' building ever on and the emine to thill or corners proporty. Johnst a new artist the unindulus of an bearings at lighted material of .Dr. Dr. in to a me this littly famina i committed the which this m . not in presentation.

a backer arenald circ. Jees besolveth aronar aff three-story building about a feet she, it fort to could and 35 feet bigh in relen be ereducied and inidems; irui transferring with contract the contract of the beating beating a transage of mant the feet and a tipth of shear is free; and bare a this on the ease to wan a same and open square extensions to the eilny, the lot being arose 108 fort over that there is not british were comed by and laintaker; that so had meaters a series of the laid that and the who were to the form and find basefores the second to be been trees from the service of the contract of the services as the contract and herenteen the contract building a manufactual at the contract and the -topic peninasa milas room ben ind to draw sand denoxe of

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ing, and some of the joists in the front and rear of the building remained in place. A portion of the east wall at about the center had also fallen as a result of the fire.

West of the destruction was caused during the first three hours of the fire although it burned for a day or so afterwards during which time the fire department continued to throw water on it. After it was finally extinguished Christiansen made ready to rebuild his building. Plaintiffs, in the conduct of their business, used a motor truck, which, when not in use, was kept in the yard in the rear of their building. On Esturday, November 29, about 7:15 o'cleck in the evening, there being a strong west wind, a part of the east wall remaining after the fire fell onto plaintiffs' property including the truck and other personal property. It was for this damage that this suit was brought.

ourt should have directed a verdict in his favor on the ground that the evidence showed that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence in failing to remove the truck and the other personal property that was damaged by the falling wall, and for the further reason that the evidence discloses that the wall between the two buildings was a party wall and there was a common duty on the plaintiffs and defendant to protect it and keep it in repair; that the plaintiffs under their written lease from Laietzky were bound to repair this wall, and since no attempt was made to do this after the fire, and since it was as much plaintiffs duty as it was that of the defendant to do so, a verdict should have been directed.

Both of the plaintiffs, George and Peter Sutter, testified that during the fire some of the bricks from the

ing, and seem of the joints in the front and rear of the building remained in place. A sortion of the east sail at about the center had also fallen as a result of the first three west of the destruction was usused during the first three hours of the first three hours of the fire although it burned for a day or so afterwards during which then the fire department continued to three water on it. After it was finally extinguished christ-three water on it. After it was finally extinguished christ-three conduct of their business, used a solar truck, which when the conduct of their business, used a solar truck, which when not in use, was look in the yard in the rear of their businessing, there being a strong west sind, a part of the east the familial of the truck the fire fell cate rishability property including the truck and other personal oreporty. It say for this damage that the tens brokent.

The defendent, Christiansan, contends that the trial operate should have directed a vertical in the dever an two ground that the evidence shared that chartiffs says guilty of contributory negligeons in falling to receive the truck and the ether personal property that we canneged by the Talling wall.

The the farther reason that the evidence distinger that the wall between the farther reason that the evidence that the wall between the tre to party soll and there was a common duty on the plannille and defendent to protect it and keep it in repair; that the picintify and to repair this and; and artical that and since from laisting and to repair this and and along the sail.

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deen of the plaintiff, the sure and deter matter, tentified then auxing the fire name of the transfer that the

top of the east wall fell and broke the roof of plaintiffs' building; that they informed Laietzky of this and he repaired it on Saturday. November 20; that immediately after the fire the east wall was leaning in the middle and was warped and oracked. The evidence further showed that plaintiffs saw Christiansen around the building every day after the fire.

Witnesses on behalf of defendant tectified that the wall was not leaning or cracked but appeared to be in good condition, and that Christiansen intended to rebuild and make use of that part of the wall that remained standing after the fire. If the testimeny in the record as to the condition of the wall was only that given by the two plaintiffs, it might well be argued that they were guilty of contributory negligence in leaving their trucks and other property on the rear of their lot as they did. But the evidence on behalf of defendant is to the effect that the part of the east wall standing was in . good condition, and there is no evidence in the record that anything was said between the parties, or anyone else, that it was dangerous to leave the wall standing. And the evidence further shows, by the conduct of the plaintiffs in conducting their business as usual, that they did not consider that the wall was about to fall. This is also further borne out by the fact that plaintiffs' landlord repaired the roof of the building on Saturday morning but a few hours before the wall fell.

The jury were instructed that the plaintiff could not recover unless they found from the evidence that plaintiffs exercised due care to protect their property, and since they found their verdict in favor of plaintiffs, we must assume that they found plaintiffs had exercised such care, and since we cannot may that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion

toy of the east cell fall and broke the roof of plaintiffs' building; that they infermed labetaky of this and he repaired it on thiurday, howember 20; that impositately offer the fire, the east well non leading in the middle and ma varyed and created. The evidence further chosed that plaintiffs can Christienzen around the building every day after the fire.

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that the plaintiffs were negligent in conducting their business after the fire, we cannot disturb the verdict. Upon a consideration of all the evidence in the record we are of the epinion that this was a question for the consideration of the jury.

But the defendant contends that this was a party wall, and under plaintiffs' lease from Laietzky it was as much the duty of plaintiffs as it was the duty of defendant to repair it and, therefore, defendant was in no way liable, and that this is shown by the lease from Laietzky to plaintiffs. The difficulty of this contention is that when plaintiffs offered the lease in evidence it was excluded on motion of defendant Christiansen and only admitted as to defendant Laietzky, who had not been dississed out of the case at that time. Other evidence that Christiansen contends shows that the wall was a party wall is the fact that when Laietzky built this building he made use of the wall. We think this is not sufficient evidence to show that it was a party wall and, therefore, that question was not in the case.

Complaint is also made that the court should have granted Christiansen's motion to strike out all the evidence pertaining to the damages to the automobile truck on the ground that the wall was known to be unsafe and, therefore, it was plaintiffs' duty to remove the truck, which could have been easily done. Since we have held that whether the wall was apparently unsafe was a question for the jury, nothing further need be said on this point.

It is also contended that the damages were excessive and it is pointed out that Laietsky testified that he sold certain of the personal property destroyed by the falling wall to plain-

that the plainilife were negligent in annucling their business after the fire, we cannot airture the verdict. Then a consideration of all the cyldense in the every we are at the opinion that this was a question for the consideration of the jury.

Must the defendent arms then laid the see a party wall, and under plaintiffed have from laid they it was as week the duty of plaintiffed as it was the duty of defendant to repair it and, therefore, asferdant was in no may limite, and that this is shank the plaintiffe.

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The difficulty of this contention is that were plaintiffed offered the lease is erisence in meeting of defendant the lease in artisence in an exclusive of defendant their transment and only admitted we to defendant lateralist whe will care the teast of the case of that case of the case of the party well is the fact that that the many party well is the fact that when laterably beitt the ball ding he was not the the the transment of the third bill in our cuty well and the transment of the case, the sail of the case.

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much less than the value of them as testified to by plaintiffs. At the time Laietzky gave this testimeny he was
still a party to the suit, and upon a consideration of all
of his evidence we think the jury were warranted in giving
little or no credence to what he said. We think there was
sufficient evidence to justify the amount fixed by the jury
in their verdict.

There being no substantial error in the record. the judgment of the Superior Court of Cook County is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THOMBON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

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of his evidence we think the jury were worranted in giving
little or no eredence to shat he enid. We then then jury
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TROMORA P. J. AND CALLE . C. C. C. C.

212 - 27169

Y.

JOHN D. SCULLY.

Appellee.

APPEAL PHOE

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

OLIVER I. HAWKINS

Appellant.

227 T.A 6104

Opinion filed Nov, 29, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the epinien of the court.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by him by reason of the negligent manner in which defendant, a dentist, is alleged to have extracted one of plaintiff's teeth. Plaintiff claimed \$980.00. There was a trial before arguide and jury and a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff for \$980.00, the amount of his claim. The court entered a remittitur of \$380.00, and entered judgment on the verdict for the balance, \$600.00, to reverse which defendant presecutes this appeal.

Plaintiff testified that on the 28 or 29 of July.

1919, defendant extracted "a lewer right jaw tooth" for him, and in so doing wrenched the tooth to one side in a violent manner thereby breaking his lower right jaw bone; that he suffered intense pain and a few days afterward became infected with blood peisoning; that on August 4 following he called on a physician but the physician declined to treat him except in connection with a dentist; that plaintiff then called on defendant and defendant washed out plaintiff's mouth and painted his jaw with iodine; that afterwards he called on Dr. Collins, a

218 - 27169

JOHN D. SCULLY.

Appeller,

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OLIVER I. BAVILIO

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Opinion filed Tov, 29, 1922.

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physician, who had advised plaintiff to see a dentist; that plaintiff theneaw Dr. John D. Newell, a dentist, on two separate occasions and that Br. Newell took from plaintiff's wouth a piece of bone which had been "shivered off his jaw"; he further testified that prior to the extraction of the tooth by the defendant he had been a strong healthy man; that he had never had syphilis or any other venereal disease; that "his injury and less of time was due to the negligence and carelessness of Dr. Hawkins in extracting his tooth and in breaking his jaw bone"; that as a result he suffered great pain and was put to certain specified expense in and about endeavering to be cured; that he was laid up at the hospital about six months; that prior to this he had been earning about \$25.00 to \$35.00 per week. He further testified that no one was present when the tooth was extracted except himself and the defendant. Dr. Newell testified for the plaintiff that he was called in to see plaintiff on August 4, 1919, and that plaintiff was then infected; that he declined to treat plaintiff except in connection with a dentist; that he washed plaintiff's mouth with isdine and advised him to see a dentist; that he did not examine plaintiff's jaw to see if it was fractured and that he did not know if it was fractured or not; that necrosis could be of long or short duration. Dr. Gollins, for plaintiff, testified that he saw plaintiff about August 7 or 8, 1919, and that the latter was suffering great pain and his face and jaws were swollen; that there was pus which he extracted from the jaw; that "the infection was necrosis of the bone caused by a fracture: " that the fracture could have been of long or short duration; that he advised plaintiff to see a dentist and to go to the County Meapital. Dr. John D. Newell, for the plaintiff, testified that he saw

physician, who had advised plaintiff to see a dentist;

77 171 - F11

that plaintiff theness Dr. John B. Fowell, a dentiet, en two separate cocastons and that Br. Newell teck from plaintiff's mouth a piece of bone which had been "naivered off his tiw't he further testified that pries to the extraction of the tooth by the defendant he had been a errong healthy mes; that he had never had syphilis or any einer venereal disease; that "his injury and leas of time was due to the negligence and exrelesiment of Dr. Mewelus in extracting his tooth and in breaking his jaw bone"; that as a result be surfered great pain and was put to certain apecified expanse in and shout endersoing to be cared; that he was laid up at the mend had see this or tolto take published the bad been sarning about \$25,00 to \$35.00 per week. In further testitied that an one was promot when two week was extracted emount himself and the defendant. In. Accel testified for the plointiff that he was colled in to see plaintiff on August . 1919, and that plaintiff was then infected; that her dealine ed to treat dentiff except in connected ettl. a dentist; of min begives and anthei dita diame efficient badaes ed fadi see a dentine; that he did not execute statett's jaw to see if it was free bured and that he did not know if it wer freetured or met; that meeresis dould be of long or eacht jurnitan. Dr. Gellies, for plaintiff, testified bors in new cloicaliff. about August ? er 4, 1910, and thus the latter was autifulturen great pain and sie froe and jave sers swellen; that there was pus which he extracted from the jow; that "the infection one medrosis of the bone deaned by a fracture;" that the freshing - Lead to the set lead or eller duractury U.S. he advised plaintiff to see a Coutist and in go to the County Homitual, Dr. John D. Howell, for the plaintiff, contifed that he sum plaintiff early in the month of August, 1919, when he examined plaintiff's jaw bene and took therefrom a piece of bone which had been "shivered off"; that the piece of bone was "old, black, and showed that it had been shivered off for a long time", and that in his opinion, the fracture was not of recent date; that plaintiff's jaw was infected and that the infection was due to plaintiff's own negligence, absolutely; that the tooth had been extracted in an ordinarily skillful and careful manner common to that usually performed in Chicago smeng dentists."

The defendant, in his own behalf, testified that he extracted a "lower right cuspid tooth" of the plaintiff on or about the 28th or 29th of July, 1919; that he did not wrench plaintiff's jaw bone nor jaw tooth "to one side in a rough, violent nor careleen manner;" that he did not break or fracture plaintiff's jaw bone; that "he did not extract a jaw tooth, but the lower right cuspid, which is a front tooth near the corner of the mouth"; that he dused due skill and care in the extraction of the tooth; that plaintiff was afflicted with pyorrhea; that on August 5 he was called by plaintiff and that he treated plaintiff's jaw and told him to call again the next day, but that he never saw plaintiff afterwards; that at the time the tooth was extracted, J. B. Densby, another dentist, was present and saw the operation.

Densby testified that he was a dentist practicing in Chicago and that he was present and saw defendant extract plaintiff's tooth; "that the extraction was made in a skillful and careful manner; that the tooth extracted was not a jaw tooth; that plaintiff's jaw bone was neither broken nor fractured

plaintiff early is the month of August, 1918, when he erraled plaintiff's jew bone and took therefore a stoce of bone
which has been "shirered off"; that the piece of bone was
"old, black, and showed that it had bone mulyoned off for
a long time", and that in the epintes, the fracture was not
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by Dr. Hawkins; " that the plaintiff was suffering from pyorrhea, and that the extraction was done in an ordinarily skillful and careful manner "common among dentists in the City of Chicage."

This was all the evidence offered or received on
the trial. The evidence is set forth in narrative form in
the record, so that probably the exact words of the several
witnesses are not given. It is clear from the record that
plaintiff suffered a great deal of pain on account of his
fractured and infected jaw bone, but there is no evidence
except that of plaintiff himself that the tooth was negligently extracted by the defendant. No surgical, medical or
dental witness was asked whether, in his opinion, the extraction was done in a proper or negligent manner, and we think
the subject is such as would require witnesses of that character
to give their expert opinion on the subject.

In the case of <u>Bledgett</u> v. <u>Beviue</u>, 189 Ill. App. 544, where damages were sought to be recovered against defendant, a dentiet, for negligently extracting plaintiff's tooth, in the operation of which plaintiff's jaw was fractured, this court said: "The case of the plaintiff is predicated solely upon the fact that a fracture of the jaw and other alleged physical injuries resulted from the treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant. Proof of a bad result is of itself no evidence of negligence or lack of skill. As has been well said, 'a physician is not a warrantor of cures. If the maxim, res ipse loquitur', were applicable to a case like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however, slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial liability

by Mr. Hembins; "that the plaintiff was suffering from pyerrhes, and that the extraction was done in an ordinarity skillful and coreful somer "femmes among denties in the Oity of duinage."

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In the case of Michaels v. Seving, 188 111. App. 564.

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court maid: "The case of the stainiff to predicated toldy
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failure is our were held to be evidence, however, this, or
had result, for that part of the physician or surgeon equaing the
bad result, for they sould have to assume of practice the

for nearly all of the 'ills that flesh is heir to.' ' The burden rested upon the plaintiff to show a want of care or skill in the treatment, and that the bad result that followed the treatment was the result of such want of care or skill. He presumption that the defendantwas unskillful or begligent follows from the mere feat that the jaw was fractured and that the plaintiff was otherwise injured." And in the case of Goodman v. Bigler, 133 Ill. App. 301, it was said that whether a physician was negligent was largely a question to be determined from expert witnesses. To the same effect is the holding in Meline v. Christy, 180 Ill. 334, where it was said that the fact that a good result is not obtained in the cure of a wound is of itself no proof of negligence or lack of care, but that there must be affirmative proof of such negligence or lack of care, and that the injuries resulted therefrom. It was there also held that such proof could only be established by the testimony of experts skilled in the medical or surgical professions. See also Pettigrew v. Lewis, 26 Pac. (Kas.) 458.

There being an entire absence of any evidence in the record tending to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was unwarranted and it will, therefore, be reversed.

REVERSED

THOMBON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONSUR.

for nearly all of the 'lile that flack it into to.' ' The burken rested upon the pidintiff to show a rent of three or skill in the treatment, and that the bed rought that fallawed the trentment was the result of much wonk of name or to Inlilian unantion that the defendations unaffilial. boultgest follows from the mere fort that has gan fractured and that the plaintiff was otherwise injured." And in the case of Condana v. Bigler, 181 . 198 . act . it was atta chee whether a physician was centiment was largely a greation to be extermined from expert witnesser. To the name effect is the helding in Heline v. Shrinky, 186 11.. 354, obere it was said time the fact that a good result to be to the fire curs of a wanted in af thesis no prease of negligance or lack of care, but that he en much be afficeative proof of and angligomes or lack of care, and that the injuriag resulted therefrom. It was there also had that ough pract sould only be established Included to leadings the salitate states of the continue to See else Retrigrar v. Leuis, 2a ime. (Ken.) 488. Professions.

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THOMSON, P.J. AM. TAXION, I. BESTE,

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221 - 27178

H. H. CULMER,

Appellee.

T.

UNITED STATES ELECTRO
CHEMICAL COMPANY, a
common law trust, F.W.
ARMSTRONG, HOWARD ARMSTRONG, JOHN M. STINSON

AND JOHN C. BURMEISTER

Appellants.

APPEAL FROM

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

227 I.A. C105

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE O'CONMOR delivered the opinion of the court.

H. H. Culmer brought suit against the United States Electrical Chemical Company, a common law corporation, F. W. Armstrong and Howard Armstrong individually and as co-partners doing business in the State of Illinois as the United States Electrical Chemical Company, to recover \$300.00 claimed to be due him as wages at the rate of \$75.00 per week. fendants entered their appearance and filed an affidavit of merits denying that they owed plaintiff any money and denying that there was an account stated between them. Afterwards plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended statement of claim against the same parties substantially the same as the original statement of claim. To this amended statement of claim defendants filed an affidavit of merits setting up that the correct name of the so-called common law corporation was the United Electre Chemical Company, and denying that there was due and owing from the defendants or either of them any money to the plaintiff, and denying joint liability. The case went to trial before the court without a jury and after the evidence was all

221 - 27178

H. H. CULMER,

Appellee,

APPHAL FROM

MUMICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

UNITED STATES KLECTRO
CHEMICAL COMPANY, a
common law trust, 7.W.
ARMSTRONG, HOWAND ARMSTRONG, TORW M. STIMBON
AND JOHN C. BUZNEISTRE,

Appellants.

OID ATTE

Opinion filed Nov. 20, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE O'COMMOR delivered the opinion of the court.

H. H. Gulzer brought suit against the United States Electrical Chemical Company, a common law corporation, F. W. arentrag-on an bus whish interior anotherna brawch bus mortesta doing business in the State of Illinois as the United States Electrical Chamical Company, to recover \$300.00 claimed to be due him as wages at the rate of \$75.00 per week. fendants entered their appearance and filed an affidavit of morite denying that they owed plaintiff may money and denying that there was an account stated between them. Afterwards plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended statement of claim against the same parties substantially the same as the original statement of claim. To this smended statement of claim defendante filed an affidavit of merice setting up that the correct name of the se-culled common law corporation was the United Electro Chemical Company, and denying that there was due and owing from the defendants or sither of them any money to the plaintiff, and denying joint liability. The case went to trial before the court without a jury and ofter the evidence was all

in the court, on motion of plaintiff, entered an order that all the papers and proceedings be amended by making John M. Stinson and John C. Burmeister additional parties defendant and correcting the name of the so-called common law corporation in accordance with defendant's affidavit of merits to the amended statement of claim. There was a finding and judgment in plaintiff's favor against all of the defendants for \$150.00, to reverse which they prosecute this appeal. Plaintiff has filed no brief in this court.

Defendants' first contention is that the judgment should be reversed because while leave was given plaintiff to amend the papers and records to show that Stinson and Burmeister had been made additional parties and to show the cormect name of the so-called common law corporation, the amendaments in fact were not made; and, therefore, eince the record shows judgment rendered against two defendants who were not mentioned in the statement of claim the judgment cannot stand. This was a fourth class case in the Municipal Court where formality in pleading to a great extent is not required, and we would not reverse the judgment on that ground were it cormect in ether respects.

It is further contended for the defendants that the evidence shows that they entered into a written agreement which provided that the individual defendants should only be liable as trustee and, therefore, since the judgment runs against them individually and not in their representative capacity, it is not warranted and should be reversed. If the judgment in the instant case were against only F. W. Armstrong and Howard Armstrong, we think the point made would not warrant us in disturbing the judgment because the evidence showed that plaintiff was employ-

in the court, on motion of plaintiff, entered an order that all the papers and proceedings be amended by making John E. Stinson and John C. Burmeister additional parties defendant and correcting the name of the so-called common law corporation in accordance with defendant's affidavit of merits to the amended statement of claim. There was a finding and judgment in plaintiff's favor against all of the defendants for \$150.00, to reverse which they prosecute this appeal. Plaintiff has

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It is further contended for the defendents that the evidence shows that they entered into, a written agreement which provided that the individual defendants should only be liable as trustee and, therefore, since the judgment runs aquinst them individually and not in their representative especity, it is not warranted and should be reversed. If the judgment in the instant case were against only W. W. Armetrong and Howard Armstrong, we think the point made would not warrant us in disturbing the judgment because the evidence showed that plaintiff was employ-

ants and that Stinson and Burmeister were not in any manner mentioned. The only way they were brought into the case was by written articles of agreement entered into between the defendants and which were introduced by them at the trial and which tend to show that they were only liable as trustees. In these circumstances the judgment should not have been remedered against Stinson and Burmeister, and since this is an action on centract, we cannot affirm it as to some and reverse it as to others.

The judgment of the Municipal Court will, therefore, be reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMSON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.


ed by and worked only in connection with these two defendants and that Stinson and Burneister were not in any manner
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which tend to show that they were only liable as trustees.

In these circumstances the judgment should not have been rendered against Stinson and Burneister, and since this is an
action on contract, we cannot affirm it as to some and reverse
tt as to others.

The judgment of the Municipal Court will, therefore, be reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERBED AND REMANDED.

THOMSON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.



MR. JUSTIC \approx C **GGNNCR delivered the opinion of the court.

A complaint was filed against defendant charging that he "did make, aid, countenance and assist in making an improper noise, riet, disturbance, breach of the peace and diversion tending to a breach of the peace in violation of Section 2012 of the ordinance of the City of Chicago." The case was tried before the court and the defendant found guilty as charged. A fine of \$100.00 was imposed.

The defendant contends that there is no evidence in the record tending to sustain the charge made against him and, therefore, the court erred in finding him guilty and refusing to discharge him. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to set forth the evidence we find in the record.

Miss Cullinan testified on behalf of the City that she worked in Pullmen and going to and from her work she passed a church located at 113th Street and South Park avenue; that there was a bench alongside the church in plain view of both streets, the church being located at the corner; that nearly every day for a period of about two weeks she saw the defendant sitting on the bench reading ever and sorting some

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

Appellant.

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antigrado inchestes intena heiti ese intalemo a " de " that he "did make, mid, countersance and ascist in making on impreper noise, riot, disturbance, branch of the peace and diversion tending to a breach of the peace in violation of Section 2012 of the ordinance of the dity of inicago." the ease exact lambastes and the court see following forms and the as charged. A fine of \$100,00 me imposed.

The defendent contends that there is no evidence in the record country to match the charge ands against the and, therefore, the court erred in finding him quilty and refusion to discharge him. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to set forth the evidence we find in the record.

Mine Cullings testified on being? of the Caty that the worked in Frilman and going to and from her sork whe passed a church learter at 113th "tiret and "outh Fork svenue: that there was a bench alongaide the course in plain view of inth neresta, the charge being leaned of the corner; this mently every day for a period of about two works she saw the defendent attitue on the beach resulted ever and acritic mane

papers that locked like bills; that this was around the moon hour; that she saw a child about six years old, Madoline Bach, on two or three of these occasions dancing and twisting around on the sidewalk in front of the defendant; that she did not see the child sitting on defendant's lap, nor did she see the defendant touch the child in any manner.

Miss Lewandowski testified that she was an assistant principle in the Pullman public school which was located but a few blocks from the church at 113th Street and South Park avenue; that she passed this church four times a day going to and from her home to school; that she saw defendant sitting on the beach mentioned at moontime on one occasion only; that he was looking over some kind of papers and seemed to be sorting them; that on this occasion she saw the child Madoline "dancing and twisting around on the sidewalk in front of defendant;" that she did not see the child sitting on defendant's lap and that she did not see the defendant touch or do anything to the child.

Mrs. Bach, the mother of the child, testified that Madeline was six years old; that on two or three occasions the child came home with gum, but that the witness could not find out how the child got it; that the mother went out in the morning, noon and afternoon for a week or so and watched after Madeline when she left for school and when she was due to return to see who was giving her the gum, but that she was unable to ascertain who the person was; that she had never seen the defendant until the time she testified in court.

Leopold Bach, who swore to the complaint, testified that he was the father of Madeline and that he arrested the defendant June 9, 1921, took him to a corner candy store and

papers that looked like bills; that this was proud the noon hour; that she now a child about wir years and, indicine Each, on two or three of these constinus dentity and twisting around on the eithealt in front of the defendant; that one did not see the child sitting an defendant hap, not did who one the defendant touch the child in any manuer.

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had a neighbor hold him while the witness telephoned for the police: that prior to that time his wife had informed him that comeone was giving gum to Madeline, and he wanted to find out who the person was: that on two or three occasions he followed and watched after Madeline when she was due from school at noontime, but that he never saw anyone give her any gum; that on June 9, about moontime, he saw defendant near the church sitting on a bench putting some kind of papers in a bill book; that he then saw Eadeline coming along from school; that she turned and walked up to where defendant was sitting: that Madoline then saw the witness and ran to him and that she had a piece of gum, and that the defendent was chewing gum; that immediately he took the defendant by the arm and told him he was under arrest and compelled him to go to the candy store; that defendant did not resist; that there was no noise or disturbance of any kind and that he had never seen the defendant prior to that date.

Madeline Bach was called as a witness on behalf of the City and the record shows that she was not sworn. The record then is as follows: "Prosecuting Attorney: What is your name little girl? And. I don't know. Yes, my name is Madeline. I don't know how old I am. The Court: Little girl. do you know what it means when you come into court and raise up your right hand? Ans. No." Counsel for the defendant objected to the witness testifying as she was too young and did not understand the nature of an oath. The objection was overruled. The record then shows: "Prosecuting Attorney: Is this the man (pointing at defendant) that gave you the gum? Ans. Yes. Prosecuting Attorney: Did this man hold you on his lap? Ans. Yes." This last question was objected to on the ground that it was leading but the objection was overruled. "Prosecuting

bad a netober onld the wille the withens teleproned to. the paline; Must prior to that the bife and terrored him that sommone may giving gain to redeline, and he emiled to that out who this sersen west time in the or three scenaling to fillowod and matched after hadoline when the and dee from reacci at nounting, but this is noter on anyone give but oil gue! their on June 9. about the stine, it were used not near the church exiting on a benefit fail the best that a property on a guittin min and the classification of the gramme entracts was unit will not deal िरेंड : क्राइडे इस है कि इस है के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक्ट के क्रिक के pair offs to I her was on more only property will some confi breakfolder a pamer of gue, and that the about recept our training you; textand the bir. or were will be an analysis of give and the or give all man totalo the o all al an ol and about the feether an basen tobal the well to relies on you would take the see on the ferbuston sail buthings of any wind and that he had react seem the formatit sorter in that date.

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Attorney: Did this man lift up your dress and put his hand under it? (Objection overruled) Ans. Yes. " This was all the evidence, and defendant's counsel moved that defendant be discharged. The motion was overruled and thereupen defendant took the stand and testified that he was employed by the People's Gas Light & Coke Sempany as a special collector; that he handled collections such as where bills were paid by checks and the checks dishonored by the bank; that he was the only man doing this work in that part of the city for the gas company, and that in doing his work he necessarily passed 113th Street and South Park avenue twice a week or on an average of three times in two weeks; that he usually arrived at the church at about moon time and that after his lunch he usually sat on a bench for about fifteen minutes looking over his work and preparing his bills so as to have them in proper order; that he saw Madeline about three times: the first time she was with two other little girls and a little boy of about her age; that he took a package of gum from his pocket and divided it among the children; that on another occasion Madeline came to him while he was sitting on the bench and asked him for gum; that the third occasion was on June 9 when he was sitting on the bench getting ready to leave when the child come up and asked him for gum and he gave her a stick; that he never held the child on his lap at any time; that he did not lift up her dress nor put his hand under it; that he did not touch the child in any manner except to give her gum.

Robert R. Burr testified that he was employed by
the Cas Company as assistant superintendent of the collection
department; that defendant had worked for the gas company for
the past fourteen years and that the witness had known him all
that time; that defendant had never been arrested before and

Attermey: Did this man lift up your dream and put his hand under it? (Objection everuled) Ans. Yes. * This was all the evidence, and defendant's counsel moved that defendant be discharged. The motion was overraled and therwapen defendant took the stand and tentified that he was employed by the People's des Light & Coke Campuny as a special collector; that he mandled ocilections such as where bills were pand by chacks and the checks dishonered by the bank; that he was the only wen deing this work in that part of the city for the gas company, and that in deing his work he necessarily passed 115th Street and South Fark avenue tuise a week or on an avenue of three times in two weeks; that he unusily arrived at the church at show the cast that after his land he could not seen as a beach for about fifteen minutes locking ever his work and preparing his bills so as to have then in proper order; that he sew Endeline about three three; the first time she was with two other little girls and a little bey of about her age; that as teak a paskage of cum from his people and divided it among the children; that on another security sample came to him while he were sitting on the banch and caked him for gun; that the third econeton was on Jane 9 when he was sitting on the bened getting ready to leave shan the child came up and asked him for cam and he gave her a stick; that he never hald the child on his ing mt any time; that he did not lift up her dress nor gut his hend under it; that he did not touck the child in eny manner example to give her gum.

Rebert R. Burr testified that he was employed by the das dempany as assistant superintendent of the eclienties department; that defendent had worked for the gas company for the just fourteen years and that the witness had known him all that time; that defendant had never been arrested before and that the witness had hever heard any complaint against him; that he was familiar with defendant's reputation for truth and verseity, as well as for sorality and that it was good.

Mrs. Minnie O'Harrin testified that she had known defendent for the past six years; that he visited her husband frequently and that she knew his reputation for truth, veracity and morality and that it was good; that she had three small children of her own and several times on Saturday afternoons when the went shopping she left the children in the care of the defendant and he always took good care of them; that she had never heard any complaint made against him before. The defendent then rested and moved that he be discharged. prosecuting attorney then advised the court that he had another witness, a police officer, who found an obscene picture in defendant's possession. The police officer was sworn and testified that he was not the officer who made the arrest; that that officer was not in court; that there was a certain picture of an obscene nature found in the passession of the defendant at the time he was brought into the station and that he understood it was a picture with a poem and an advertisement of a hardware store printed on it; but that he had never seem it. Counsel for the defendant then moved that the testimony of this witness be stricken out and the court overruled the motion. The court then inquired of the officer if he thought the picture could be found at the station and the officer stated he would endeaver to find it. The case was then continued, the court instructing the officer to look around and see if he could find the picture. the court stating that the case would be continued and "in the meantime I want this defendant examined by Dr. Hickson"; that he wanted the report of the Dector at the hearing to which the case was continued. Two or three weeks later the case was called and

that the witness and mover heard any emepleint against him; that he wer facilize of th defendent's regulation for bruth and versaity, as well as for morality and test it was pace.

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Mrs. Winnis C'Harrin testified that she had known defoudent for the past six years; that he visited her husband frequently and that she later his regulation for truth, verseriff and ade fadt theon went it tand ban grifares has write amall oblicted of her own and saveral times on caterday oftereastly the east well at the at a life 4. 690 mosar when she west absorting she left the villdres in the care the defour it and he almays took good one it and the 05 had never beard our complaint made exainst his before. of T defendant then rived and mayed that he be the character. presenting alternay than advised the court tent he had another witness, a pelice of ther, who found an obseeme picture in defendant's posmeeting. The porter officer was swarm and teutifind that the error and the efficient who made the errors that that officer was not in court; that there was a cerula picture of an obsected mature found in the passes air of the defendant at the time he was prought than the station and that by anderstood it was a picture with a peak and an advertisement of a hardware after printed on 11. the that he mad never about it. Councel for the defendant that unved then use seemeny of this witness in stricken and end the centre organished and mailen. The court ed bices equiple and thought to be the continued to betture could Frund at the states and the efficar stated as mente endeaver to find it. the sens were then dontinued, the greek traitingting the officer to last excured and see if he ecula fied blue picture, the court stating dut the case would be reputated and Fin the meantime I want this 'eforder's examinate by lar. literrena; thet he manted the report of the Booter of the innering to which the ones Ine or three weeks later the cone was colled and van angilmund.

the court asked the presecutor if he had Ir. Hickson's report. The presecutor answered that he had and handed it to the court. The court examined it and stated that it was favorable to the defendant. Thereupen counsel for defendant requested that he might see the report. This request was denied by the court on the ground that the report was not in evidence. The court then inquired as to whether the police officer had been able to locate the picture but was advised by the city presecutor that the officer was unable to find it. The court then imposed a fine of \$100.00. This is all of the evidence in the record.

has not said one word touching on the merits of the case. There is not a word of argument that the finding of guilty was justified by anything that appears in the record, nor do we think such an argument could be successfully made. Counsel has, however, urged a number of hypercritical objections to the record in an endeavor to prevent this court from passing on the merits. Cases should not be disposed of in this court or any other court on some mere technicality, but the court should endeavor to pass upon the merits of the controversy where it can be done without violating some established rule of law or procedure, and we have no difficulty at all in passing on the merits of the case before us. But before doing so we will consider the technical points made.

The first is that the previsions of the ordinance which defendant is charged with having violated is not in the record; that the trial court under the law takes judicial notice of such ordinance but that this court does not; that to bring an ordinance before this court it must be incorporated in the record. This is the law as announced incomp decisions of this and the Supreme

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In court askenings it and straid that it was favorable to the defendant. Therefore account is not favorable to the defendant. Therefore account the acquest one cantides the pourt of the ground that the report was not in section. The court absorbance as to another on abic to be included as to another the policy of the sourt absorbance as to another the court absorbance as to another the court absorbance as the process of the star and the court absorbance as the process of the court about the court and the court and the court as and the process and the court as and the court as and the court and the court.

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Court, but in the absence of the ordinance from the record is of no consequence to the decision of this case. We have no eccasion to pass on the construction of the ordinance. The complaint filed against defendant charged that he "did make, mid, countenance and assist in making an improper noise, rict, disturbance, breach of the peace and diversion tending to a breach of the peace in violation of Section 2012 of the ordinance of the Sity of Shicago." The contention of the defendant is that the evidence does not sustain the charge made in the complaint. If the evidence in the record did sustain such charge and it was contended that this did not constitute a Violation of the ordinance, we would presume, the ordinance not being in the record, that the trial judge took judicial notice of the ordinance and, therefore, we would presume that the trial court's finding was correct that the ordinance had been violated. But in the instant case we have no occasion to consider such question and, therefore, the absence of the ordinance from the record does not effect the question at all. The question for decision is. Does the evidence sustain the charge made in the complaint? and this question might be properly decided without the ordinance being in the record.

The next point made by counsel for the City is that the certificate of the trial judge to the facts occurring on the trial is not in compliance with section 23 of the Municipal Court Act. That section provides that in case an appeal is prosecuted from the Municipal Court the judge, if requested by either of the parties shall sign and file "a correct statement to be prepared by the party requesting the signing of the same, of the facts appearing upon the trial thereof and of all questions of law." Counsel's contention, as stated by himself, is that the

Court, hut in the absence of tan ordinano from the record to of no consequency to the decision of thin asso. Je Saka 30 essesson to page on the construction of the eralmance. demolate filed against defeading charged that he "dif acke, at a quaremance and neers in walting on improper noise, rict, disburbance, breach of the peace out diversion teading to a brunch To committee and to alida mediace to muitalety at some out to the evidence does as sustain the cherge made in the coupleini. il oma opendo dove riskuso odo decor als as condice and II was continued that this sic sensitivies a victiting of the ordinance, we would presume, the ordinaces and being ly too resord, that the trank ladge took judickal relate of the ordina ande and, therefore, we will presume that the trial on rety Cinding was carrect that the ordinance but hear violated. Sit AD the leaven't case we have no constitute to consider even visit Men and, therefore, the obuness of the exchange from the renow does not refeet the attributed at all. Inc marking are desirates in agent the extremine suchmin ten consign and animal complaints and this absolute adapt in dispersy world and this the ordinance brief in the reaction

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not appear that it contains all of the evidence or all of the proceedings in the trial court, and that, therefore, it does not comply with the statute. The certificate is as follows:
"I, John A. Richardson, one of the Associate Judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a correct statement of the facts appearing upon the several sessions of the trial of the above entitled cause, and the decisions of the Court upon such questions of law." We think this is a substantial compliance with the statute. The trial judge certifies that the "foregoing" is a correct statement of the facts. If it is what it purports to be a correct statement of thea facts it means all of the facts and not a part of them. The point is hypercritical and without merit.

Counsel for the dity next contends that the case is not properly before us because the appeal bond in the record while it contains the words "Approved, John A. Richardson, Judge, Seal," yet there is no order in the record approving the appeal bond, and that since the statute requires the bond to be approved, and since the most that can be said is that it was approved by the judge, the case is not properly precented here. We metion has been made to dismiss the appeal although the record has been here for some time.

On the merite of the case the record discloses that the only matter that would in any way tend to show that the defendant was guilty of the charge against him was the statement of the little girl. And we think from an examination of the record that she did not understand the nature of the eath. If she did not so understand she should not be permitted to

quilificate of the trial judge is immufficient decouse "It decemps appear that it seathers all of the prosectings in the trial court," and that, therefore, it decemply with the trial court, "the certificate is as follows: "I, John A. Michaelsen, sor of the hasaiste dudges of the Municipal Court of Chicage, so hereby certify that the shore and force is a nurreact etatement of the facts appearing upon the noveral acentum of the trial of the above entitled court the noveral acentum of the Crial of the above entitled court in the trial this is a schedule that upon this is a schedule. If a trial judge certifies that the fire trial the court is a schedule of the trial of the trial finge certifies that the force all of the crial statement of the facts is what it purports to be a correct statement of the facts is the core all of the facts and not a part of these. The point is in second and facts and not a part of these. The point is in second and facts and not a part of these. The point is in second and sinest ment.

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she was not sworn. We know of no way of proving matters in a court of record in this State except under eath or affirmation. There was no eath or affirmation so far as the child was concerned. Testimony given in a case in court must have the sanction of an eath. I Greenleaf on Evidence (16th ed.) sec. 328; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1824; R. v. Brasier, East. Pl. Gr.,1-443 If a child is found not competent to take an eath, its testimony cannot be received. A careful consideration of all the evidence in the record, and which we have set forth rather fully, shows beyond question that there was no evidence against the defendant to sustain the charge and, therefore, he should have been discharged.

The judgment of the Munikipal Court of Chicago is reversed.

REVERSED.

THORSON, P.J. AND TAYLOR, J. CONCUR.

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the judgment to true. Implification and to Jewegood to the reserved.

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Timbeld, D. J. Mr. & Kinker, J. Crime.

27238 FREDERICK PARTIE, Appellee. Appeal from Circuit Court, -YS-CHICAGO RAILWAYS COMPANY, et al. Cook County. Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of 2271.A. 611² the court.

By this appeal defendants seek to reverse a judgment of \$5000.00 recovered by plaintiff in an action for personal injuries.

Plaintiff's theory of the case was that while he was in the act of boarding one of defendants' street cars which was stopped at a regular stopping place to take on and discharge passengers, the car started before he had time to board it and he was thrown to the payement and injured. On the other hand defendants' contention was that plaintiff dig not attempt to board the war until after it had started up. Plaintiff and two other witnesses called in his behalf testified to the effect that the our had stopped at a regular stopping place to take on passengers and that some passengers got on the car; that plaintiff then placed one foot on the lower step and took hold of the hendrail shen the car started up and he was thrown or fall from the car and injured. On behalf of defendants seven witnesses gave evidence to the effect that after the car stogged at a regular stopping place some persons boarded it and the car then started up and other persons got on while the car was in motion; that afterwards while the car was increasing its speed around a curve, plaintiff attempted to get on and was thereby injured.

Counsel for defendants carnestly insist that the verdict of the jury is against the manifest weight of the

280-27236 FREDERICE PARTIE.

Appalles, Appalled

CHICAGO BAILBANG COMPANY, es el.

Peak County.

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

Olrenitt Court.

MR. JUSTICE D'OCETOP Bellybrad the crimion of

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By calm appeal defeadance and to reverse a judgmunt of \$6000.00 recovered by plainfull in an auction for recount injucted.

Plaintiff's bloomy of the disc ess that wolle be when france 'sire.waited to bee indicated to due off of mast Sae we sater, od as a social cherrian alor to see the colde discharge passer ers, the sar eterated be bee he had sine to Spare it and he was the cold in the it is the set has the language Alt resulting the own southerness of the mind being sedie of . a britant bad al with librar the the chard of templia tem tirges his ded wid of Drites are and a rate and out two literals Them is the the force the tree are the reading and the property for elective we have lade has stappergraph no eight of surfic galg resel say an dear in their aids 1 that the that there edf ac tre to felters the er and theshwad d. o thed agod was quite he was shown or to I true div out injured. On theil of and some and the control of mites two and the, as at a legal at the plant place node a front no 3-2 these is also at the cosmolo again the the si pobshed The translation of a made of the facility of the two out of the business the training appear in the little and section and . Dornial goodest une fan no fon at

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evidence and that the judgment should be reversed with a finding off fact. We have carefully considered all of the evidence in the record and have examined it in the light of the able argument made by counsel, but are of the opinion that we would not be warranted in saying that the finding of the jury, which has been approved by the trial court, is against the manifest weight of the swidence. A reading of the swidence from the printed pages of the record might lead to the conclusion contended for by defendants if we should leave out of consideration the action of the jury and the better op ortunity they had for determining the truth than we have here. To set aside the vardict this court must find that it is munifestly against the weight of the evidence after taking into consideration the batter opportunity of the jury and of the trial court to determine the question by reason of their opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. Marble v. Marble, 304 Ill. 239.

Since we have reached the conclusion that the judgment must be reversed for another reason we have refrained from discussing the testimony in the record.

The declaration was in two counts. The first contained allegations to the effect that the car was standing still when plaintiff attempted to board it. The second was based on the theory that the car was moving slowly when plaintiff attempted to board it. The defendants contend that it was error for the trial court to refuse to aliminate the second count because there was no evidence to support it. We are of opinion that there was no evidence to sustain the second count and the court should have eliminated it as requested, but the failure to do so is not a legal ground for reversing the judg-

evidence, and that the judgment should be veverued with a We have ourstilly considered all of the finding off fugs. to sugal oils at it handhave eved two bypan ods at combine the able erguses and by seeinel, but are of the spinion thes we would not be werrented in waying that the finding of the tury, which has been a preved by the brish court, is against the gualfest waight of the ortiones. A reading of the evidence -moo add of hand fair in brooms and to appen boshing and mort divator contended for by defendants if we should leave out of valuation of the setten of tar far far far of the peters of they had for determing the truth than so nave here. To set risablene of at and but! seme same oils solbany eds ables . mental the metals of the evil energy of the saling that and formtion tak better or permitty of the jusy and of the trible court to determine the coupling by managery of and animaste of nee and hane ale elemente. Markle v. Markle, 374 Ill. 235.

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ment. Scott v. Farlin & Orenderf Co., 245 Ill. 460. But upon a re-trial of the case, if the evidence is the same as that in the record before us, we think the trial court should eliminate the second count of the declaration.

It is further contended by the defendants that the first count of the declaration was not good as a pleading; that it did not state a cause of action and that the court erred in giving an instruction on behalf of plaintiff which told the jury in substance that if plaintiff proved the allegations of the first count, he was entitled to recover. The argument in support of this seems to be based on the ground that it is not alleged in the count that any acts of the defendants were negligently done. The count does not allege specifically that the acts of defendants were negligently done, but it was not necessary to do this if the acts alleged show that the defendants were guilty of any negligence. The substance of the allegations of the count is that the defendants were common carriers operating the street car in question; that the car case to a stop for the purpose of taking on and discharging passengers, and while it was stopped for that purpose the plaintiff, with notice to the defendants and with all due care and caution for his own safety, the defendants, through their agents, did not stop the car a reasonable length of time to enable plaintiff to board it, but suddenly started the car ferward and by reason of such negligence the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured. We think the count is not subject to the objection made. Of course, it follows that the instruction given on behalf of plaintiff was not improper.

The defendants offered three instructions phrased in different language but all to the effect that if the jury believed from the evidence that plaintiff attempted to board the car in

nent. foott v. Parlin & Orendorf Co., 345 Ill. 660. But upon a re-trial of the date, if the evicence is the name us that in the record before us, we think the trial court should oliminate the second count of the declaration.

eas took asumbooled one and bubassage radract at al first count of the declaration was not good so a planding; that It did not etain a cemen of morion and that the court erred in civing as impression on behalf of plaintiff which told the To enoisonable wit herorg illimining it that property at Tivi the fixet occurs, he was sutition to recover. The argument in don el fi fed daugus set an besed od et encen etat la facque alleged in the count that any ucts of the defundants were cagligently done. The sount dose not allege apportfically that the asts of columbs were megligently were, but it em not reconsing to do this if the acts alleged sher that the defendants sere guilty of may magis reads. The substance of the allegations of the cours in that the definedate were con earliers operating ons are some one in quartion; that the one one on the confine mapone of taking on and dison write passes and anima to mapone atapped for that coupons the plaintiff, with notice to the defendon'ts and with all 'me cure and caution for his own safaty, the defendents, through their xgents, tid not stop the car & seasonable longth of rice to enable plaintiff to beard it, but schishly stated the cor foreard and by reason of cause statement plainist? our thrown to the ground and injured. Fo this the court is not subjust on the objection ands. Of ocurus, it ichicase the saw littliff; lo lished to asst, nellenteni and ladt .Togozeni

The defendance offered three luntruptions paranes in different imagnage but als to the sires that if the jury brileved from the swittensu that plaintiff extensive to branch in our in

question while it was in motion and was injured as a result thereof, he could not recover. The court refused to give any of these instructions but did give another instruction offered by the defendants shigh told the jury that if they found from the evidence that pluintiff was injured while boarding the car while it was in motion and that such conduct on his part was a want of ordinary care for his own safety which contributed to the injury complained of, then he could not recover. The defendants contend that they were entitled to at least one of the three instructions refused. We think the court should have given one of the instructions offered because a consideration of the syldence clearly shows that the theory of the plaintiff, and his evidence. was that he started to board the car while it was standing still and that it started forward before he had time to do so. The theory of the defendants, and their evidence in sup ort of it, was to the effect that after the car had stopped to take on passengers and after the passengers had boarded the car while it was stopped it was then started and other passengers ran after and got on the oar, and after this plaintiff attempted to get on. Each side was entitled to an instruction on its theory of the case. Of course, there are circumstances where a person would not be guiltyof negligence in attempting to board a car which had stopped to take on passensers after it had started up, for example, where a person was standing in a street at the proper place to board a car and the car came to a stop but did not stop a sufficient length of time to enable the person to get on. But that is not the situation before us, because if the testimony of defendants' witnesses was true, plaintiff was not at the proper place to board the our when it stopped, but was a considerable 'istance from such place, and in these circumstances, of course, there would be no invitation to the plaintiff to become a passenger at

alwant a us bongini are ban notion at use of office noticous To you seeks of thought sauce out thatast, he could not rapered. these innergotion metal " the second of the second or large by the continue of the second of the sec the defendants which told the jury that it they found from the evidence that plaintid! was imported thill boarding the our while to seek a way fire old no founded at un fact bas notion at one fi runtal and for all orn salety with a contributor for the that is until to complaint of and he would sur everyor. The coffeets can--il cold the low of the base for the of balliage rise were take hand atrections reduced. We thank the orbit should have alved one of the limited state of the contract a contract of the delicate clearly shows that but themes of the plaintiff, and the grangers. tiles writered on ti obide has theel of heather of inferior AND THE PERSON OFFICE DIST. IN THE THE TENER OF THE theory of the duringhave, one thoughts are indeed in amprour we de-The read of Strikes were the two read that the strike and of wear ार्थ कर कर परण अब ने पेर राज देशन देवता स्वतनस्त्र एसन दर्शका नेतन करके स्वास्त्र है। The story and it was burn, sairteed was end a consider and and got on the end and the state of the stat sale of the drawl of apprecial does to the trailing was pute Month the interest that it is been a paying the control of the control o De guillen and a comment in newlong to govern a description of information to the following to the defendence of the following the second or at the bound of the service of animal break wer meaner is also die Juniorist, a sie to ell in een to mora let tal ha top a balod 770 At 1 do + 2 . 16 at is now y and them as owns to against the pitualism before we, secouse it the thirtheon, or defendants' bound the one then be see but, by the and we will a second and the sample of the action of the second In the rest to a move of our stability add no bistation of bloom

the time and place in question. And upon a consideration of all the evidence in the record, we think it clear that the defendants were entitled to an instruction on their theory of the case, and are unable to say that they were not prejudiced by the refusal of the court to give such instruction. It follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TAYLOR, J. concure. THOMSON, P.J. dissenting:

While I concur in the view that the defendants were entitled to have some one of the three instructions offered given, and that the trial court erred in refusing them, I am not of the opinion that the verdict for the plaintiff is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It seems to me to be clearly so, and therefore that the judgment should be reversed with a finding of fact. As the cause is to be remanded for a new trial, I shall refrain from commenting on the evidence.

the time and place in question. And gran a consideration of all the evidence in the recent, we think it effect that the distributions in the treatments were matified to the institution on short theory of the case, and are mather to the char they were that responding by the respect of the court to give anch institution. It follows that follows the judgment of the Circuit Court of Gook County and the reversed and the characteristics as new trial.

REVERBELL IND FIRANCE.

TAYLOR, J. concurs. THOUSON, P. J. disconting:

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18RAEL BERGER AND TILLIE BERGER.

Plaintiffs in Error.

BESSIE BERGER, CHARLES W. PETERS, Sheriff, and LEON FIEDELMAN.

Defendants in Error.

GOOK COUNTY.

Defendant in Fror.

2 2 7 J.A. G. F. T.

ISRAEL BERGER, ZILLIE BERGER and LEON FIEDELMAN.

Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed November 29, 122.

MR. JUSTIC" TAYLOR delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit involves a bill of complaint to restrain the defendant. Bessie Berger, from custing the complainants under a judgment for possession of certain property and for an accounting and a reconveyance of certain real estate and for such other relief as may be equitable.

The defendant Bessie Berger filed a cross-bill and asked that a certain affidavit filed in the Recorder's Office be removed as a cloud upon her title to the property in question. A decree was entered finding the equities in favor of Bessie Berger, the Cross-complainant, and dismissing the original Bill of Complaint.

The property involved consists of a twelve flat building and a brick barn, located at 1037 and 1039 Racine

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ESPAND BERGER AND TILILE ERRORS.

Plaintiffs to Beror,

AMBER BREWER, CHARLES V. PETERS.

Dofendants in Arrer.

BECHEE BIRGER.

Defendant is Mrev.

IGRAFI BURGUR, TILLIN BURGUR ONG LEON FLUDZINAK,

Finintiffy in Error.

or Robbie

SUPPLIED ROLLING.

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Opidion filed Movember 29, 122,

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MM. THERETT TARTER Relivered the coluces of the

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This suit involves a bill of complaint to restroing the different, from (unitary the complainments under a judgming for associated of asythic preparty and for an accusting and a recenveyance of astain real article and for such other reals as may be equitable.

The defendent Bearse Berger filed a proceebill and soked that a certain affiderit filed in the Recertar's effice be removed on a cloud agon her title to the property in queetion. A decree was entered finding the equition to involve hearts Bearse Recyer, the Gross-com Intenet, and discipling the original of Complaint.

The pro orly involved densions of a twellow flat building and a brick barn, located at 1637 and 1639, sector

avenue, Chicago.

To understand this litigation it is necessary to consider a former suit in equity in the Circuit Court in this County involving the same property, and in which a final decree was entered. That cuit was brought by Bessie Berger against Israel Berger and George Young to remove certain clouds, particularly, a sheriff's deed to one Young, and establish title in her to the real estate in question. The decree entered in that case found and decreed substantially as follows:

That on September 13, 1907, Israel Berger was the owner in fee simple of lot 16 and was in possession, and together with his wife gave a warrenty deed of the premises to Emelie Eastman, which was recorded September 14, 1907.

That on September 15, 1907, Israel Berger was the equitable owner and in possession of lot 15; that the legal title was in one Davis Fiedelman; that on February 1, 1906, one Menry Scheresewsky for a valuable consideration paid to him by Israel Berger conveyed by warranty deed lot 15 to Davis Fiedelman which was recorded March 5, 1907.

That on September 13, 1907, Isaac (Ierzel) Berger precured Davis and Anna Fiedelman to execute a warranty deed to Smelie Hastman of lot 15, which was recorded September 14, 1907.

That on January 11, 1912, Emelie Enstman conveyed by warranty deed the two lots, 15 and 16, to Leon Fiedelman, which deed was recorded January 12, 1912.

That on Nevember 4, 1913, Leon Fiedelman, a bachelor, conveyed lots 15 and 16 by warranty deed to Isaac Berger, the husband of Beesie Berger, which was recorded July 25, 1914.

That Isaac Berger at the time of the last conveyance paid Leon Fiedelman a consideration of \$1769.00, which was the money of Bessie Berger.

That at the time of the conveyance by Leon Fiedelman to Isaac Berger the property was subject to an aggregate of \$15,000.00 in mortgages and other liens of record; that least Berger became possessed of the legal title of the premises in question.

That at the time of the conveyance by Leon Piedelman to Isaac Berger an agreement was entered into between Isaac and Bessie Berger on the one hand and Israel and Tillie Berger whereby Israel and Tillie agreed to collect the rents and profits from the premises in question and apply them to the

avenue, Chicage.

To understand this litigation it to ascessary to someider a former swit in equity is the Circuit Court in this Somery involving the some property, and in which a final descret was entered. That suit was brought by Bearie Borger against Laruel corgan and Copye Young to remove deriving clouds, pertiodarly, a sheriff a deed to are Young, and establish title in her to the real entered in question. The decree entered in that they found and deares entered in that they have found and dearest substantially as fellows:

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deed of the premises to beeler bediese, which was
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That on Mantenber 13, 1967, lorded Serger was the equitable comer and in prevention of let 15; that the Regal tille was in one casts Findelman; that on February 1 1966, ere Netzr Coherecesh; that on February 1 1966, ere Netzr Coherecesh; for a willable densi-station paid so his ty larged Honger Conveyed by matronity deed to in the Cavin Mantenber Conversed by matronity deed to in the Cavin Mantenber Coherence of the Conversed Research 1, 1867, 2001 of the Conversed Research 1, 2001 of the Conversed Rese

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Frat at the time of the agreement was anter-Pindelmen to issee Barger wa agreement was antered into between lawns and Bossie Herrer on the one hand and isseed out Itilia Sarger becoming agreed and Tilito agreed to relike the ender and profits from the premises in greation and arily then to the payment of insurance, repairs, taxes, interest. ete; that Leon Fiedelman surrendered all rights

and possession to the said premises.

That by reason of the payment of \$1769. to Leon Fiedelman, Bessie Berger became entitled to and was possessed of an equitable interest in the premises; that on or about July 20, 1914, Bessie Berger, believing that she had a right to change the name in said deed, caused to be crased therefrom the name of Issac Berger and inserted therein the name of herself and then filed the deed for record on July 25, 1914; that the erasure of the name and substitution of her name was not done for a fraudulent purpose but in a mietaken and honest belief that the title to the premises could be thereby conveyed to her.

That on June 1, 1915, Isaac and Bessie Berger executed a warranty deed of lots 15 and 16 to Bessie Berger: that pursuant to said conveyance the legal as well as the equitable title became vested in Bessie Berger as against the defendant, George Young.

That from June 9, 1915, when the bill was filed Bessie Berger through her agent Israel Berger was in disputed possession of the premises.

That the property was subsequently sold under a judgment obtained by one Barney Greenspahn and on February 8, 1915, redeemed by Bessie Berger by the payment by her of \$414.78.

That in a certain suit in the Municipal Court by Minnie Lowe against Emelie Eastman and Louis Chatkin, Jr. judgment was obtained and a levy made on the interest of Emelie Enstman in lots 15 and 16 and the property sold to Lillian Chatkin; that the certificate of sale and deed were issued and on April 20, 1915, the property was conveyed by the grantee thereunder to Bessie Berger; that the consideration paid therefor by Bessie Berger was the sum of \$450.00.

That on April 23, 1915, a judgment by confession of Israel Berger was entered in favor of George Young in the sum of \$7578.50 in the Superior Court of Cook County which was without consideration. That the notes upon which the judgment was entered were executed and delivered by Israel Berger to Young with the intent to cheat and defraud Bessie Berger by thereafter confessing judgment and making pretended redemption of the premises; that it was the intention of Israel Berger and George Young that the latter would reconvey tomismael Berger; that although an execution was issued and a deposit made by Young it was all in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme to defraud Bessie Berger and place a cloud on the title of the premises in question; that all the proceedings pursuant to the confession of judgment are null and void and should be vacated and set aside as to her that the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and all the parties to the cause.

That the said conveyance from Leon Fiedelman to Israel Berger by way of warranty deed and the said

payment of insurance, repairs, tames, interest, ete; that leen Fledelman surrequered all rights and personnies to the said presiden.

That by recure of the payment of \$1769. to Leen Fiedelman, Berste Herger became enittled to and was passened of an equitable interest in the presiden; that on or about July 20, 1914, Bearie Berger, believing that she ked a right to change the name in soid dead, caused to be arased there-from the name of isane herger and inserted therein the name of norself and then filled the feet for record on July 23, 1914; that the erneure of the mame and substitution of her name was not done for a froudulent purpose but in a mistaken ond blump westerning ent of pills and fand totled farmed be tacreby conveyed to her.

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That from June 9, 1915, when the bill oun files ner remark terms tur egont terms because nerve to disputed pesacesion of the president.

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True? Emploies and the ter English Sourt by Annis Leve nauinal Raelis Bastons and Louis Charkin, Jr. judgment was chantned and a lery made on the interest of Amelia Section is into it mad to and the property and the lill and thatfries that the certificate of eale and deed ners tuented rad on april 20, 1915, the proporty was conveyed by the grantes thereunder to Beauth Sergar; that the conelderstion paid thereins by Beard : Nerver was the . 18.0513 to kun

That employed 27, 1918, a judgmont by confession of inrael Barger was entered in favor of George Young in the sum of greys. M is and Suspering loans andrawableno suchsky end define groups done to borelos and incomoni, and arine as a series and indiware exceeded and delivered by large herger to Young with now ivent to name and defroud densite Serger by thereafter anifemeing judgment out make iog protecues redemption of the provident that is time the latenties of Lemni Person or Sering Young time although an dayantica one leaded and a mappenit made by found it was all in purrument of a freudu-Levil newsper to defrate deads verger and liver a closed on the ettle of the prestor to question; that is noternities on or uniquency and there or a line besiever and blussia bao blow her line was inomabile -wirst, and inuce out tous well of an abian tou our disting of the embject-matter and mil ten parties to the enume.

That the batt seaveysane from then liedelean te larned Benger by way of wearenty tend and the naid conveyance from Israel Berger and Bessie Berger to Bessie Berger by way of warranty deed were and each of them in the nature of a mortgage and that the indebtedness secured thereby has not been paid but that the court does not attempt to find the amount or amounts due thereon, and that the amount or amounts due thereon are expressly left undetermined and undecided as not being within the issues of this cause."

The decree then determines that the deed be est saids and declared null and void as a cloud on the title of Bessie Berger and that it be delivered up to be cancelled by the clerk of the court.

The bill of complaint in the instant case which was filed by Israel and Tillie Berger on January 5, 1920, in the Superior Court - after setting forth a chain of title to lots 15 and 16 and reciting the contents of the decree in the Circuit Court in the case of Bessie Berger v. Israel Young, and the decree in a case entitled Greenspahn v. Berger, and alleging also an ejectment suit begun by Bessie Berger against Israel and Tillie Berger in which Bessie Berger obtained judgment for possession of "the second flat in front of the premises known as 1037 Bouth Racine Avenue, Chicage" - prays that the defendants Bessie Berger and Peters, the sheriff, be restrained from dispossessing the complainants, Israel and Tillie Berger, from the premises in question, and that they have such other further relief in the premises as is equitable.

To the bill of complaint in the instant case the defendant, Bessie Berger, filed an answer, and on June 24, 1920, filed her cross bill. By her cross bill she seeks to have an affidavit of Israel Berger, which on January 7, 1920, was recorded in the Recorder's effice set as a cloud upon her title and declared to be null and void. That affidavit signed

conveyance from leveel horger and levele lerger to bestle Berger by way of warrancy deed were and each of them in the mature of a markeys one that the fractioners accured thereby has not been paid but that the court dees not untampt to find the americ or anchers due thereon, and that the ancure or anches due thereon are expressly left undetermined and underded in not being within the irone of this cause."

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In the Superior Sourt - after sesting forth a chain of title to lote It and reciting the neutrales of lac sygrey.

In the Circuit Sourt in the end of Secone Borger v. Israel Young, and the decree in a case and tied Oreangehm v. herser, and alloying also an ejectment suit tegus by Serger and taked largel and illie Decree is which heads borger abtained judgment for yesserant, a of the second flet in front of the premises bown of 1037 South Santes Arenue, This according prays that the defendants from the premises bown of the second file of the second file in front and That the defendants from the graph that the defend stayers and forters, the abstiff, and Tills Sanger, from the greature of question, and that they have much other further relief to the premiers of the section, and that

In the bill of complaint is the testest sore the defendant, teache larger, filled on consert, and on the fill of service little to seeks to have an official of femal beinger, which on femaly 7, 19m, and trouded in the leastfarte office art as a cloud upon her title and declared to be mull and veil. That affices it signed

by Israel Berger undertakes to recite the history of the title to the property in question. It recites among other things, that he, lersel Berger, "upon request of Leon Fiedelman made a deed from Lean Fiedelman to Isaac Berger the brother of this affiant (Israel Berger) which deed Isaac Berger promised to hold and not record the same" until a certain puit had been disposed of: it then recites further the alteration in the name of Isanc Berger by Beesie Berger, and, else, recites the entry of the decree on May 19, 1917, in the suit of Bessie Berger v. Israel Berger and Young, and sets up "that accordingly upon the payment to said Bessie Berger by affiant of the amounts due her, all her interest in said property ceases and is determined and the property then becomes solely the property of the affiant only and clear of any right of lien which Bessie Berger has or claims to have in said property. The affidavit admits that Bessie Berger obtained judge ment in ejectment against the affiant, Israel Berger.

The function of the affidavit, as recorded, was to give notice that Bessie Berger is merely entitled to a lien on the property and that Israel Berger himself is the real owner.

There was a reference to a Master before whom evidence was taken, and a report made by him, which was subsequently approved by the sourt. Exceptions thereto were overruled, and on March 25, 1921, a decree was entered finding all the material allegations in the cross bill of Bessie Berger to be trus; that the affidavit of Israel Berger constitutes a cloud upon her title in and to the premises in question; that Bessie Berger at the time of the filing of the cross bill of complaint in the

by lemmal berger undertaken to rectte the history of the title to the preparty in question. It resites meny other things, that he, israel forgur, "agon request of hoor Fiedelwan made a deed from boon Medalana to fuse Berger the brother of this affigut (Israel Serger) which deed lamme Berger prostee dielers a line "ease and brooms for bar blad of hoste had been disposed of: it then rection further the alternatum in the news of luene Berger by Seerie Serger, and, alea, recases the entry of the decree on May 19, 1917, in the suit of Bounts Barger v. lerant Berger and loung, and sete up "that ecceptionly upon the payment to eath despise Berner by affines of the amounts due her; thi has interest in said property ceases and is determined and the property than hacomes melely the preperty of the affinet only and clear of eng at be of lish which Seests Respect has or chains to have in said proparty. * The affacryit admits that Bearis rarger obtained judge went in ejectment spaint the efficient learned berger.

The function of the afficust, or recorded, was to give noticed at the motion of the light section of the property and that larged the property and that larged the property and that larged the property and that

There was a reference to a Marier before when avidence was taken, and a react made by his, which were absecuently approved by the court. Example and thereto very approved, and on Earch 25, 1931, a deered was entered fively, all the materatal milegalique in the erem bill of Secric Serger to be true; that the affidavit of larger constitutes a cloud upon her title in and to the growless in cassion; that beauty larger at the time of the filling of the order bill of complaint in taken

instant case was the owner and seized in fee simple and in pessession of lets 15 and 16; that paragraph 34 of the fermer decree - in the case of Berger v. Bergerand Young, in the Circuit Court, that certain warranty deeds were in the mature of mortgages - was merely a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact, and was not within the issues of that cause and was inconsistent with the finding of ownership in Bessie Berger as found by that decree; that neither Israel Berger, Tillie Berger nor Leon Fiedelman have any right, title or interest in and to the property in question. That decree ordered that the affidavit in question be declared to be a cloud upon the title of Bessie Berger and that said instrument in writing and "said paragraph 34" be and they are hereby declared null and void against the title of said Bessie Berger, etc. and that the bill of complaint of Israel Berger and Tillie Berger be dismissed for want of equity. To reverse that decree this writ of error is prosecuted.

It will be observed that by the decree in the former suit the Circuit Court held that the legal and equitable title had become vested in Bessie Berger; that the Sheriff's deed to Young was a cloud on her title and should be set aside; that the conveyance by Fiedelman to Isaac Berger, and the "conveyance from Isaac Berger and Bessie Berger by way of warranty deed were and each of them, in the nature of a mortgage and that the indebtedness secured thereby has not been paid but the court does not attempt to find the amount or amounts due thereof." One of the questions that arise herein is whether as against Israel Berger the decree in the suit in the Circuit Court, which was in favor of Bessie Berger and against Israel Berger and Young is res adjudicate as to the claim of Israel

instant once was the owner and defeed in fee simple and in poweresten of lote is and 16; that paragraph 34 of the former dearen - in the case of Eerger v. Eargerand Young, in the Circuit Court, that cortain warranty deads were in the mature of mortages - was nevely a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact, and was not within the issues of that cause and was inconsistent with the finding of commercial in Meetle Serger as found by that decree; that neither layer burger, Tillia Berger nor been Medelmen bave may right, title or incores in and se the preperty in question. That deeree ordered that the affidavit in august be declared to be a cloud upon the title of Beeste Sarger and that and instrument in writing and " was d paragraph 34" he and they are hereby declared mall and void against the title of naid Beselv Berger, att. and that the bill of semalatet of larged Berger and Tillie Rerger be dissipped for want of aquity. To reverse that degree this write of error to presecuted.

It will be conserved that by the decree in the former suit the Circuit fourt held time the legal and equitable title had become vested in bearis held the frontiff's deed to four was a alous on her title and should be set aside; that the conveyance by Fisdelman to Isaac Ferger, and the "conveyance from lease Berger hy way of warrably deed ware and each of them, is the nature of a worthally deed the indebtechness accured therapy has not been paid but the same take indebtechness accured therapy has not been paid but the theretain these not the quasiless that arise her in the whether therefor." One of the quasiless that arise her in the whether as against larger the decree in the cutt in the directificate and tower in the cutt in the directificate was in twee to the cutt in the directification was in these terms and against levasi

Berger in the instant case. In this case he claims that she is only a mortgagee, and he prays for relief on that theory.

of the title, qua title, as between Bessie Berger and Israel
Berger and Young, and decreed that the legal and equitable title
were in her then it could be pleaded in bar to the present suit.

It is the claim on behalf of Israel Berger that he could not be bound by the findings or decree in the former case for the reason that the only issue therein was whether the claim of Young was a cloud on the title as far as the interest of Bessie Berger was concerned. On the other hand it is claimed an behalf of Bessie Berger that according to the text of the decree in the former case it was therein adjudicated that Bessie Berger was the legal and equitable owner of the property; that - because it is the law that in order to be entitled to remove a cloud one must aver and prove that he is the owner of the property from which it is sought to remove the cloud - the ownership of the property - was one of the issues in the former case which the court was bound to determine, that is, whether Bessie Berger was the owner of the property in question.

An examination of the pleadings in the former case and a determination of the particular issue precipitated thereby, discloses that on their face the only ultimate issue was whether the sheriff's deed to Young was a cloud on the title of Bessie Berger and whether as to her it should be set aside and vacated. It may be said that that issue by itself, no matter how determined, would not affect the rights of Israel Berger in the property in question; in other words, that there

Person in the instant cone. In this ones he cluster that encite on one tenter.

If the former owne properly involved on editidation of the tille, on between Forme derger and level Perger and Young, and decreed that the local and equitable title were in her then it would be pleaded in her to the present cult.

It is the claim on behalf of Israel Berger that he early not be bound by the findings of decree in the farmer each for the remon first the only issue therein was whether the claim of Young was a sixed on the title as far an the interior of hereis of hereis forger was conserved. So the other hand it is classed on behalf of Borger was denger that thereto adjustential of the deares in the former days if that thereto adjustential that hereis hereis the interior of the court is the interior of the transmitted to remove a cloud one other that in order to be one titled to remove a cloud one other over and orange the interior of the ownership of the property and orange the chart of the ownership of the property - and one of the inspection in the former case which the court ace bound to determine, that in, whether bearfs harger was the senot of the property in

An exemination of the particular braining predictives correspond and a determination of the particular issue predictived thereby, disalous that on the in for the only ultimate inche wor
whether the sheriff's doed to loung was a disal on the title
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and vacated. It may be said that thus issue by iteriff, no
matter two determinad, would not affect the rights of laract
being in the groperty in question; in other varie, that there

Bessie Berger and Israel Berger. But in Ely v. Brown, 183
Ill. 575, the court said, "This being a bill of the appellees
to remove clouds from their title they must aver and must
prove that they are the owners of the property from which it
is sought to remove the clouds alleged to exist." Judson v.
Glos. 249 Ill. 32. That means that ownership is a prerequisite to filing a bill to remove a cloud. Accordingly,
as the law considers it essential in such a suit that the
complainant must first show title, we feel bound, in the instant case, to consider the decree in the Berger v. Young
case as adjudicating and establishing not only that the
sheriff's deed to Young was a cloud, but, also that Bessie
Berger was the owner of the property in question. That decree was not appealed from or reviewed and so is decisive.

It is true that paragraph 34 of the decree in the former suit purports to find that certain conveyances, one from Leon Fiedelman to Israel Berger and one from Israel Berger and Bessie Berger to Bessie Berger, each of which was a warranty deed "were, and each of them, in the nature of a mortgage and that the indebtedness secured thereby has not been paid" etc. In a measure that seems inconsistent with the assumption that the court had jurisdiction by reason of proof that Bessie Berger had title to the presises, a title greater than that of a mortgagee. But an examination of the proceedings in the former case discloses that me claim was made by Israel Berger that Bessie Berger was a mortgagee of the property in question; in fact he claimed in his answer that Bessie Berger had no interest whatever, that he was indebted to George Young and that the latter was the owner of the property. There is no doubt some conflict between the finding

were no insue in the former one to any matters between Secula Berger and Israel Berger. Set in Hy v. Arpus. 183 181. 578, the sourt said, "this being a bill of the appollues to remove clouds from wheir titls they caust aver and must prove that they are the eware of the property from which it is accept to remove the clouds alieged to exist." Judger v. Gier. 248 111. 32. That means thus sungraring is a prove-quisite to filling a bill to remove a cloud. Accordingly, as the lew considers it setents in such a soft that the complainment suset first show title, so feel bound, in the instant case, to consider the decree is the feeger v. Young stant case, to consider the decree is the feeger v. Young case as adjudicating and combining not only that the cherties as the word to Young was a cjoud, but, also that the cherties was the owner of the property one out the declete.

eds at seroch oils to be identified for some at al al former suit surporte to find the a rectain convernment, one from Lean Medelman to lernel kergur and one from lornel Berger and Bearts Berger to Beats of Berger, each to which was a rarrenty deed "ware, and cean of them, in the nature of a Jon and that the transmission and that the design and the baga guld ava. In a measure that neems inscended atth the assumption that the outet and jurisdiction by reason of proof that beaute herger bud eitle to the presiden, a litte ers than time time of a markanges, inch an armanathot of the proceedings in the former nese discisors that an claim was made by larmel harger that hearts hereer see a mertgeper of the property in question; in fact he claimed in his answer that Bessie Marger had no interest whatever, that he was indebted to foreign laure and that the the open the owner of the ore-There is no doubt sene conflict between the finding

Isaac Berger and Isaac Berger and Bessie Berger to Bessie Berger were in the nature of mortgages, and the finding, on the other, that it had jurisdiction to remove a cloud and that Bessie Berger had the legal and equitable title, and directing the cancellation of the Young deed. In view, however, of the substance of the decree, we consider the finding as to certain deeds being in the nature of mortgages as negligible, and that the decree in the former case must be considered as having determined as against Israel Berger that Bessie Berger was the owner of the premises in question.

Further, and in itself a sufficient reason for confirming the decree in the instant case, the evidence in the former suit showed that Israel Berger, together with George Young, conspired to cheat and defraud Bessie Berger, by means of fraudulent notes and a confession of judgment and precedings thereunder, including a sheriff's deed, out of whatever interest she had in the property.

The decree in that case, which remains in full force and effect determined expressly that Israel Berger had attempted by a deliberate fraud to cheat Bessie Berger cut of whatever interests she had in the property in question, and, as a consequence of that fraud, ordered the judgment vacated and the Sheriff's deed to Young removed as a cloud on her title. Israel Berger in the Bessie Berger v. Young suit denied in toto any title whatsoever in Bessie Berger and asserted title in Young, his co-conspirator. He claimed that Young was the owner; he new claims that he, himself, is the owner. In the former suit he claimed that Bessie Berger had no right or title whatever; he new claims

on the one head that the ecaveyance of least Madelsen to least Berger and Berger and Berger to Marter to Marter and Berger and Berger to Marting.

Berger were in the alare is that the constant and the time of the Lating on the ether, that is the constant and the Lagar and equition to remove a cloud and that the cannellation of the Loung days. In vive, however, of the authorizance of the decrea of the course of the former of motigates an augustation and that the decree in the former case mast be considered an having decreasing an applicable, and that the decree in the former case mast be considered an having decreasing an applicable presented in the former case mast be considered an having decrease of the president in question.

Straing the degree is the lactual cose, the widing in the fraction of the firming the degree is the lactual cose, the widing in the foreign former with showed that immed hereas, heather with showed to cheet and defrant beauty compiled to cheet and defract beauty as formed and proceed of fraudulent notice as a costernion of present and proceedure. Interest the remainer, including a size iff and, the circumstant of the contract.

The deepes in that owes, which restrict is a in this force and effect desprenued carenary that is not is not absert that alternation is a strength of successful the force of the call of successful the constant of the const

of the decree in the former case and the duplicity and froud of Israel Berger, this court will not entertain Israel Berger in his claim that Bessie Berger is now only a mortgages of the property and that he is the legal owner. He who asks equitable relief concerning a situation about which he has been adjudicated guilty of fraud invites rebuke, not help. He is both morally and legally estopped. <u>Mossler v. Jacobs</u>, 66 Ill. App. 571.

Further an examination of the bill of complaint as smended, in theinstant case, shows that it is claimed that Bessie Berger is a mortgagee, and also, it is claimed in the alternative, that there was an express trust of the property in favor of Israel Berger. The finding of the Master on that subject, which was approved by the Chanceller is as fellows:

"The bill of complaint, as amended, appears to be drawn with a double aspect. In one aspect, it is a bill to declare the conveyances to least Berger and to Bessie Berger to be mortgages, and in its other aspect, it is a bill to declare an emprese trust in said presises, in favor of Israel Berger.

On the first proposition, that it is a bill to declare the conveyances in question to be mortgages, I find that the allegations in the bill are not supported by the evidence; indeed, I find that the evidence of Israel Berger and his daughter. Hrs. Ida Benjamin, is in direct contradiction of this theory of the case. Israel Berger testified:

- Q. Now, when Fiedelman executed the deed to Isaac Berger - how did that happen?
 - A. It was done at my request.
 - Q. Did you tell him to make the deed?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Did you get any mency for that?
 He, sir; no consideration was paid.
- A. No. sir; no consideration was paid.
 Q. What did lease Berger say the would do with
 the deed?

Mrs. Resaid he would hold it for me. Mrs. Renjamin, complainant's daughter, testified:

Isaac Berger was going to leave the room, and my father called him back and asked him if he would not take up a deed to the property at that time, but he

that che is in the defence case and the us listly and from of the decree is the former case and the us listly and from of larger, this scurt will not enterthin israel deriver in his slaim that these Sorger is now only a workpages of the property and that he is the legal owner. To she nebe squite while relief oppositing a situation when this is no new head able relief oppositing a situation when this is not help. He is judicated guilty of fraud invites rebare, het help. He is both morally and legal; setonned. Maraler v. Junche, 63 Jil. App. 371.

Surfluer an exclusion of the bill of conficient as assembled, in bindination, the same chair is a similar that the same for the in all and the same series at the same arms of the same property in taker of increase in the same property in the same of the same arms on that in taker witch was approved by the Samblest in as Samblest. Same suppose:

"The bill of gon this. As menden, or ears to be dram to the dram with a double began. In exe aspect, it is a bill to declar the correspondent to touch it is a bill to declar the correspondent to touch in the second to be decided to the second to the whish appeal, it is a militaries of expense trust in the indu preduces, in the correspondence of exact trust in the preduces.

On the first proposition, each it is notify decise the carric sector of the teath and the plant of partice of the carries the allegations in the this extension to the evidence of the evidence of the evidence of the theory is the deapler. Made the the blant of the teath of the constant of the true of the constant of the true of the constant of the true of the constant of the const

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A. It was 'one at 19' regulant.

Q. Mid you toll him to make the coust.

it. It . you got very well, for limit?

A. Ho. 17; so constitutions private.

the dead?

Mrs. A. He ente ne werld nold that an. Mrs. Erati

Astron Serger and grain to leave the following to act the fall and the

did not want to take it, and my father insisted he asked him if he would not take the deed. Leon
Fiedelman was ready to get married and he said he
didn't want to take the property. He (Israel Berger)
said: 'If you can't keep the deed, I will take it
from you and give it to my brother;' and he called
Isnac Berger back and sked him if he would not take
it, and he said 'No;' and Israel said; 'There is no
one nearer and dearer than you, and I know I will get
it back pretty seen, keep it, but don't record it!
I was there at the time the deed was transferred to
him; he finally said, 'I will take it as a favor to
you, and keep the title to the property;' the grantee
in the deed was Isnac Berger. He (Israel Berger) said
he intended to give the deed to his brother (Isnac
Berger) because he trusted him. (Rec. 181 and 182.)

There is no evidence offered by the complainants tending to show any indebtedness of the complainants to either Isaac or Bessie Berger. On the other hand. Isaac Berger stoutly denied the above statements as to the circumstances under which the deed was executed and delivered to him, and he seemed to me, under all the circumstances, to be the more credible witness.

As to the other aspect, that the bill is one to establish an express trust in the premises in question in favor of Israel Berger, and against the defendant. Bessie Berger, I find that the Statute of Frauds has been pleaded, and that inasmuch as the entire transaction rests in parol and that said trust, if it were to be found established, must be wholly based upon oral testimony, I must conclude that the statute is a bar thereto.

However, I have considered the evidence offered by both parties bearing on the question of an express trust, and am of the opinion that aside from the defense of the statute itself, that the complainant has not established this aspect of his bill by a prependerance of the evidence. I have heretofore already indicated that Israel Berger has not appeared to me to be a credible witness, "etc. Williams v. Williams, 180 III. 361.

We have examined the evidence and are of the opinion that the findings of the Master were entirely justified. Inview of what the record shows, the findings and decree in the suit in the Sirouit Court, the adjudication of fraud on the part of Israel Berger, and the failure to establish an express trust, we are of the opinion that the decree herein should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

did not want to take it, and my factor insiving the asked him if he would not take the deed. Leen fiedelmen was ready to got usarried end he nead he didn't want to take the property. So (larse) derger) satisfied if you and give it to up her hear! and he colled from you and give it to up her ther! and he colled lease derger hear mad aked him if he mould not take it. It, and he eat? 'We;' and larsed anid; 'There is no one nears and deerer take you, and I knew I will get it hack pratty seen, knew it, was dun't recent it! you have income the it has there as the time the feed was transferred to him; he finally anid, 'I will take it as a feren to bill, and the deed was transferred to you, and hear the ite take the as a feren to be in the deed was I such deed to the property;' the instead to give the deed to him her hear land. I he heren? I he intend to give the deed to him her hear (land) her intended to give the deed to him her hear (land)

There is no evidence offered by the completents tending to show any indebted of the completents to attest large of the cites completents in a time interpretation of the cites and desired the cites at the circumstance and the bir of the circumstance and the circumstance and the circumstance to the contact to act and the contact to act and the circumstance.

As to the chart sense, that the bill is one to entablish as express truck is the presion in augustion in four of lersel at the presion in four of lersel factors. I find that the fresults of Franks man been pleaded, on a that that the fresults of Franks man been pleaded, on a that landscould up the entire transtantion fould mark if it were to be found extentions, such and that the hard are the fertiles, if it were the the that the mattite is a her thereto.

Nowver, I have considered the evidence offered by hoth parties bearing on the question of an express trust. And an electron the constitution of an express of the analysis of the status of the first and an established that the first of the evidence considerate the constitution of the evidence of the evidence of the evidence of the evidence of the constitution of the instant dense. I have been already dustoned that instant dense into the constitution of the consti

We have exemined the evidence and are of the epinion that the findings of the further were entirely justified. Inview of that the findings and lecree in the suit in the Circuit Court, the adjuditantion of fraud on the part of level Durger, and the fallers to escabilate an express trust, we are of the opinion that the degree herein should be affirmed.

259 - 27217

C. W. HOWE doing business as

Appellee,

APPEAL FROM

MUNICIPAL TOURT

OF CHICAGO.

1 . 3 3 6 m.

STEGER & SONS PIANO MFG. COMPANY, a corporation.

Appellent.

227 I.A. 611

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

MR. JUSTICE TAYLOR delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered against it in the sum of \$13836.27, for want of a satisfactory affidavit of merits.

On January 26, 1921, the plaintiff C. W. Howe filed a statement of claim alleging substantially the following:That for four menths or more price to May 20, 1919, he was employed by the defendant "to get customers for phonographic cabinets, to be made and furnished to certain customers by the defendant, at a commission of 50% per cabinet for small cabinets and \$1 per cabinet for large sixed cabinets to be paid by defendant to plaintiff on securing the orders for customers which were acceptable and accepted by defendant"; that prior to May 20, 1919, he secured and delivered to the defendants orders for cabinets as follows:-

@ 50g ea. \$1500.00 Mightingale Efg. Co., 3000 cabinets Gt. Bastern Mfgrs. 3500 cabineta 50 # es. 1750.00 Cumming-Forster Corp. 1000 small 50# ea. 500.00 4000 large 4000.00 21 ea. 1000.00 2000 small 50 d es. Playerphone T.M.Co. 3000 large \$1 en. 3000.00 \$1 2000.00 Mack H. Burnstine 2000 cabinets \$13.750.00

my ", - L. Y

259 - 27217

O. W. HOWE Soing mainten as

Appohler.

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REBILIPAL COURT-

OF CHICAGO.

STYGER & BOES PLAND MPG. TORFARY.

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

ER. JUSTICA TAXACH Belivered the spinion of the court.

This is an appeal by the defendent from a judgment entered against it in the one of 413656. Af, for west of a satisfactory efficient of merste.

On Innuary 26, 1921, the plaintiff G. W. Nowe filed a statement of claim alleging submentially the following:

That for four memons or more prior 20, 1919, he was employed by the defendant for got contensors for phonegraphic oablasts, to be under and furnished to certain enteracts by the defendant, at a convisation of 50d per cabinet for small cabinets and \$1 per axbinet for large stand cubinets to be mussement which were accepted to securing the orders for suspends by defendant to per accepted and accepted by defendant to the submet which were accepted and accepted to the that prior to day 36, 1919, he occurred and delivered to the contents or for accident orders for accident orders for accident as for large.

Alghtingale Mig. Co.,	3006	alenader.	4 30e	.39	31.306.44
6t. Bastorn Kigra.	ASCC	21021500	208	. 38	33. 2841
Guaming-Pareter Cerp.	3000	LIMING	NOU	. 19.9	07.730
	20.24	1 wires	13	.00	46(6.66)
Playerghone T.M. Co.	SCC C	Figure 1.2	200	. 89	30.1000
	3000	28261	It	· AP	71.1738
Mack M. Burnstian	0.43%	ainaidap	£&	. 20	00,000

That all of the cabinets so cold were to be delivered to the customers within sixty days after the time of the order and all deliveries completed by November 1, 1919; that the orders in the above table were accepted by the defendant and some cabinets delivered on each order; that none of the orders was ever cancelled and that the customers insisted upon delivery and stood ready and willing to accept deliveries and pay for them; that the defendant through its own fault neglected and refused to deliver all of said cabinets. That the total commissions earned were \$13,750.00 upon which the plaintiff has been paid \$879.00, leaving a balance due him of \$12,871.60.

Two affidavits of merits which were filed by the defendant were, apparently, stricken. The record does not show what they contained. A third smended affidavit of merits was filed on Hay 20, 1921. It is a document containing nineteen typewritten pages.

tiff struck it from the files on the ground that it did not set up a sufficient defense and entered judgment on the statement of claim in the sum of \$13,836.27. The only question upon this appeal is the sufficiency of the third affidavit of merits.

In paragraph 2 of the affidavit of merits the defendant alleges that it employed the plaintiff to get customers
for cabinets, to be made and delivered by it and agreed to pay
a commission of fifty cents per cabinet for small sizes, and
one dellar for large, but - and this shows a different contract
from that set up in the statement of claim - "on such cabinets
as were delivered to said customers and paid for by smid cus-

That all of the cobinets of sold were to be delivered to the customer vitain sixty says after the time of the order and all deliveries completed by sevencher 1.

1919; that the orders in the above table were enceyted by the defendant and seme achieve delivered on anon order; that mene of the orders was ever sencelled and that the onether and the time delivery and stood randy and willing to accept deliveries and pay for them; that the defendant to accept deliveries and pay for them; that the defendant chrough its can fault neclected and well-net to deliver all through its can fault neclected and sections of the defendant of end cabinets. That the total oranteerons sermed were 113,730.00 upon and the of \$13,871.00.

Two affiderite of worter ships our filed by the defendant were, apparently, extinten. The record down not show what they contained. A third emended affidavit of meytie was filed on May 20, 1921. It is a deciment containing minches typewrition pages.

The irial judge on metter of rounsel for the plaintiff struck it from the files on the ground that it did not set up a sufficient defence and entered judgment on the statement of claim in the sum of \$15,836.47. The only question upon this appeal is the sufficiency of the taird affiderit of merits.

In paragraph & of the wifidavit of earlist the defendant alleges that it employed the plaintiff to get quetomere
for debinots, to be made and delivered by it and agreed to pay
a commission of fifty rests per debinet for annil sizes, and
cos deliar for large, but - and tile seams a different occitees
from that not up in the attrawant of claim - "on each oabinets
as were delivered to said questomers and paid for by rade oue-

tomers" and "no commissions were to accrue or to be earned or to be due and payable" * * * "unless and until payment was made to defendant for phonograph cabinets delivered, and that said commissions were to be only on such cabinets as were actually paid for by said customers in cash."

It will be observed that this promise to pay the plaintiff is quite different from the promise to pay which is set up in the statement of claim. Further, paragraph 2. recites that the contract with the plaintiff provided that the customers "were to establish and maintain, during the continuance of the centract" * * * "credit-standing satisfactory to the defendant, and that the defendant was to be under no obligations to manufacture or to continue to manufacture, or to ship or deliver, or to continue to ship or deliver, cabinets under any order secured by the plaintiff for said defendant from any of said customers if credit satisfactory to defendant was not established by such customers in any case, or if the credit established was not maintained as aforesaid in a manner satisfactory to thedefendant, or if said customer in any case failed to pay for said cabinets in accordance with the terms of the contract made or to be made between defendant and said customers" That paragraph then denies that any commissions were due or to become due to plaintiff merely upon the securing of orders from customers which were acceptable to, and accepted by defendant.

In paragraph 3 of the affidavit of merits, the defendent admits that the plaintiff secured customers as recited in the statement of claim, and that those customers placed orders with the defendant, as stated in the statement of claim, but it sets up that the total amount paid by such customers pursuant towers" and "no couniesione; were to mornia or to be earned or to be, due and payable" * *, * "unless and until payaent was made to descendent for phonograph antinots delivered, and that said constructons were to be only on such actions of were natually paid for by said outloomers in accio."

It will be observed that that promine to pay the deing of seince all seems from the stip at Thisials is not up in the statement of ciria. Further, paragraph d. resides that the centruct with the plaintiff provided that the customers "more to setablish and maintein, during the continuence of the contract" * * * credit-standing sotiafeatery to the defendent, and that the definions was to be under me abligations to camefature or to continue to camefacture, or to ably or selliver, as to continue to ship or deliver, debinets under any order secured by the plaintiff for outd defendant from any of said quantment if aroutt methafactory to defordant was not established by made succeeds in any case, or al the error of the distance of the second of the second is a manner natiofactory in the celembert, or it said our tomor in may came fauled to pay for saud exhimete in ecopeannon with the terms of the centrast wous or to be weste between cellundant and said custemars. That paragraph then are the that wishing sore due or to uscome due to plaintif merely upon the securing of granzs from envisorers words, were societies in to, and neorpton by defeatent.

In paragrash & of the notiners of merits, the defendant admirs that the platnical secured customers on recited in the etatement of claim, who then those customers placed orders with the definadant, on stated in the temest of claim, but it sets up that the test interpret pain or made customers gurspant to those orders, was such an amount, that the plaintiff only earned commissions, at the contract rate, in the sum of \$1475.50, and having been paid \$879.00, there is now due him only \$596.50, which the defendant is ready and offers to pay.

In paragraph 4 the defendant denies that all the cabinete sold by the defendant were to be delivered by November 1. 1919. It also states that some cabinets were delivered on each of the orders mentioned in the plaintiff's statement of claim with the exception of the order of Bernstine. It also denies that any of said orders were ever cancelled, and denies that said customers insisted upon the delivery of all the cabinets in their respective orders, and denies that said customers stood ready and willing to accept said deliveries and to pay for the same, but asserts that said customers, and each of them, refused, neglected and failed to take deliveries and pay for them in accordance with their respective orders and denies that through its own fault it has neglected and refused to deliver all of said cabinets, and avers that it has fully complied with the terms of said orders and was ever ready, able and willing to complete and fill same, and offered so to do.

The affidavit of merits then proceeds to recite in great detail the history of its negotiations with each of the five customers mentioned in the statement of claim. In paragraph 5 the affidavit of merits recites as to the Hightingale Mfg. Co. that the defendant received an order on February 24, 1919, for 3000 cabinets, which order contained cutting specifications for the manufacture of 1500 of said cabinets and previded the cutting specifications for the manufacture and delivery of the balance, to-wit: 1500 were to follow; that said order provided that the cabinets would be delivered F.O.B. factory, Steger, Illinois in installments, 250 as early as poss-

to these arters, was such an emount, that the plaintiff only correct at one can the series of the series of the series of the ser baving been paid \$679.60, there is not due him only \$590.50, which the defendant is ready and offers to pay.

to the dategraph 4 the defendent tentes that all the cabinete sold by the defendent were to be delivered by Esymber 1. deserging that some saidness were delivered as a la of the orders mentioned in the plaintiff's statement of claim with the exception of the order of Bernetine. It also denies Must any of taid orders were were cancelled, and desice that said ountemers insisted upon the delivery of all the eastests in their respective orders, and denies that said customers stood ready and willing to accept eald deliveries and to pay for the cane, but asserts that said curisment, and each of them, refuned, neglected and failed to take deliveries and pay for them in accordance with their respective orders and deales that through its own fault it has neglected and verused to deliver all of said cabinete, and every that it has fully compiled with the terms of said orders and one ever reser, while was whilten to complete and itll meme, and offered se to de.

The efficient of merits then proceeds to realth in great divisit the history of its negotiations with each of the grant divisity and the math and of the five anticare mentioned in the statement of claim. In paragraph 6 the affidurate of merits redites an to the Eightingala Mig. 60. that the defendant treewived an exact on February 24.

1919, for 3010 cabinets, which order contrined cutting precition for the manufacture of 1800 of said cubinets and previded the cutting specifications for the manufacture and previded the cutting specification for the mentioners and prelived the balance, to-wit: 1500 were to fullow; that and devices provided the cutting onlinets sould be delivered F.C.D.

factory, Steamer, illinois in installments, 250 as early as copu-

ible or within 40 days, and a minimum of 250 per month until the aforesaid 1500 cabinets for which cutting specifications were given in said order were completed; that said order provided that the terms of payment were to be 2% for cash in 10 days or net 60 days, trade accetpance upon receipt of bill; that said order also provided that changes in the time of delivery or work would probably be necessary.

That paragraph recites that upon receipt of said order the defendant refused to accept it as it was offered because of the financial responsibility, standing and credit of the company not being satisfactory to the defendant, and made a counter proposition to the Nightingale Mfg. Co. which that company in March, 1919, accepted; that the Mightingale Mfg. Co. though often requested, failed to produce evidence or proof of its financial responsibility and standing or oredit; that, subsequent to March, 1919, 203 cabinets were delivered to that company between May 29. 1919, and July 7, 1919, and were accepted and paid for by the Rightingale Mfg. Co. pursuant to the order so modified and in accordance with the terms thereof; that subsequently the defendant proceeded to manufacture and did menufacture additional cabinets to fill the order for the first mentioned 1500 cabinets, pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the modified order and when the inability of the Nightingale Mfg. Co. to establish its credit continued and when consequently the original schedule of deliveries proposed by and in said order never became operative the defendant made deliveries to said company from time to time in amounts reasonably consistent with the company's ability to pay and extended a limited credit to it; that said arrangements were satisfactory to the Hightingale Mfg. Co. and pursuant thereto the defendant delivered to the Mightingale Mfg. Co. between

ible or within to days, and a minimum of 250 per menth until the aforesaid 1500 enthusis for which entling specifications were given in said order were completed; that ead order previded that the terms of payment were to be 25 for each in 10 days or not 50 days, trade scortpasses upon rescript of bill; that eadd order also previded that changes in the time of delivery or park rould prehably be necessary.

Thet paragraph restor that upon realist of weld erder the different refuned to accept it as it was offered because of the Einengial respondibility, standing one aredit of the company wet burns callefactory to the defendant, and made a counter proposition to the Mightlandle Mig. Co. which that company in Eureh. 1919, accepted; that the Mightingale Mig. Co. though often requested, failed to produce evidence or proof of its financial respectfully and standing or aredit; blat, mibeequest ;e doren, 1919, 203 cabinete vero delivered to that company between May 29, 1918, and July 7, 1918, and work accept eds of standard, .at . On olayaltagile wit your old atag ban be the this same and it is nonstrance of the beittings as tabue that subsequently the afredant proposed to senuracere and all manufacture adulticant askingis up fill the order for the first mentioned lice anthreto, jurguest ... and in population with the terms of the rodified order and when the inshilter of the Aghtingele Min. do, to scambilsh tou prests constaund and work comeasungily the original agredule of collection prospeed by any to said order naver became excretive the defendant made deliveries to not company from that the it wishers bun dag is gillida a 'quagunu ena cilw senatatonou qidanesara extended a limited aredit to it; that unia miragements mare estisfactory to the Mightispale Mfg. Co. ond ourseest thereto the defendent delivered to the Mightingelo Mig. to between

May 29, 1919, and Earch 4, 1920, 380 abinets; that for said 380 cabinets the defendant was entitled to receive \$11,364.89 but the Mightingale Mfg. Co. only paid in all the sum of \$9037.54, leaving due the defendant \$3127.35. That the Hightingale Mfg. Go. gave the defendant ten notes aggregating \$3127.35, which notes were not accepted by the defendant as payment but only as evidence of and menurity for the balance due; that only the first two of said notes aggregating \$625.47 were paid: that after the shipment of February 4, 1920, the credit of the Nightingale Mfg. Co. became so uneatisfactory that the defendant refused to deliver further cabinets except for cash; that the Nightingale Mfg. Co. agreed to that; that between January 6, 1920, and March 6, 1920, the defendat continually demanded that the Nightingale Mfg. Co. carry out its aforesaid order as modified; that on March 6, 1920, the defendant had on hand ready to deliver, and offered to deliver, 80 cabinets or any reasonable part thereof; that the Hightingale Mfg. Co. notified the defendant that it could not and would not accept said cabinets nor pay for them nor for any further cabinets; that the Nightingale Mfg. Co. was then virtually bankrupt and remained so; that no cutting specifications were ever given the defendant by the Mightingale Mfg. Co. for the second 1500 cabinets. so that the defendant could not even start the manufacture of them; that the Mightingale Mfg. Co. suffered a fire in September, 1919, which it stated resulted in great financial loss to it, and which it alleged was one of the causes for its inability to accept and pay for the cabinets theretofore manufactured; that on July 9, 1920, the Nightingale Efg. Co. was duly adjudicated bankrupt; that the only payment the defendant has received on its claim is the sum of \$255.77, for which it has given the plaintiff credity that it has done everything

May 89; 1919, and March 4, 1920, 380 abinote; that for said 380 cabinets the defendant was unditied to recrive \$11,364,83 but the flagistrapple will, do. only paid in all the sum of \$8037.34, leaving due the defensent \$3127.35. That the Hightinemle Mfg. Co. gave the defendant ton motor egyregating filly. 25. which notes were not escepted by the defendant as payment but. only on evidence of and security for the balance due; that only the first two of said hoter aggregating \$625.67 were paid; that after the shigmant of February 4, 1940, the eredit of the Mightingule Mfg. Co. became so unsatiufactory that the defendant refused to deliver further excincts except for each; test the Mightingale Mrg. Co. agreed to that; that between January 6, 1920, and Marer 6, 1920, the defendat continually desauded that the Mightingals Min. Co. carry out its aforesaid order as medified; that on Maren 6, 1920, the defendant had on hand ready to deliver, and offered to deliver, 80 colinets or may rescensive part thereof; that the dightingale afg. do. notified was defendent that it would not end you'd not accept only cabincis nor pay for them nor for any further cabinets; that the Mightingale Mig. Co. was blen virtually benicupt and remained so: that no sutting apositications were aver given the defendant by the Mightingala Mic. Co. for the second 1500 cobinets, to erusualunas eds store aven store the manufacture of them; that the Mightingale holy. Co. outfores a fixe in Septsuber, 1919, which it stated resulted in great financial loss to it, and which it sileged was one of the asunes for its inability to accept and pay for the cabinets therefore manufactured; that on July 9, 1920, the Mightingale off. Co. was duly adjudicated benkrupt; that the easy payment the defendant has received on ite claim is the cum of \$265.77, for which it has given the plaintiff erects time to has done everything

on its part to be performed with reference to the Mightingale Mfg. Co. order so modified as aforesaid, and was always ready, able and willing to perform and complete it but was prevented from doing so by the default of the Mightingale Mfg. Co.

quite obviously, considering the contract between the defendant and the plaintiff, "that no commissions were to accrue or to be earned or to be due and payable "funless and until payment was made" and that said "commissions were to be only on such cabinets as were actually paid for by said customers in cash" and that "customers were to establish and maintain credit standing satisfactory to the defendant and that the defendant was to be under no obligations to manufacture or te continue to manufacture or to ship or deliver or continue to ship or deliver cabinets under any orders secured by plaintiff for said defendant from any of said customers if credit satisfactory to defendant was not established by such customer in any case or if the credit established was not maintained as aforesaid in a manner satisfactory to the defendant or if said customer in any case failed to pay for said cabinets in accordance with the terms of the contract made or to be made between the defendant and said customers," the plaintiff would not be entitled to any commissions on the Hightingale Mfg. Co. order save as set forth in the amended affidavit of merits.

It may be that if upon a trial it were proven that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant were as alleged by the plaintiff in his statement of claim, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover commissions on 3000 cabinets. But that contract is desied and in its stead the defendant sets up such a centract that if the facts were proven on a trial as set forth in paragraph 5 of the smended affidavit of merits the plaintiff

on its part to be performed with reference to the Mightingale Mig. Co. order so modified as eforeenid, and were always ready, able and willing to perform out oregions it but wen prevented from doing so by the default of the Hightingale MCG. "c.

dutte obviously, acceptant the ourtract barrens the defendant and the plaintiff, "that ne seems estens were to secret or to be served or to be due and payable" and until payment was made" and that cott "countestane vere to be only on such cabinets so were actually gold for by said outlinewhich has dalidedee of ores executives led the edge of the tain eredit etending eathefactory we the defautant and that the defendant was to be under no obligations to manufacture ar to continue to anuferture or to whip or deliver or continue -tialy le bourses orders and the termine to the contract to th sibere it aremorane bine to you want income to bine tol little Temajano dous es badvildajos Jan ame samestab es gracafallas in any same or it the eredit entablished was not wainfained me aforemak in a career ratiefuriery to the deliment or if said customer in any case failed to pry for seld califors in sucordmay with that terral of the control sends of as an anal Hitter and end for bling lilitations. The clare line little all the best and entitied to any commitment on the lightingale off. To. order save so set forth in the amended officerit of mertice.

It may on that if upon a trial at the error error that the contract between the plaintiff and the definition the plaintiff as his streamed of plain, the plaintiff could be entitled to revover consistent on 2000 cabinets. But that centract is denied and in the stand the definit on a contract is denied and in the stand the definit on a contract that if the facts were proven on a trial as set forth in paragraph 3 of the meeted afficavit of merits the claimits.

would not be entitled to recover beyond what the defendant admits to be due. In other words the amended affidavit of merits properly puts in issue the claim of the plaintiff for a commission of \$1500.00 for the orders which he obtained from the Nightingale Mfg. Co.

Counsel for the plaintiff refers to the allegation in the affidavit of merits, that the contract between the Nightingale Mfg. Co. and the defendant was modified and that the acceptance of the modification was made in writing on March 10, 1919, and argues that the written acceptance does not appear in the affidavit of merits, and that therefore there was no acceptance. It was not necessary for the pleader to set forth the written acceptance in detail in the affidavit of merits: that would have been not only superfluous but improper as it would only have lent to the prolixity of the pleading by reciting in detail the evidence. Of course, according to the defendant's statement of the centract with the plaintiff, which contains the words "if in any case said customer failed to pay for said cabinets in accordance with the terms of the contract made or to be made between the defendant and said customer." the defendant had the right to modify a centract with a customer without notifying the plaintiff and without subjecting itself to a limbility for commissions if cabinets were not delivered thereunder and paid for.

It is also contended by counsel for the plaintiff that as the Nightingale Mfg. Co. paid cash for 203 cabinets it thereby established its credit, intimating that the defendant was not thereafter entitled to dispute the future credit of the Nightingale Mfg. Co., that, however, is not reasonable and upon a trial the defendant will be entitled to introduce, if it desires, evidence on that subject.

would not be entitled to recover beyond what the defendant minites to be due. In other words the immended afficults of wherite properly puts in tunes the slaim of the class plaintiff for semminates of 41300.00 for the order which he obtained from the nightfagels wig. Go.

Council for the plaintiff rafore to the allegation in the nilidayit of merrim, that the unitract between the fighttuguit aff. Co. cou the defendant was neutrack and that the acceptance of the wedification was made in writing on March 16: 1919, and expuse that the written seceptance does not appear the efficient of marile, and that therefore there elere accomplance. It was not necourary for the plander to set forth dens the most to describe the describe all the solutions and the describes and would have been not only superflueur but issue per as it would only have lent to the prolimity of the pleading by reciting in dotail the evidence. Of course, according to the defendant's statement of the contract with the Daintiff, which contains the words "if in any near said muntemer failed to pay for said estimate in accordance with the terms of the contract made of to be made between the defendent and rule auntenny, the defendant had the right to modify a centrant with a customer without mostrying the pistosiff and without subjecting thealf bernvilled for commission if online and tillifate a cl thereunder and putd for.

It is also contended by counsel for the plaintain that us the bighteless after for your country that us the bighteless of the credit, intimating that the defendant was not thereefter outlied to dispute the future gredit of the Hightingale life. Go., that, however, is not reasonable and upon a irial the defendant will be entitled to introduce, if the definer, or ideal white motions.

receipt of notes for \$3127.35 constituted payment as far as the rights of the plaintiff were concerned. That is untenable. Upon a trial the defendant would be entitled to undertake to show that they were received in such a way that they did not constitute payment.

Paragraph 6 recites that on March 1, 1919, the defendant received from the Great Mastern Manufacturing Company an order for the manufacture and delivery of 2500 small type phonograph cabinets at the rate of 50 per week, one half mahogany and one half oak, to be manufactured according to sample submitted, deliveries to be made F.O.B. Steger, Illinois, at the rate of 50 of each type per week; and 1000 large type cabinets, deliveries to be made at the rate of 50 or more per week; terms to be 2% ten days, thirty days net, cabinets to be made in accordance with sample design submitted, and deliveries to begin 40 days after acceptance of said order; that the order was accepted on March 27, 1919; that between June, 1919, and December, 1919, the defendant delivered, pursuant to the terms of the order, 457 cabinets which were accepted regardless of the defendants delay in delivering; that the Great Eastern Hanufacturing Co. waived strict performance in regard to the time of delivery, and as to the remaining cabinets due under the order, and continued said order in full force and effect until February 12, 1920, on which date the Great Hastern Manufacturing Go. notified the defendant not to deliver any more cabinets under said order; that it would not accept or pay for the same; that so far as it was concerned said order was cancelled; and without any just or legal cause or excuse refused to accept or pay for any more of said cabinets, assigning as the only reason for said cancellation that it was overstocked with cabinets

Counsel for the claimist intime argue that the receipt of motion for \$5187.35 countitieted payment on for an farant in the state of the aluminist worn concerned. The is unionable. Upon a trial the defendant smult because it to understate to show that they not received in such a way that they did not constitute payment.

termeraph 6 traiter that or March 1, 1919, the defeedant regeived from the orest destant Hamiltestating Jumpeny we order for the sending and delivery of affic anoth type shonegraph sabinets of the rote of 30 per wast, one half makenany and one half cak, to be manufactures countains to assente submitted, delivering to be well about 11.5.5. Stenger, illisotu, early egree 1900 ban there are erent tone to 16 to eler est te cantinger, deliveries or to be easily at the easy of an action of week; terms to be it's ten days, thanky days ner, reldness to be made is accordance at a comple design mination, and duliveries when od days alter one organic char to be seen at the constant of Was seespird on tare at 1610; then hetween Aune, 1918, and Dedember, lell, the dates that delicaters been particulated the the terms of the crawn, 607 watter to which were neverted regordens of the defendants nolog to tellyesize; that the Great Anglers Ason-Penturang in culter this compande in requid to the time of delivery, and . . in the remining ancients due touch the order, and newtheres and order in its! force one client until Rebunary le, 1920, on which doke the Break viters named and the Co. notified the defendent or to opinyer on, here onlinete thought for the state in a little at the state of the state of the second ther the for an it the operation being and arter an arrested; and TO SHOPER OF he pres begrette to be seen to be seen to be seen the seen seen the seen seen the seen seen the se pay for any more of sald cultrate, eachyming an the only reason or seeks serverishing last at was overstoned with sebinote and was having difficulty of disposing of them; that the defendant on that date and during the entire continuance of the contract had performed all the things on its part to be performed and was ready, able and willing and offered to complete the delivery of all cabinets remaining due under said order and had cabinets on hand complying with the contract which it was ready and willing to, and offered to deliver to said company but was prevented from performing by the refusal of that company to perform and by its breach as aforesaid, and not by any fault of the defendant; that the said company paid for 455 cabinets which were delivered and the commissions due on those payments have been credited to the plaintiff.

There are three other items in the statement of claim. one being that of the Cumming-Fester Corporation, another the Playerphone Talking Machine Co., and another that of Mack M. Bernstine. As to the first two of those items, the affidavit of merite shows that the purchasers failed to pay for cabinets which they had received, which, of itself, would prevent the plaintiff from recovering a commission providing the contract as to commissions was that set up in the affidavit of merits. As to the Bernstine item; after the order was placed Bernstine, according to the affidavit of merits desired to substitute a certain corporation in lieu of himself but as Bernstine failed to obtain a proper guarantee no arrangement on that basis was made. Further, Bernstine refused, without just cause or excuse, to accept the cabinets which the defendant had already manufactured. His refusal was not because they were not made within the time specified in the original order, as Bernstine, netwithstanding the delays "had requested defendant to continue the said centract and did not insist on strict compliance with

and wen having difficulty of disposing of these; thet the defeedent on that dute and during the entire continuance of the
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The e are three cities thems inthe statement of slain, one bases that of the Tuestag-Poster Jers. cation, another the Playerphone Indicting Macaine 1c., ond ensited that of Mack M. Bornstine. As as the first two of those litter, the affiderit of mortee chara that the resolvenite feel a to yet for arbiness. which bing had reentwed, which, a livelf, rould provent the Tract of the out the coveres a compactor providing the out tract an to constraint our that rat up intim of thirts of merito. As to the Rerastine them; withe orner wiened bergeling, according to the alliance of leafite destroy to albeituite a sertain corporation in lieu of himself out an derecting Tailed age wheel hald no samewayer on each age of the a cold a a aladde of made. Warther, Bernstike refuses, without just cesses or arwhenth an industrial the alenders and in the content at manufactured. His raducal was not har they were not reade. within the tien specified in the criment order, as Bernetine, metwithstanding the delays "and requested defendant to crutinue as in sometimen softic no scient for his bar sometimes bles ens the terms of said contract with respect to deliveries", and the affidavit of merits also alleges that the defendant was not in default at the time of Bernstine's breach of contract.

Assuming the contract to be as alleged by the affidavit of merits, and that no material default occurred on the
part of the defendant, but that the customers either failed
to pay what was due or to furnish proper evidence of satisfactory credit, it follows inevitably that a good defense has been
pleaded, such a defense as, if proven, would defeat the plaintiff's claim.

The fact that the defendant alleges that in some instances cabinets were not manufactured and delivered accordance ing to the technical chronology of the original orders/no difference because in each instance it is alleged that the customers did not refuse to pay or to give credit on that ground but condoned that and gave other reasons for their refusal.

The rules of the Municipal Court provide (Rule 15n.) that "The denial of any material allegation shall constitute an issue; no other joinder of issue is necessary." and further. (Rule 15.b.) "Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the ultimate fects on which the parties pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved."

In the instant case, the affidavit of merits sets forth a centract with the plaintiff different from that set forth by the plaintiff in his statement of claim, and the affidavit of merits, also, sets forth a history of its conduct with the various customers, which, if true, as alleged, proves that it does not now owe the plaintiff any further commissions. than

the terms of said contract with respect to deliveriest, and the efficients of merits also pileges that has defradent was not in default at the time of Marastine's hreen of contract.

Assuming the sourcest to be an elleged by the silicated days of merita, and that no material default occurred on the part of the defendant, but that the castomers silicated to pay what was due or to furnish proper criticates of sutlefault of credit, it is lessen inavitably that a good defense has been pleaded, such a defence as, if proven, wen'ld defeat the plate.

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those admitted to be due.

After carefully considering the statement of claim and the third amended affidavit of merits, we are quite clearly convinced that the latter precipitated an issue of fact and sufficiently set up a defense, and, under the circumstances, that it would work an injustice to deny the defendant the right to introduce evidence in an endeavor to make out its case as alleged. And, further, even if it were not so clear and was a matter of some doubt, it would only be fair and reasonable even then that the defendant should be given the opportunity of a trial upon the merits.

As a matter of wisdom, it is far better and safer to err in favor of allowing an adjudication upon evidence than to err in giving judgment passed solely en merely formal and admittedly controversial pleadings.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THEMSON, P.J. AND COUNCR, J. CONGUR.

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THERECE, P.J. ASD COCENOR, 3. CCHUUR.


286 - 27244 JOHN NEKNAN Appellant. APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO. CALUMET AND SOUTH CHICAGO HAILWAY CO., et al doing business as CHICAGO SURFACE LINES. 227 I.A. 6121 Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

ER. JUSTIGE TAYLOR delivered the opinion of the court.

On March 18, 1917, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendants for damages for personal injuries. There was a trial before a jury and at the close of the plaintiff's case, and, upon an instruction given by the trial judge to the jury to find the defendants not guilty. a verdict was given and a judgment entered in favor of the defendants. This appeal is therefrom.

The plaintiff's statement of claim sets forth that the plaintiff's claim is for damages in the sum of \$1,000.00 as the result of injuries sustained by him on or about October 2, 1916, by reason of the negligence of the defendant; that on Cottage Grove avenue between 92nd and 93rd streets in the City of Chicago the defendants so negligently operated one of their street cars that, while it was running at a terrific rate of speed and violating a city ordinance, it collided with a horse and wagon which were being carefully driven by the plaintiff, and injured him.

The defendants filed on affidavit of merits which



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denied the negligence charged in the plaintiff's statement of claim and alleged that the collision and damages, if any, were caused solely by the negligent manner in which the horse and wagon were managed and driven at the time and place in question.

At the trial, which was before a jury, only three witnesses were called; the plaintiff, John Neenan, Arthur Bohr, a passenger on the street car in question and one Dr. Barrett, a physician and surgeon who attended the plaintiff immediately after he was injured.

The evidence of the plaintiff, is, substantially, to the following effect; that on October 2, 1916, he was driving a box-wagon, which was 14 by 16 feet in length, with a team of horses delivering goods from place to place in the City of Chicago for the Bastings Express Company; that between two and three P.M. his wagon and horses were standing in front of a store about 200 to 300 feet north of 93rd street on the west side of Cottage Grove avenue; that he delivered to that store a stove, and then had occasion to go right across the street for enother delivery; that he walked around the front of his team, which was facing north and was against the west ourb of the street; that he walked in front of his borses to get up on the wagon; that at that time he saw the street car standing at 93rd street; that he preceded to get up on his wagon; that from the time he took up the reins he did not turn or hear any bell or gong sounded; that he started across the street; that the next he remembered he was home, in bed. practically unable to move.

On cross examination he stated that he delivered packages and freight for the Hastings Express Company; that on

denied the negligeness charged in the plaintiff's statement of claim and slaged that and collisten and deanges, if any, were enused solely by the negligent manner in which the heree and wagen were manned and driven as the time and place in question.

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The evidence of the rightliff, is, substantially, to the following offect; that on Cotober 2, 1915, he sea driving a bon-wegen, which was le by la feet in length, with a teem of Marson delivering stode fier place to place to the City of Chicago for the Santings Sayress Conpany; that betseen two and three P.K. into regen and horses were structure in front of a store about 200 to Med feet nearb of Gard atreet on the west slice of Jollage Grove avenue; that he delivered to that store a shave, and then had encested to go right sorest than depend one that be the median of deep the transfer and the free from of his team, which wer facing corth and was against the wast ourb of the street; take on valked in front of his normes to got up on the vagon; that at that in any the street car standing at 93rd circus; that or presented to potent wassen; that from the time he took up the reine he did not turn or hear believe bediest sounded; that he sunited seres the street; that the next he remembered he was mome, in hed. practicelly unable to save.

On erose examination by claim that hat had the delivered one freight for the Mantings Empress Coupany; that en

the day in question he had been driving the magon since nine o'clock in the morning; that when he came out of the store he walked around the horses heads over on the other side of the wagon; that he usually boarded it on the left side; that he went around on the right side because of "a habit of getting on the way the wagon stands"; that he went around the hornes heads because of a habit he had of seeing whether the lines were unsnapped: that he looked south and saw the street car at 93rd street: that when he made the delivery he was between 92nd place and 93rd street; that it was about 200 or 300 feet from 92nd place and about 100 feet from 93rd street; that when he went around the horses heads he did nothing to the bridle or lines but went along and got up on the wagon; that he then saw the street car headed north; that he, himself, was going to drive his horses and wagon right across the street after he started up from the west side of Cottage Grove avenue; that while he was walking around the horses heads, which took him one or two minutes, the street car remained standing on the scuth side of 93rd street; that when he climbed up on the seat of the wagon the car was still standing to the south about 100 feet away; that he gathered up the lines and drove right straight across the car tracks; that he had a turn-table wagen and had no difficulty in turning the horses around: that he was looking east after he got started; that the street car was still stopped; that the horses started east and he remembers when the herses went on the southbound track that then he could not see where the street car was at that time; that the last time he looked was when he got up on the wagon; that at the time the herses were going across the street they were going clowly; that he did not urge them with a whip; that they were going "not off a walk"; that he could have stopped them inside

the day in sunction he but been driving the expension of nor efclos in the nertific that when he came out of the store he walked around the barver brooks ever on the other alde of tant jedle stel and no la bebrand glimma an last jumper and he west around on the right side because of to habit of getting on the way the ragen etande"; that he cant cround the and undired aniose to use of slice a to escaped absent seeman lines were ununapped; that he locked south and the sirest dog at 93rd atroot; that when he work the dailyery he was between Pand place one Shra street; that it was about Aff ar 300 feet from 92nd place and about 144 feet from 92rd ctrast; 2 3013 when he went around the barres breads he did optibles to the bridle or lines but went along and got up on the wager that he then mer the atrost our monded north; that he, himself, ven there are measure togic outper and america and events of mates sere avial agested to ebre tear and soul qu bereads od testes and that while be was walking around the horses herer, which tion him one or ted airciant, the mares or a receiped condition no go bedette on mede toot theets by and and when an tendence on the sees of the wagen the car are call wheaten to the south start les sway; thet he gethere up the lines and drave Tight enrulyht sorous the car tracks; that he had a turn-tab. vages and had se difficulty in turning the bereen proved; that the seast and lacking the got planted; that the street our was ettle steppede that the horizon are the base the base where the hears are the new holes treek treek that the other Jone and the state of the same to the state of the same of the time he teaked was when he got top on the net ones alone as sime the harrest were putag should be the street they were column electy; that he did not urge them at the a while; the he they mere asing "rate off a walk"; think he oill have staying they apend of ten feet; that he did not know what hit him.

On redirect examination the plaintiff stated that he could have gotten up on either side of wagon; that the point of next delivery was north about two or three doors; that he crossed the street on a sig-zag; fin turning I just swung the horses straight and shot plump scross the street."

The evidence of the witness Arthur Bohr, is to the effect that on October 2, 1916, he was a passenger on the car in question; that the car stopped on the south side of 93rd street: that when it was grossing 93rd street the motorman opened the side door, or front door, of the car and looked behind him. The language of the witness is as follows: "What he was looking at I den't know, but he kept looking out of the ear and I was right alongeide of him and as we drew near the wagon. I did not see the wagon until we were about ten feet from the wagen, and the motorman was still looking out the side of the car, and he glanced around * * * and made a grab for the controller." When asked further what happened, the witness testified: "The motorman turned around and made a grab for his controller and before he could stop the car he had dragged the wagen about ten or fifteen feet." The witness further testified that at the time the wagon was struck the horses were on the east side of the car track and the wagon pointing to the northeast; that the plaintiff, the driver of the wagon, was brocked off the seat and in some way under the street car so that the latter had to be backed up; that the plaintiff was then taken into a real estate office; that the car at the time of the collision and from the time it cressed 93rd street was going between 15 and 20 miles an hour; that no gong nor bell was sounded. On cross-examination he testified that he did not

of tem feet; that he did not know mimt hit him.

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The evidence of the physician and surgeon, Dr. Barrett, was to the effect that he attended the plaintiff shortly after he was injured; that he found him suffering from injuries to the right arm, both legs and both hips; that there was a centusion on the right shoulder and a wound about two inches long between the buttocks; that he dressed the arm, cleaned up the contusions on the legs and put on wet dressings and bendages; that he continued to visit him for about five weeks thereafter.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence counsel for the defendants offered and asked the court to give the following instruction; "The court instructs the jury to find the defendants and each of them not guilty." Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the instruction but the objection was over-ruled and the instruction given and a verdict returned in accordance with the instruction and subsequently judgment was entered upon the verdict in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

It is now claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that the trial judge erred and that the evidence ought to have been sub-

see any traffic eshar then the street car and the magen on Cottage Grove arome at the time; that the others our was a care length on the no.th side of the ordering when the meter-mus apened the dear and gut the head out; that he continued to look has until the ear was vithin ten or fifteen fork of the choic of the major; thet he, binnelf, was watching the executed from the time the opened the core and the electron that one of the circumstance was man at theritare the horses went cate the track; the time the freet the secret of the engen and same to a step within fifteen feet afterwards.

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At the cines of the plantiff's evidence counted for the defendants offered rearnabled the court to give the following instructs the jury to find the defendants and owen of these welly. A desired to the plaintial asternation but the the plaint and owen of the incurrential the tipeties and every to accordant the the instruction of the and a verdict returned in accordance with the last frequention and authoristic judgment was entered upon the verdict in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

It is now claimed in behalf of the plaintiff that the term been unbetted dudge overed and that the evidence ought to have been unbe-

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mitted to the jury. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the defendants that the court was justified in directing a verdict in their favor on the ground that there was no evidence submitted by the plaintiff which would reasonably authorize the jury to find the defendants guilty of the negligence charged.

meny of the plaintiff and the witness Behr, there was sufficient evidence of negligence to justify its submission to the jury for their determination. There is no doubt but that there are some ambiguities in the testimony of the plaintiff and, yet, taking his testimony all together and in conjunction with that of Behr, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, to show a failure of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff nor can it be said to fail to show negligence on the part of the defendants. The plaintiff had a perfect right to get up on his wagon and then turn and drive across Cottage Grove avenue, as he says he did, if at that time he saw the street car standing at 93rd street some 200 to 300 feet south of where his wagon was.

around the horses heads preparatory to getting up on the wagon the street car remained standing on the south side of 93rd street; he also says that when he climbed up onto the seat of the wagon the street car was still standing to the south about 100 feet away. There is a slight discrepancy between that statement and the statement he made on direct examination.

The evidence of the witness Bohr correborates the testimony of the plaintiff that the street car stopped on the south side

sited to the jury. On the cider burnt it is contended on behalf of the desertants that the court was juntified in directing a verdict in their laser on the ground that there was as evidence cubelted by the plaintiff erich bould reasonably authorize the jury to find the defendants anilty of the negligonee charged.

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of 93rd street. Bohr adds the fact, however, that when the street our was crossing 93rd street the motorman opened the mide door, or front door, of the car and looked behind him.

Bohr's testimony is in these words, "What he was looking at I don't know but he kept looking out of the ear and I was right alongside of him and as we draw near the wagon, I did not see the wagon until we were about ten feet from the wagon, and the motorman was still looking out the side of the car and he glanced around * * * and made a grab for the controller * * * and before he could step the car he had dragged the wagen about ten or fifteen feet." Bohr also testified that at the time the wagon was struck the horses were on the east side of the car track and the wagon pointed to the northeast and that the driver had been knocked off the seat.

clude that it leads to but one conclusion, that is negligence on the part of the plaintiff. We are of the opinion that whether under the circumstances the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care when driving across the street as he did, was a matter which should have been determined by the jury and not by the trial judge. Chicago Union Traction Company v. Jacobson. 217 Ill. 464; Chambers v. Chicago City Railway Company, 189 Ill. App. 62; Louthan v. Chicago City Railway Company, 198 Ill. App. 329.

In the Louthen case this court said, "As a general proposition a question of contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury and only becomes one of law when the evidence clearly establishes that the accident resulted from the negligence of the injured party. If there be any difference of opinion on the question, so that reasonable minds may not ar-

of sard elset. Sour aces the fact, however, that when the street ear eas are expected acres the notion of the sar and locked behind him.

Other face, or frest dear, of the sar and locked behind him.

Near's testimony is in there words, "That he was locking at a dea't know hut he hept locking out of the sar and I was right alongside of him and so we draw ases the wages, I did not not and the wages, I did not the majorans was attil locking out the fire of the car and and the motorus was attil locking out the along of the car and he glanced around * * * and made of the aces the acet the acet the sages about ten or fifteen feet. Then have and the sages about ten or fifteen feet. Then have we entire and the time the track one the mages about the same that he or the mages and the the the car had been the mages on the each that the the the driver had the the the same the feet the mages of the same that the been the car who been the mages of the same that the the the same that the the the same the feet the same at the the same that the the the same that the the the same fand the the the same that the the the same fand the same at the same at the same that the same that the same that the same the bean known and the same the same the same that the same that the same the

Considering all the exidence we are not able to conclude that it leads to mat are conclusion, that is negliged on an the part of the diametiff. We are at the climics that whether under the educationes the plaintiff and in the exercise of ordinary core when driving educas the ettert as he did, are a matter which should have been determined by the jury and not by the trial judge. Thicker late is the jury and not 217 111. 464; dischers v. Thicker late herisay languar. 183 111. App. 68; Leuthan v. Iniono dity heilary languar. 183 111.

in the louthon over this sourt said, "A" a conversing preposition a question of dontributory negligenes in one of fact for the jary and will becomes one of les about the ovidence clearly established that the socident routhed from the negligenes of the injured party. If there or nay difference of opinion on the question, so that reasonable winds may not ar-

rive at the same conclusion then it is a question of fact for the jury.*

As to the negligence of the defendant; the testimeny of Bohr, standing alone as it does, suggests, quite strongly, negligence on the part of the motorman. The result is, therefore, that there was substantial evidence on the part of the plaintiff that, at the time, he was in the exercise of care, and, also, some substantial evidence that the motorman, at the time, was not in the exercise of care. Such being the record we are of the opinion that the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendants.

It is further contended on the part of the defendants that all the parties to this action were within the purview, and governed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the evidence shows that the plaintiff's employer and the defendants, by reason of the nature of their business, were subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that, therefore, the plaintiff being injured by the defendants while at work at his regular employment is not entitled to recover in this action. That claim is untenable. Weither the averments of the statement of claim nor the proof, both taken together, show that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act apply. Whether or not the plaintiff's employer was a common carrier is not shown. Here proof of a name such as that of an express company and that the plaintiff for his employer delivered goods at different places is not sufficient.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMSON, P.J. AND O'CONNOR, J. CONCUR.

rive at the seas eccessed than it is a question of fact for the jury."

As to the negligence of the defendant; the testimeny of Rehr, standing alone as it does, suggests, quite strongly, negligence on the part of the meterson. The result is, therefore, that there was substantial evidence on the part of the plaintiff that, at the time, he was it the surraise of care, and, size, some substantial evidence that the substance, at the the substance, at the strong the the substance of ours. The time, was not in the exercise of ours. Onch being the record we are of the opinion that that fudge stred when he instructed the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendance.

Is in further contended on the part of the defendance that all the parties to this metion were within the purview, and governed by the provision of the Porkmen's Compensation Act; that the evidence show that the paintiff a ampleyer and the defendance, by reason of the meture of their business, were subject to the provisions of the meture of their businession, and that, and that, therefore, the praistf being injured by the defendants while at work at his regular analogment is not one titled to recover in this settion. That claim to antennable. It is averaged of the average of the proof, with taken together, show that the proof, both taken together, show that the proof of all and apply. The the proof of all and apply. The the proof of a name and compensation hat apply, Thether or set the proof of a name and we that of an express company and the proof of a name and

The judgment will be reversed and the couns remaided for

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STORES IN ARE POSTABLED.

THUMBON, P.J. ASD C'CCIROR, J. SONSER.

PROPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINGIS, ex rel KATHERINE GRIFFITH.

Appellee

APPRAL PROM

MUNICIPAL COURT

OF CHICAGO.

EDWARD KELLY.

٧.

Appellant.

Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

HR. JUSTICE TAYLOR delivered the opinion of the

On December 30, 1920, Katherine Griffith, having first obtained leave of court, filed her complaint in the Municipal Court of Chicago, setting up that on March 12, 1920, she was delivered of a female child which child by law would be deemed a bastard and that at the time she was so delivered of said child she was, and still is, an unmarried woman, and that Edward Kelly is the father of the child.

The defendant, Edward Kelly, was served with a warrant and appeared in court and filed a plea of not guilty. There was a trial by the court, a jury having been waived, and a judgment finding that the defendant was the father of the bastard child and ordering that he pay to the clerk of the court for the support, maintenance and education of said child, \$1100.00 as follows:- \$200.00 for the first year, payable instanter, and \$100.00 yearly for nine years thereafter, and that He give bond of \$2200.00 to secure those payments, and in default of bond be committed to jail, there to remain until he complied with the judgment order. This appeal is from that judgment.

The presecutrix, Katherine Griffith, testified that

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Opinion filed Nov. 29, 1922.

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On December 36, 1920, Ratherton driffith, having first ebtained leave of court, filed her accordance in the suntained Court of Chimage, setting up that on Perch 12, 1926, she was delivered of a female bills while by law mosts be desired a bastard and that at the time ohe was so delivered of soin obtid she was, and still is, an amounted women, our that Edward delly is the father of the shall.

The cefenond, oversiely, early acted with a serial eacted eight and serial and epocated in court and filter a place of not guilty. There was a trial by the court, a july leaders been waked, and a judgment finding that the definiont was the lather of the betagre of the cristing that the definion that is near the lather of the betagre of the expert, eathered as followed and education of and eather for the authority eather than first year, each that interior for the first year, each that the give bond of that the give bond of that and the constitute of the constituted to the fine there is now in a definite of the dead to the first the constitute of the fine that the the fine that the constitute of the constitute of the constituted to the constitute of the constituted to the constitute of the constitute of the constitute of the the the the the the constitute of the constitute of the constitute of the the the the the the constitute of the

The presecutifu, Ratherine Griffith, voctified that

she was never married; that she gave birth to a female child on March 12, 1920; that Edward Kelly, the defendant, is the father of the child; that she had intercourse with him "about the middle part of June", on one occasion and only one, and never at any other time had intercourse with anyone; that it took place "down to my home, one time in my aunt's gangway"; that he ran after her until her baby came and then he stopped; that she did not say anything to him until the baby was seven months old "because he didn't seem to care anything about it at all"; that she didn't want it to get to his mother; that she had once been in the Juvenile Court for about two months; that that was because of her relations with Edward Kelly.

The defendant, Edward Kelly, denied ever having sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. A witness, Bertha Cleveland, testified that from about three weeks after the baby was born on March 12, 1920, until October 27, 1920, she took care of the baby; that three or four weeks after the baby was born she had a talk with the prosecutrix and the latter said that the baby's father was a Mexican who belonged in Michigan. In answer to the question whether she had any further talk with the prosecutrix about the child the witness answered, "All I had was about the baby's father when she was going to Michigan to marry him." She further testified that the prosecutrix did go to Michigan.

The witness, Hattie Import, testified that she knew the prosecutrix and that on March 12, 1920, she had a talk with her and asked her if she was married and that the prosecutrix said she was not; that she then asked her who was the baby's father and she said a Mexican; that sametime in August, 1919, the prosecutrix told her that she was going to Michigan and that when asked what was she going to Michigan for, the prose-

who was never married; that whe gave hirth to a female shild on March 13, 1830; that Schoold Welly, the defendant, is the father of the child; that she had intersource with him "about the middle part of June", an one occasion and only one, and never at any other time had intersource with anyone; that it took place "done to my home, one time is my aunt's gangray"; that he was after her until her busy came and then he mapped; that she did not say enything to him until the buby was soven menths old "because he didn't went it can day in him anything about it at rils; that and didn't want it to get to his mother; that the knew been in the Juvenile Court for about to months; that the been in the Juvenile Court for about to months; that the been in the Juvenile Court for about to months;

The defendant, Noverd Kelly, desired over jering scausi intercourse with the preservation. A without, negligable intercourse with the preservation. A without the combe after the baby was form an harm 12, 1820, until Colober 27, 1820, and took care of the baby; that three or four veets after the haby was form and a talk with the preserving and the latter was faut that the baby said that the preserving who belonged in Micheland that the baby's father whether she had any further talk with the greenutian whether she had any further talk with the presence to the question whether she had any further talk with the presence of the father she can street and the said was about the baby's father shes also man going to wichigan to marry him." The further that the man going to storigan.

The winese, Swife import, tentified that the knew the prosecuting and that that on the ind a late with not and asked her if the was married and that the prosecutain sold she was not; that the then seked her one was the taby's father and one said a Mexican; that rementes in August, 1919, the prosecuting told her that the action of all that the prosecuting that the prosecuting the prosecution of the prosecution asked what was and action to bioligan for, the prosecution when saked what was and that the bioligan for, the prosecution

cutrix said "she was going there to get married to this Mexican."; that she subsequently did go to Michigan.

After the testimeny of the defendant and Bertha Cleveland and Hattie Dupont was put in, the prosecutrix was recalled and testified, "Now this lady that kept my baby I told her that Edward Kelly was the father of the baby and she knows it, she is not telling the truth. I teld her he was the father of it and it was only for the money my baby must have now." When asked by the Court if she ever said to anybody that Kelly was not the father of her child she answered, "That is not the truth. I always said he was the father and he is." And when asked by the Court about the Mexican, who was mentioned, she said, "It is not the truth. They are not telling the truth, they are all against me."

At the close of the testimony when the question as to whether the child showed that it had Mexican blood in it had been discussed, the court said, "In this case I will say very frankly, after taking into consideration the evidence both for the complaining witness and that of the defendant and his witness, that the testimony of the complainant witness carries a stronger conviction in the mind of the court than does the testimony of the defendant. Now if you are prepared to call in some expert doctor as to whether or not this child has Mexican blood in it I will hear that." Counsel for the defendant then stated that they were not urging that, and thereupon the court found against the defendant. From the statement of counsel it appears, though it is not definitely stated, that the presecutrix and defendant are both colored.

It is the contention of counsel for the defendant

quartx eath "whe was going there to get married to this Mexican."; that she makesquently did go to ilohigas.

After the testimony of the defendant end Bertha Cloveland and Smitter Supont and put in, the usessouthing was spice this ludy thus kept my baby I told her that Edward Kelly was the father of the taby and she knows it, ahe is not telling the truth. I teld her on has the father of it and it was only for the roady my budy and have non.?

The and it was only for the roady my budy and have non.?

Then it is not the follow of the ever said to maybody that fally make the follows and the father that the father of nor orthed and marked. "That is not the truth. I always and one was the father and he is." And when asked by the Jourt about the dexion, who was centrough, the truth.

At the close of the continent inequality when the question so to whether the child showed that it had been dismanded, the court of this care I will say year feetherly, after twing eate consideration the evidence both for the complaining witness and the defendant and the complaining witness and the defendant and the meast, that the testimany of the new format than does the astronger contine on feedant. On if you are grapered to call in some expert documents as to whether on not this child has testimant of the chart of the chart of the call of the same expert documents as to whether or not this child has testimated that the contine the call of the stated that they were not verying that, and the statement of some occurt found against the defendant, when the statement of some self it appears, these that are both outeraty material that the

It is the contention of councel for the defere it

that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence and that the aworn complaint was that the alleged crime was committed after the date of filing the complaint, and even though it be a clerical error, it is fatal.

The truth of peternity is always difficult as it may be said generally that the only ones who may know the truth are the father and mother themselves. Here the prosecutrix affirms positively that the defendant is the father of her child. He denies it. As a matter of common sense courts and the people are generally inclined to give greater weight to the evidence of the mother, in such circumstances as these, than to the evidence of the putative father. The chief evidence of importance which is counter to her testimony is that of Bertha Cleveland and Hattie Dupont, both of whom say that the prosecutrix told them that the father of the child was a Mexican. The trial judge at the close of the trial said. "In this case I will say very frankly after taking into consideration the evidence both for the complaining witness and that of the defendant and his witnesses, that the testimony of the complainant witness carries a stronger conviction in the mind of the court than does the testimony of the defendant." We are necessarily, and should be, much impressed by the judgment of the trial judge in such a case. It is impossible for us, sitting as we do in a court of review. with merely the printed record before us, to consider what may have been given to the mind of the trial judge as a result of the appearance of the four persons who appeared as witnesses in the case. We know that it is the law that the mere fact of the number of witnesses does not of itself necessarily determine the question at issue. People, ex rel Hewes v. Michael, 189 Ill. App. 495. In the latter case, which involved a question of paternity, the court said, "While the number of witnesses is a factor that

that the judgment is against the weight of the svidence and that the erosa complaint was that the alloged arine was committed offer the case of riling the complaint, and even though it be a clerical error. It is fatal,

The truth of paverator is always difficult as it may be east generally that the only ones who say know the truth are the father and wether themselves. Here the prouncitain affice positively that the deferiest is the father of bur dhild. Me degier it. As p makker of common wears courts and the people are generally inclined to give greater weight to the oridence of the motion, in much circumstances as these, than to the distance of the palative Inther. The chief evidence of Lapuxtames with shirt an aught to her theretween the that of deriba Cleveland and Mattle Augont, both or which any that the prosecutifs told those that the father of the thild was a derigen. The trial judge at the closs of the trial said. "In this case I will say by district teking this consideration of the teking the best graph of the best property of the best of for the complaining witness and that of the fordant and bis witherers, that the testiment of the oduplains, attache darries and many conf true and to bels out at maistives togethe toutimony of the neignant. " is see necessarily, and should be, much impressed by the judgernt of the trial judge in such a case. It is impossible for us, rithing as we do in a court of review. with merely the printed accurd before no. to constant about may To since a secret inits off to bit's add os nevig need evad the apprehense of the feet persons wit any erred on witheress in the case. We know that it is the ism that increased the marker of without there not of it could necessarily determine the question at tome. Loople, ex not brews v. sichmon, 189 112. App. in the latter case, which lavelved a tue blom of paternity. the sourt raid, "while the number of witnesses I a factor that

may be properly taken into consideration in determining where the weight of preponderance of the evidence lies, yet it is not determinative of that fact." It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that inasmuch as the prosecutrix testified that the first and only time she had intercourse with the defendant was "In June." "June 12 was the last time - the first and last time.": and as no year is mentioned, she must be considered as having referred to June, 1920, and as the complaint was sworn out in December, 1920, and the child was born in March, 1920, the defendant could not have been the father of the child. We think, however, it is the only fair, taking all the evidence together, to conclude that as the child was bern March 12, 1920, the June referred to was June. 1919, especially as Mattie Dupont testified that she talked to the prosecutrix in August, 1919, before her baby was born. There is some claim that the evidence did not show where the defendant resided; that is, whether he was a resident of Chicago, but the bastardy warrant shows it was served upon him by arresting him and bringing his body into court on January 4, 1921, and in People v. Wunsch, 198 Ill. App. 437, a bastardy case, where the defendant sought to reverse a judgment on the ground of non-residence, the court held, that it would presume that the officer executing the warrant acted strictly within the scope of his authority and within his jurisdiction and, therefore, that the defendant was found within the City of Chicago when arrested.

Finding no error in the record the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THOMSON, P.J. AND O'CCHNOR, J. CONCUR.

be properly tuken into consideration in determining where the meight of proponderance of the evidence lies, yet it in not determinative of that fact." It is claimed by counsel for the defordent that insension as the prosecutrix testified that the first and only time she had intercourse with the definant ten and June." "June 12 was the last time . the first and last time.": and as no year is mentioned, the mast be considered as having referred to June, 1920, and he the compleint was score out in Becomber, 1920, and the child was born in Sarch, 1920, the defendent sould not have bone the father of the child. We think, howaver, it is tar only fair, taking all the evidence together. to conclude that as the antid was born March 12, 1981, the Jupe referred to was June, 1919, especially as maitie Supont tacitfied that the talked to the presentate an august, 1919, before her baby was been. There is suce claim that the evidence did ast show where the defendent resided; that is, whether he was a resident of Chinago, but has beetardy warrent above to see corved upon his by arreating him and bringing his body into court en Jenuary 4, 1921, and in Facpla v. Wanneh, 198 111, App. 437. a bastardy case, share the defendent sought to reverse a judgement on the ground of non-residence, the court beld, that it would presume that the officer executing the correct reted strictly within the seepe of his authority and within his jurisatiotics and, therefore, that the defanciat was found mithin the City of Chicago when streated.

Finding on error in the record the judgment to efficienc.

THORSES, P. J. AND GIREN C. . C. SCHOUR.

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JACOB A. LEWITZ,

Appellee.

UNITED STATES FIDELITY

& GUARANTY COMPANY, a corporation.

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT OF

COOK COUNTY.

227 I.A. 6153

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Defendant issued to plaintiff two burglary insurance policies on merchandise in the latter's place of business in Chicago, one policy being dated May 23, 1919, the other November 20, 1919, and each being for the period of one year from its date. The burglary took place April 22, 1920. Defendant refusing to pay any part of the loss incurred, this suit was brought. The verdict was for \$19,971.50.

Appellant complains of the overruling of its motion at the close of the evidence for an instructed verdict, and also its motion for a new trial after its rendition, and urges (1) that there was a breach of certain promissory warranties in the policies; (2) a misrepresentation in the warranty statements contained therein as to the amount of loss from a prior burglary;

- (3) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict;
- (4) that it is excessive: (5) that there was error in the admission of evidence, and (6) error in modifying instructions.

We shall take up these points in the order stated.

1. As to the alleged breach of warranties.

The policies provide that:

JACOB A. L'MITZ,
Appelleo,

UNITED STATES FIRSTITY & SUPERITY COMPANY, a corporation,

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APPEAL FROM
SUPPHIOR COURT OF
COURT COUNTY.

WR. PRUBIDING JUSTICE RARNES DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Defendant issued to plaintiff two burglary insurance policies on merchandise in the latter's place of 'usiness in Chicago, one policy being dated Lay 23, 1919, the other November 20, 1919, and each 'eing for the period of one year from its date. The burglary took place April 2., 1920. Defendant refueing to pay any part of the loss incurred, 'this suit was brought. The verdict was for 313,971.50.

Appellant complaine of the overwiling of its motion at the close of the evidence for an instructed vardict, and also its motion for a new trial after its rendition, and urges (1) that there was a breach of certain promissory varianties in the policies; (2) a misrepresentation in the warranty statements contained therein as to the want of loss from a prior burglary; (3) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict; (4) that it is excessive; (5) that there was error in the admission of evidence, and (6) error in modifying instructions as shall take up these points in the order stated.

1. As to the alleged breach of vermanties.

The policies provide that:

"This policy shall not cover any loss or damage: (d) Unless books and accounts are regularly kept by the assured, and the actual amount of loss or damage mustained can be accurately determined therefrom by the insurer."

The basis of appellant's argument on this point is that so the books shall be kept as to enable the insurer to determine accurately therefrom, and not approximately, the actual less.

Shortly after the burglary took place appellant's investigator and adjuster went through appelled's books and accounts and made an inventory of the remaining stock and a computation of the loss, in which he was assisted by appelles's bookkeeper. Appellee had had a prior burglary. The first policy was taken out right after the same. In making such computation they started with an estimate of the value of goods on hand right after the first burglary, the inventory or appraised value not then being before them. The estimated value was \$10,000. The appraised value was \$11,000. They then examined the invoices of goods purchased between the dates of the two burglaries and found the same amounted to \$29,831.38. Deducting from this the amount of the sales in the interval and the amount of yardage and value of goods on hand, the total loss was figured at \$17,101.72, to which should be added \$1.000 owing to the difference between the estimated and actual value of the goods on hand after the first burglary.

appellant contends that from such data the less could not be accurately determined, and hence appelles did not samply with the requirements of the policy respecting the keeping of books and accounts. We do not down it necessary to make an extensive review of the character of such data. It consisted of the stock book, said invoices, the work tickets, price of garments sold, the name or character of the material, and the order book. While a strict computation required reference from

"This palicy chail not cover sur loss or durage: (4) image backs and secents are regularly kept by the userses, and the usership mount of loss or denouge mustained that be usershiply determined therefrom by the insert."

The backs of appollent's anguness or this point is that the that the that is that the theorem to determine acquiretely therefrom, and not approximately, the actual less.

Shortly of ter the burglary took place appolisat's investigates and uniqueter west through appellant and cooks and a counts and made an inventory of the remining stock and a computation of the loss, in which he was satisfied by appeller's appelies bed had a pries berglery. The first policy o vzkanako od the maintag at the committee at . were need and in gather and medical idair bond on about to arise oil in attacker on it is harate year after the first burgiary, the inventory or approxad value cos The estimated value was \$10,600. than better before under They shen exectined the Anyoteen of appraised value was this con. tands has entraligned out out to set that the entralignment found the same encurred to 450,801.53. Jedocting from Miss the arount dular har gebrer to same out the inverted off at colds adt to of .6V. 191. Var in result some saud later will . Anad as about to which should be added Al. 900 cains to the difference between the estimated and noticelly velve of the goods on hund after the link test megiary.

Appealant contenned in the mode appealant the kees could not be accordantly determined, in accoss appealant all not could with the remarkements of the colley respective the keeping of becks and named a country.

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one to another there seems to have been no difficulty on the part of the investigator or adjuster in determining the amount of the loss therefrom. While plaintiff's witnesses testified how the result was reached and produced many exhibits to verify such testimony we do not find from the evidence given by appellant's adjuster that he had any difficulty in ascertaining therefrom a reasonably accurate amount of the loss. We shall not undertake to examine the evidence on this subject in detail. While, to be sure, the books and accounts were not kept according to the most approved methods we think the data were such as to enable the insurer to determine therefrom with a ressenable degree of accuracy the amount of such loss, and it is somewhat significant that its investigator did not testify to the contrary, and that it did not refuse to pay the same until some four months after the investigator had figured up the loss from such data.

As to the value of the goods on hand after the first burglary the evidence tends to show that before the first policy was issued covering the same their value was figured by an expert and reported to the insurance broker who negotiated the insurance and that the policy was not issued until after an inspection by appellant's agent. The policy, therefore, must have been issued upon the basis of such appraised value and therefore appellant is hardly in a position to question the same.

It is urged that plaintiff's testimony as to the loss depended somewhat upon oral testimony as to items of value which did not appear in the sales book. But we think it sufficiently appears that they were disclosed to or could have been ascertained by appelled's investigator from the data aforesaid at the time of the investigation. The weight of

one to emether there seems to have been no effit oulty on the part of the investigator or adjuster in determining the mount of the loss therefren. thile plaintiff's witnesses tentified how the result was meaded and produced many exhibits to verify such tentinony we do not find from the evidence given by appellant's adjuster that he had any difficulty in easertaining therefrom a ventenchly accurate another al the lege. We shall not undertake to executes the evidence on this subject in detail. Mills. to be sure, the books and accounts were not kept keesrding to the most approved methods we wishe the data were each on to eachle the insurer to determine therefrom with a re-conside degree of necareacy the second of such loss, and it is somewhat elemificant that its investigator did not tentify to the open trary, and tilns st did you at no west ten bit it init bas , wratt four months after the investigator head figured up the less from . stab down

As in the value of the goods on hand after the first burglary the syldence touds to show that before the first policy was lasted covering the seme their value was figured by an expert and reported to the insurance broker who nugeriated the limitance and that the policy was not issued until after an importion by appoliant's agent. The policy, therefore, must have been issued upon the boots of such appraised value and therefore appellant is hardly in a position to guession the

It is anyoned that plaintiff's tertiment up to the the color depended somewhat ayes are intense of to items of value which did not appear in the solor book. Sut to think it sufficiently appears that they sees disclosured to us tould have been ancominised by appeales a invaligator from the note the slower size of the invaligator. From the note of the invalidation. The solution

such testimony as to the amount of loss is quite a different question from whether it was capable of determination by the insurer from appellee's books and accounts. Whether it was so was a question of fact for the jury, with respect to which we are not disposed to disturb their verdict. It has been held that a ressonable compliance with the terms of the policy is sufficient. (Peoples Fire Insurance Co. v. Culver, 127 Ill. 249.) And us courts do not favor forfeitures of policies for purely technical violations there has been considerable uniformity in rulings on this question to the effect that the books are sufficiently kept if they will enable a men of average intelligence to ascertain with reasonable certainty the lease sustained. (Life Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 108 Miss. 790; Horeitz v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 95 Wash. 455; Kational Surety Co. v. Silverberg Bros., 176 S. W. Rep. 97; Liverpeel. London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U. S. 132; Insurance Co. v. Ellington, 94 Gu. 785; Western Assurance Co. v. Reading, 68 Fed. 708.)

The policy required that a burgler slarm system be always used. One was installed before the policies were taken out and was in useaup to the time of the burglary but was put temporarily out of order about eight o'clock of that evening by some one on the outside smashing a window with which its operation was connected. Plaintiff directed an employe to call the burglary slarm concern to replace the alarm. The concern was not called until about nine o'clock or a little after when their place of business was closed. The burglary occurred later the same night. It is urged there was a breach of the policy requiring the system always to be used. An instruction on this subject, offered by appellant, to the effect that if plaintiff failed to show that the burglar alarm system was in working order and repaired at the time of the burglary he could not

smah toutimeny as to the amount of loop is quite a different question from whether it wer espaids of determination by the incurer from appeller's books and accounts. The ther it was no wes a question of fact for the jury, with respect to wild; we are not disposed to disturb their verdist. It has been beld that a reasonable compliance with the terms of the policy is sufficient. (Peoples Fire Insurance Co. v. Sulver, 127 111. 249.) And as courts to met favor forfelteres of policies for parely technical violations there has been considerable satisarates in makings on this quention to the effect that the books, are sufficiently kept if they will enable a man of average intelligence to ascortain with reasonable cortainty the less watered. (Life Insurance to. v. Frieden, 108 Mins. 980; Morelto v. V. 3. 31delly & Co. Co. Co. Co. and. Mailenal Samer Co. v. Silvenkern Bros. 176 S. B. Rep. 97: Liverpool. tondon & Globe Ins. to. v. Aseracy, 186 %. 5. 15%; Inpurence Co. v. Flitzekog, 64 Ga. 785; Poptern Assurance Co. v. Sording, Co Fed. 708.)

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recover was medified by the court to read;

"Unless you shall further find that said burgler alars system was only temporarily out of repair, and that plaintiff used immediately all resconable efforts to have repaired said burgler alarm system after it became out of repair."

It is arged by appelles that the provision that such a system would always be used is a more representation and not a warranty. Whether it be regarded as one or the other the is evidence impufficient from which to impute negligeness or from to the assured. If there was any negligeness it was on the part of his employe, and appelles sites cases where the court's have held policies not to have been vitiated by the negligeness or omission of an employe of the assured where the same could not be imputed to the latter. But in any event we think the instruction, as tendered, called for a too, rigid construction of the policy in this respect, and that the medification was proper.

As to the alleged misrepresentation of the amount of plaintiff's lose by the previous burglary, with respect to which the evidence is conflicting, we cannot say that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Her was the verdiet excessive if the jury computed interest on the loss from the date it was payable. It was within its province so to do even though they were given no instruction on the subject.

Appelliant contends, but does not argue the point, that certain testimony was improperly admitted. We have reviewed the same and do not think there was reversible error in the court's ruling thereon.

It is further urged that plaintiff did not prove the market value of the goods. As to those on hand after the first burglary the proof was to the effect that their value of \$11,000

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""niess you shall further that the mild barrier alams oystem o saly temporally out of repair, and that plants that pe someble efforts to have regained and hargher class system after it become out of repairs."

It is argued by appelies that the previous that and a system that at the appearant of the alarm as a serial and a sum is a serial and a sum is the actor that and is a still and in the actor that a still and its and is a sum and its and is a sum and its and is a sum and a sum

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was the market price. As to those subsequently purchased, we think the evidence tends to show that the invoices were the market prices and were so regarded by appellant's investigator and adjuster at the time of figuring the losses. There was no evidence to the contrary and many cases may be cited in which under such circumstance—the courts have upheld the verdict on very meager and informal evidence of value.

With the exception of the error urged in medifying the instruction referred to mest of the questions argued are questions of fact the determination of which by the jury we are not disposed to disturb.

As to the contention that proof of loss was not presented to appellant within the time required by the policies, if the requirement was not valved by appellant in sending its investigator to compute the same on the data furnished by appellac immediately after the burglary, yet the point was not specifically reised in the pleadings or otherwise at the trial.

Accordingly the judgment will be affirmed.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., consur.

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Accordingly the judgment will be uffirmed.
AFFIGURE.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., CORCER.



CHARLES GUHL & BROTHER,

VS.

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

CHICAGO, RACINE & MILWAUKER LINE,

Appellee.

227 I.A. 6124

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The main issue in this action upon which the case was tried, is whether appellee, the defendant, violated its duty as a common carrier to deliver within a reasonable time a shipment of strawberries transported by defendant's steamboat line from Racine, Wisconsin, to Chicago.

The judgment was for defendant entered upon the findings of court.

The shipment left Racine the evening of July 2nd and arrived at Chicago, Saturday, July 3, 1920. The boat was belated by heavy freight and fog so that its arrival was later than usual. Plaintiff's claim to damages, however, did not rest upon delay in its arrival but on defendant's alleged failure after arrival to deliver the goods to plaintiff's teamsters in time to enable plaintiff to sell them before moon of that day, after which time there was no market on Saturdays for the goods except to sell to peddlers at much lower prices.

The testimony for plaintiff was to the effect that its teamsters did not reach its store with the berries until between 11 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. that day, when the last of three loads was delivered at the store. As to the

Appellment,

APPRIARI FROM MUSICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO.

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22/7 I.A. 612

HH. PERSIDENCE DUNCTION BARRONS THE SELECTION OF THE COURT OF THE COURT.

The main leave in this notion upon which the cese wes tried, is whether appolles, the defendant, visinged the weth plantanes a midity totalen of thirties demand a se with a skippent of strawbouries transported by cofundant's stagebost line from Macine, Cisuconsis, to Chicago.

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The shipment lett Rucino the evening of July and and sow duby en' errived at Chicago, seturday, Jaly S. 1880. related by beary freight and for so that its erriging and later then usual. Plaintiff's claim to dimense, however, did not hampile a 'smaller'too no sud lavines ast at value nous tast failure after arrival to deliver the goods to plaintiff's wrated made time of Efficiency addense of each all eresember. moon of that day, efter which that there was no market on Paterdays for the goods except to sell to sections at much lower prices.

The testimony for plaintiff our to the of feet estroof old them store as i there were bit assessed ast, fads unit a do , ear tast . w. q Gl:Sl bas . m. a il coewied litar last of three leads was inlivered at the stare. a to the

time the best arrived and the berries were leaded plaintiff relied on the testimony of three tesmsters. They testified the best arrived about 11 e'clock. One said he got the berries for his lead about 11 e'clock, and the other two said they got their leads about 11:30 a.m. But each admitted that he was absorbed in a game of cards which they were playing at the dock from 8:30 a.m. until 11 o'clock. It took about fifteen minutes to lead and fifteen minutes to haul the berries to plaintiff's store. None of the witnesses could state the precise time the best arrived or when they leaded, two of them saying that they did not look at a watch or clock, and the other "guessed" at the time and said no one had spoken to him about the matter until six menths afterwards.

On the other hand both the captain and the checker and freight handler of the vessel testified that the vessel decked at Chicago at 9:05 the morning of July 3rd. The fermer said that when the teamsters were there, they were given the berries as soon as taken off the boat, and the latter testified that after its arrival the borries were taken off in a very few minutes and placed at the door where the commission men are called to take them, and that when they are there the berries are put on their wagons, and when not, the berries are sorted into piles for the different concerns to be loaded as called for. There was no evidence that the berries were called for before eleven o'clock that morning, and that the teamsters could not get them before that time. We think, therefore, the court's findings to the effect that there was no unreasonable delay on defendant's part to have the freight ready for delivery after arrival of the vessel in Chicago, and that the berries could have been had in sufficient time to be marketed had defendant's teamsters called for them, and that

time the best arrived and the berries were loaded plaintiff relied on the testimeny of three teamstore. They testified the boot arrived about 11 e'clack. One said he got the berries for his load about 11 e'clack, and the other two said they got their leads about 11:30 a. m. Rut sach admitted that he was abserbed in a gues of cards which they were playing that he was abserbed in a gues of cards which they were playing at the dock from 8:50 a. m. until 11 o'clock. It took about fifteen minutes to lead and fifteen minutes to hand the herries to plaintiff's store. Hone of the witnesses could state the precise time the boat arrived or when they loaded, two of them saying that they did not look ut a watch or clock, and the saying that they did not look ut a watch or clock, and the other "guesacd" at the time and said no one had opeken to him other "guesacd" at the time and said no one had opeken to him

On the other hand both the captain and the checker and freight handler of the veusel testified that the venuel docked at Chiesgo at 9:05 the norming of July 3rd. The former suid that when the teamsters were there, they were given the berries as soon as taken off the best, and the latter testified that effer its arrived the berries were taken off in a very on mission notation of the coor where the commission as are called to take them, and thut when they are there the berries are put on Gill wagens, and who a not, the borries are surface into piles for the different concerns to be locded to called for. There was no evidence that the berries were culled for before eleven o'eleck that morning, and that the teamsters could not got them before that time. We think, therefore, the court's findings to the effect that there was no unreasonable delay on inferdant's part to have the freight ready for delivery after arrival of the vested in whichen, and that ad es emis such large been heef number of the colored eds marketed had defendant's tempetern called for them, and that being engressed in a game of cards they deferred loading for nearly two hours after the boat's arrival, were justified by the evidence.

Complaint is made of admission of some evidence.

As the trial was before the court without a jury we need not consider the point, for if the evidence was not relevant the court presumably disregarded it, and the testimony complained of had no material bearing on the controlling fact, as above stated, upon which the case was decided.

Appellee was put to the unnecessary expense of providing an additional abstract stating matters necessary for the decision of this case. Its cost will be taxed against appellant.

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Morrill and Gridley, JJ., concur.

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AFFIRMAD.

Morrill and Gridley, 37. conquer.

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
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MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BARNES
DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action brought to recover the balance of alleged purchase price of 50 boxes of cheese. From a judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff ascessing its damages at \$421.50 this appeal is taken. The transaction out of which the controversy arose was as follows:

Appellant Resembeim, then an employe of the Fruitvale Grocery & Market Co. went to appellee's Evanston store with Metz, the manager of the Syanston branch of the Fruitvale Co., and there conferred with Coover, appellee's local manager, with reference to buying some cheese. The price mentioned was 25% a pound. There is no question here about the price. Rosenheim said he would take 50 boxes of that cheese, 25 to be sent that day or the next, and the remaining 25 to be left until ordered out, as the Fruitvale Co. had no room or facilities for handling so much at a time. Coover replied that as the Fruitvale Co. had not established a line of credit with Armour & Co. if he wanted the cheese it would have to be charged to some one else, whereupon Rosenheim said: "Charge it to me." Accordingly the first 25 boxes were invoiced to Rosenheim and delivered as directed at the Fruitvale Co.'s place of business and were charged on plaintiff's books to Rosenheim and were paid for.

ALMOUR & COMPAIN.

APPOILES.

APPOILES.

APPOILES.

APPRAL FROM
MUNICIPAL COUNT
OF CHICAGO.

MR. FREMINING JUSTICE BARNES DELIVERED THE STIMION OF THE COURT.

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Appellant Hosenheim, then an employe of the Fruitvale dra out to kent to appeal of for the store of the store with Meta, the manager of the aventen branch of the Fmitvele Co., and there conferred with Coover, appeller's local manager, with reference to buying none chasse. The price mentioned was 25st There is no question here shout the price. Mosenhoim anid he would take 50 bears of that chesse, 25 to be sent that day or the next, and the remaining RE to be left until ordered out, as the Fraitvele Co. had an very or familities for handling Conver regised that an the Frustvale Co. so much at a time. had not established a line of oredit with Amour & to. if he wanted his channe it would have to be charged to some one claswhereupon desenbein seld: "Grarge it to me." .. coerdinaly the first 25 boxes were involved to descripting and delivered en directed at the Fruitrale Co.'s place of business and sere charged on plaintiff's beeks to tosesheim and were paid for.

Later Coover was called up by telephone and asked to send the other 25 boxes, which were also sent to the store of the Fruitvale Co., invoiced and charged as before. It is for the price of the second delivery that this suit was brought, Rosenheim claiming that the original purchase was for 25 boxes only. But it appears from the testimony of Metz, who accompanied him, that Resembeim said at the time of the purchase: "I will take 50 cases, 25 to be sent out now and 25 on order," and corroborates the testimony of Coover as to whom credit was extended. Metz also testified that Resembeim told him that they had "25 cases out at Armour's," and directed that it be ordered out; that thereupen he called up Coover on the telephone, and ordered delivery of the seme. In his testimony Rosenheim admitted that at the time of purchase he said: "We can use 50 boxes of this." and that he told Coover to "send 25 boxes down there and then when they want the other 25 they will order it out." This testimony was certainly sufficient to warrant the verdist of the jury that there was a sale of 50 boxes, and that the credit was extended to Rosenheim.

We find no room for appellant's contention that there was a breach of the contract by plaintiff or that there was any error in receiving in evidence plaintiff's alleged accounts, the original invoices from which they were made having been introduced in evidence and showing that credit was extended to Rosenheim. No particular error in instructions is pointed out and none is apparent.

Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Later Conver was called up by telephone and caked to send the other 25 become which were also cent to the store of the Fruitvale Co., invoiced and charged am before. It is for the price of the second delivery that this suit was brought, Reconsists claiming that the original purchase was for 25 bones only. But it appears from the testimony of Mets. the accompanied him, time Hempheim anid at the time of the purchase; "I will take 50 cames, 25 to be sent out mow and 25 on order." and corroborates the testimony of Coover as to when eredit wis extended. Mets also testified that Resembets told him that they had "the cense out at Armour's," and directed that it be briefed out; that thereupen he called up Corver on the telephone, and ordered delivery of the sems. In his tentiment These on sendance to eake out the acid but the elegence in ean use 60 become of this. " and that he taid Conver to "nend 35 boxes does there and then shen they rest the other 25 tiny vill or incluitive ginterno new quantitors will acted to parrant the verdist of the jury that their was a sele of 80 boxes, and that the orreits was extended to decembein.

We find no reas for appellant's nestention that
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go ... Accordingly the judgment is allimed.

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS A.JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 I.A. 613

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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General No. 6873

Charles E. Smith, appellee

. Vs.

Appeal from La Salle

Frank C. Bellrose, appellant,

Jones, P.J.

This is a suit in assumpsit upon a declaration consisting of a special count and six other counts in indebitatus assumpsit, the last being the consolidated common counts. The special count alleged that the appellee Charles E. Smith leased to the appellant Frank C. Bellrose, a tract of land described as the east 10.50 acres of the east one-half, lying north of the canal of the north half of the south-west quarter of Section 18 in Township 33, North, Range 3 east of the Third Principal Meridian in La Salle County, Illinois, upon terms and conditions set out in hace verba in said count. The land contained valuable deposits of sand rock which appellant wished to mine, remove and sell.

No question is raised on the pleadings. Upon a trial in the Circuit Court there was a verdict for the plaintiff — appellee here — in the sum of \$650 upon which the court entered judgment after over-ruling motions to set aside the verdict and in arrest of judgment.

This case has been before this court twice before and is reported as Smith vs. Bellrose, 200 Ill. App. 368 where we reversed a judgment of the circuit court in favor of the appelles for \$1.00 and again as Smith vs. Bellrose, 213 Ill. App. 656 (opinion not published) wherein we reversed a judgment for the appelles for \$1,478.50 upon a directed verdict.

Harry W. Bellrose, brother of the appellant, leased the premises above described, from the appelles for a term beginning February 1st, 1904, and ending July 30, 1908, for the purpose of mining, removing and selling the sand thereon. The lease provided for the payment of a royalty of five cents a ton on the sand. Being unable to carry out the terms of the said lease, Bellrose so informed appellee in the presence of appellant. Appellant then entered into negotiations with appellee for a lease of the premises for the same purpose.

General No. 6873

No. 7.

Charles E. Smith, appellee

Append from La Salle

Frank C. Bellross, appellant,

Jones, F.J.

This is a suit in assumpait upon a declaration consisting of a special count and bix other counts in indebitatus assumpait, the last being the consolidated common counts. The appealant count alleged that the appealant Charles E. Smith leased to the appealant Frank C. Belivose, a tract of land described as the east 10.50 across of the east one-half, lying north of the canel of the north half or the acutu-west quarter of Section 12 in Township 35, North, Range 3 sunt of the Third Principal Meridian in has Galle County, Illinois, upon terms and conditions act out in hase verba in said count. The land conseined valuable decosite each cook which appellant sires for sine and sell.

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Harry W. Bellrose, brokers of the appellant, laused the printies above described, from the appelles for a term beginning Footwary 10t, 1904, and ending July 30, 1902, for the puriose of mining, removing and selling the sand thereon. The lasts provided for the grant of a royalty of five cents a ten an the sand. It inguishes the carry out the terms of the caid lease, Bellrose so intermit appells in a unspectant then satered into a goldations with appellant. Appellant then satered into a goldations with appellent for onless same nurses.

The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad right of way extends across the land from east to west, and is not excepted from the description of the premises set out in the lease above mentioned.

Appellant admits he agreed to pay the stipulated royalty, but contends that he entered into a verbal lease with appellee; that he leased only the land owned by appellee at that point; that appellee did not own the right of way of the railroad; that the sand for which recovery is sought came from the right of way; and that he is not bound to pay appellee for sand belonging to the railroad.

Appellee admits that all of the sand for which recovery is sought came from the right of way but contends that the right of way was included in the lease and that appellant entered into possession of the right of way under the lease and removed the sand in question; and having so entered appellant cannot deny his landlord's title without first surrendering to him all the premises into which he entered under the lease. Appellee also contends that he is the owner of an undivided interest in the fee (or reversion) of the right of way, having a right to the sand thereon subject to the rights of the railroad; but we do not think a consideration of that claim or a consideration of the rights of the railroad company is necessary to a decision of this case.

Upon a review of the evidence we find that appellant testified that appellee claimed to own the land on which the right of way was located; that he, appellant, entered upon all of said land included in the right of way, believing the same belonged to the appellee; and that he paid rent thereon to the appellee. He further testified that he had no other understanding of the situation until the officials of the railroad objected to the removal of sand so close to the tracks that it endangered the road. Appellant further testified that after he began mining sand he had a conversation with the appellee in which he inquired whether the appellee owned the land from which the sand was taken and the appellee answered in the affirmative. The court permitted him to make as full proof as he could relative to the land included in the lease and relative to the land occupied by him under

The Chicago, Sock Island and Pasific Railroad right of way extends across the land from cast to (st. and is not excepted from the description of the premises set cut in the least above mentioned.

Appellant admits he agreed to pay the stipul ted royalty, but conterns that he entered into a verbal least with appellar; that he least only the land owned by appelles at that point; that agreels did not own the right of way of the railroad; what the aend for which recovery is sought came from the right of way; and that he is not bound to pay appells for sand belonging to the railroad.

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Upon a review of the earl on which the right of way was taken appelles claimed to one the land on which the right of way was located; that he, appellent, entered upon and of early land included in the right of way, orlieving the same belonged to the appelled; and that he paid rent thereon to the appelled. We furth a testified; and he had no other understanding of the situation until he officials of the railroad objected to the recoval of earld accordent to the trucked that it endangered the road. Application with the appelled in this he began mining sand he had a conversation with the appelled in this back the inquired whether the appelled on the affirmative. The appeals and the appeals as the court was taken and the appeals and the allegent in the affirmative. The ocur permitted him to make as full proof as ne could relative to the land occupied by him under

the lease pursuant to our ruling on the last appeal. From his own testimony it is apparent that he entered into possession of the right of way as a part of the land leased to him by the appellee. He could not thereafter deny his landlord's title without first surrendering to his landlord the possession of all the land into which he entered as a tenant even though both he and the landlord were mistaken with respect to the ownership of the land. (Doty vs. Burdick, 83 Ill. 473; Macken vs. Haven, 187 Ill. 480; Mohannah vs. Mohannah, 292 Ill. 133)

The appellant complains of the assumption in instructions 4,5,6 and 8 that the land in question was included in the oral lease. In view of appellant's own admission that he entered upon the premises under the lease supposing the land to belong to appellee who claimed it, we think the question was no longer one for the jury and that it was not error for the court to assume that fact in the instructions. Instructions 7 and 9 do not assume that the oral agreement included the right of way as contended by appellant.

Instruction number 55 tendered by the appellant and refused by the court was properly refused because it ignores elements of facts contained in appellant's own admissions on the witness stand. He is clearly bound by his admissions and cannot thereafter have an instruction given to the jury which adopts a theory of the case inconsistent in fact and law with such admissions. Instructions 47 and 49 tendered by appellant were properly refused because they assert that title in the railroad to the right of way is a complete defense to the suit for collection of rent thereon and completely ignore the question of whether such right of way was included in the lease or whether the appellant entered thereon under the lease.

Appellant complains that the sourt refused to hear evidence upon the plea of set-off after counsel for appellee had stated to the court that appellee did not claim pay for sand mined north of the right of way of the railroad, and that he was thus not permitted to prove that he had at considerable expense removed the top cover of soil from the rock and sand on appellee's land north of the right of way. The

the lease purguent to our ruling on the last appeal. From als own testimony it is apparent that he sutered into possession of the right of may as a yest of the 1-12 leaged to mis by the appellee. He oculd pairefrents forit to it is entit, starcalcal old the rethreshift ton to his landword vie possession of all the land into which we entered diby resetate enew trottast titles it for igue i new themen a sa respect to the ornershir of the Luit. (Doty was Burdick, 83 III. 473: Macken ve. Part, 10" 1.1. 486; Mohannan ve. Mohannan, 294 111. 133) The appoint complaint of the assummtion in instructions 4,5,6 and 8 tout to lead it on spice we included in the oral lease. In view of appellant's own alwissio: that he entered woom the prewiess under the 1923 eupopaing the land to below to annealee was claimed it that the guestich was no longer ore for the jury and that it was not error for the sourt to assure that I so in one instructions. Latracions ? and 9 do not assum, that a e over errearent . attack the right of ray as contended by angliann.

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claim of set-off rested upon an alleged eviction of the appellant from the premises by the appellee. While there is some comfusion in the record concerning the grounds for the ruling complained of, an examination of the record discloses that the court permitted the appellant to introduce all the testimony he offered tending to show an eviction. The evidence upon this question is substantially the same as it was upon the first appeal. We then held (Smith vs. Bellrose, 213 Ill. App. 368) that an eviction was not shown and therefore no right to a set-off was proven. With the state of the record in the same condition it then was, we must again hold that an eviction was not shown. It follows that the court correctly excluded evidence of the cost to the appellant of stripping the top soil from the sand north of the right of way. There being no substantial error in the record the judgment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Jung saud affilmed.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, Second District.

I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof. I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this ______/ Lord one thousand _______.

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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following, to-wit:

7013

JRT JOSÉ A LA CALLACTION DE LA CALLACTIO

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 I 1. 013

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on OCT 2 1 1 7 the opinion of the Court was filed in the

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General No. 7013

No. 1.

W. R. Hunter, Appellant,

VS.

Appeal from Kankakee

Frank Belleau, Appellee,

Jones, P.J.

Appellant was driving his automobile west on Court Street in the City of Kankakee about 6:15 P.M. of June 6th, 1920, on his way to the Big Four Depot. Chicago Avenue runs north and south and intersects Court Street at right angles. Appellant in his course to the depot turned north to go up North Chicago Avenue. Just as the turn was being made or immediately thereafter a collision occurred between his car and a car owned and operated by appellee. The steering wheel of appellant's car was thereby made to spin and in doing so wrenched, broke and otherwise injured appellant's wrist.

Appellant brought this action on the case to redover damages alleged to have been sustained by him in the accident. He filed a declaration containing three counts. The first charged general negligence. The second charged that appellee was guilty of negli-gence in that he violated Section 2 of a certain ordinance of the City of Kankakee, which provides that a vehicle, except when passing another vehicle ahead, shall keep as near the right hand curb as safety and prudence will permit. The ngeligence charged in the third count is that appellee violated the Statute of this State in not seasonably turning his automobile to the right so as to pass the automobile of appellant without interference. A verdict was returned in favor of appellee and a judgment entered thereon.

Both Court Street and North Chicago Avenue are paved streets with curbing on each side. North Chicago Avenue is 30.2 feet between the curbing and Court Street is 68 feet between the curbing. The evidence is very conflicting as to the position of the two cars at and just before the accident and also as to the rate of speed each car was then travelling. There is testimony tending

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Avenue on the left hand side thereof close to the gutter and that appellee did not seasonably turn his car to the right so that appellent's car could pass without interference. There is also evidence tending to show that appellee had been running his car immediately before the accident at a speed which was unreasonable having regard for the traffic and the use of the way. On the other hand, there is evidence tending to show that although appellee had been on the left side of North Chicago Avenue, he had turned over to the right side thereof before appellant turned into said Avenue; that appellant was operating his automobile on Court Street at a speed greater than was reasonable having regard for the traffic and the use of the way and was unable to turn into North Chicago Avenue without swinging far out beyond the middle of said Avenue; and that in so doing his car struck appellee's car.

Under such a situation a verdict should not be disturbed if the jury was accurately instructed as to the law applicable in the case. (C. N.W. R.R. Co. vs. Dunick, 96 Ill. 42)

At the request of appellee the court gave instruction No. 15 in which the law was stated to be that if the jury "Believe from the evidence that both plaintiff and defendant were driving automobiles along the public streets of the City of Kankakee at the time and place in question, then each was under the same obligation to use due and reasonable care; that the rights of both upon the streets were equal; that neither had a right to use the street that was superior to the right of the other. And in this case, if you believe from the evidence that the injury to the plaintiff, if any, would free not have been received by him if he had been driving his car in a careful and prudent manner, then you are instructed that the plaintiff can not recover etc. In our judgment this instruction is erroneous and misleading under the facts and was calculated to have been prejudicial to appellant. The ordinance of the City of Kankakee which was offered in evidence requires the driver of an automobile to keep his car as near the right hand curb of the street

to show that appellee's car was going south on North Chicago Ayenue on the left hand side thereof close to the gutter and that appellee did not seasonably turn his car to the right so that appellant's car could pass without interference. There is also evidence tending to show that appellee had been running his car immediately before the accident at a speed which was unreasonable having regard for the traffic and the use of the way. On the other hand, there is evidence tending to show that although appelles had been on the left side of North Chicago Avenue, he had turned over to the right side thereof before appellant turned into said Avenue; that appellant was operating his automobile on Court Street at a speed greater than was reasonable to turn into Worth Chicago Avenue the use of the way and was unable to turn into Worth Chicago Avenue without swinging far out beyond the middle of said Avenue; and watthout swinging far out beyond the middle of said Avenue; and

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Complaint is also made of instruction No. 18 given by the court on behalf of appellee. This instruction told the jury that even though they should believe from the evidence that appellee did drive his car on the left side of the street in question, nevertheless, if he turned his oar to the right side of the street in reasonable time to permit the plaintiff's automobile to pass and if the jury further believe from the evidence that if the plaintiff had been in the exercise of reasonable care, he could have avoided the collision by turning to his right and failed to do so, then there can be no recovery in this case. Like instruction No. 15, the instruction now under consideration directs a verdict. Consequently the circumstances under which the verdict should be rendered under such instruction should be consistent with the facts and the law in the case. It is the contention of appellant, and there is testimony tending to support such contention, that immediately upon his turning into North Chicago Avenue he was put in a place of danger because of appellee's being on the wrong side of the street; that he used his best judgment to avoid the accident, but was unable to do so. When a person finds himself placed in a dangerous situation through the negligent act of another he is not bound to do the very thing which will extricate him from his danger. All the law required of him is to do that which an ordinarily reasonable person would do under like circumstances. One who has, through his own negligence, put another in danger can not excuse himself by saying if such other

as safety and prudence will permit. Under this ordinance the right of appelles to run his car on the sast side of North Chic go Avenue when going scuth was not equal to right of appellant to that eith of the etreet, when going north. Appellant has a superior right to use the sast eide of eadd Avenue at that the . The force of the instruction given was to mullify the legal effect of the ordinance. One of the counts of the declaration was prefer upon that ordinance. Appellant offered restingny whist tended to support the material averments of that count. Therefore, the paraful effect of instruction No. 15 must be apparent.

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We also think that the 12th instruction is erroneous because it assumes that in turning the corner at said street intersection. appellant was operating his car at an unlawful speed. The location on the street of the accident was one of the questions in dispute in this case. Hence the instruction should not have assumed to decide that question. Furthermore, the instruction seems to assume that the Statute limits the speed of automobiles in turning such corners as the one in question, to six miles per hour. Such is not the law. Speed in excess of six miles per hour at such a corner is made prima facie evidence of negligence but where there is testimony tending to overcome such prima facie evidence, it is then a question for the jury to determine whether or not such speed is or is not greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and the use of the way or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person. (Berg vs. Marshall, 196 Ill. App. 209; Johnson vs. Pendergast, opinion filed Aug. 5th, 1923)

During the progress of the trial some of the jurors went to the place where the accident in question is said to have occurred. They there made measurements and other observations which it is said they considered in arriving at their verdict. Appellant on the hearing of his motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial person had done this or that he would have avoided injury. According to appellant's testimony there was not room to pass appelles on the right side when he turned into the Avenue and appelles's car was coming straight toward him. He then turned to the left seeking to avoid a collision just at about the same time appelles turned his car toward the west and the collision resulted. Whether appellant's acts under the ofroumstances were those of an ordinarily reasonable person was a question for the jury. The court should not have undertaken to tell the jury what was a reasonable sot or what was not a reasonable act under the oiroumstances. (Chicago City Ry. Co. vs. O'Donnell, 308 Ill. 367; M. Chicago Street Ry. v. Erwin, 303 Ill. 354; Roberts vs. City Ry. 363 Ill. 338)

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offered to make proof of this circumstance by means of affidavits of a certain juror, and he requested the court to have other jurors brought before it and examined under oath as to this subject matter. The court declined to consider such proof and we think justly so. They could not be heard to impeach their own verdict. (Wykoff vs. Chicago City By. Co. 234 Ill. 613; Chicago vs. Saldman, 234 Ill. 625)

Because of the errors committed on the trial, this cause must be reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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
Because of the errors committed on the triell, this cause must be reversed and remanded.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

nine hundred and twenty- three

Clerk of the Appellate Court.



AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff 227 I.A. 613

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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David Sterling Bevier, Defendant in Error,

VS.

Error to Circuit Court of Stark# County.

M. L. Hay, Trustee, etc. Petf. in error,

Jones P. J.

Mordecai Bevier, now dece sed, by his last will bequeathed certain property to the defendant in error, David Sterling Bevier. A codicial to said Will so far as it relates to the subject matter of this suit is as follows: -"My son, David Sterling Bevier having acquired and become addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors since the date of said Will now, therefore, if he permanently reforms and quits the use of intoxicating liquors altogether. in any quantity or for any purpose during my lifetime, then said Will shall stand as it is written, but if my said son, David Sterling Bevier continues the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage to any extent whatever, or for any length of time hereafter. then and in that case .--- I do hereby nominate and appoint my daughter Minnie M. Bevier---as trustee of my said son. David Sterling Bevier-in trust for the use and benefit of the said -- David Sterling Bevier: and I direct that the income derived therefrom be pedd to him-but in case (he) shall permanently quit the use of intoxicating liquors, and shall permentently eform in that respect, then I direct that his full share and proportion of my estate shall be transferred and paid over to him."

After the death of the said test tor, Minnie M. Bevier assumed the duties of trustee under said Will. She afterwards resignmed and M. L. Hay, the plaintiff in error, was appointed and qualified as such trustee.

The bill in this case represents that at the time the testator departed this life the said plai tiff in error was still addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, but that for a con-

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tinuous period of more than two years prior to the filing of the bill in this case, he has entirely ceased the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage and during all the time from such date up to and including the present time, he has totally abstained from the use of intoxicating liquor, and has permanently reformed in the matter of drinking intexicating liquor, and for more than two years last passed to the present time he has continuously abstained from drinking or use of intexicating liquor and has entirely redeemed himself from the drinking habit. The bill prays that the said trustee shall pay to the said plaintiff in error the sum of \$4613 or so much thereof as remains in said trust fund after paying the proper charges against the same on account of said trustee. An answer was filed by the Trustee, the defendant in error, denying that he has any knowledge of said alleged reform of the olaintiff in error; alleging that the said Bevier has moved away from the State of Illinois where the defendant has not been personally able to observe his habits; and denying that the said Bevier has fully reformed in his habits as required by the terms of the Will.

Upon a hearing a decree was entered in favor of the defendant in error, requiring the plaintiff in error to account to the said Bevier at the next term of said court. This cause is now brought here for review.

The evidence in the case consisted very largely of depositions taken in the State of California where the defendant in error has been for a number of years. It tends to show that Bevier has entirely abstained from the use of intoxicating liquors for more than two years last passed; that he has had frequent opportunity to drink intoxicating liquor but has invariably declined so to do; that he is a man of good character and is now a man of sober habits. The plaintiff in error offered no evidence tending to rebut this

tinuous period of more than two goars pilor t the filler of the bill in this case, he has entirely ce sed the use of incalcating liquor as a beverage and during all the time from suon date up to and including the present time, he he totally later ed from the use of intoxicating liquor, and his normanently refored in the matter of drinking int wiesting liquor, and for while then two years last wased to the propert time he had continuously abstained from drinking or use of intextentiar liquer and has ratirely redeemed hi self from the drithing habit. The bill many but the said trustee shall pay to the said plaintiff in err r the sup of \$4613 or so much thereof as remains in said trust fund saften paying the eroper charges against the same on account of the trustee. An answer was filed by the Aust e, the Aelena of in same, denying that he has any knowledge of Usid Sligged r form of the nlathiff in error; sale gire the time s id Beriar hes tod awsy from the State of Illinois where the defeni t has not been personally able to observe his bebits; and denging that the asid Bevier hes fully reformed in his healts a required by the toris of the Will.

Upon a houring a decree was entered in favor of the d fendant in error, requiring the pluintiff in error to account to the said Bevier at the next term of said court. This came is new trought here for review.

The evidence in the acce o clated very largely of acceptions taken in the Stare of Clifornia where the defending in one has been for a number of years. It tends to show that heries has entirely abstitued from the use of intexicating it was a real two years last passed; that he has had frequent on the iny to drink intexicating liquer but had in risply declired as the test as men of good character and is not a sum of substance in evidence tending that till the error offered an evidence tending to that till

testimony. The defense was wholly technical and wanting in circumstances. We think the pleadings and proof were presented to us by a sufficient record and under the facts as disclosed by such record and under the provisions of the Will as the same are construed in Bevier vs. Hay, 221 Ill. App.; the defendant in error is entitled to a restoration of his property and to a discharge of the trustee. The decree of the chancellor is therefore affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this ______ / # the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

Pc/0 22

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M JETT, Justice ...

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT'S. AYERS, Sheriff. 77 I.A. 613

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on
the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
following, to-wit:

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E. R. Mickelberry.

Appellant,

VB.

Appeal from Peoria

Arthur Keithley,

Appellee,

Jones, P.J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Peoria County dissolving an injunction restraining appellee from selling a certain note for \$15,000 secured by a mortgage on real estate and dismissing the bill as to appellee, Keithley, for want of equity.

Appellant, Mickelberry, was the owner of certain real estate in Adams County, Illinois, containing about 222 acres. He contracted to sell the same to John B. King. Subsequently, on March 9, 1920, King contracted to sell it to Edmund H. Dwyer. The deal was not completed for some time thereafter because of objections made by Dwyer's attorney to the title as shown by the abstract. About September 1st, King and Mickelberry entered into an arrangement between themselves, whereby a deed was made by Mickelberry to Dwyer. The latter executed and deliver -ed to King the said note for \$15,000 secured by a montgage on said real estate. The uncontradicted evidence shows that under the arrangement between King and Mickelberry, the said note and mortgage were taken for the use and benefit of both King and Mickelberry and that King's interest in said note amounted to about \$1,000 and the remaining interest belonged to Mickelberry. The note and mortgage were left in King's custody under a declaration by him that he would dispose of the same to the Masonic Lodge in Peoria for cash and retain from the proceeds of the sale the amount due him and pay the remainder to Mickelberry. King endeavored to make a sale of the note and mortgage to the said Lodge but his efforts were not successful. Later King deposited the note and mortgage with the appellee, Keithley to secure King's personal note to Keithley in the sum of \$6,000. This fact was not known to Mickelberry until December when he received a notice

E. R. Mickelberry,

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Appeal from Peoria

. E V

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that Keithley would sell the note and mortgage at public sale to satisfy the King note. Mickelberry thereupon filed the bill in this case. The decree ordered King to pay the sum of \$14,172.71 to Mickelberry as the amount due Mickelberry on said note. King makes no complaint against such decree. The appeal involves only the action of the chancellor in desolving the injunction and dismissing the bill as to Keithley.

The conduct of King in transferring the note and mortgage to Keithley to secure King's note for \$6,000 was unauthorized. Under Section 59 of our Negotiable Instrument law, a holder, is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course. Section 52 of said Act defines "a holder in due course" to be one who has taken the instrument under the following conditions! 1. that the instrument is complete and regular upon its face: 2. that he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it has been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; 3. that he took it in good faith and for value; 4. that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the persons negotiating it. It is claimed by the appellant that Keithley had notice to of King's defective title at the time the note and mortgage were transferred to him and that such transfer is therefore subject to the equities of appellant. A defeotive title having been shown in King, the burden is upon Keithley to prove that he acquired the title as a holder in due course, that is to say, that he took the note in good faith and for value and that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defects in King's title to the instrument.

Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that to constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or

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defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.

The material facts in evidence from which it is contended that Keithley had notice of King's defective title are as follows:-Both King and Keithley are practicing attorneys at law in Peoria and for something like fifteen years had carried on business dealings with each other. At various times King was indebted to Keithley. He also acted as Keithley's attorney in certain matters of litigation. At the time the instruments in question were negotiated to Keithley, King was employed by him in the collection of a certificate of deposit issued by a St. Louis Bank and he was also acting as an attorney for Keithley in litigation then pending in Woodford County, Illinois. King informed Keithley that he had contracted to buy the Adams County land from Mickelberry and had turned the deal to Dwyer at a profit to himself but that he needed \$4,000 or \$5,000 in each to consummate it and offered to give Keithley a note for \$6,000 secured by the Dwyer note and mortgage as collateral. Just how the sum of \$6,000 was arrived at as being the amount needed by King is not very clear but it included a transfer to King of the said certificate of deposit, certain items of indebtedness then existing between King and Keithley and also some cash. A careful examination of all the evidence in this case utterly fails to show that Keithley had actual knowledge of King's defective title to the instruments negotiated to him or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instruments from King amounted to bad faith. We, therefore, hold that Keithley was a holder of the instruments in due course. This view is supported by Justice vs. Stonecipher, 267 Ill. 448.

Counsel for appellant contend that where a note and security are transferred together and the security is non negotiable because of its provisions or because of the law, the purchaser takes the same subject to all defenses which might be interposed to a 6hose in action. C.D.V. Ry. Co. vs. Lowenthal, 93 Ill. 433 and other cases are cited in support of that position. These authorities can not be

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invoked in this case. We have held that appellee is the owner of the note in due course and it would be inequitable to apply such a rule, if it exists, when appellant knowingly allowed the note and mortgage to be taken in King's name and surrounded him with every indicia of ownership.

While we think the general conclusions of the chancellor are correct, we are constrained to hold that the decree is erroneous in that it does not grant the relief warranted by the findings contained in the decree. Keithley does not claim to be the owner of the Dwyer note and mortgage, but admits he holds them merely as a pledge to secure the payment of the King note for \$6,000. It, therefore, necessarily follows that Mickelberry is entitled to redeem the instruments from Keithley by paying the amount due on the King note or in the event of his failure to so redeem, then that the said instruments may be sold to satisfy the amount due Keithley on the King note. All proceeds of such sale over and above the amount due Keithley on the King note shall be applied to the payment of the amount decreed to be due from King to Mickelberry. It appears from the evidence that the Dwyer note is worth its face value. In the event of a redemption by said Mickelberry, he shall credit King with the difference between the amount due on said mortgage note at the time of redemption and the amount paid Keithley to effect such redemption.

The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed and remanded with directions to the chancellor to modify the same by granting appellant thirty days time after the date of the entry of such modified decree, in which he may redeem the said note and mortgage from Keithley by paying to the latter, the amount due on the said note of King for \$6,000. The said modified decree shall also provide that in the event appellant does not redeem as aforesaid within the time herein allowed to do so, then that the said note and mortgage will be sold at public vendue upon such notice and by such person as the chancellor shall in said modified decree direct and the proceeds from such sale shall be brought into the circuit court where it shall be distributed among the respective parties in interest and in

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accordance with the views hereinbefore expressed. It is further ordered that the costs of this appeal be adjudged against appellee, Keithley.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.





AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Segun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present--The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS A. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff 2 7 T.A. 9711

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on
the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
following, to-wit:

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General No. 7071

No. 25

Fred J. Steurer, Appellant,

vs.

Elgin and Belvidere Electric, Company, Appellee.

Appeal Circuit Court of Boone County.

Jones. P. J.

The appellee is an electric railway company possessing and operating a line running through Garden Prairie, an unincorporated village. The tracks of said Company run east and west through said village and intersect a public highway which runs north and south. The appellant was on December 11, 1917, riding in a Ford automobile operated by his son. The automobile had been stopped in front of a store about 116 feet south of appellee's tracks. It was then started and while appellant was attempting to cross said railway tracks a collision occurred wherein appellant received certain physical injuries and his car was damaged. The declaration charges the appellee with general negligence in operating its electric car at and before the time of the collision, and it avers that at such times appellant was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety.

This case has been tried by three different juries and has been in this court once before on appeal. Stuerer vs. E. & B. E. Co. 220 Ill. App. 546. The first trial resulted in a verdict in favor of appellant for \$500. This verdict was set aside and a new trial awarded by the trial court. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of appellant for \$550. An appeal by the railway company resulted in a reversal of the judgment entered upon said verdict. Because of an erroneous instruction the case was remanded and again tried. The jury in the last trial found the issues in favor of the defendant, the appellee here.

Appellant urges that the case should be reversed and remanded,

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first, because the court improperly excluded certain evidence offered on behalf of appellant; second, the court improperly gave instructions 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 on behalf of appellee; third, the court improperly refused instruction No. 1 tendered on behalf of appellant, and, fourth, the verdict and judgment is contrary to the manifest weight of evidence.

The seventh instruction given on behalf of appellee told the jury that "the exercise of ordinary care, caution and prudence for ones own safety or to avoid being damaged or injuried, such as is required in this case is the exercise of that care which every person of common prudence bestews upon his own affairs or concerns. And the ordinary care and prudence which reason and law require a person to exercise for his own safety and to avoid being injured, must be proportionate to the danger, if any, and exercised with reference to the situation and position in which the person finds himself. And if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff by the exercise of such degree of care on his own part at the time of and immediately before the injury would have avoided or excaped the injury and if the jury further believe from the evidence that he and his said son did not use such degree of care, then he can not recover in this case and the verdict should be for the defendant." Complaint is made of this instruction because it does not require that the care which must be exercised shall be proportionate to the known danger. It is true as an abstract proposition of law that the danger as to which care must be exercised is either a known danger or danger which might reasonably be expected under the circumstances of the particular case. Nevertheless. it is difficult for us to understand how the jury could have been any wise misled by this instruction. Railroad tracks and railroad crossings are places of known danger, the danger always being from the approach of a car or

first, because the continuous ly resided cortain evidence offered on behalf of specificat; sected, the court is promard, gaveinstructions 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 on behalf of whelles; third, the court is properly refused instruction No. 1 tendered on behalf of appellant, and fourth, the vordict of judgment is contrary, to the manifest weight of cridence.

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train. Such approach of the car or train may be attended by obvious and perceptible signals or it may not be so attended. But whatever the circumstances are, it is established not only by the law of the State but by common knowledge that grade crossings are places of known danger. (Chicago & N. W. Ry. vs Hatch 79 Ill. 137; I. C. R. R. vs. Baches 55 Ill. 379; C. M. & St. P. Rys vs. Halsey 133 Ill. 248; Chicago Terminal etc. Co. vs. Helberg, Admstr. 124 Ill. App. 113). It was impossible for the jury to gather any other meaning from the instruction than that it was necessary for the appellant to exercise ordinary care in avoiding being injured by appellee's approaching car. Instructions must always be considered in the light of the evidence and the subject matter of the law suit. (Atchison vs. McKinie 233 Ill. 106) As applied in this particular case to the evidence adduced in it, the said instruction was not erroneous and was not prejudicial to appellant's case. The objections to appelles's instructions 8, 9, 10 and 11 are very much the same as that made to the 7th instruction. The court fully instructed the jury as to the meaning of the term "ordinary care" in the fourth instruction given on behalf of appellant and we see no lack of harmony in the use of the term as it is employed in the various instuctions given by the court.

It is contended by counsel for appellant that appellee's tenth instruction assumes megligence on the part of appellant. Standing alone, this instruction might possibly be open to the attick made upon it, but in view of all of the instructions given in the case, no harm was done appellant by the inartful language employed in this instruction. Instructions are to be read and considered as a series and when so considered, if the law has been fairly stated as a whole, it will be held that the jury has been correctly informed as to the law applicable to the case.

or beforest a granification of the deserve douc. obvious and perce tible signal. In it is not be so attenni. But whatever the circumstances are, it is established not only by the law of the tate but by common knowledge that gr de crossings are places of known denger. (Chicage & M. M. A. Astoh 79 Ill. 137; I. C. K. I. vs. Bechee 55 Ill. 379; C. M. s ot. 2. Mys vs. Maisey 133 Ill. 248; Unicase terminal tte. Co. vo. Helberg, Admstr. 184 111. app. 113). It was impossible for the jury to gather any other meaning from the Lestruction than that it was necossary for the appellant to exercise ordinar; care in avoiding being injural by inheline's an reaching car. Instituttions must always be considered in the light of the cylderee and the subject matter of the La. Lutt. (Luchi, 113. Lebi te 233 Ill. 196) as appli a in this o figurar area. A clare adduced in it, the said mathetican ... a not erroudue and war not projudicial to appellant's sas a The o'gestions to a mellee's instructions 8, 9, 10 and ii revery such the sale strat sade to the Vtb instruction. The cuit fully incurrect the jury of to the exiting it he term "c.oim.r. ane" in inc. ur ha cirristion given a sendi f ampallat and we see as door of his a record in the use of the ter, so it is each to the will de instriction given u, the court.

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(Lourence vs. Goodwin 170 Ill. 309; American Car Company vs. Hill. 226 Ill. 227)

There is no error in the action of the court in commection with appellant's refused instruction No. 1. The same instruction in substance was contained in the first given instruction asked by appellant,

After a careful examination of the record in this case, we are of the view that the court did not commit any error in its ruling upon the admissibility of evidence or in the giving or refusal of instructions. We can not say that the verdict and judgment are against the manifest weight of the evidence. It would certainly appear that upon the third trial of the cause, all of the available facts in support of the contentions of the respective parties would be produced. Whether or not the injuries of were caused by the negligent operation of appelled across car or by the lack of ordinary care on the part of appellant, or from both, was fairly submitted to the jury and under the circumstances we can not disturb the jury's findings. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(Lourence vu. Goodwin 170 Ill. 309; Aleria n Car Coloudy S. +6. Pl (735 .IEI 3:3

There is no error in the etion of the otart in consection with sopellant's refused iss'riction No. 1. The .mm. instruction in substance was contained in the first piven instruction asked by specilent,

After a careful exacination of the record in tale care, es are of the riew that the ocurt did not consit any error in its ruling vion the addicability of evidence of the giving or refusal of instructions. We can unit asy that the product and judgmont are against the m misest weight of the evidence. would certainly appear that apon the third trial of the saude, all of the systlable facts in ap ort of the cententias of the respective sarties would be in duses. Incher of the top topices of were caused b, the nerlympt then of an ell o'r or or by the lack of reinery sere in the mart of assectiont, or from both, was fairly subultted to the jury and under the circum tancus we can not disturb the jury's findings. The judge of is affir eq. . De Titte to mappel

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this _____/ 4 th__day of in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COUBT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the whird day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand pine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 1

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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> > Judgae.

4. 10 1 43. 8 23. 24 14. 18. Sinclair Refining Company,
Appellant,

Va.

Appeal from Lake

Joseph Pester,

Appellee

Jones, P.J.

The appellant brought a suit in assumpsit against appellee for the recovery of a balance alleged to be due it from the appellee on account of merchandise sold and delivered. The cause was tried be-fore a jury and a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant. Judgment was entered thereon in bar of the action and against the plaintiff for costs. This cause is now here on appeal.

Appellee was engaged in selling oils, and he purchased the same from appellant. Deliveries were made by drivers of appellant. On such occasions, if the appellee paid cash upon delivery for the oil, a receipt for such payment was given him. When he did not pay cash for the oil, a ticket was made out in triplicate showing the quantity of oil delivered, the price and the date. This ticket was then signed by appellee. Being unable to read or write he made his signature by mark. The testimony tends strongly to show that he generally failed to pay cash on delivery but at the time of the next delivery he would make a payment for the whole or some part of the oil delivered to him on former occasions. This practice was not invariably followed out. Whenever he made payments on prior deliveries he was given a receipt and he testified that these receipts were then hung upon a hook in his shop.

On the trial of the cause appellant introduced in evidence 44 tickets, duplicates of which it was claimed were given to appelles at the time of the delivery of oil which was not paid for on such occasions. It is nowhere disputed that the oil mentioned in such tickets was delivered to appellee nor is it disputed that at the

Sinclair Refining Company,

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Appeal from Lake

Joseph Paster,

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Appellee

Jones, P.J.

The appearlant brought a suit in sasurpsit against angelize for the recovery of a balance alleged to be due it from the ac alles on account of merchandise cold and delivered. The cause was tried before a jury and a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant.

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On the triar of the ocuae appillant introlucer in evitence 44 tiokets, suplicates of wards it was oldined very jiven to apolise at the time of the delivery of oil with the oil men'ione, in anomore occasions. It is nowhere displace that the oil men'ione, in activities was delivered to appellee nor is it disputed that the

time such deliveries were made the oil was not paid for. Appellee insists that payments fully covering such deliveries were afterwards made. However, he produced no receipts. He kept no books and evidently relied altogether upon his memory.

The court gave the following instruction at the request of the appellee "If you believe that the defendant paid for all goods sold and delivered to him by the plaintiff in this case, at the time subsequent deliveries were made by the plaintiff, and that the agents of the plaintiff were duly authorized to collect unpaid balances from the defendant, and that the said agents did keep and retain some of the money so collected, or did sell and receive money for goods which were to have been delivered to the defendant, and which, accounts of the company show were delivered to the defendant, then the defendant is not liable for the moneys so kept and received, if any, by the agent or agents of the plaintiff. There was no basis whatever for the giving of this instruction. There is not a particle of evidence on the case even tending to show that the drivers who delivered the oil kept and retained any of the money they collected from appellee nor that any of them sold to others any of the oils intended for delivery to appellee. The prejudice likely to result from the giving of such instruction is so patent and obvious it needs no dismussion. It was error for the court to give an instruction not predicated on the evidence. (Boldenwick vs. Cahill, 187 Ill. 218: Harvey vs. McQuirk, 158 Ill. App. 50)

This cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

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Reversed and remanded.

-45-03 213

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.



7079

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand pine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present--The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon! THOMAS AM, JETT Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk. 227 1.6 27

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on

1922 the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
following, to-wit:

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General No. 7079

Elias Feinstein, Appellee,

VS.

Sameul Schwartz, Appellant.

Appeal from Circuit Court of Lake County.

Jones, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee,
Feinstein and against appellant, Schwartz for \$1,607.17 and
costs recovered in an action of assumpsit. Appellant was a dealer in certain soft drinks made by Pabst Brewing Company. Appellee
was a customer of appellant and purchased large quantities of
Pablo. He was entitled to a rebate or credit for all empty cases
and bottles which he returned. The controversy between the
parties to this suit invalves only such rebate or credit. Before
entering upon atrial it was stipulated between the parties that the
account between them showed a balance against appellee amounting
to \$6,042.38, subject, however, to whatever offset or credit he
is entitled to because of teturned cases and empty bottles.

The finding of the jury that there was \$1,607.17 due Feinstein after charging him with the said above mentioned balance seems to be justified by the evidence.

The point seriously insisted upon for a reversal of this case is that the court refused to give the following instruction to the jury: "You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses and if you believe from the evidence that any witness has wilfully sworn falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may unless the same is corroborated by other credible evidence or fact and circumstances in evidence, disregard the whole or any part of the testimony of such witness, and in passing on the credibility of any witness or the weight to be given to his testimony, you may consider his manner and conduct upon the stand, as means of knowledge, the relationship of the

Genural 110. 7079

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Elias Petnstein, appeliet.

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sameul schwartz, ansellant.

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Jones, 2. J.

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party, if any, and the interest that he may have in the result of the case."

We held in Conlon vs. C. G. W. Ry. Co. 139 App. 555 that where some of the statements of a witness on direct and cross examinations are not consistent and harmonious with each other, it is error to refuse an instruction advising the jury that if they believe any witness has wilfully and knowingly sworn falsely to any fact material to the issues in the case, they are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of such witness, except in so far as it may have been corroborated by other credible evidence or by facts and circumstances proven on the trial. reason to depart from the holding in that case and if the instruction asked for in the Conlon case had been tendered to the court in the instant case, it no doubt would have been give," But an examination of the instruction now complained of will disclose that it is loosely constructed and quite difficult of understanding. the jury understood that they might disregard false testimony only when it was not corroborated by other credible evidence or facts and circumstances in evidence, is not at all clear. It is possible to make the instruction clear by a transposition of certain of the language employed. But the court is not required to re-draft or re-construct instructions. We are mindful of the serious and exacting task of the trial judge in examining and passing upon instructions at the close of a trial. It ought not to be expected of him that he will take the time to remodel embiguous instructions in order to put them in proper shape to be given to the jury.

There is another mistake in this instruction which is obvious to everyone in the legal profession but which might not be apparent to a layman, and therefore the meaning of the instruction could not be appreciated by the jury. The instruction concludes as follows,

party, if any, and the let rest that he say has in the result.

We held in 3 mion to. i. C. M. . . . oc. 108 on. 555 that where some of the states and a state of the some orest exactnetione are not out an ampenation of the enditenties en is error to refuse an instruction of the thir this to rorre at boliere any witness has ilitally ad nowingly earns in the enr fact asterial to the last a in the case, they are to liberty to disregard the entire distance is such attress, erest in so far as it may have been correctified by there a main trid nee or by facts and circu staless iv a mitte latel. In the latell in reason to depart from the rot of an in a condition to the total ion asked for in the Comium of a bud wer early a trake a but in the instant case, it a doub , and have emulyof at ar u, aination of the instruction of the instruction of the instruction is locally coration in and cold of the first of with the ding. whether The ground of a fire will be a find that no derechand gray edd when it was not corrected by their constitution of facts and circulated in the this, if contains the smaller to make the fraction sould be true the critical rest of the language of the art to a contract the language of but at the side of the side of the street of the street of the side of the sid man and see an original or in a more list and to dead guitabase instruction of the state of the termination of the commetted institution of the color of the state of the state of the

There is nother found, by a unit in the analysis of the to everyone in the lepth found to be a laymen, and here is the mention of the source is the form of the source is the form of the source is the form. The introduce is colden a follows.

"You may consider his manner and conduct upon the stand as means of knowledge"etc. Undoubtedly the use of the word "as" was a typographical error and the word intended to be used was "his", but the jury could not know this, and the instruction standing as it does is unintelligible. The court was justified in refusing it. The judgment of the court is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this / 4 day of in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court



7082 (266/

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon, NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, £1erk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 TA. 614

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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7082

George W. Brown, Appellant,

VS.

Appeal from Stark.

33

Robert Conover, Appellee.

Jones, P. J.

Brown sued Conover in the circuit court of Stark County to recover commissions for the sale of real estate and filed a declaration containing three special counts and the common counts. The special counts alleged that Conover owned a farm in Marshall County and employed Brown to procure a purchaser therefor and arranged to pay him a commission for procuring such purchaser and that Brown did procure a purchaser to whom Conover sold the land, and that Conover had not paid him the agreed commission. Conover filed a plea of non-assumpsit. The sause was tried by a jury. At the end of all the evidence plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury to find for him in the sum of \$500.00. This instruction the court refused. The jury found for defendant. A motion for a new trial by plaintiff was denied. Defendant had judgment and plantiff appeals.

It was not definitely agreed at first what the commission should be, but it was finally agreed that it should be \$500. Brown interested one Lyon in the premises and showed the farm to him and introduced him to Conover and afterwards the parties all went to Henry and Lyon and Conover afterwards went to a bank and the contract was there prepared and executed. It was not, however, a contract for the unqualified sale and purchase of the farm. The contract was dated July 31, 1919. The price named in the contract was \$60,000, of which sum \$2,000 was paid down, \$15,000 was to be paid on March first, 1920, and on that day the deferred payments were to be secured by a first mortgage on the land. Said contract contained also the following provision: "The party of the first part hereby acknowledges a check from the party of the second part for \$2000.00, the same when paid being accepted as a prepayment on the amount due March 1st, 1920, but in event of the party of the

second part failing in his agreement, the said sum of \$2000.00 shall be

George W. Brown, Appellant,

Agooal Proc Sterk.

Robert Conover, Appellee.

Jones, P. J.

appeals.

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It was not definitely greed that the comission should be, but it was finally sgreed that it should be \$600. Erond interests one Lyon in the premises and showed the farm to him and introduced him to Conover and afterwards the parties all went to Henry and Syrn and Conover afterwards went to a bank and the contract was there orepored and executed. It was not, however, a contract for the unqualified sele and purchase of the farm. The contract was dated July 31, 1515. The price named in the contract was \$50,000, of which sum \$2,000 was pid down.

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part for \$2000.00, the same when pald being secented up a prosagment on the amount due March 1st, 1920, but in event of the party of the second part failing in his egrous at, the said our \$2000.00 shall be

retained by the party of the first part, as loss or damage to him on account of such failure, and this agreement shall then be considered otherwise null and void." This in substance like the contract involved in Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96. It was held that this was only an option contract and that the agent in that case did not effect a sale by procuring a purchaser who entered into such a contract only. It was there said; "If he saw fit to forfeit the \$1500, as he had the option to do, no wale was effected and no componsation earned by appellee. In order for appellee to comply with his undertaking so as to entitle him to compensation he was bound to produce a purchaser who was willing to enter into a valid. binding and enforceable contract for the purchase of the premises, and not one who was only willing to take an option thereon." This case was cited with approval in Bunnov. Keach, 214 Ill. 259. If when March 1, 1920, came. Lyon had made the payments and given the notes and security specified in the contract. Brown's commission would then have been earned, but before that time came Lyon forfeited the contract. Conover still owns the land. He has the \$2,000 as the money which he was to retain as his damages if Lyon did not exercise his option to buy. But in the language of Lawrence v. Rhodes, supra, no sale was effected and no compensation was earned by the plaintiff.

Brown argues that it was a fraud for Conover to have entered into a contract which contained this option clause. The proof does not support this contention. Brown went away from the bank where Conover and Lyen were discussing the matter for a long time. What was there said is not in proof, There is no proof that Lyon would have signed the contract with this option feature left out. We must assume that Conover obtained as favorable a contract as Lyon would make.

Some criticism is made of the ruling of the court on intructions, but as the undisputed evidence is that Brown is not entitled to recover, it is unnecessary to discuss those rulings.

The judgment is affirmed.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, ss. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court. SECOND DISTRICT. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this 14 the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-



AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice. Hon AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS A JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.
CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on 61,1 5107 the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:



General No. 7084.

No. 34

Clark & Tess, Appellants,

vs.

Appeal from Stark.

Chas. P/ Dewey, Appellee.

Jones, P. J.

The appelle was the owner of a half section of land in Starak County and in the latter part of the year 1919 he listed the said land with several real estate brokers for sale. them were the appellant, Ellsworth Clark and Fred Tess, Jr. who were doing business under the firm name of Clark & Tess. time about the first of the year 1920, the appellant, Clark, endeavored to interest W. D. Dye as a purchaser and took Dye out to the farm to look it over. According to the testimony of Clark. Dye after having examined the farm stated that he would like to buy it but could not close the deal just at that time; and that he would soon have a sale on his farm, after which he would enter into negotiations looking towards the purchase of the farm. denied that he made such statements to Clark but says that he told he was not interested in the farm. The record does not disclose whether or not Dye afterwards had a sale on his farm, but/is apparent that no further negotiations between appellants and Dye were had until the following September. Dye, who is also a real estate broker, claims that prior to this last mentioned date and about the month of July, Dewey listed the farm with him for dale and that he, Dye, afterwards entered into a contract with Dewey whereby Dewey was to sell the land to him. This contract of sale was entered into between Dewey and Dye on October 6th, 1920. Clark testified that Dye told him in September, 1920, that he. Dye. was still interested in the place. Dye, however, says that at that time he told Clark he had bought the place.

After the execution of the contract of October 6, between

General Mc. 7084.

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Clark & Toss, Appellants,

Anne or Look

Chas. P/ Dewey, Aupellee.

Jones, r. J.

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Dewey and Dye, Dewey sold the land at a profit to himself, so one William H. Hartz, whose attention had already been drawn to the farm by appellants. At the instigation of Dye, a deed was made direct from Dewey to Hartz in order to avoid successive conveyances and to save the cost of revenue stamps, etc.

The price paid for the land by Dye was \$76,800. This is a suit for a commission of two per cent. The cause was tried by a jury. A verdict was returned in favor of the defendant, the appellee here, and the cause is before us on appeal.

It is strenuously insisted that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. It must be conceded that there is much testimony in the case tending to support the contentions of the appellants, but whether or not they were the procuring cause of the sale to Dye was squarely presented to the jury. There was also a very considerable amount of testimony in favor of the contentions of appellee. The jury saw and heard the witnesses. They were in the best possible position to judge of the weight and credit to be given to the testimony of each of them. They found the issues in favor of appellee and whatever may be our impression as to the merits of the relative contentions, we can not say that the finding of the jury was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

It is also urged by the appellants that the court committed reversible error in reference to instructions both given and refused. The first complaint in reference thereto is that the court refused to give the following instruction. "The court further instructs the jury, that if you find from the evidence, that the plaintiffs have proved their case, by the greater weight of all the evidence in the case, then it would be your duty to find a verdict in their favor." Standing alone no criticism can be made of this instruction. However, the court gave an

Dewey and Dye, Dewey sold the land at a o ofit to limself. to most william H. Hartz, whose attention had here d, been and the farm by appellants. At the interpretation of the deep and direct from Dewe to Hartz in o der to a to a to save the cost of rayenus temps, els.

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instruction at the request of appellant in which the jury was told that although the burden is upon plaintiff to prove their case by the greater weight of all the evidence, still, if after hearing all the evidence and instructions of the court, the jury finds that the evidence preponderates in plaintiff's favor, although but slightly, this would be a sufficient preponderance, and the jury should in that event find in favor of the plaintiff. It will be readily observed that all of the elements contained in the refused instruction are found in the given instruction. Therefore, the appellants suffered no injury by the refusal of said instruction.

Complaint is also made because the court modified certain instructions tendered by appellants. The instructions as tendered required the jury to believe from the greater weight of evidence that Dye was procured as a purchaser through the instrumentality of the plaintiffs. The court modified the instruction by requiring that the purchaser be procured through the instrumentality and solicitation of the plaintiffs. We believe the instructions as they were tendered were correct and were not in need of the modifications made. If a purchaser was procured through the instrumentality of the plaintiffs, it matters not whether that instrumentality consisted of solicitation or something else.

Another instruction tendered by plaintiffs (the instructions are not numbered either in the brief or abstract) in addition to being modified as above set out, was further modified by the court and as modified told the jury that if they believe from the greater weight of the evidence that Dewey employed plaintiffs to sell his farm and that they accepted said employment and first solicited Dye to look at the lands and that Dye in consequence of said solicitation, became the purchaser, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. It is rather hard to tell whether the insertion of the word first makes the instruction mean that the

instruction at the request of accellant in which the fur, who wold that although the burden is usen plaintiff to prove their case by the greater weight of all the 'vidence, still, if after nearing all the evidence and instructions of the scart, the fury first that the evidence prependerates in plaintiff's far r, although but slightly, this would be a sufficient a conformac, and the jury should in that event find in fiver of the descript. It will be readily observed that all if the elements service. It will be readily observed that all if the elements service in the refused instruction are found in the given in section. Therefore, the appellents suffered no injury by the refusel is used.

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Complaint is also made teachers the court modified sertein instructions tendered by appellants. The instructions service as tendered required the jury to believe from the prestor tender of evidence that Dys was erecured as a purchaser the uph the instrumentality of the plaintiffs. The scort colider the instruction by requiring that the envelopes or each becapt the instrumentality and solicitation of the olders were tendered the instructions of the modifications as decired as a service of the med of the modifications as decired as a service of the instruction of the mether that in the constitution of the algebraic of the constitutions of something else.

Another instruction condered hypersulfs. (Using the later not municed at the rate of the later than the later than the later that it they not the search and as a disted total the part that it they not that the proater weight of the orid nest ant pass, the initial to sell his farm and that they does et and chose and first on and first the lands and the measures of seld solicited by a to look at the lands and the manager of seld solicited to recover. It is rather has a total whether the entitled to recover. It is rather has a total whether the

jury was to believe that plaintiffs accepted employment and that thereupon and before doing anything else, they solicited Dye, or whether they must believe that Dye was solicited by plaintiff before he was solicited by any other agent of the owner. In this connection it may be said that according to Dye's testimony, his attention was first called to the farm by H. C. Cox, also an agent for the sale of the land. No matter which interpretation may be given, the modification was in our judgment a harmless one and the jury was not mislead by it. After considering the instructions as a series and taking them as a whole, it is impossible to conceive that the jury had any other idea of the question before them than whether or not appellants were the procuring cause in bring about the sale to Dye, so as to entitle them to commissions.

Error is also assigned because of the court's ruling upon admissibility of evidence, It will serve no useful purpose for us to fully set out all the objections made in this regard. It is sufficient to say that there was no substantial error committed by the court. We are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SECOND DISTRICT. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this _____ / # the day of _____ in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty- two.

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS A. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 1172

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on
the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
following, to-wit:

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General No. 7093

No. 40

Lem Noice and Thomas Parker, Appellees,

vs.

Appeal from Grundy,

William Welsh, Appellant.

Jones, P. J.

The facts in this case and the law applicable thereto are substantially the same as those involved in the case of Noice and Parker vs. Welsh, the opinion in which case was filed in this court on the 5th day of August, 1922. The judgment here is controlled by our opinion in that case. Therefore, the judgment in this case is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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General No. 7093

Mo. 40

Lem Noice and Thomas Parker, Appellees,

ve. Appeal from Grundy,

William Welsh, Appellent.

Jones, P. J.

The facts in this case and the law soulicable thereto are substantially the same as those involved in the case of Noice and Parker vs. Welch, the cointon in which case was filed in this court on the 5th day of August. 1982. The judgment here is controlled by our opinion in that case. Therefore, the judgment in this case is affir ei.

Judg - it siffrmed.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, \ ss. I. JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this

Mov. in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty- two.

Clerk of the Appellate Court

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS AA, JETT Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 L.A.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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Etta M. Hartley, appellant,

vs.

Appeal from Stark

Mystic Workers of the World,

appellee.

Jones, P. J. Etta M. Hamtley was the beneficiary in a certificate issued by the Mystic Workers of the World to her hubband, Arthur C. Hartley, He died and she brought this suit to recover the sum payable by defendant to her under the terms of said certificate. She filed an appropriate declaration upon the certificate. Defendant filed the general issue and two special pleas. The general substance of the special pleas was that the contract between the society and Hartley was evidenced by the constitution and by laws of the society and Hartley's application for membership and by the beneficiary certificate issued by the society. The pleas set up that Hartley agreed to abide by all the laws, rules and regulations of the order, now or hereafter in force. and that his application was the basis of the contract; that the constitution and by laws required the applicant to conform to the laws of the order, then or thereafter in force; that section 53 of the constitution provided that no mortuary benefit should be paid to the beneficiary of any one whose death was caused directly or indirectly in whole or in part as a result of his own wilful act or the violation or attempted violation of any of the laws of the country; that before the death of Hartley said section 53 was amended as section 126, which provided that if a benefit member died through or by his own violation or attempted violation of any criminal law or laws against misdemeanors, then the benefit certificate shall be ipso facto mull and void; that said amendment was in full force and effect before and at the time of the death of said Hartley and still is in force and binding on Hartley and his beneficiary; that in his application Hartley agreed that if he died as a result of the violation of the criminal laws of the country, he for his beneficiaries waived all rights or benefits based on the application.

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Jones, P. J. Bita M. Entloy wer the sensition of a centiff, to issued by the Mystic Workers of the World to her brabband, article g. Eartley, We ailed and she brought this sait to red the or the or by defendant to her under the terms of said cor ificate. In filel ar appropriate declaration uses the certification. Defender to filed the general issue and two appoint plems. The general suchtman of the pnetal pleas wer that are contract between the sear t, and well, and evidenced by the constitution, and 'y inter of the sound the constitution, and 'y application for removerably in our citizens, and the stigger by the society. The place and we have the part of the society. the first pales and a sea is a use a bit sofer, and each - no it is an interest of the same and the same a ar returned to the sound of any section of the rest of the maintification of the section of the the order, then or thank a trible or a contract remaining order. - un a reviewed that no ne real research as all all the services and the services are the services and the services are the services and the services are the s lary of any one another tothing one of the cold to the in part as a result of it of the contract as as its violation of end of the course Bartler said section of was the destruction of and an income

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result of the distallar at the origin base of the line to the the beneficieries waited all rights or regults that the contract of the second o

The pleas further averred that in said County of Stark on December 6.1919. which was the date of death alleged in the declaration, Hartley attempted to and did violate the criminal laws of the State Of Illinois and the laws against middemeanors and the laws of the country, and did then and there unlawfully assault one Ogburn, with intent then and there to commit a violent injury on the person of saidOgburn and that Ogburn, in defense of his person and to repel said unlawful assault, so about to be committed on him, did then and there strike said Hartley a violent blow on the head with a pitchfork, then and there held in the hands of said Ogburn, thereby then and there inflicting upon the person of said Hartley a dangerous and fatal wound, from which and by reason of which said Hartley afterwards died: and the pleas averred that the death of Hartley was through and by his own violation of the criminal laws and the laws against misdemeanors of the State of Illinois, and by reason thereof the benefit certificate in the declaration mentioned became and is null and void and all benefits of the plaintiff under said certificate were forever barred. Plaintiff demurred to said special pleas. The demurrers were overruled. Plaintiff elected to stand by them. Judgment in bar was entered against plaintiff, and she appeals therefrom.

Appellant contends that in order for the matters set up in said pleas to constitute a defense they should show that the violation of the law was of such a character that Hartley should have anticipated that his death would result as the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act. We are of the opinion that to so hold would be to write into this contract, provisions which the parties did not embody therein. Certainly, the parties had a right to agree that there should be no liability on this certificate if Hartley's death resulted from his own violation or attempted violation of any criminal law or of any law against misdemeanors. They did make such a contract in terms that were explicit and do not admit of any such construction as is here sought. We are of opinion that the action of the court below is sustained by

The pleas further sverred that in said Canada of stork on see where i, by a chief was the date of do the alleged a two doctors are, in they attempted to end did violate the original laws of the way to stilliants and the laws of the country, and will then and there was spainst middomeaners and the laws of the country, and will then and there was will be the country and there to country to on the person of emidogourn and that against in defens of his person and to repel and well-offul assault, so seems to be demistrated in him, did then and there strike said Earthey a violent blow on the head with a pitchfork, then and there held in the hadren of said Opourn, there-

y then and there inflicting upon the person of said darthly a despons and total wound, from which and by retson of which asid hauley afterwards died:

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Less to constitute a defeate that warries when a teat the ricibility of the away of such a contract that warries when it is eath would result as the natural and weakly construct of the unitariated. We are of the ounion that to so hold wall be to the intermedia contract, providers which the parties and not enoughter the establishing, the parties had a right to agree that the contract the parties had a right to agree that the contract the had a right to agree that the contract that the contract that the contract of any criminal had a right of any criminal had to the contract that the contract of the contract of any criminal had to the contract of the contract of any criminal had to the contract of the contract of any criminal had to the contract of the contract of any criminal had to the contract of the c

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gainst misdemeanors. They did make such a con'r it in to

Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen, 204 Ill. 508; Gauger v. American Patriots, 263 III. 604, and the decision of this court in Supreme Cent of the Knights of the Maccabees v. Hammers, 81 Ill. App. 560, and by the authoritites cited and discussed in those opinions. It would serve no useful purpose to burden this opinion with a recital of what is decided in these cases. The sum and substance of it all is that the parties had a right to make such a contract and that the contract they made is not susceptible of the construction contended for by appellant.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Soitzinger v. Modern Woodsen, 2.4 fli. 5.; Delger v. .met can 1 fris s. 263 lil. 504, and the dreister of this start in duriets of the Maccabes v. Manaers, 51 lil. 400. 500, 11d is the attention of the Maccabes v. Manaers, 51 lil. 400. 500, 11d is the usual and discussed in three offices. It would gorse no useful rurpose to burder this conter with a start of what is neither to the sum and substance of it all is that the start to make such a contract of that the contract of the construction contended for by a content.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. (SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this

in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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R. H denied Jan 4, 1923 7097

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October. in the year of our Lord one thousand line hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 615

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on $\mathcal{O}\mathsf{CT}^{(2)}$ the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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THEY --

General No. 7097

No. 43.

Henry Knott, appellant,

VS.

Appeal from Winnebago

Frank J. Fry, appellee,

Jones, P.J.

This is an action brought by Henry Knott, appellant, against Frank J. Fry, appellee, to recover for personal injuries sustained by appellant and for damages to his automobile alleged to have resulted from a collision between the car of appellant and that of appellee. A trial was had before a jury which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Fry. The only ground urged for the reversal is that the verdict and judgment are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

At about 10:30 o'clock of the morning of January 1st, 1920. Henry Knott in company with his wife, son and daughter-in-law were riding in a fave passenger Buick car driven by his said son, Harold. On the front seat by the side of the driver was his wife, Nora Knott, and on the rear seat was the appellant, Henry Knott and his wife, Carrie B. Knott. The appellant was seated on the right hand side. They came from Holcomb and were driving to Rockford. They had reached the outskirts of that City and were proceeding north on Kishwaukee Street which is the main street for north and south travel through Rockford. Eighteenth Avenue crosses Kishwaukee Street at right angles. There are street car tracks running south on Kishwaukee Street to Eighteenth Avenue where they turn west. They are laid a little to the west of the center of Kishwaukee Street and slightly to the south of the center of Eighteenth Avenue. The day was clear and cold. The streets were slippery, being covered with ice. Shallow tracks had been worn in the ice by automobile traffic. Appellant's car was on the right side of Kishwaukee Street and just as it had reached the center of said street intersection or

Henry Knott, appellant,

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Appeal from Winnebago

Frank J. Fry, appellee,

Jones, P.J.

This is an action brought by Henry Knott, appellant, against Frank J. Fry, appellee, to recover for personal injuries sustained by appellant and for damages to his automobile alleged to have resulted from a collision between the car of appellant and that of appellee. A trial was had before a jury which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Fry. The only ground urged for the reversal is that the verdict and judgment are against the manifest weight of the ortlesce.

At about 10:30 o'clook of the morning of January let, 1980, Henry Knott in company with his wife, son and daughter-in-law were riding in a five passenger Bulck our driven by his esti son, Yorold. On the front seat by the cide of the driver was his wife, Hora Knott, and on the rear seat was the appellant, Henry Knott and his wife, Carrie P. Moott. The suppellant was ac. 1-d on the right hand side. They came from Holoomu and were driving to Rock ord. Them had reached the outskirts of thet dity and were proceeding north on Kishwaukee Street w.io. is the tein street for north and south travel through Rockford. Fighteenth Avenue orosees Missweakes Street at right angles. Inere attest oar tracks running south on Macwayles Street to Elinteenth Avenue where they turn west. They are laid a little to the west of the center of Kishsaukas Street and slightly to the south of the center of fighteenth Avenue. The day was clear and cold. The streets were slipp ry, being new tenter to with ice. Shallow trucks had been worn in the ice by autonobile traffic. Appellant's our was on the right eide of Klahraukes "troot and just as it had reached the center of sail street intersection or

a little north thereof the collision occured between it and the car of appellee. Appellant's car was forced into an electric light pole located near the north east corner of said street intersection and he thereby received serious injuries including the fracture of the skull, the loss of his right eye, a broken right leg and also a broken shoulder with other damage to his right arm greatly impairing its use.

It does not appear how wide either of the streets are but the space used for automobiles on Eighteenth Avenue is north of the street railway tracks. Both sides of the railway tracks are used for automobile travel on Kishwaukee Street. At the south west corner of the street intersection is located a store building. There is an open space immediately south of said store building and also immediately west thereof so that a person who is in a proper position on either street may look behind said store building upon the other street. The store building does not extend as far north as the side walk along Eighteenth Avenue. North of the sidewalk are poles for electric wires. The north rail of the railroad is twelve to fifteen feet north of the north line of said sidewalk, Appellee's car was in Eighteenth Avenue north of said north rail. He claims that at a point ninety feet from the street intersection he was traveling about twelve miles an hour. And that he then slowed down as he approached the street intersection to about five or six miles an hour. He attempted to turn north into Kishwaukes Street, and it was while he was making the turn that the collision occurred. He did not see appellant's car at any time until after the collision occurred. According to his own testimony he knew nothing of the presence of appellant's car until the accident happened. He also testified that when he was west of said store building he looked through the open space back of it and did not see the approach of any car, and that just as he was about to cross the tracks, where they curve from Kishwaukee Street into Eighteenth Avenue, he again looked in a southerly direction or as he alittle north thereof the ocllision occured between it and the car of appellee. Appellant's car was forced into an electric light pole located near the north east corner of said street intersection and he thereby received serious injuries including the fracture of the skull, the loss of his right eye, a broken right leg and also a broken shoulder with other damage to his right arm greatly impairing its use.

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termed it "katty-cornered" across the street and saw no car approaching. He further testified he was well acquainted with that street intersection and his particular attention was directed to the north to see if a street car might be approaching.

Outside of those who were in appellant's car there were no eye witnesses to the accident. Appellant himself was rendered immediately unconscious by his injuries and was unable to describe anything which occurred after that time. A witness by the name of Raguse, testified to a conversation he claimed to have had with Harold Knott, in which the latter is quoted as saying about six weeks after the accident occurred, that he could not turn to the right on Eighteenth Avenue so as to avoid the collision because he was going better than twenty—five miles an hour. Harold Knott when called in rebuttal positively denied having made any such statement. On direct examination he testified that he was driving from eight to ten miles an hour. His, wife, Nora Knott, testified that their car was being driven about ten or twelve miles an hour. The appellant Henry Knott testified the car was going from eight to twelve miles an hour.

The car driven by appellant's son was the heavier of the two cars. The witnesses who came to the scene of the accident immediately after it occurred, testified that appellant's car was on the east side of the street next to the curbing and against the electric light pope; that the rear half of the left running board was smashed; both rear fenders were damaged; that the body of the car on the left side was broken. These facts irresistibly lead to the conclusion that the front end of appellant's car was further north than the front end of appellee's car at the time of the collision and that appellant's car was struck on the left side near the center by the right front end or side of appellee's car.

Counsel for appellee argue that the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident disclose that the driver of appellant's car was driving at a high and dangerous rate of speed and that such was the cause of the accident. We can find nothing in the record to

termed.it. "Matty-cornered" across the street and saw no car approaching: He further testified he was well acquainted with that atrest intersection and his particular attention wes directed to the north to see if a street car might be approaching.

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justify this claim except the alleged admission claimed to have been made by Harold Knott to Raguse some six weeks after the accident occurred and also the fact that Harold testified that just as he got to the street intersection he saw appellee's car something like forty or fifty feet away coming toward him around twenty to twentyfive miles an hour; that the first thing he thought of was to stop his car but he could not do that without stopping in front of appellee. He then decided to "step on the gas" and get out of the way. He followed this thought but was unable to avoid being run into. If Harold found himself in such a situation he was justified in using his multiple best judgment in attempting to avoid injury and if he increased his speed from ten to twelve miles an hour to a greater rate of speed in attempting to avoid an accident he can not be held to have contributed to the accident. It seems most improbable, under the circumstances here presented, that he would make such a statement to Raguse, as it is claimed he did.

Appellee's testimony that he looked twice to see whether any car was approaching on Kishwaukee Street from the south, is hard for us to reconcile with the undisputed facts in this case. He may have looked bahind the store building from Eighteenth Avenue to Kishwaukee Street. He could easily have done this without seeing appellant's car. Both oars had to be in the right position for the driver of one to see the other. There is nothing in the record to show which car was further from the intersection at the time appellee was in a position to have seen appellant's car. But he says that he looked a second time just as he was about to cross the car tracks on Kishwaukee Street and that he did not see appellant's car. His counsel argue from this that appellant's car was then not in view and that this indicates that such car came at a high rate of speed and crashed into appellee's car. The physical facts shown by the condition of the cars after the accident positively refute such contention. Bus aside from this, if, as appellant claims he looked in a southerly direction as he was about to cross the railroad tracks, why is it that he did not see the car? It was somewhere on Kishwaukee Street.

justify this claim except the alleged admission sleims I to have been made by Harold Enett to Raguer some aix we ke after the agoldent occurred and also the fact that Harold testified that just as he got to the street intersection he saw appelles a car accetiing like forty or fifty feet away coming toward him around twenty to twentyfive miles an hour; that the first thing he thought of 'as to stop his car but he could not do that without etopping in front of appellee. He then decided to "atep on the gas" and get out of the way. followed this thought but was unable to avoid being run into. Marold found himself in such a situation he was justified in using his estant best judgment in attempting to avoid injury and if he moreaeed his speed from ten to twelve miles an hour to a gratter rate of speed in attempting to avoid an accident me can not be held to make contributed to the accident. It seems most improbable, under the ofroudstances here presented, that he would make such a statement to Raguse, as it is claimed he did.

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If it was straight in front of him or even to the south, there was nothing to obstruct his vision and he could have seen it had he looked in either of those direction.s If it was north of him, he had to run faster than it was going in order to collide with it. His testimony that he did not see the car at all until after the collision admits of no other deduction than that he did not look in the direction the car was coming from, just before the collision. Section 33 of the Motor Vehicle Law provides that "All vehicles traveling upon public highways shall give the right of way to other vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the right, and shall have the right of way over those approaching from the left." Under this section it was the duty of appelled to give the right of way to appellant's car. This appellee did not do and from our view of the evidence he made no effort whatsoever to respect the right of way which appellant had at that particular time. Under the facts in this case as shown by the evidence, appellee was running his car at a high rate of speed with total disregard to the rights of appellant. The accident seems to have been caused solely by the negligence of appellee.

It is urged upon us that there is a conflict of testimony in this case and that, therefore, we should hesitate to reverse the judgment and order a new trial. It is a well established rule of law that a judgment will not be set aside when there is contrariety of evidence, if the facts and circumstances, by a fair and reasonable intendment, will authorize the verdict. In this case there is no substantial contrariety of evidence. The facts and circumstances as shown by such evidence, can not by any fair and reasonable intendment authorize the verdict which was entered in this case. The cause is therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

If it was straight in front of him or even to the south, there was nothing to obstruct his vision and he could have seen it had he looked in eith r of those dir ction.s If it was north of him, he had to run faster than it was going in order to collid' sith it. His testimony that he did not see the our at all until after the dool son lik in than than then teduction that he ill not look in the direction the car was coming from, just before the collision. Section 33 of the Motor Vehicle Law provides that "All vehicles traveling upon public highways shall give after to the property vebicles approaching along intersecting bighways from the ribt, and more the tight of way over those approaching from the left. " Under this section it was the duty of appelier to give the right of way to appellant's car. This appelles lit not do and from our view of the swidence be made no effort chatasever to respect the right of may which appellant had at that particular time. Under the facts in this case as shown by the svidence, appells say running his car at a high rate of ageed with total dist the rights of appellant. The addident seems to have been damed solely by the negligence of appeliee.

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Reversed and round 1.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I. JUSTUS L. JOHNSON. Clerk of the Appellate Court. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois. and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

ning hundred and twenty- three

Clerk of the Innellate Court.



7104 (X (/))

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 61: 5

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on

(1) 1022 the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
following, to-wit:

L'A PRES A . H. A PRILLA

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 General No. 7104

No. 49

W. A. Hill & Combany, Defendants in Error.

vs.

Error to Seco. Peoria.

A. Jacobson, Plaintiff in Error.

Jones, P. J.

This suit was begun before a justice of the peace and was afterward tried on appeal in the circuit court without a jury.

Judgment was rendered against plaintiff in error, A. Jacobson for \$268.60 and costs.

The plaintiff in error is a practicing attorney in Peoria. His brother-in-law, Sol. M. Lipkin, was adjudged a bankrupt in December, 1913. Lipkin was then indebted to W. A. Hill & Company, defendants in error in the sum of \$200.00. Later he became desirous of being discharged in bankruptcy. Defendants in error threatened to make objections to such discharge and also threatened to begin aiminal proceedings against him. Lipkin thereupon began negotiations to settle with defendant in error.

It is claimed by plaintiff in error that defendant in error,
W. A. Hill agreed to settle the claims of his firm against Lipkin
if plaintiff in error and his brother, Meyer Jacobson would give
defendants in error their promissory note for \$200.00 payable
twenty months after date thereof; that pursuant to this arrangement, A. Jacobson went this office and there prepared the note
in question and after signing the same delivered it to Lipkin with
the understanding that Meyer Jacobson would also sign it before
its delivery to plaintiffs in error; that Meyer Jacobson refused
to sign the note, but notwithstanding that fact, Lipkin delivered
it to defendants inserror who retained it until the bringing of
suit thereon; that the delivery of the note to defendants in error
by Lipkin was unauthorized; that such delivery was invalid because
of the understanding that the instrument was not to be deemed complete

General No. 7104

49. 49

W. A. Hill & Com say, Defendante in Error,

Error to orrects.

A. Jacobson, Plaintiff in Error.

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W. A. Hill spreet to settle the claims of his fire a stast linking plaintiff in error and its betther, where the used were defendents in error their promissor, note for \$200.00 orgable twenty months after aste thereof; that arm at to his arm and twenty months after determent; that arm at to his arm and ment. A. Jacobson went to his office and there is everyd the arts in question and after siming the same determined in the first the understanding that Moyer Jacobson would also light total tefore the understanding that of the first that the defend at a free or, blaid, deep to sight the defend at free twithhelending that free, blaid, deep the authorise that the defendants in error who retained to defend at free that the delivery of the note to defendants in error by Lipkin was acceptant its the instrument and the understanding that the instrument and the todow a bound of the understanding that the instrument and the todow a bound

until it had been signed by both plaintiff in error and by the said Meyer Jacobson and therefore that the rendition of judgment against plaintiff in error was improper.

Defendants in error deny that there was any understanding between them and plaintiff in error that Meyer Jacobson should sign the note but claim that when the matter of settlement was under consideration they offered to accept a note signed by either plaintiff in error or the said Meyer Jacobson; that Lipkin told them Meyer Jacobson would not sign the note, whereupon it was agreed that a note signed by plaintiff in error along would be accepted by degendants in error and that the note sued on in this case was so executed and delivered by the said plaintiff in error.

Under our negotiable instrument act, where an instrument is no longer in the possession of the party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery is presumed, until the contrary is proved. In this case the burden was upon plaintiff in error to prove that the delivery of the note in question was upon condition that it be signed by Meyer Jacobson as well as by the plaintiff in error and the question as to whether or not the delivery was intentional was purely one of fact. The evidence in this case was conflicting but the witnesses were sworn and examined in open court and the trial judge was in the best position to determine the weight and credit which sould be given to the testimony of the respective witnesses and we are therefore disinclined to disturb his findings. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

until it had been signed by both plaintiff in error and by the said Meyer Jacobson and therefore that the rendition of judgment easinst plaintiff in error was innreaser.

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Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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A. denied Jan. 4, 191-13

AT A TERM OF THE AUPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS AN. JETT, Justice. 2/2/2

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

2271.A. 616

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

> . (1-17-2

TO THE PARTY OF THE

With Division of the Control of the

Walter Spangler, plaintiff in error,

Error to Woodford 13

Marie D. Spangler, defendant in error,

Marie D. Spangler, appellee,

7105 VB.

7047

Appeal from Woodford 50

Walter Spangler, appellant,

Partlow, J.

VS.

The two cases above entitled are from the same court, between the same parties, relate to the same general subject matter and have the same counsel. In one of the briefs for Mrs. Spangler her counsel say:

"It is respectfully submitted that the two cases be read together, so that a more complete history and a better understanding of the cases and the law applicable thereto may be had." We have accordingly pursued that course; and we conclude that a single opinion covering both cases will save much repetition.

The parties were once husband and wife and lived in York, Pennsylvania, and other places near there, and were parents of a child, Mary Gelista Spangler, born February 20, 1909. They asparated in February, 1910. The mother has the child. Afterwards Spangler removed to Secor, Woodford County, Illinois, where he still lives. On July 29, 1914, he filed in the circuit court of Woodford County a bill for divorce and had service upon his wife by publication and mailing of notice to her at McSherry'stown, Adams County, Pennsylvania, where she then lived. She received the notice and consulted a justice of the peace in her town and later consulted lawyers in Pennsylvania, wrote to the clerk of the circuit court of Woodford County, and to different lawyers in that county, but did not appear not answer. She was defaulted and the cause was heard on September 28, 1914. A divorce was granted Spangler on the ground, among other things, that Mrsx Spangler wilfully deserted her husband without cause on February 3, 1910, and so continued thereafter. Several years later Spangler married again. On June 25, 1931,

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Partion, J.

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Mrs. Spangler filed in said divorce suit in Woodford County a petition asking that the decree be set aside or amended; that she have leave to answer the bill and that she have such other relief as to equity shall appertain. She filed an answer without leave. The petition was verified by her and in addition she filed a long affidavit, setting out her poverty and ill-health, and the advice she sought and inquiries she made after receiving notice of the pendency of the divorce suit. She stated that she obtained a certified copy of the decree of divorce in January, 1931, and that this was the first she knew a divorce had been granted. In said affidavit she set up civil proceedings which she alleged she brought against her husband in York, Pennsylvania, soon after the separation, under which Spangler or his bondsmen paid \$300 for the support of herself and child, and that he was ordered to pay \$3.00 per week, which sum he paid till June 1, 1913, and since which time he had paid nothing. In the answer which she filed without leave she asked that Spangler be compelled to pay her said \$3.00 per week allowed by the Pennsylvania court and a reasonable amount for the support of herself and child. Spangler was notified of the filing of said petition and appeared by counsel and moved to strike the petition from the files because insufficient in law and filed too late. He also filed with said motion an affidavit denying any fraud by him on the court and denying that Mrs. Spangler was entitled to the relief sought by her and he set up his subsequent marriage in December, 1917, in reliance upon the validity of said divorce. The court denied the motion to strike the petition from the files but heard the petition upon affidavits and counter affidavits and denied the prayer thereof. Mrs. Spangler did not preserve the proofs then heard by a certificate of evidence, and did not appeal from said order nor prosecute a writ of error therefrom, nor has she assigned cross errors upon the record wherein these matters appear. By this petition she submitted to the determination of the court in said divorce suit her right to have an allowance from the father of her child for its support from June 1, 1913, to the time of that hearing, and for the future. Whether the denial of such an allowance was right or wrong, it was an adjudication

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against her claim, binding upon her till set aside in some proper proceeding.

On August 3, 1931, nine days after the denial of her petition in the divorce case, Mrs. Spangler brought an action of debt against Spangler in said circuit court of Woodford County, and filed a declaration therein based on a judgment alleged to have been rendered in favor of Mrs. Spangler and against Spangler in the court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of the County of York, Pennsylvania, at the February Term, 1910, for the payment by Spangler to Mrs. Spangler of \$3.00 per week beginning February 14, 1910, and continuing till the further order of the said court. This declaration in debt charged that on January 28, 1910, Spangler wilfully deserted Mrs. Spangler and her child. Spangler was served in that action of debt on August 3, 1931.

Before anything further was done in that action of debt, Mrs. Spangler on September 9, 1921, filed another petition in said divorce case. She therein set up among other things her poverty and the proceedings against Spangler in said Pennsylvania court which resulted in the payment of \$3.00 per week by him up to June 1, 1913, and his failure to pay anything thereafter for the support of herself and child. It set up his proceedings for divorce and denied the charge he made in his bill for divorce that she had deserted him and alleged that in fact he had deserted her. It set up the fact that neither the bill for divorce nor the decree of divorce made any reference to sail child nor any provision for its custody and support. The petition stated that Mrs. Spangler had supported and clothed said child and furnished it medical service and paid for its schooling since June 1, 1913, and that by reason of ill-health, she is unable to continue to support said child. She stated her information as to the ability of Spangler to support the child and the petitioner, and that Spangler is not a fit dat person to have the custody and education of said child and the reasons therefor, which related to religious differences between the parties. The petition further alleged, what is not otherwise shown in this record, that in 1910 Spangler sued Mrs. Spangler for a divorce in Pennsylvania and she filed an answer and that the cause

against her claim, binding upon b r fill or. while in her more er proceeding.

Before ampthian furth r was done in all a setten of leut, Mer. Spengior on September W, 1981, filed nother withthe a name dispression case. She therein set up address that thing a fer dierest and seen occdings against Council with a Council of the the payment of 3.0. p r need to a read and a read at a read - tran unnovek til agalleenorg eta gu dee dI in the bid for the control of the control of the bid aid aid and in the first of the state of the fact he h d das riva nor. divorce nor the luctual of literary and any me of any provision in its out corress in part. are Spanisor and about the control of the control of weight service and yet afor and application and Jen 1, thank by record of inlainers, the interest in 17,200 112 112 1 (13° 30 11) to support the child and to ; titioner, al-Tit she protein of an army she til the remain ther for, which remains the parties. I. gestalts for her willy ! shown in this recor , that he is itel Character a divorce in Pennsylveni. or she first a case or ond the to is still pending in said court of Pennsylvania. The prayer of the petition was that the decree of divorce be vacated, that Mrs. Spangler be awarded the custody of the child and Spangler be required to pay to Mrs. Spangler a reasonable sum for the support and education of said child and that such order be entered as of the date of the filing of the original decree of divorce. Spangler and his attorneys were notified of the filing of said petition and appeared and moved to strike said last named petition from the files on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to hear it and to grant the relief sought, and that the petition showed that Mrs. Spangler was not entitled to the relief sought and that the petition was filed without leave of That motion was heard and denied. Thereafter said petition court. was heard upon proofs presented. Spangler did not appear by counsel. at said hearing, but he was called as a witness by Mrs. Spangler and testified. That evidence was preserved by a certificate of evidence. The court entered a decree upon said petition, finding it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, finding the marriage and the birth of said child, and the divorce; that Spangler since June, 1913, had contributed nothing to the support and education of the child; that it is the duty of Spangler to support the child, and that Mrs. Spangler on account of sickness is unable to support the child, and it found the income of Spangler and his ability to pay the sum fixed. The decree awarded the custody of the child to Mrs. Spangler until the further order of the court and ordered that Spangler pay her

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Spangler questions the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition of Mrs. Spangler in said divorce proceeding. We regard what is said in Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, on p. 353, as decisive of that question. The court there said:

\$250 within ten days and the further sum of \$25 each month beginning November 1, 1931, and the costs of suit, and that execution issue for any unpaid installment. The first above entitled cause is a

writ of error sued out by Spangler to review that decree.

[&]quot;The custody of the children was necessarily comprehended within the scope of the original bill although nothing was

to still punding in out four of Pransylvani. The pray r of the petition and that the idem of divorce be ved tot, the Mr. . S. . gr r be missided the quatedly of the ont. and deangler he relained to pay to Wrs. Spangier a re sonible that "no adject and editor a said that shild and that augu order se entered as of 1. 1 to of the tiller of the original decree of divorce. So negly and rise to come care antieditto of the to be been enough the actifung blue to mailly odd to bein said last mused potition from the false on the ground tur ten orurt see without furialistich to hear it and is in the fer is! sour; and that the octifies spoked that irus Sprag Francisco noista the over it the six bhi. I new notition that the thigher leifer edt and it is a first or it. I should be and any notion J. of . STUCO Spangler oil not orther or coursell, was heard whom proofs presented. at said hearing, but he was called as a disc se by "It. C. alor and That office was required and or were we active sait testified. The court (ntered a stores upon as a terminal truce of diction of the oarsk a was in subject of view a line is and the birth of said outly, it, list the of the beat do the June, 1913, but dontributed and dark to the artest and added on the in the end drugger of rangist for the data the data Mrs. Epungler on Locount of closers i days to surport for shirt, and it found the income to dismite and it. I am and it found the The from a was but on our or or and a relative or in a relative the thirty and the state of the state of the state of the rathery of their deas But on burn it in the 1 and alaste 088\$ were the latter and the color of the correction of the contraction for may and the train man. T' first rove not be can read for . . and I family a great out to the control of the control to river

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The custody of the whiten was necessaring the constitution of the corps of the original bill little with the corps of the

said about them. The filing of the original bill for divorce brought within the jurisdiction of the court the minor children of the parties by virte of the statute, which suthorizes the court, on ap licetion, to make such order concerning the custody and care of children during the pendency of the suit as may be deemed expedient and for the benefit of the children, and if a divorce shall be decreed the court may make such order touching the care, custo y and support of the children, or any of them, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall be fit, reasonable and just."

The bill-and answer in that case said nothing about the existence of children of the marriage. The language above quoted therefore applies to this case. It is common practice in this state in divorce and separate maintenance cases to apply to the court at a later term than the entry of the decree for modifications as to the custody of the children and their support, and to grant changes in those matters as circumstances may require: We are of the opinion that Mrs. Spangler

was within her rights in filing this petition in the divorce case after the term at which the divorce was decreed and while the child was not of age. The proof justified the allowance. Spangler is not wealthy, but his income at the time the order was made justified the allowance. In years prior to that his income was less and perhaps would not have justified so large an allowance then. If his income hereafter decreases or increases, the court has jurisdiction to change the allowance according to the circumstances of the parties.

There is one error in the order here under discussion. It awarded the custody of the child to the mother and did not provide that the father might visit the child. In Limmerman v. Limmerman, 242 Ill. 552, the court on p. 560 said: "When a trial court in a suit for divorce disposes of the cusotdy of the minor children of the parties, it should always by its decree provide that the parent who is divested of the custody should be given the privilege of visiting the children under such terms and conditions as seem proper in that particular case." Ordinarily the place of such visitation should be within the jurisdiction of the court, but here the child has never been in the state of Illinois. The mother's home has always

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been in Pennsylvania. Spangler is the one who moved from his original demicile. Under these circumstances we think it sufficient that he be given leave to visit the child at the home of the mother in Pennsylvania oncertain specified dates, perhaps two or four times a year. The order will therefore be affirmed except as to the provision for the chatody of the minor child, and as to that provision the order is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to provide for the visitation of the child by the father in connection with the order awarding the mother the custody of the child in conformity with this opinion. Spangler will pay the costs in said cause first above entitled.

After the foregoing order had been entered in the divorce case Mrs. Spangler on December 7. 1921, obtained leave in her action at law to change the action to assumpsit and to file an amended declaration. She thereby abandoned her suit upon the supposed judgment in her favor in Pennsylvania and indeed, the order in the divorce case obtained by her must ber any further action on that judgment which she set up in her octition. The amended deteration contained certain of the common counts. It alleged that Spangler was indebted to Mrs. Spangler for labor and services of Mrs. Spangler, bestowed in the business of Spangler at his request; for work done and materials furnished by her to him at his request; for money expende, by her for his use at his request; and a promise by Epangler to pay the same on request, and a request and refusal to pay. Spangler filed four pleas. The first was non-assumpsit. The second was that the action did not accrue to Mrs. Spangler within five years before the filing of the amended declaration. The third was that the action did not accrue within five years before the commencement of the suit. fourth was very lengthy, set up the facts as claimed by Mrs. Spangler, including the desertion and the divorce, and that the suit is for moneys spent for the child in Pennsylvania and that liability therefor is governed by the laws of Pennsylvania, and that by those laws

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Spangler is not liable to Mrs. Spangler for the support of the child. Issue was joined on the first three pleas. A demurrer to the fourth plea was overruled and a replication thereto was then filed by Mrs. Spangler, which averred that Spangler deserted Mrs. Spangler and the child, and that by the laws of Pennsylvania Spangler was liable for the support of the child. This replication concluded to the country. There was a jury trial and a verdict for Mrs. Spangler for \$1750. Spangler moved for a new trial and this was denied. Mrs. Spangler had judgment on the verdict and Spangler appeals, and that appeal is the case secondly above entitled.

Spangler complains of the denial of a motion made by him for a bill of particulars. Said motion and the showing for and against it and the ruling of the court thereon are not contained in the bill of exceptions, and therefore that question is not preserved for review.

Several sufficient reasons for reversal appear in the record. Mrs. Spangler introduced evidence tending to show that Spangler deserted her. Afterwards Spangler introduced the decree of divorce. That decree was binding upon Mrs. Spangler and was conclusive that she wilfully deserted him without cause. The court instructed the jury that that decree was binding upon the parties, but the court was also requested by Spangler to instruct the jury to disregard all other evidence on that subject except the decree, and that instruction was refused. It should have been given. The court gave two instructions for plaintiff submitting to the jury the question whether the father wrongfully abandoned and deserted the child. There was no evidence that he deserted the child. The only evidence on the subject was that shortly after the separation of the parents Spangler had the child in his possession at his father's home, and that in his absence and without his consent Mrs. Spangler took the child away from his father's home. That instruction therefore should not have been give. One of the issues under the pleadings was whether

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under the laws of Pennsylvania Mrs. Spangler could recover for the support and education of the child. The decision in Fitler v. Fitler. 33 Pa. St. 50, was in evidence, and whether the question be treated as one of fact or of law, it establishes that under the circumstances of this case, the law of Pennsylvania is that the father is not liable to the mother for the support of the child in an action at law. Mrs. Spangler sought to avoid the effect of that decision by oral proof that Spangler deserted her. This evidence was no doubt competent when received, but afterwards the bill for divorce and decree of divorce by the circuit court of Woodford County were put in evidence. and they conclusively established, as against Are. Spangler, that she was the one guilty of wilful desertion without cause. Therew on Spangler offered an instruction that Mrs. Spangler could not recover. which the court refused. That instruction should have been given. We do not hold that the law of Pennsylvania governa the right of action intthis case, nor that the fourth plea was proper, but as Mrs. Spangler did not abide by her demurrer thereto, but formed an issue of fact thereon, and the proof on that issue was conclusive against her, a verdict against her should have followed.

We are disposed to hold under the case made by this record, that a mother for whose fault a divorce is granted may not thereafter recover from her former husband what she has expended for the support and education of the child of the marriage in an action at law upon an implied promise by the former husband to pay the same. Mumerous Illinois authorities are cited by Mrs. Spangler to sustain her contention that he is so liable, but, with a single exception in an appellate court case where the liability at law was not discussed, the cases so cited are actions for divorce or separate maintenance or the like, where the court applies equitable principles in determining who shall support the child. Cases may readily be imagined where the mother without cause had concealed the child and refused to permit the father to visit the child, or where

wader the land of drangivents were place cont a record to the support and education of the chiat. The west a farter of the property 33 Ra. 33. 50, rec in oriding . one metrer i paration by the ton ne one of feet or of law, it a the light this this the street to seek this came, the law of fear givenia is that the father i or in the bu the mother for the author of the will an an author off and the mother to the contract of the mother than the contract of the c Spangler sought to a old the off to the deciden of the season iner. con farar on ep. o ables thil . and bairesob reignage tads wren received, but attended the bill for it pres id inorde rediverge his all the court of in drops of actoric and in arthrope, and they conclusively sate libers, to same to so, they are to the and while one guilt, that the real thank out to the There's on shich the court refused. Last to true this same in our or of one miles to their out to grant and and tade block for ch in this code, nor time the r o in the set will a drea out or tise of spide by her dear the ere, but I'v or to be ere aut . / ofter trad bis. 12 man Janiaga Solbrev

The are dispersed to held use. See as a second, the court, the mother for whome fault and enough to the second for from her fremer stond which her should and country and concises to the second to the second list of the sec

the mother is wealthy and has cared for and educ ted the child at great expense, while the father is a purper and is unable because of ill health to support himself. Under such circumstances a court of equity would be governed by the circumstances and conduct of the part-If an action at law may be maintained on an implied promise these considerations cannot avail the father, whereas in a court of equity they would have due consideration in determining the question. It is also clear to us that the circuit court of Woodford County in the divorce case acquired jurisdiction to determine the custody of this child and what contribution, if any, the father should make to its support, and therefore a court of law could not thereafter be vested with the power to determine those questions. In her last petition above recited. Mrs. Spangler asked that Spangler be compelled to pay these expenses from the first day of Jone, 1913. She sought that relief in the divorce case. She obtained much of the relief which she acught. She did not appeal or assign errors upon the failure to award her all the relief she sought. We are of the opinion that after having obtained that relief she could not further maintain an action at law for the same thing from her former husband.

The judgment in the case second above entitled is therefore reversed at her costs with this finding to be entered in the judgment. (We find that in the divorce case the court acquired and exercised jurisdiction to determine the questions of the sum, if any, to be said by Spangler for the support and education of the child, and that Mrs. Spangler could not thereafter have a remedy at law against him for the same thing.)

The order in the first above entitled case is affirmed in part and reversed in part at the costs of Spangler, and the cause is rehanded to the circuit court with directions to enter an order as to the custody of the child in conformity with this opinion. In the second above entitled cause the judgment is reversed at the costs of Mrs. Spangler, with the above finding.

the mother to willthy and he cered for and odne ted ine child at great expanse, while he father is a paper of it will comme of 111 how to be to star of the the start of the control of the equity would be readed that wire wire are also and in a contract of the is a solice at I we so benistation as you will so relieve as ti . see these consideration dance to the fractor, rear as an event equity they would have due son idea the wher intig the quantum. It is also clear to us that the cit and tendered also is in the director case and tred juri diction to determine the case of this child .a. what com thus. ... if an. . he ti ber ... -stof for two wil to true a confined: In. . truege all of eder after be vested with the scuer in diter ine these sentitue. I her last petition show realited. The plant of the opings of conversed to pay thouse a second course of the line in a line in the converse led. do lede on a collect in the discrete one one the relief hish the chegus. The did not armed of he is or fr in the contract of the contrac oft of the fitter house course of that roughly the course recreet and with a lift and education on the alton we blad about and and .basdaud

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT.

I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this ______ day of ______ in the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clark of the Appellate Court.

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R. H. demed Jan 4, 973.

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present--The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS AA. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 616

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on
the opinion of the Court was filed in the
Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
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Cymthia J. Case,

Appellant,

vs.

Charles V. Weddell,

Appellee.

Partlow, J.

Appellant, Cynthia J. Case, began suit in the circuit court of DeKalb county against appellee, Charles V. Weddell, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by her by reason of the sale to her, by the appellee and his alleged co-conspirators, of 750 shares of the capitol stock of the United Agency, a credit rating corporation, the purchase price of the stock being \$16,294.00. Upon issue being joined, there was a trial by jury. At the close of the evidence on behalf of the appellant, on motion of the appellee, a verdict was directed in favor of the appellee. Judgment was rendered against the appellant for costs and in bar of the action, and from that judgment an appeal was prosecuted. The errors assigned are that the court excluded certain evidence, and improperly directed a verdict.

The evidence tends to show the following facts. In 1908, the United Mercantile Agency was organized and surchased the business of the Early Agency and the Eastman Agency, both of which had been in existence for several years. \$1600,000.00 in stock of the United Mercantile Agency was issued in payment for the assets of the Early Agency. The United Mercanti Agency had offices in the Stock Exchange Building in Chicago, and had a large force of employees, and maintained about seventy branch offices throughout the United States. Its business consisted of furnishing credit repor similar to those furnished by Dunn and Bradstreet, and it published books containing credit ratings covering forty-three states and including over 1,000,000 corporations, partnerships and individuals. Its assets consisting of the records of these ratings together with some other personal property, cost about \$2,000,000.00, in addition to the \$1,600,000 in stock paid for the Early Agency. The money to develop this busines.

Cynthia J. Case,

Appellant,

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Charles V. Weddell,

Ap ellee.

Apposal from the Circuit Court of DaKalb.

Partlow, J.

Appellant, Cyathis J. Osso, began suit in the circuit curt of Dekalb county against appelles. Cherles V. Wednell, to red ter then appelled to have been sustained by her by reason of the eale to her, by the appelles and his alleged co-conspirators, of 750 sheres of the capitol estock of the United Agency, a credit rating ecrops tion, the purchase price of the stock being \$16,894.00. Unon issue being join d, there was a trial by jury. At the close of the evidence in beholf of the avellant, on notion of the appelles, a verdict was directed in favor of the avelles. Judgment was rendered against the appellant for eats and in favor of the avelles. Section, and from that judgment as as eal vas prosecuted. The errors ussigned are that the court excluded carries evidence, and i errors ussigned are that the court excluded carries evidence, and i errors latered a verdict.

The evidence tends to show the following facts. In 1900, or United Mercantile Agency was organized and michared the business of the Marly Agency and the Eastman Agency, both if which had been in evilous for the several years. \$1500,000.00 in speck of the United Percentile age of the January in the saceta of the January Agency. The United Mercantiles agency had offices in the stock Enchance Baily Agency. The United Mercantilarge force of employeds, and and their desire of employeds, and and their desire of employeds. Its hustiness consisted of Franching creative countries of the following the first of the following containing creative for the first of the containing creative of the records of the second in the first of the records of these itings the first of the records of these stings their rith the critics of the records of these stings their rith the critics of the records of these stings their rith the critics of the records of these stings their rith the critics of the records of these stings their rith the critics of the records of these stings the color rith the critics of the sonal property, cast about \$2,000,000.00 in additional ciths to the factor paid for the Early Agency. The money in death of the factor of the soney in death of the factor of the factor of the soney in death of the factor of the factor of the factor of the soney in death of the factor of the factor of the soney in death of the factor of the f

had been raised largely through the sale of stock. In 1913, the United Mercantile Agency had about 3,500 stockholders, including the appellee.

on April 11, 1913, the United Mercantile Agecy was adjudged bankrupt, and a stockholders' committee was formed to preserve the assets and effect a reorganization. This committee, on May 14, 1913, purchased of the trustee in bankruptcy the assets of the United Mercantile Agency for \$22,500.00. The United Agency, the corporation in question in this case, was incorporated on May 23, 1913, and the first board of directors was elected, but did not include the appellee. Fotice was sent to the 3,500 stockholders of the United Mercantile Agency recommending that they protect their holdings in that corporation by the purchase of stock in the United Agency, which stock was offered to them at \$1.00 per share. The stockholders committee, it is claimed, continued in force a large percentage of the service contracts of the United Mercantile Agency, and kept intact the organization of that corporation, including most of the experienced employees.

On June 12, 1913, the stockholders' committee submitted a written proposal to the directors of the United Agency in which the committee proposed to purchase 150,000 shares of the capital stock of the United Agency, at \$10,00 per share, and to pay for the same by assigning to the United Agency all of the property and assets of the United Mercantile Agency ourchased by the committee at the bankruptcy sale. The directors of the United Agency accepted this proposal, but agreed to issue, not to exceed 75,000 shares of stock, and the balance of the stock was to be issued only upon the further payment of additional amounts as the board of directors should determine. After the purchase of the property of the United Mercantile Agency, and the organization of the United Agency, the latter corporation started to extend its rating system to cover the balance of the United States, and to sell its service to jobbers, wholesalers and manufacturers in the territory where it had established offices. It published semiannually credit rating books containing the ratings so far as completed. In 1919, it claimed to have credit reports and ratings on over 1,600,000 firms, corporations and

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individuals, covering from 63,000 to 64,000 cities. It also claimed to have completed the ratings throughout the United States except for the Burroughs of Queens and Richmond in Greater New York and the city of Philadelphia.

In its bookkeeping, that part of its expenditures which were chargeable to the extension of its credit rating system, was added to its plant
account, until the total of its capital assets of this character, on
December 31, 1918, was claimed to be \$3,501,640.11. The books were audited by certified accountants, and the financial statements issued from
time to time were supposed to be based on the audits made by these accountants. The corporation maintained offices in the Gunther building, in Chicago
where it occupied two floors, and it had a large number of branch offices
in the leading cities of the United States. A large force of employees
was required to procure credit information, to compile this information
and to furnish the results to customers of the agency.

The money necessary to complete these ratings, and carry on the business, was to be raised through the sale of stock. To accomplish this, salesmen were employed and a securities department was organized. appellee was a retired farmer residing at DeKalb, Illinois, and his farm was located near Rollo, Il linois, about six miles from the farm formerly owned by the husband of appellant. It was by reason of his trips to Chicago, and by the receipts of reports and statements, that he kept in touch with the company's activities. The appellee wasknown by appellant and her husband for years, and was highly respected as a man of integrity and good judgment, and this fact, coupled with the fact that he was a large investor in the stock of the complany, influenced the appellant and her daughter to buy stock. The first certificate purchased by appellant was dated June 7, 1917, the second August 23, 1917, and the third March 1, 1918. Shortly afterwards, a ban was placed by the government on the sale of securities, except Liberty Bonds, unless permission was granted by The Capital Issues Committee. Permission to sell 41,027 shares of preferred stock was granted in June, 1918, on condition that they were

individuals, covering from 64,000 to 64,000 cit se. It also elef it the have completed the ratiogs that unds table United of the national factors and the city of Eurroughs of Queens and wiches did faceter hew York and the city of Philadelphis.

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sold to the stockholders, and the proceeds would not be available until a minmum of \$300,000.00 had been sold. This stock was offered prorata to the stockholders, and the directors subscribed their proportion, which stock was not to be re-sold but was to be held in escrow until the end of the war. At least \$300,000.00 of stock had to be subscribed in order to finance the completion of the ratings. Subscriptions were secured for the required amount, but many of the subscribers settled by notes, and due to war conditions, many of these notes, as well as notes previously taken, remained unpaid. In August, 1919, the company was unable to meet its obligations, was forded into bankruptcy, and its assets were sold for \$35,100.00.

The declaration consisted of three counts, all substantially alike, except that they relate to the separate purchases. Each count alleged in substance, that in the spring of 1913, the appellee, who owned stock in the United Mercantile Agency, then bankrupt, entered into a conspiracy with others and organized, under the laws of South Dakota, a corporation known as the United Agency, for the purpose of carrying on a mercantile rating and reporting agency as the successor of the United Mercantile Agency; that the stock of the United Agency consisted of 300,000 shares of \$10.00 each, and in pursuance of the conspiracy, the assets of the United Mercantile Agency were bought at the bankruptcy sale for \$20,500.00, and the United Agency contracted to issue \$1,500,000.00 of its capital stock in exchange for the \$20,500.00 of assets, and thereafter issued the stock to the appellant and others for \$1.00 per share as fully paid up stock: that from time to time thereafter, the United Agency issued financial statements setting forth grossly extragagant and false figures as to its assets and surplus: that at no time during the existence of the corporation did its assets exceed \$50,000 and there was no surplus; that statements were made that the value of the stock was \$15.00 per share at the time of the organization in 1913, and from time to time thereafter during the period of six years, the stock was given a value of from \$15.00 to \$23.50 per share; that the stock was worthless

sold to the stockholders, and the proceeds would not be available uptil admining of \$300,000.00 had been ecid. This attock was offered proceeds to the stockholders, and the directors embedthed their proceditm, which stock was not to be re-wold but was to be held in escrow until the and of the war. At least \$300,000.00 of stock and to be subscribed an order to fixance the completion of the retigs. Subscriptions were secured for the required amount, but many of the subscribers sattled by notes, and due to war conditions, many of these notes, as well as notes praviously taken, remained angely. In August, 1919, the company was a mobile to see that obligations, was forded into markruptcy, and its assets were acided the obligations, was forded into markruptcy, and its assets were acided of \$35,100.00.

" The declaration consisted of three crusts, all subuts, thally alike, xcept that they relate to the separate purchases. Rach court alleged in mbetance, that in the spring of 1933, the appoint outed attor in the nited Mercantile Agency, then bankra t, courred into a dome piracy with thers and organized, under the laws of douth unkests, a comporation known a the United Agency, for the ur wee of earrying on a sersochile rating and reporting agency as the successor of the Pulled Mercentile Agure; het the stock of the United Agracy statisted of 300,000 shares of \$10.00 ach, and in pursuance of the conspir up, the essets of the United Mercentile Agency were bought at the heak, they rule for \$20,000.00, and the United gazey, contracted to issue \$1.500,000.00 of its capital stock in exchange or the \$20,500.00 of assett, . d the easter issued the stock to the sonellnt and others for \$1.00 gar shave at fully beld we atook; that from the to ime thereafter, the United Agency towned firencial statements coffing forth resuly extregarant and false figures as to its assets and are deep that at o time duffing the existence of the correction will its essets unceed \$5.000 and there wee no surplus; that statisments were ande that the value of the took wss \$15.00 per shere at the time of the creatism ton in 1915, and from ing to time thereafter during the pariod of six pasts, the stook was placen

value of from \$15.00 to \$26.00 pr sbare; that the steak mat worthless

at all times: that the officers and agents of the corporation represented it to be solvent, whereas it was insolvent; that each financial statment was made so as to show a better financial condition and a greater value of its stock than each preceding statement, and this was done to sell stock and to conceal the actual condition of the corporation; that it was represented that the corporation was successfully established in business, when at all times it was totally insolvent, and would, at no time, have been able to proceed with its business except for the money raised from the sale of stock by means of the various frauds committed in pursuance of the conspiracy; that it was represented that the amounts of assets and surplus were based upon actual appraisements by appraisers of high standing, when in fact the very reports referred to did not purport to give any appraisement of the assets but stated that no appraisem nt had been attempted; that from May, 1913, to August, 1919, appellee was a director of the corporation and knew that all the representations stated in the declar tion were false, and he actually participated in the furtherance of the conspiracy and in the perpetration of the fraud; that all of the representations were made to appellant pursuant to the conspiracy, and she purchased her stock in reliance upon these representations, believing them to be true and without knowledge of their falsity.

In determining whether the trial court properly directed a verditt in favor of the appellee, it is not necessary for us to weigh the evidence and determine whether or not a conspiracy did exist, or whether false representations were in fact made by the directors, officers or agents of the corporation. All that is necessary for us to determine is whether there was evidence in the record fairly tending to support the charges in the declaration. If there was such evidence fairly tending to support the charges in the declaration, **If there was such evidence fairly tending to support the court improperly directed a verdict in favor of the appellee. If there was no such evidence, then the ruling of the court was correct. Frazer v.

ti is it is it is a state of its and it is a state of the too be a transfer of the work of the Los ed of the was mus as a show a telling in a must be as as must of its fine in a web presented as some and about a si to stock and to one at the sound of the second Wis represented that the elrors in the little that the land is a second business, when at a time to a time t no time, have been able to princial chorts on the desire money rested from the wic of the early and the transfer the later server see was it aim the server off an eshausting in bettimber the incurts of araets and air and a lab basta thoughts for by soprefaces of high stanting, what in its on en of all and the factors of a line of tractor for bib of that no sortaisem not mad become it is it is it is in a August, 1919, a slite is a silet i i i i all the representation at the contribution of the actually participates so use after more and a second so a second so the permetration of the final; it is not the interest of the state of appoint to t the tree sound of the set of the story of the liarce work there is a constant, in the continuous each and each Luowletre ! hill f '11 5.

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Howe, 106 Ill. 653; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Bailey, 222Ill. 480; Helm v. Illinois Gommercial Men's Assn. 279 Ill. 570.

The evidence tends to show that appellee attended the first meeting of the incorporators of the corporation and subscribed to its stock; that he was a director from July, 1913, to August, 1919, that he was a member of the executive committee of the board of directors from October 12, 1915, to July 1918; that he was present at practically every meeting of the board of directors; that for at least three years he was one of the five managing directors; that he actively participated in the action of the board of directors in raising the price of stock, either by making a motion, or by seconding a motion to make such increase and that he actively engaged in all of the business of the corporation.

The evidence also tends to sow that the assets of the United Merdantile Agency were purchased at bankruptcy sale by a committee of stockholders for \$22,500.00, and within a few days thereafter the United Agency was organized, whereupon these assets were turned over to the new corporations for certain shares of stock.. The first charge of fraud and conspiracy is based upon this transfer, appellant claiming that the assets turned over, had no such value as was placed upon them, and that this transaction was the basis of a large part of the assets of the corporation afterwards listed and sent out to the prospective purchasers of stock. Ryerson v. Peden, 303 Ill. 171, was a case in which the cause of action was not like this, but some of the facts were quite simil r to the facts here presented, and on page 175 it was said: "Payment for capital stock with property is no payment except to the extent of the true value of the property, and if the property is taken at an over-valuation the stockholders are liable to make up the deficiency; and when a failure occurs in the business, the law outs upon the persons who disposed of the assets of a former company to pay for the capital stock of the new company the burden of showing that the property so turned over equaled the value of the capital stock for which it was considered to be paid." In the case at bar there was ample ground for dispute as to the value of

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The exidence shall be to the second of the first reference and the edit Agency thre currenced at hack of a control of the c \$22,500.00, and within few 4 a a a control of the c ired, wherever three with the control to the for certain abares if allow. A limit of the certain abares of is based whom this rould at the time set to over, had no meh Lib .. w. ther bear love softon was the breist of the control was no like this, bu - .. this - .. to the first the t bero precentes, and of the first of the street of the stre with iros ty is o pay cook it is a control of the the property, and if the country of the control of the control of the country of stookholders sre lies by E. R. Ph. 2004 g.; d.w. . . 1 the assets of a for or c = any - cy for the country. The in in the commany the burden of the first the earty a comment the value of the appill? Use which it is the taken the

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the assets turned over to the United Agency, the business engaged in was the furnishing of the ratings for the whole United States similar to those furnished by Dunn and Bradstreet. The collection of these ratings involved vast labor and large sums of money. After these ratings were collected, they were of no value except to a corporation equipped to use them. At a forced sale there would be few bidders for such property, and the property would naturally bring very little money, but to a corporation equipped to utilize the tatings in their business. they might be of considerable value. Appellee claims their value was established by public accountants, but the evidence on this point is in conflict. In this condition of the record, their value was a question of fact for the jury, and it was for the jury to say whether, under all the evidence, they were worth the stock issued for them, and whether the stockholders who received this stock, paid full value for it. also a question of fact for the jury to determine whether these assets were listed by the corporation at such an amount as constituted a fraud upon the persons who purchased the stock of the corporation.

The next question for determination is whether there was any evidence fairly tending to show that after the United Agency was organized and began to sell stock, the appellee and his fellow directors and the other officers were guilty of the conspiracy and fraud alleged in the declaration. The evidence tends to show that at irregular intervals from November 30, 1913, to December 31, 1918, twelve balance sheets were issued and used by the salesmen in the sale of stock. Each sheet showed a substantial increase in the assets, liabilities, (except capital stock) and surplus. On November 30, 1913, within six months of the organization of this corporation, the balance sheets showed an income account of \$66,770.68, operating and general expenses of \$41,692.11, reserve for uncompleted contract of \$10,572.00, leating a net of \$14,560.57. It also showed assets of \$1,536,992.86. liabilities of \$18,825.57, and a surplus of \$790,766.46. These amounts were increased in each balance

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sheet until December 31, 1918, when the assets were listed at \$3,913,329.17 the liabilities at \$148,965.37, and the surplus at \$1,929,887.03. The increased surplus came from the sale of stock and not from profits earned by the corporation.

In January, 1916, the directors had an appraisal of the rating book and special report files made, which purported to show a value of \$2,447,517.60, being \$956,355.98 above what the rating book and special report files were then carrying upon the books of the corporation.

Thereafter, upon authority of the board of directors, and based upon the alleged appraisal, \$1,069, 819.42 was gradually added to the plant account and surplus. \$325,000.00 of this amount was added to the plant account in December, 1915, and in March, 1916, \$155,000.00 was added and in December, 1916, two items of \$250,000.00 and \$339,819.42 were added from the same source and in the same way. After each increase in the plant and surplus account the directors, at meetings which were attended by the appellee, fixed the price of the stock. They commenced in 1913 at \$45.00 per share and followed this up at later periods with prices as high as \$23.50, the latter being the price of the stock when the corporation went into bankruptcy in September, 1919.

The report of the president to the directors and stockholders dated January 14, 1914, stated that the corporation started with ten or twelve employees, with ho live business on the books, but the business had developed with remarkable rapidity; that the working force then numbered about seventy people, with additional offices in outside cities; that the corporation voluntarily fulfilled the contracts for service which the United Mercantile Agency had taken and for which it had received the money in advance and failed to perform the service.

As tending to support the allegations of fraud, many exhibits were introduced in evidence by the appellant containing statements relative to the assets and financial standing of this corporation. It will be impossible to refer to all of them, but we have selected a few which present the general statements as made by the officers. Exhibit 69,

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In January, 1915, the directors in der appriles of the retire to and special report files made, which mappriles to they are always and special report files made, which mappriles to the retire to be sent in report files were then carrying uses the books of the consecution. Thereafter, uses atheretay of the board of these or, and consecutions the alleged unpraises, algorithm board of these or, and consecutions the alleged unpraises, algorithm board of this amount and surplus. \$655,000.00 of this amount and surplus. \$655,000.00 of this amount and aded to the dest and in December, 1915, and in an oh, 1911, \$155,000.00 of aded and in December, 1915, and in an oh, 1911, \$155,000.00 of aded and in December, 1915, the items of \$150,000.00 of \$750,900.00 of added aromethe was source and in the last case of the sense of the interference of the

The report of the provide to the direct runce of the report of the provided dated Jamesry 14, 191, are touched the dunce of the result of the control of the

which was without date, contained the statement that the corporation afforded an investment with every element of permanency and safety and free from any inherent elements of weakness; that the corporation was the most agressive agency in the field; that it had assets which cost over \$4.500,000.00 was fully equipped, in active operation, and enjoying a consistent and ever increasing growth in its v lume of business; that the organization was without any watered stock or debts; that the officers and directors were men of known business ability and high integrity; that for a limited time the public could procure some of the stock. Exhibit 74 stated that the corporation holds the record for safety. permanency and earning power; that in quality of service it already ranks above either of the old concerns; that it was operating on a satisfactory basis; that when the ratings are completed it will make a very decided increase in earnings, together with a marked advance in the value of the stock; that it is as stable as the Rock of Ages, as permanent as business itself, and is profitable far above the average business enterprise; that it has \$1,750,000.00 in actual assets and every dollar in stock issued will be backed by \$2.00 of assets; that its earning capacity is so far above any ordinary investment that no comparison is possible. Exhibit 75, which was a selling talk for salesmen, stated that the business the corporation was doing more than paid the operating expenses; that it had assets of more than \$2,000,000.00; that the preliminary work was finished and the big profits would begin to come in; that it was firmly established on a good sound basis; that every share of stock issued had been paid for in full; that on 100,000 subscribers it would have an income from contracts alone of over \$10,000,000.00, and as the income from banks and attorneys alone ought to be sufficient to pay all expenses. the \$10,000,000.00 should be clear profit available for diddends; that there was no chance for the stockholders being frozen out; that there was no promotion stock and nobody could get control of the corporation; that the profits will be big so there will be plenty for all. Exhibit 82 stat-

which was without date, con. thed the state of the corner les afforded an investment lib ever, in the tree of the term of the the a liter the add of accounts to stand a theread the mort early the ordered agency and that that the first of the agency average and over \$4,500,000.00 was rully welly all a sell a sell , nd sty or a consistent and rier increments in this in this or hint cou; that the organization was vituat angles stock of do ba; "but tro fringer and directors were now o locke bestense audility . dd cipi i to ritry; that for a limited time the mblic a old creat ache of the stack. Exhibit 74 stated that the corporation holds the reserve file at fig. permanency and entaing joint; that in quality i bireich in I reads ranks above alther of the old schoolr: that it was courtee on a estisfactory basis: that when the ret go ere or deted it will not very decided increase in conning. , begin this with the feet the value of the stock; has it is use the real of these s permenent as business interior and the continuous forms of the continuous sections and the continuous sections and the continuous sections and the continuous sections and the continuous sections are continuous sections are continuous sections and the continuous sections are continuous sections business enterprise; rast it and \$1,750,000. Noin call habets and every dollar in stook issued. ils to cocked by (2.70 of stocke: there its earling capacity is a far than a crit iny or st. that .) comparison is sobbiole. Later ; which are so life telk i t saloumen, etc. ou thit the b site. In out a class the in That is a colo be on 167; he arm and they redd \$2,000,000.un; what too profittener; - the we instable that the life -, the side of the standard of the standard flow stilling a T' will a hor of the state of the day, 000, Oct or said ; first of contracts arem of crer \$10,000,000,000 and is the fact of the barks and attracts of a tempt to temptificial to 10 to 10 th the \$10,000,000.00 - hould be elear wellt ev. 1 . 1. for , 31 ' , 1 there was no character the should while here here at a tree at a tree tar : ofthe order that he will be the blues the first motiones on the profits will be big a there will be old my or all. Arbit shat '-

ed that the history of the corporation is a history of one of the greatest achievments of American business life. It holds the record for safety, permanency and earning power; that its progress has been remarkable; that it is already doing a splendid business and showing a consistent growth from month to month; that there is, at a low estimate, \$1,000,000.00 worth of husiness awaiting the completion of the rating book; that it is showing a very satisfactory profit; that the element of risk is negligible; that the business is not affected by floods, fires, earthquakes and panics.

There was evidence tending to show that The National Advisory Bureau was controlled by the officers of this corporation, and one of the sales agents conducted such reporting concern from another office; that salesmen were instructed to tell prospective stock purchasers to write to the National Advisory Bureau for information about the United Agency; that such inquiries were received by the agent of the corporation and information prepared in advance was sent to those seeking information; that Morris, who was a stock salesman and who wold the stock to the appellant, was the National Advisory Bureau for a part of this time.

In the summer of 1917, before the purchase by appellant of 513 shares of the stock in question, Dr. W. M. Avery, who roomed and boarded at the Case home, after discussing with Mrs. Case and her daughter the advisability of consulting the appellee before buying any more stock, went to the appellee's home and there had a conversation relative to the financial condition and prospects of the corporation. Dr. Avery testified that he told appellee that appellant was thinking of investing in more stock, and appellee stated that the corporation was the best investment he knew of, and he went into detail regarding its financial condition. This conversation was repeated by Dr. Avery to the appellant, and 513 shares of stock were purchased a few weeks later. The appellant, who is seventy-five years old, testified that she talked with appellee at the office of the corporation in Chicago and asked him what he thought about the corporation and he replied that he thought it

ed that the history of the very ration is a mistery of one of the greatest achievmenth of An rises business life. It would the resurd for safety, permanency and sarium offer; that it is alread, dring a solendin business and above a consistent growth from nouth to not; that there is, at a low could mate, \$1,000,000.00 worth of business amplifing the completion of the rating book; that it is showing a very satisficiently or rist the feath of that the business is not affected by floods, firet, earthquakes and pinics.

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Bureau was controlled by the officers of this corposition, and of the sales spents conducted such reporting concern from an their office;

that salesmen were inducted to tell area scrive stock purch also that salesmen were inducted to tell area scrive stock purch also write to the National Advisory Bureau for indomatin accuration that such insufries due are area area by the agent of the sorm ration and information preserved in advance was and information are screwashed and who sold the stock to the appellant, was the National Advisory Burger for the acres of this time.

In the aummer of 1917, sefere the annuause by an clip t of 513 chares of the atrok in question, Dr. M. M. Avery, who resued and learded at the Case hare, first discussing with wish. Case in durit despite the advisability or case liting the appoined both the caping was according went to the appoint of the financial could do not be appointed that he told an olice that appoint of the caping was the first of that he told an olice that appoint the start first was the caping of the caping

was a fine thing and that it was a good investment for any one who had any surplus money.

We have only recited a portion of the principal facts which appear in evidence concerning this transaction. The fraud charged is that \$22,500.00 worth of property was listed as \$1,500,000.00 of assets; that false statements were made that the stock was fully paid; that the 3500 stockholders of the United Mercantile Agency did not pay full value for their stock; that grossly extravagant and false statements were issued as to the assets, liabilities and surplus, whereas the total assets were not worth to exceed, \$50,000,00, there was no surplus, the stock was worthless, and the corporation insolvent; that the corporation never was operated on a satisfactory basis and never had any earnings in excess of expenses; that every dollar of stock was not backed by two dollars of assets; that the officers and directors, including appellee, knew all of these representations were false and made them for the purpose of selling stock.

It may be true that some of these statements might be classified as legitimate puffings of the business, but that is not true of all of them. Some of them contain positive statements of fact which the evidence tends to show were not true and were calculated to mislead and deceive. may also be true that the officers and directors were trying to establish a legitimate business, very extensive in character, which if established would possess vast earning powers, and that they were prevented from so doing by circumstances over which they had no control, but this fact would not justify them in sending out statements which were known by them to be untrue and which were calculated to mislead and decaive prospective purchasers of stock their financial disadvantage. The evidence tends to show that appellee's relations with the corporation and its officers and directors were such that he could and should have known of its true condition. Within a short time after these reports of the assets and business were made, the corporation became bankrupt and its total assets were sold for \$35,100.00.

was a fine thing and that it was a good investment fr any one who had any surplus mency.

We have only recited a portion of the principal facts which appear in evidence concerning this transaction. The fraced abarged is that \$22,500.00 worth of property was it to a \$4,500,000.00 of assite; that false statements were analyted in stock was fully prid; that the 3500 stockholders of the United Mercentile Agency did not pay full value for their stock; that grossly extravagent and false atstements were issued as to the assets, liabilities and surplus, whereas the total assets were not worth to exceed, \$50,000,000, there was no arriver, the stock was worthless, and the corporation incolvent; that the corporation incolvent; that any earlies in excess of expenses; that every deliar of stock was not because by two dollers of assets; that the officers and directors, including appellers of assets; that the officers and directors, including appellers of assets; that the officers and directors, including appelling above.

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were sold for \$35,100.00.

It is not for this court to say whether this evidence sustained the allegation of the declaration charging a fraud and conspiracy, but all that it is necessary for us to determine is whether there was evidence fairly tending to support the charge of fraud and conspiracy. From a careful consideration of all this evidence we are of the opinion that there was evidence fairly tending to support the averments of the declaration; that whether this evidence showed fraud and conspiracy was a question of fact for the jury to determine, and that the jury should have been permitted to determine this question; that for this reason the court should have submitted the case to the jury and was in error in directing a verdict for appellee.

For the errors indicated, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views above expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

It is not for this court to Lar help this inthe exection of the section of the se

Fr the errors indo ted, the jament vill we retread and dro cause required for further productions it accordes to the the viers above exercised.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, \ ss. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this ___ 15th day of nine hundred and twenty-

Justus L. John Clerk of the Appellate Court.

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 163

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on

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Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures
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William Pentland, appellee,

VS.

Appeal from Whiteside

Mathis Brothers & Company,

appellant,

Partlow, J.

William Pentland is a retired farmer and in June, 1930, had oats on a farm occupied by a tenant. He wished to remove the oats to make way for the new oats. Mathis Brothers & Company, a corporation, had elevators in different parts of the surrounding country, one of which was at the village of Hooppole. Roy Mathis was the manager of the elevator at Hooppole. On June 30 or 31, Pen land went to that elevator. He claims he sold the manager his cats at \$1.00 per bushel. On June 25 he delivered 1235 bushels to the company. It was placed in a separate bin and that amount of oats, either the same oats or others of like kind and character, were kept therein by the company up to the trial of this suit. The company claimed that it offered Pentland \$1.00 per bushel at his first visit and that he refused to sell at that price but arranged to store the oats. Long afterwards he demanded \$1.00 per bushel and they denied they had bought the oats, and offered him a much less sum as the price of oats had fallen much lower. On September 7, 1921, Pentland brought this action of assumpsit against the Company and filed the common counts. Defendant filed the general issue. The case was tried by a jury and there was a verdict for plaintiff for \$1,235.00. A motion by defendant for a new trial was denied. Plaintiff had judgment. Defendant appeals.

Plaintiff alone testified in support of his contention. He was contradicted by the manager at Hooppole and a bookkeeper in the office, both of whom testified that Pentland positively refused to sell at the price offered. The bookkeeper testified to a conversation with Pentland a couple of months later which plainly indicated that he had not yet sold the oats. There was another witness to statements still later by Pentland indicating that he had not yet sold his oats. In Donelson

William Pentland, appellee,

.AV

Appeal from Whitseide

Mathie Brothers & Company,

appellant,

Partlow, J.

William Pentland is a retired farmer and in June, 1930, had eats on a farm occupied by a temant. He wiened to remove the cats to make way for the new oats. Mathie Brothers & Company, a corporation, had elevators in different parts of the surrounding sountry, one of which was at the village of Hooppole. Roy Mathia was the manager of the elevator at Hooppele. On June 20 or 21, Penghand went to that elevator. He claims he sold the manager his cate at \$1.00 per bushel. On June 25 he delivered 1835 bushels to the company. It was placed in a separate bin and that amount of oats, sitier the same oats or others of like kind and obsecter, were kept therein by the company up to the trial of this suit. The commany claims it offered Pentland \$1.00 per bushel at his first wists and that he refuned to sell at that price but arranged to store the oats. Long afterwards he demanded \$1.00 per bushel and they denied they had bought the osta, and offered him a much less sum as the price of cate had fallen much On September 7, 1921, Pentiand biguunt this action of assumpait against the Company and filed the common counts. Defendant filed the general tesue. The case was tried by a jury and there was a verdict for plaintiff for \$1,335.00. A metion by defendant for a new trial was denied. Plaintiff had judgment. De'endant appeals.

Plaintiff alone testified in support of his contention. He see contradicted by the manager at Hooppole and a booksemper in the office, both of whom testified that Penthand positively refused to sell at the prior offered. The booksemper testified to a conversation with Pentland a couple of months later which plainly indicated that he had not yet sold the cats. There was another without a statements will later by Pentland indicating that he had not yet sold his cata. In Donelson

v. E. St. L. Ry. Co., 335 Ill. 625, the court said: "The constitution, which provides that the right of trial by jury as previously enjoyed shall remain inviolate, does not make the jury the final judges of the weight of the evidence, and if a verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence it is the duty of the trial judge to set it aside and grant a new trial, and a failure to do so is error, for which a judgment must be reversed." Other cases are there cited which sustain that position and a quotation to the like effect is made in Bradley v. Palmer, 193 Ill. 15, on page 90. This verdict is so clearly against the weight of the evidence that in our opinion a new trial should have been granted.

The first instruction given for plaintiff was as follows: "This case is to be decided solely on what was said or agreed upon between plaintiff and the agent of the defendant during the month of Jyne, 1920." That statement is literally true, for if plaintiff ever sold his cats to defendant, it was in June, 1920. Yet it was calculated to mislead the jury in this case. There was considerable evidence of statements made by plaintiff long after June, 1920, which tended to show that he had not sold the cats in June, 1920. This instruction might easily be understood by the jury to mean that they were to consider solely what was said between the parties in June, and to disregard the proof of what plaintiff said afterwards.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

y. F. Ut. L. Ky. Go., as III. Lef. In court lid: "The committetion, which provides that the risk to a court by jur, as previously enjoyed shall remain inviolate, to a cot mak. The jury ins final judge, of the weight of the svicence, and if a vertice is and final judge to the evidence, and if a triangular to as it aside and grant a not trian, and a fair triangular to as a strong which a judgment must be reversed. The case are there eited in the sustain that position are a quotation to the like effect in make in Bradley v. Palmer, 133 Ill. 15, on page 90. This effect in make in against the weight of the evidence that in our opinion a new trial should have been granted.

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The judgment is rev radicht one olu - remerand.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, second district. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of

nine hundred and twenty-



7070 (20-/1)

AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clefk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 51.7

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on

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C. E. Harrington, appellant,

vs.

Appeal from Lee

Julius Lepley, appellee,

Partlow, J.

Harrington brought replevin against Lepley to recover possession of 25 hogs. The declaration charged in one count that defendant took and unjustly detained said hogs, the property of plaintiff, and in a second count that defendant unjustly detained said hogs, the property of plaintiff. Defendant pleaded (1) non cepit; (2) non detinet; and (3) that said chattels were the property of defendant and not of the plaintiff. The parties did not form a written issue on said third plea, but went to trial voluntarily, and thereby formed an oral issue. Strohm v. Hayes, 30 Ill. 41; First Nat. Bank v. Miller, 235 Ill. 135: Supreme Court of Honor v. Barker, 96 Ill. App. 490. Under said third. plea the question is whether plaintiff had the right of possession; and plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own right of possession, and the burden is on him to establish it. Reynolds v. McCormick, 62 Ill. 412; Constantine v. Foster, 57 Ill. 36; Chandler v. Lincoln. 52 Ill. 74; Pease v. Ditto, 189 Ill. 456; Defendant had judgment on a directed verdict and plaintiff appeals. The litigated question is whether plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the hogs, as against defendant, when he brought this suit.

Plaintiff was landlord and defendant was tenant under a written lease for a term originally expiring March 1, 1920, but which was extended to March 1, 1921. The lease required defendant to deliver to plaintiff as rent for the land demised, one half of certain specified products of the farm, including hogs. One paragraph of the lease was as follows:

"At the termination of this lease, the property owned jointly by the parties hereto shall be equally divided between said parties in the manner following, to-wit: Party of the second part shall divide such joint property into two lots and party of the first part shall have the right to take as his share either lot he may see fit, and party of the second part shall take the lot remaining after such selection, which shall be final as regards the division of the property owned jointly."

C. F. Harrington, appellant,

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Partlow, J.

Harrington broug t replaying against Is ; i recover ocus, saton of 25 hope. The declaration charged in one count that defendant took and unjustly detained seld bogs, the property of plaint'ff, sni in a second count that defend at unjus and detained seld log . . promptty of plaintiff. Defendant pleaded (1) non cerit; (2) non detinet; and (3) that said chattels were the property of defendant and not of the bit t bise on eyest netting a not for bib seiting on Ilithisiq ples, but went to trial voluntarily, and thereby formed an oral issue. Strohm v. Hayes, 20 Ill. 41; First Fat. Bank v. Miller, 235 Ill. 135: Supreme Court of Honor v. Farker, 96 Ill. App. 490. Unier oilt 'rd. plea the question is wiether plaintiff had to right of proceden; and plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own right of consecton. and the burden is on him to establish it. Reynolds v. McCornick, i-Ill. 418; Constantine v. Foster, 57 Ill. 36; Chandler v. Lincoln, 52 111. 74; Paass v. Ditto, 185 111. 456; Defendant had judgment on a directed verdict and plaintiff appuls. The litigated question is whether plaintiff was entiried to the possession of the ogs, as against defendant, when he orought this autt.

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Another paragraph began. "All sales of personal property so owned jointly shall be by said first party."

The lease was to expire on March 1, 1921. This suit was begun on February 34, 1931. At that time, if any one was entitled to the exclusive possession of these hogs then on the farm, it was the tenant and not the landlord. The fact that any sale of the joint property was to be made by the landlord, did not mean that the landlord could sell any of the joint property at any time at his own pleasure without the consent of the tenant, and could take any such property into his exclusive possession at any time for the purpose of selling it, without the consent of the tenant. The land had been let to another tenant for a term beginning March 1, 1921, and Lepley had rented another farm which he was to occupy on March 1, 1931. The parties had divided practically all of the other property before February 24, 1931, when this suit was brought. The tenant had, as the lease provided, divided different kinds of the joint property into two parcels and the landlord had exercised his choise as to which parcel he would select. In one case the landlord made the division and also the choice. The tenant wished the hogs so divided, and intended to remove to his new farm the parcel which the landlord did not select. The tenant made a division of the hogs several times, but the landlord refused to make his selection. We are of opinion that the lease did not give the landlord the right to sell the joint personal property, or any part of it, at will, and thus deprive the tenant of his right to keep the half which the landlord did not select under the provisions above quoted. The fact that all the rest of the joint property had already been so divided was not improperly admitted in evidence, as it tended to show that the parties had decided to divide the property in the manner provided by the lease. No attempt had been made to sell any of the other property. Obviously the property could not be divided on the very last day of February and the tenant's portions removed that night to his new farm, which was several miles distant. Obviously the division and removal would

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require a considerable part of February. We think it is not necessary to determine what legal term best describes the interests of these parties in these hogs. We only hold that the landlord did not have the exclusive right to determine that they should be sold, and did not have the exclusive right to their possession, and that when he brought this suit he did not have the legal right to replevin the hogs from the tenant.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

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Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand ning hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 I A. 617

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on 1975 the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

Begun and held at Ottana, on in day, no hire day of October,
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Claude H. Black, Etc., appellee,

VS.

Appeal from McDonough

James E. Bennett, et al., appellants.

Per curiam.

On August 14, 1920, Claude H. Black, a minor, by his guardian and next friend, brought this action of assumpsit in the circuit court of McDonough County, against James E. Bennett and others, partners as James E. Bennett & Company, and Sid C. Fluegel. Stimmons was serve upon the members of the firm of James E. Bennett & Company in Cook County and on Fluegel in McDonough County. A declaration was filed, with an affidavit of claim. The defendants served in Cook County filed a plea, which they call a plea to the jurisdiction in the nature of a plea in abatement. Plaintiff filed a replication thereto. Afterwards, on motion of plaintiff, said plea was stricken from the files and a repleader ordered by a certain day. On the day named said Chicago defendants elected to stand by their former plea, and they were defaulted. The plea in abatement and the action of the court thereon were preserved in a bill of exceptions. filed four pleas, one the general issue, the second a denial that he was jointly liable with the said Chicago defendants, the third that the action did not accrue to the plaintiff within six months before the commencement of the suit, and the fourth, a similar plea to the To these pleas he attached an affidavit of merits. were joined thereon. The cause was tried by a jury. Before the cause was tried plaintiff amended his affidavit of claim so as to claim only for two items accruing within six months prior to the commencement of the suit. Plaintiff had a verdict for \$325.00. A motion by Fluegel for a new trial was denied. Plaintiff had judgment against all the defendants for \$325.00. This appeal by the defendants is brought to this court by agreement. We affirmed the judgment, and afterwards granted a petition by all the defendants for a rehearing.

Claude H. Black, Etc., appellee.

Appeal from McDonough

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James E. Bennett, et al., appellants.

Per curiam.

on August 14, 1920, Claude H. Black, a minor, by his guardian and next friend, brought this action of assumpsit in the circuit court of McDonough County, against Jenes E. Bennett end others. partners as Jan a E. Bennett & Company, and 31d C. Fluegel. Stammons was serve upon the members of the firm of James E. Bennett & Company in Cook County end on Pluegel in McDonough County. A declaration was filed, with an affidevit of claim. The defendants served in Cook County Illed a plea, which they call a plea to the jurisdiction in the nature of a plea in sectoment. Printiff 'iled a realisation thereto. Afterwards, on motion of plaintiff, said plas was stricken from the files and a repleader ordered by a certain day. On the day named said Chicago Acfordante elected to stand by their former ples, and they were defaulted. The ples in abstement and the settlen of the court thereon were preserved in a bill of exceptions. Fluegel filed four pleas, one the general issue, the second a deniel that he was jointly liable with the said Chicago defendants, the third that the cotion aid not accrue to the plantiff within six mortine ectore the commencement of the suit, and the fourth, a shallar plea to the third. To these pheas he attached an afridayit of norits. Issues were joined thereon. The cuose that tried of a jury. Bother the os as os wise in the standing san debook fitting being see to olaim only for two items accruirs within six sorths orier to tic commencement of the suit. Reintiff had a verdict for Jaks. 00. a motion by Fluegol for a new trial was denied. Alitating fluegolf against all the defendants for \$325.00. This appeal by the accentuation We afflraed the judgment, and is brought to this court by agreement. afterwards granted a petition by all the defendants for a relearing.

The declaration alleges that the defendants were indebted to the plaintiff for money had and received by defendants for the use of the plaintiff, and that, being so indebted, they promised plaintiff to pay him said sum of money on request; yet, though requested, they have refused to pay it. The affidavit of claim stated that plaintiff's demand is for money had and received by the defendants to and for the plaintiff's use, being money lost between August 14, 1919, and May 14, 1920, on option contracts to buy and sell grain at future times, it being agreed by both parties thereto at the time of making such contracts that the options, when exercised, should be settled, not by receipt or delivery of such property, but by the payment only of differences in prices thereof, in which said several transactions the plaintiff made and delivered bank checks on which defendants received the money and which checks bore dates and atelin the fallowing amounts, (stating them) and that said sums were lost by plaintiff, and that there is due to plaintiff from defendants after allowing to defendants all their just credits, deductions and set-offs, \$2, 775. 00. The amended affidavit of claim is similar, except that it was for money so lost within six months before the commencement of the suit, and two checks only were described, amounting to \$325.00. A question arises as to the relation this affidavit bears to the declaration. In Healy v. Charmley, 79 ILL. 592, the court said that such an affidavit of claim, though no part of the declaration itself, was a pleading authorized by statute. In McKenzie v. Penfield, 87 Ill. 38, the court said: "Affidavits of this kind so far partake of the nature of pleadings that they must be dealt with on the same principles." In Kertor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 144 U.-S. 434, a case from Illinois, the court said that the affidavit, though no part of the declaration itself, was a statutory pleading. Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655; Haggard v. Smith, 71 Ill. 226; Mayberry v. Van Horn. 83 Ill. 289 Henry v. Merian & Morgan Paraffine Co., 83 Ill. 461, are cases where it is held that the declaration is modified and restricted by the affidavit claim, and that such affidavit limits the issues to be tried. Therefore, while, under the declaration alone plaintiff could prove

ב'ת ב שפניבדי ליו על וריפ לדים ללים עיל של יו . . וישב בו ני all out it is a life to be the contract of the life cf 'ho bler '... erl 'hol, bele' '... '... '... intia. I had the following of the state of t afficient and the control of the second to the control of the cont , Lie Bir, ill ik innimme 'a. En sain galar geen e'fittrille being express by coth criss charactors to the commence of the state of the contract of the con the the cutions, man decreation, with the post list to the cutions, man decreated delivery of each consult, the heart of a great and a second prices thereof, in which with a ware transcrubed with a comment the the red beat red to the his which the beat the first bars ੇ ਕ ੂ ਜਾਂਦੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਹੈ। ਕੋਈ ਨੂੰ ਦੇ ਸਦ ਸੀ ਮਹਾਰਾ ਹੈ ਕਿ ਕਿਹਾ ਕਿ ਜੀ ਕੀ ਹੈ। era that but committee to the test that and it it for a second erecit., Objection and a teority (4), 70%. Le init to the transfer of the state of the contas being the color of the cit, 598. the new thirts will be the old dealers. of the door rater that, as a direct to the foot add to McKermic . For this 28, the entire the contract of the contrac rd to far out in or the extension of the 8. 434, a cre 2.0. 17120 i., the s mt ninter on 222 . 10, 1 . 2 no part of the declar tie 1.25, w u.l. to tree on where it is near the dealer of the state of Therefore, while, unter the declaration along and the constant

and recover for any sum of money which the defendants had and received to the use of the plaintiff to be paid on request, and which, though requested, they had not paid, yet under that declaration as limited by this affidavit plaintiff could only recover from defendants money lost within six months before the commencement of the suit in gambling in the price of grain, and then not to exceed \$325.00. This therefore, is an action brought under Section 132 of the Criminal Code, which authorizes the loser to recover from the winner all sums so lost and to bring various forms of actions therefor, including assumpsit for money had and received.

Defendants contend that the plea in abatement was stricken from the files because no affidavit of merits was attached thereto. If that was the ground on which the plea was stricken, that ruling was erroneous, if we were right in holding, in American Spirits Mfg. Co. vs. Peoria Belt Ry. Co., 154 Ill. App. 330, that an affidavit of merits is not required to accompany a plea in abatement, though an affidavit of claim is attached to the declaration. Howe v. Thayer, 24 Ill. 246. Drake v. Drake, 183 Ill 526. But we do not interpret the ruling of the court. The motion as preserved in the bill of exceptions was to strike the plea from the files and for judgment as in case of default for lack of such an affidavit, or, in the alternative, to strike such plea from the files and order a repleader. The court granted the alternative motion and struck the plea from the files and ordered a repleader by nine A. M/ the next day. The replication admitted the sufficienty of the plea, and the plaintiff should first have withdrawn the replication before attacking the plea. If we treat the motion as including a withdrawal of plaintiff's replication, the question then arises whether it was proper to strike the plea in abatement from the files. The general rule is that pleadings should be tested by demurrer and not by motion to strike. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers. 166 Ill. 361; Firestone Tire Co. v. Ginsburg, 285 Ill. 132. It is, however. held that under certain circumstances a plea may be stricken from the

and recover for any sum of money which the defendants had and received to the use of the plaintiff to be paid on request, and which, though requested, they hid not and, yet under hat deel ration as limited by this afridavit plaintiff could only receiver from defendants money lost within six months before the concencent of the suit in gembling in the price of grain, and then not to preced \$325.00. This therefore, is an action brought under Section lost of the Crimical Code, which sutherizes the loser to receive from the winner all sums so lost and to bring various forms of setions that for, including assumpait for money had and received.

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files, and one of such cases is where the plea presents an immaterial issue. Hitchcock v. Haight, 2 Gilm. 604; McClure v. Williams, 65 Ill. 390; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, supra. The supposed defect in the plea in question which is called a plea to the jurisdiction in the nature of a plea in abatement, is that it not only set up the service of process upon the defendants who joined in that plea in the County of Cook where they reside and not in the County of McDonough. but also that they were not jointly liable with Fluegel for the money sued for. The Chicago defendants contend that under the language of Section 54 of the Practice Act (Cahill's Ill. R. S. p. 2678.) they had a right to d my joint liability with Fluegel, either by plea in abatement or by plea in bar. In our former opinion we held that this action is not governed by said section 54 of the Practice Act, because it is not brought upon a contract, but to recover a statutory penalty for gambling in grain. We now conclude that view is not sound. In 12 R. C. L. 765, it is said: "The right to recover money lost in betting is a demand arising on contract." In Harty Bros. V. Polakon, 237 Ill. 559, the court said: "The law always implies a promise to do that which a party is legally liable to perform." The court there held that the term "implied contract" is also used "to denote that class of obligations imposed or created by law without the assent of the party bound, and sometimes even notwithstanding his actual dissent. upon the ground that they are dictated by reason and justice." It is also there said that these are fictions of law adopted to enforce legal duties; and also, "Whatever the laws order any one to pay, that becomes instantly a debt which he hath beforehand contracted to discharge." Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 312, discusses implied contracts, and among them " contracts implied by law from the existence of a plain legal obligation, without regard to the intention of the parties or even contrary thereto." The statute quoted in Warren b. Chambers, 12 Ill. 124, and the former statute of 1841, therein referred to, and section 54 of the present Practice Act. are practically indentical on this subject.

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Warren v. Chambers, supra, it was held that joint liability could only be put in issue by plea in abatement. To the same effect are Shufeldt v. Seymour, 21 Ill. 524, and McKinney v. Peck, 28 Ill. 174. Later cases hold or imply that such denial of joint liability may be either by plea in abatement or by special plea in bar. Smith v. Knight, 71 Ill. 148; Goodenow v. Jones, 75 Ill. 48; Zuel v. Bowen, 78 Ill. 234; Powell Co. v. Finn, 198 Ill. 567. The denial of joint liability was essential to this plea in abatement. We conclude that the Chicago defendants had a legal right to make that denial in that pleas. Plaintiff suggests difficulty in trying the issue under the pleas. The same difficulty existed in several of the cases above cited. The motion to strike that plea from the files should have been denied, and if the plea had been questioned by demurrer, that demurrer should have been overruled. Defendants were not bound to plead over.

The judgment must therefore be reversed as to the defendants who filed the plea in abatement. But a judgment at law is a unit as to all defendants. If reversed as to one defendant, it cannot be affirmed as to another. Jansen v. Varnum, 89, Ill. 100; Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co., 205 Ill. 77/ It is therefore unnecessary to discuss the case as to defendant Fluegel.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

v. Seymour, 21 III. 524, and McKi ney v. fook, 28 III. 174. Later aggree hold or imply that such denial of jant 11 bility may be either by alea in abstement or by should be a in br. with v. Anight, 71 III. 148; Good now v. Jones, 75 III. 48; wold v. Bowen, 75 III. 204; io.ell oc. tinn, 198 III. 507. The derial of jirt limity we calculate to this plan in ab tenent. We conclude that the Chicage defendants had a egal right to make that dealer in that in that jim. In inthis anglests difficulty in trying the issue under the plac. The same difficulty existed in several of the cause above cited. The metion to strike that

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The judgment is revured to the course is reas ded.

After the opinion in this case was filed, counsel for appellee filed a petition for a rehearing. In such petition he insists that the case of Shomide v. Brewerton, 306 Ill. 365, is conslusive of the question involved in this case. Upon mature consideration of our original opinion and of the contentions urged by appellee, we are of the opinion that all controversies have been narrowed down to one question, to-wit; whether or not non-residence and non-joint liability can be raised by plea in abatement. We think the cases cited in the original opinion are decisive of the question in favor of the right to raise such questions by plea in abatement as well as by a plea in bar.

In the instant case the questions were properly raised by a plea in abatement. The trial court improperly struck such plea from the files and the appellants having elected to stand by their said plea in abatement after having been ruled to a repleader, were defaulted and were thereby precluded from interposing a defense. We think this was error and we cannot perceive how it can be seriously contended that the Shomide case is authority for a different conclusion. The only thing wettled in the Shomide case was the procedure which should obtain at the close of the evidence where the resident defendants are dismissed out of court leaving only the hon-resident defendants in court. The Supreme Court in that case said that inasmuch as a plea of the general issue was on file it would have perhaps been better practice for the hon-resident defendants to have asked leave to withdraw the plea of the general issue andthen to file a plea in abatement. Naturally this suggestion by the Supreme Court would be wholly unnecessary if such non-resident defendants had already filed a plea in abatement and had not filed a plea of the general issue.

After the opinion in this case was filed, counsed for appelled filed a potition for a reheating. In analypetition he invirts that the case of shoulders, for a present, so in correlative of the question involved in this case. Upon acture correlation of cur original equipment and of the contentions urgad by copelle, we are of the opinion that all controversies have been morrowed down to one question, to wit; whether or not non-residence and ren-joint liability can be raised by plea in abstement. We think the cases cited in the original opinion are decisive of the greation in favor of the right to raise such questions by plea in abstement as well as by a plea in the original contents by plea in the right to raise such questions by plea in the team as well

In the instant case the questions were properly remed by a ale in shatement. The trial court issuesperly struck such plea nieds yd bagss of Selecte gairan starlingge edd bas sellt edd mont said plea in abatement after having been ruled to a repleader, see defaulted and were thereby procluded from interposing a defense. we think this was orror and we owner perseive how it and be seriously cour ended that the showile case is authority for a different conclusion. The cnly thing settled in the diomide onso are the procedure which should obtain at the olise of in, syllence where the resident defendants are dismissed out of court i aving only the bon-resinant defendants in court. The Jupremu - v. T in the t use and tract ipestanch as a sleat of the general facts as of file it wold a rehane been better practice for the pon-inclusit larend the to hire saked louve to withirm that pirk f in general ; our rithin to file a plea in a tresit. Islamar, this ear meation by the durance court would be alled an electric to such a necessary to the reactions his sare a peril do need but the the tile of series of the series of the general issue.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SS. I. JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this 2 a the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand mine hundred and twenty-two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present -- The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Presiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS AM . JETT, Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk.

CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff. 227 I.A.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the opinion of the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

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Present--The Hon. NURALLET. FOULD. Principle Community C

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The People of the State of Illinois,

Defendant in error,

VS.

Error to Carroll

Clare Holman, Plaintiff in error.

Per curium. Section 27 of the Prohibition Act (Cahill's R. S., p. 1464) is as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to own, operate or maintian, or have in his possession or any interest in a still, unless he shall first secure a permit from the Attorney General. but in case the office of Commissioner of Prohibition shall be created. then from such Commissioner, to own such still, which permit shall be kept conspicuously posted at the place where the still is located." Clare Holman and Albert Holman were indicted by the grand jury of Carroll County under said section. The indictment contained six counts. Some charges that defendants had in their possession a still, etc., some that they unlawfully owned, operated and maintained and had in their possession and had an interest in a still; some that they unlawfully operated a still and had an unlawful interest in a still, etc. count charged that this was without a legal permit from the Attorney General. Albert Holman pleaded guilty. Clare Holman moved to quash the indictment. That motion was denied. He then pleaded not guilty, was tried by a jury and convicted. A motion for a new trial was denied and he was sentenced to pay a fine of \$150.00 and the costs and to imprisonment in the county jail for five months. He has sued out this writ of error to review that judgment.

It is claimed that the indictment should have been quashed because the statute does not warrant the indictment. Defendant contends that it is not a violation of the above section to operate or maintain or have in possession a still without a permit by the Attorney General, and that it is only in case the defendant owns the still that he is required to have such permit. We hold it/be the true construction of said section that it is unlawful for any person to own, operate, maintain or have in his possession or have any interest in a still, unless he first procures

The People of the State of Illinois,

Defendant in error,

Brros to Carroll

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Clare Holmen, Plaintiff in error.

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the required permit. It would defeat the obvious purpose of the statute to construe it to mean that a still may be maintained without a permit from the Attorney General.

It is argued that a new trial should have been granted because no proof was introduced that defendant did not have a license from the Attorney General as required by the Act. In support of this position defendant relies upon People v. Butler, 268 Ill. 635, and other like cases. We are of the opinion that these cases are not properly applicable to the question here presented. In kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221, on p. 229 the court said:

"Whether the plaintiff in error was licensed to practice dentistry in the state of Illinois was a matter of defense which devolved on him to establish. Where the subject matter of a negative averment lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the averment, unless disproved by the defendant, will be taken as true. Such is the rule in all prosecutions for the doing of an act which the statute prohibits to be done by any person except those who are duly licensed."

The same doctrine was applied in Birr b. People, 113 Ill. 645, in a case of a prosecution under the Dram Shop Act for selling liquors to a minor without the written order of his parent, guardian or physician, as required by the statute. It was there held that the People were not required to prove lack of such a written order, but that it was for the defend at to prove This rule was again appthe existence of a written order, if it existed. lied in People v. Montgomery, 271 Ill. 580, where the charge was the sale of a certain drug without the written prescription of a registered physician. No proof of the non-existence of such a written prescription It was held the burden of proof on that subject was on the was made. defendant. The position of the prosecution on this subject is further sustained by Section 39 of said Prohibition Act (Cahilles R. S., p. 1467), where it is provided that it shall not be necessary in any indictment to include any defensive negative averments. We therefore hold that the point made is not well taken, and that the duty rested on defendant to prove such a permit, if he had it.

It is contended the evidence did not warrant the conviction. On

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August 5, 1921, the Sheriff and a deputy, accompanied by the State's Attorney of Carroll County, went to a heavily wooded island in Carroll County about 4 P. M. and there found a still, but without a fire, the details of which still do not need to be described as the evidence on that subject is not denied. They went away and returned about 8 P. M. and found a still in operation with a fire, and found there present Clare and Albert Holman. Clare was a bachelor, who lived about 60 rods from the still and was a grown man. Albert was his nephew, about 19 years old. When the officers found them, the proof by the Sheriff and his deputy was that Clare said: "Don't it beat hell; the first batch I tried to make I get caught before I even get a drink." One of the officers on receating the remark varied it slightly. The remark implied that he was trying to make intoxicating liquor at that still. Neither defendant said anything further at that time as to who owned or was operating the still. were arrested and taken to the county jail, and were brought back to the vicinity of the still the next morning for an examination before a justice of the peace. At that time each defendant claimed, as he also testified on the trial in the circuit court, that Albert had assembled the entire outfit constituting the still, mostly from equipment which he found in the woods in that vicinity, where someone apparently had had a still before that, and that Clare had no interest in the still and had taken no part in its operation and had never been there until three or five minutes before the officers came, when he came bringing a lantern at the request of his nephew. Clare did not deny the statement charged to have been made by him that evening, but only testified that he did not remember it. When all the details of this evidence are considered we conclude that a verdict against Clare cannot be disturbed on the ground that it is not supported by the evidence. In view of the fact, however, that the People had no positive evidence that Clare had any possession of or interest in the still, while defendant and his nephew gave positive evidence that he had none, it was important that the jury should be correctly instructed in regard to the rules applicable to the testimony of

Angust 5, 1921, the obeside and a color of the otal's Attorney of Carroll C anty, want to a him a get hat being to year all County about 4 2. M. and ther flored a s ill, in with it willing, the details of which still in the data to a satisfication of the chiefe the contract of that subject is no one . hey ver's a grad a current so us to and found a still in operation with a dire, and come here present Clare and Albert Molman. Clare / s _ loobeich, who listd . . . 60 . cus from When the officers found then, the world by the cheilfr all has as utin was that Clare said: "Dent it best ; flow that the tried to make I get caught before I ever got a druk." One of the filicers on cenceting the remark varied it dightly. The less that is that he is trying to make intextesting Lagor at that still. Deither defendant said onything further at that tire as to who owned or ase over ting the stall. were arrested and taken to the county full, ind size brought block to the vicinity of the still the cont a solar for an excession before & justice of the posse. At thit time clob actendant claimed, as he also t stiffed on the trial in the circuit sourt, that allo that act, bled the entire outfit done i'uting the still, still from squi mart hitch he f und in the words in the richito, where we do ne writing and ha a atill before that, and in the har of the block in the bild of hid taken no part in 148 charded on had bord for about on three or five minutes before the officers tale, but be a see "light g a lastern st the r quest of his reghts. Clare with the day the of a mark dury, d to have been rude by him the tarte to tall to tilled the red of not remember 1. When all the ditail of his will be a lidered so ecinclude that a verlict age to to first of test to distinct a prince that it is not search d by the elike or. I lieved the sea, I even, that the Pao le had no solitive its see that the red in the Billion of or interest in the still, while before two both as the eds in the result of the evidence that he had and the ment that he find that the " i by grateful of the color of the color of the content gliterroom

the defendant.

The court at the request of the People gave the following instruction:

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"The Court instucts the jury, that while the law makes the defindant a competent witness in this case, yet the jury have a right to take into consideration his situation and interest in the result of your verdict, and all the circumstances in evidence, and to give his testimony when considered together with all the evidence in the case such weight as, in your judgment, it is fairly entitled to."

No other instruction on that subject was given by the court. The sufficiency of such an instruction has been frequently discussed by our Supreme Court. Such an instruction was approved in Doyle v. People, 147 III. 394, and that ruling was followed without discussion in People v. Terrell, 262 III. 138, on p. 146. But on the same day in an opinion by the same judge in People v. Harrison, 261 III. 517, on pp. 524-526, it was held that such an instruction coupled with the requirement stated in the instruction that the same tests apply to all other witnesses as to the defendant is approved in many cases. It was found there that in that case the instruction complained of was followed by another instruction given, which did inform the jury that the testimony of the defendant was to be subjected to the same tests as other witnesses, except in the mere fact that he was the defendant being tried. But it was there said:

"An instruction which singles out the defendant, alone, from all the other witnesses and calls the jury's attention to his interest, or to some other circumstance which may affect his credibility, ought not to be given without also telling the jury that the same test applies to all the witnesses in the case as well as to the defendant."

This matter was again under review in the recent case of People v. Harvey, 286 Ill. 593. The 12th instruction in that case was much like the instruction now under consideration, and in the 13th instruction there given was the following: "And in determining the wright and credit to be given his testimony you have a right to consider not only the fact that he is the defendant on trial and his interest in the result of the soit, but also his demeaner on the witness stand, "etc. Of this instruction the court there said: "This instruction, as well as the words quoted from instruction 13, would tend to discredit the testimony of plaintiff in error and put him in

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would tend to lead the jury to believe that they were not bound to treat his testimony as the testimony of the other witnesses." The court also there said: "There was nothing in the twelfth, or thirteenth instruction which would lead the jury to understand that they were to apply the same tests to the testimony of the defendant as to other witnesses." This is the last expression of the Supreme Court on the subject. The frame of the instruction throws a doubt upon the testimony of the defendant, and it does not tell the jury that his testimony is to be subject to the same tests as other witnesses except as to the fact that he is a defendant and was interested in the result. In a case so close as this upon the facts and with such strong evidence in the record in favor of the defendant, we conclude that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial awarded because of the giving of this instruction with no qualification in that of any other instruction.

The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, ss. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk of the Appellate Court. in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ottawa, this 14 Th day of Mov. in the year of our Lord one thousand

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AT A TERM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Begun and held at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty two, within and for the Second District of the State of Illinois:

Present--The Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Bresiding Justice.

Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTEOW, Justice.

Hon. THOMAS AN .JETT Justice.

JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Clerk. CURT S. AYERS, Sheriff.

227 I.A. 617

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards, to-wit: on the Court was filed in the Clerk's office of said Court, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

T A TIRM OF THE APPELLATE COURT,

Regun and held at Otters, on Tuesday, the Edre day of our ten, in the year of our tord of a somewhat the summer of the State of two summers, and the State of Talinot and the summer of the State of Talinot a

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Albert Fowler, et al., appellees,

VS.

Appeal from Boone

William C. DeWolf, appellant.

Per Curiam.

William C. DeWolf owned a farm in Boone County. Paul Naatz was his tenant thereon. Naatz was heavily indebted to a bank and indebted in smaller sums to many other people The lease was ended in September, 1919, before it expired by its terms. tenant owned certain horses, farm implements and machinery on the farm, and DeWolf and Nastz owned in equal parts other live stock and farm roducts on the farm. They desired to sell all of this and they agreed to have a joint sale, both of the jointly owned property and of that owned by Naatz. They agreed on an auttione r and a clerk. John F. Meyers, Vice President of the bank in question and surety 66r Naatz on commercial paper was selected as clerk. The sale was advertised and held on September 19, 1919. At the sale the auctione r announced in the presence of DeWolf and Naatz, that the gurchasers should settle with the clerk. At that sale Albert Fowler and Bert Fowler each purchased quantities of hay. After the sale contentions arose between DeWolf and Meyers. DeWolf notified Meyers not to collect from the Fowlers and notified the Fowlers not to pay Meyers. Afterwards the Fowlers each paid Meyers the amount of his bid and Meyers received it. Thereafter DeWolf sued Meyers in assumpsit in the circuit court for what he claimed he ought to receive from the proceeds of the sale. Meyers then filed a bill and an amended bill of interpleader against DeWolf and Naatz, in which he alleged the fact of his clerking at that sals, and receiving as such clerk, various sums of money and notes for property purchased there, and his inability to settle with the owners of the property, and his willingness to pay each whatever share of the proceeds belonged to him and he asked that they interplead and that the amount

Albert Fowler, et al., appellee,

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he owed each be ascertained. He alleged that he was indifferent as between the parties. Thereafter DeWolf brought suits against Albert Fowler and Bert Fowler, severally, before a justice of the peace and there had a judgment against each. DeWolf appealed therefrom to the county court, and the Fowlers each appealed to the circuit court, so that there were four suits pending in favor of DeWolf against the Fowlers in the two courts. Thereafter, by leave of court, in the Meyers interpleader suit, each of the Fowlers filed an intervening getition, setting up his purchase of hay at the sale and the amount did therefor and that he had paid the same to Meyers, the cl rk of the sale, and that DeWolf had thereafter sued him and the result of the suit and the pendency of the apreals in the County and Circuit court. They each asked and obtained an injunction, restraining Dy Wolf from prosecuting those appeal cases in the county and circuit courts. DeWolf answered the Meyers bill, and the cause was referred to a master to take report the evidence and his conclusions. Thereafter the Fowlers conceived that their intervening petitions were defective in some respect, and by leave of court each filed an anended intervening petition with like prayer for injunction. The master took much evidence, in which the Fowlers did not take part, although they seem to have had a solicitor present who was prevented by objection from cross-examining one or more witnesses. The matter of the purchase of the hay and of the payment therefor was gone into before the master by Meyers and DeWolf, respectively. After the proof was nearly concluded Naatz was allowed to file an answer and introduce some testimony. The master made a long report in which he found among other things that Meyers was not indifferent as between the parties, and that his bill of inter pleader should be dismissed. He found the facts as to the Fowlers. Meyers filed objections to the report which were overruled, and then filed them as exceptions before the court, and thoy were

the owed with the ascert incl. He illeged that is a sindifficity as between the parties. Thereafter Danaf cross to act a Albert Fowl r and Bert Fowler, sew r , r tre r usting rf the peace and trare bud a judy and an instant son. Laws. ? therefrom to the county court, and the Foliers of areeled to the oirquit court, so that there wir flur suits erains in favor of DeWolf against the Fowlers in the sw. olores. The first by leave of court, in the Mer re inter le der witt, short vis Powlers filed an interv ming exition, to ting us his ourosed of hay at the sale and the amount Mid the refer and that he had be go in the same to Meyers, the of rm of the sune, and that DaWorf had thereafter west its and the result of the suft and tot perdency of the appeals in the County and Circuit court. They ask a icd and obtain a an injunction, regraining D-Wolf from thisecuting those appeal o sea in the soundy and circuit of the sea of age seeds answered the Mey rs old, and the same refer to to t ke repert the vidence and his dinormake. Third for the Forle 3 a notived that their inferventing perfetons and a stive in some reseast, and by any, of curtical first interpolation revening retition with itse pray r w resistant. The continue of the k much evidence, in at act the Tow the that a terminate of the they seem to make hid a rollerur richt till the to the objection from order-elability on or may 3: . "L9 cft. a little und and it is the yell end to real oru end to into before the mast ray Merra and Dewell, ... It the recof w. a n. rly oc callet . 1942 THE TELL OF SELL OF SELECTION O Low is at the second of the to good the following the progen not in lift contain to the court of the containing of the containing of Forlir. Meyort Lot Concest to the offer ruled, and "hon filed than ere to he wilker (-tt, le

here overruled. On July 30, 1931, a decree was entered. The court overuled the exceptions of Meyers and confirmed the master's report and dismissed his bill of inter-leader for want of equity as to Meyers only. The court consolidated said amended bill with the patitions of Albert and Bert Fowler in order to determine therr rights and equities. The court then offered to re-refer said cause to the master to t ke further testimony, and the parties were present in court and did not desire to have said cause re-referred and to precent any further testimony. We interest this to mean that the parties submitted the interests of the Fowl rs for determination upon the master's report of proofs and findings then in the record. The court then passed upon the equities of said Fowlers and found that before they said Meyers for what they purchased at the sale they were notified by DeWolf not to may Meyers for the same, and that Mayers before receiving said pay from them was notified by DeWolf not to receive any pay from Albert and Bert Fowler; that notwithstanding said notice they did pay AlmartxandxBartxBarka Meyers the full price at which they respectively purchased the hay at said sale; and that they had a legal right to pay said Meyers therefor; and the wourt overruled the master's report finding otherwise in that respect. The court further found that said hay was the joint property of DeWolf and Maatz, and that prior to said sale and at said sale DeWolf and Nastz had fully authorized Meyers to collect the purchase price of said/crops from all purchasers and from said Albert and Bert Fowler. The court made perpetual the injunction theretofore ordered against DeWolf and Naatz, and p retually enjoined DeWolf from further prosecuting the suits pending the county court and in the circuit court against Albert and Bert Fowler. DeWolf prostoutes this appeal from that decree and only claims error

There is no assignment of errors on this record. Rule 12 of

as to the Fowlers.

were overruled. On July 30, 1981, a Peores resent red. court corruled the executions of Wey re and confir to the a stria report and dissisced his bill of the r of ser for a policy os to Meyers only. The court consolidated and amount till with the petitions of All rt and Bort Fivil's in order to detricine their rights and soulties. The court teen off, ed to co-roter entd cause to the mark a to t ke furt or training, and the perties more openent in apart and did not dealers to have situate re-reformed and to pre ent any further to throny. As inter ret this to mean that the parties extendited the later acts of the Four lor determination upon the wastric rejort of proofs and disfinge them'in the record. Thi court them wered when the quities of sild-Fowlers and found but to they all Mayors for she racy . purchased at the said they are a tiffed by Devolf not to any ! Mayors the same, and that Weyers before Adveting caid our from these was notified by D Wolf not to receive one my free allert and Bert Fowl of that not tibe, miling said errice they are p.y AlbantandakkantaRaniea Mayeng toe Inl price at wide they rear totlyes I bow yent tast the paint state state they and they are I say I right to pay said Mayers therefort and the sourt or article the marter's report similing otherwise in the relevous. The sourt are ther found that this tis the join our lay. Other there is Masta, and that prior to esta once has a new control of Manta had fully sutagrized Mayara to columnt to. Grands it is or and it at the nor hard and order of the act the second ples to Fowler. The opunt sude personal the injunction ther to bru of the tions Union ... ut an a stant for Mewed tanings be in fall o find at an in a suit with a find a first find a first fi in the oirputs court turne fluirt and high formit. Defett grossoutes this appear from the state and may a set or the is to the Forlera.

There is no anotherent of error unit. Fair late in a

this court (137 Ill. app. 624) provides that the assignment of errors must be written upon or attached to the record. The Supreme Court has had a similar rule for many years. The rule now in force in that court is Rule 11. 273 Ill. 14. 15. The force and effect of this rule has been often discussed by the Supreme Court and by the appellate courts, from Williston v. Fisher. 28 Ill. 43, down to People v. Andrus, 299 Ill. 50. In the latter case it is said on p. 56: "It is a rule of this court with all the force of a statute, that when a transcript of the record is filed the appellant shall in every case assign errors, which must be written upon or attached to the record, and on failing to comply with the rule the appeal may be dismissed or the judgment or decree affirmed." A supposed assignment or errors is printed in the abstract. In several of the cases it is held that that does not comply with the rule. Benneson v. Sagage, 119 Ill. 135; People W. Pryer, 157 Ill. App. 89. We so held in Guth v. Haas, 210 Ill. App. 437. While some of the cases on this subject hold that the proper order in such case is to dismiss the appeal. others hold that in such case the judgment or decree may be affirmed. This condition of the record requires us either to dismiss the appeal or to affirm the decree. We conclude, however, to discuss some ofher questions appearing in the record.

DeWolf here seems to contend that no intervening petitions were filed by the Fowlers. On the contrary, we find in the record what we conceive to be a petition and an amended petition by each of them sufficient for the purposes of this decree.

DeWolf contends that when Meyers' bill of interpleader was dismissed there was nothing left to support further action by the court. All that was done in the final decree was on one day. If the decree had been so worded as to first grant the prayers of the intervening petitions and then dismiss the bill as to Meyers only, we presume it would not be supposed that there was nothing to support the decree in favor of the Fowlers. We hold that it is

be written upon a dischel to the word. The and a stitue of similar rule for ar, ears, in laber of the relation wie 13. 275 Ill. 74, 15. The fact a effect to release ofter discusses by the Surres Cut tending in mail to grate. ---Millisten v. Micher, 18 Ill. 43, 1 am to who la . Trent, 23: 11 . Jr. In the Latter sa e it a wild on p. od: " I . wild of a st east if ed an all the force of a climite, that alore that the tree of the is filled the supplicationall in or power satisfactor off at by writted woon or ettern & to the rich and of Police to de the A supposed assignment or our rais princed in the arre of. In in Orth v. ag s, all 111. And 40 a anne and and anne . The 12 lead that the down is a second to the fold to be to the second others held that I. wish care the chine of I called the first This condition of the record requires as tiper the conditions to effire the dourse. We obtained the contract of .br.se. : At ni gil: Lacqa anoltesus

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immaterial in what order the several proceedings of that one day were stated in the decree, but that it is all one decree on that day. But if this is not so, the Fowlers were parties to the suit! They had equities to be adjusted which were also set up in the answer of DeWolf to Meyers' bill. They had petitions filed by leave of court, asking the court to protect them, and it was proper to adjust their equities. In a cause in equity, the equities of all the parties should be disposed of, if practicable, and they should not be left for further litigation.

Among the many cases so holding are the following: Chendler v. Morey, 195 Ill. 596; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 Ill. 470; Braithwaite v.

Henneberry, 222Ill. 50. We applied this rule in Roman v. Humphreys, 220 Ill. App. 502. We therefore conclude that the court had jurisdiction on that day to settle the equities of all the parties by its decree, except those of Meyers, for reasons stated by the master and not questioned here.

DeWolf contends that as the Fowlers filed no objection to the master's report before that officer, nor any exceptions to his bulings before the court, they are bound by the findings of the master and therefore could not have this decree. The rule is that the findings of fact hy the master are binding on the parties who do not properly object and except to them, but that such parties may question his determination of questions of law arising from the facts so found without any objection or exception. Von Platen v. Winterbotham, 203 Ill. 198; Marlow v. Rich. 252 Ill. 442; Olp v. Meyers, 277 Ill. 202. The master found all the facts as claimed by the Fowlers, but he held as a matter of law that De-Wolf had power to forbid Meyers, the clerk at the sale, to settle with the parties after the sale was over, and notwithstanding the announcement at the sale by the auctioneer in the presence of DeWolf and Naatz that every purchaser should settle with the clerk. It was not necessary that the Fowlers should except to the rulings of the master on the facts in order to determine that

is aterial in which order the sort of control of a latered in the issues, who is a control in the issues, who is a control of the analysis and sort of the sound of the control of the many orbitic files and the count to protect them, which is a control of a control of the count to protect them, and if any and the count to protect the sound of a control of a control of the control

Sabolf contents that a the four sales of a sale of the sales mast in report le ine that officer, . . and e and . resting before the enert, they are or die, the first we have the fire a bld and his his acres. The mass is the first and the by the notion of their the ratios in the ratios in the residence of the residence of the rational states of the residence of exampt to them, the true setter as, it is to all the true of question of the section of the contraction of the contraction סמי ואני יולני לו לפר של של יו יולנים ליוני, ויינו בי לו יולנים ליונים בי לו יונים בי לו יונים בי לו יונים בי factor by the first by he for the held and a line of a first baselo set, who a little of towns ban the in the cody of the off the care to the terms of the name ser in a straight the straight to the see down Project a chemical to the contract the contract and a story tan " nu Taj de o"

question of law, and the court held that the master had determined that question erroneously. The virtual agreement that meyers should receive the proceeds of the sale from the buyers was made by DeWolf and Naatz, jointly. Meyers became their joint agent. DeWolf alone could not afterwards cancel that authority. The Fowlers therefore had a right to pay to Meyers. They could not safely pay any one else. DeWolf and Naatz owned this hay jointly, each an undivided omehalf. On a settlement between DeWolf and Naatz, it might turn out that Naatz was entitled to receive this money, for DeWolf received considerable sums from Meyers.

There is another reason why it was proper to enjoin DeWolf frompprosecuting these suits in his own name against the Fowlers. He did not own this money. He only had a one-half interest in it. Any suit at law to collect the money from the Fowlers, if they had not paid it, must have been brought in the joint names of DeWolf and Naatz. As DeWolf could not recover in his own name alone, a court of equity would properly forbid that the Fowlers be harassed by these suits. DeWolf claims that the Fowlers, or one of them, promised to see him paid. The master made no such findings of fact and DeWolf did not object or except to his report. He therefore cannot take advantage of any such supposed proof before the master.

We must presume that the master was right in finding that
Meyers was partial and not indifferent and that his bill of interpleader was properly dismissed as to him for that reason. It
is to be regretted that either DeWolf or Naatz did not file a
cross bill for an accounting. It seems to be evident that DeWolf
alone cannot recover any of the proceeds of this sale in an action
at law against Meyers, in which Naatz does not join, and that
the true state of the accounts arising out of this sale cannot
be determined by a jury in an action at law brought by only one
of the interested parties. It seems to us there must be an

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We must prove that the street of the street

accounting and a settlement of the state of the accounts in some binding form before Meyers can safely pay either party.

The decree is affirmed.

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
The decree is effirmed.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT. SS. I, JUSTUS L. JOHNSON. Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof. I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said appellate Court, at Ottawa, this ____ / The_day of ____ the year of our Lord one thousand

nine hundred and twenty-

Clerk of the Appellate Court.



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General No. 7280

Agenda No. 5

October Term A. D. 1921

Ralph Bradford, a Minor by Claude Bradford, his next friend, Appellee,

s. /227IA.

J. G. Fisher, Appellant

Appeal from Vermilion.

NIEHAUS, J.

Ralph Bradford, a fourteen year old boy, on or about October 24th, 1919, was returning home, after attending school; and with other boys, was going along a paved country road in Vermilion county, called Oakwood Avenue, near the city of Danville. When he arrived at a point about 200 feet east of O'Neal's store, on the road in question, he attempted to cross; and in attempting to cross the road, came into contact with appellant's automobile, which appellant was driving at an alleged excessively high rate of speed. The automobile ran over appellee's left leg; and he suffered an oblique fracture of. the femur; and other minor injuries. The fracture resulted in at least one permanent injury, namely, shortening of the injured leg. Suit was commenced in the circuit court of Vermilion county by appellee, by next friend, against the appellant J. G. Fisher; and a trail was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the appellee. fixing the amount of his damages at \$3,000.00. The appellant made a motion for a new trial, which after a remittitur of \$105.00 had been entered by the appellee, was overruled by the court; and a judgment was thereupon entered for \$2895.00. From this judgment an appeal is prosecuted. The judgment was affirmed by this court in an opinion filed at the previous term, but a re-hearing was granted to enable the court to re-examine some of the questions, which were raised on appeal. Appellant's first contention relates to the amended declaration consisting of four counts, which was filed in the case. It is contended that

Page 1

this declaration is substantially defective; and that the court should have sustained the demurrer thereto. The first count was legally sufficient under the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Chicago City Railway Co. v. Jennings 154 Ill. 274; and we are of opinion, that the other counts also state a cause of action; but

any defects or omissions in the statement of a cause of action in any of the counts, though fatal on demurrer, cannot be a matter of contest after issue joined, and a trial had upon the issues raised, and a verdict rendered on the issues. Jerke vs. Francher 158 Ill. 375; Watkins Medical Co. v. Bailey 217 Ill. App. 460; Fairbanks v. Bahre 213 Ill. 636. Appellant contends, that there is a variance between the proofs, and the allegations in the declaration. It is sufficient to say, with reference to this contention, that no such question was raised on the trial in the court below. In order to raise the question of variance, a specific objection must be made at the trial of the case, and variance pointed out at that time; Linquist v. Hodges 248 Ill. 491; Swift & Co. v. Rulkowski 182 Ill. 18; Swift & Co. v. Madden 165 Ill. 41; Ballah v. Peoria Life Ins. Co. 168 Ill. App. 603. Appellant contends, that the evidence clearly shows, that the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence. Whether the appellee, in attempting to cross the highway in question, under the circumstances, and in the manner in which he did it, was guilty of contributory negligence, was a question for the jury to determine; and whether he exercised such care as a reasonably cautious person of that age, would exercise under the circumstances and conditions which prevailed at that time. The jury found against the appellant on this question. We cannot say, that the jury's finding was not warranted by the evidence; or that the finding was manifestly against the weight of the evidence in the case. It is assigned as error, that the court admitted in evidence the amount of the hospital bill of \$105.00, which had been paid by the father, and for which the father had become liable in connection with appellee's injuries. But whatever error, there was in the admission of this testimony, which related to a definite

Page 2

amount, was cured by the remittitur of the same amount from the verdict. T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Beals 50 Ill. 150; Chicago City Railway Co. v. Gemmill 209 Ill. 638. Complaint is made by the appellant to the giving of the 8th instruction, which refers to the measure of damages. It is insisted that under this instruction the jury could allow damages for loss of time, and loss of earning power, during the appellee's minority. We are of opinion, that no such inference could be reasonably drawn from the wording of the instruction; the instruction is clearly limited to the com-

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pensation for the injuries which the evidence shows the appellee suffered or would suffer if any, as the result of the collision with appellant's automobile and was limited also by the allegations in the declaration. The criticism made to the giving of Instructions No. 1 and 6, are not well taken. Taking the instructions altogether for appellee and appellant, we are of opinion, that they state the law concerning the matters of negligence, and contributory negligence involved in the case, with substantial correctness. We find no error in the refusal of appellant's instructions; and no error is specifically pointed out in the brief. It is sufficient to say concerning the question raised of improper or prejudicial arguments made to the jury by appellee's counsel, that these questions cannot be raised for review by ex parte affidavits; Barnett v. Barnett 188 Ill. App. 32; People v. Vall 242 Ill. 284; Clark v. The People 224 Ill. 554. It is also contended that the amount of the damages recovered is excessive. Taking into account the fact, that the appellee received a permanent injury; and that he must have suffered much pain and distress, the amount of the judgment cannot be regarded as excessive.

The record does not disclose any reversible error; and judgment is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

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General No. 7353

Agenda No. C2

October Term A. D. 1921

Rufus M. Rotts, Insurance Superintendent of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error,

Assured's National Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Plaintiff in Error.

Error to Sangamon. 227 I.A. 618

NIEHAUS, J.

This cause is heard upon a writ of error issued to review a decree of the circuit court of Sangamon county approving the report of the receiver J. C. Lyons, who had been appointed in the case of Rufus M. Potts, Insurance Superintendent of the State of Illinois v. Assureds National Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Plaintiffs in Error herein, and who had taken charge of the assets and personal property of the Insurance Company mentioned, and filed the report in question asking to be discharged as such receiver.

Objections to the report were filed by the Plaintiff in Error; and the objections filed, and the matters involved therewith, were referred to a special master, who heard the evidence concerning the objections. While this matter was pending before the master, the parties to the controversy made a settlement, which was reduced to writing and executed under seal. The master thereafter made his report, in which he found, that the receiver aid not preserve or conserve the assets of the Plaintiff in Error; and that he performed his duties as receiver in such a negligent careless and wanton manner, as to cause uestruction and loss of much of the property and assets of Plaintiff in Error. He also reported, that the Plaintiff in Error and the Receiver, had made a settlement of the matters in controversy, which was evidenced by a written instrument under seal; and which released the receiver from liability concerning the loss suffered by the

Page 1

Plaintiff in Error, because of the mal-administration of the receiver concerning the property placed in his charge by the order of the court; and that this written instrument and release, which is set out in the report, was fully fairly and voluntarily entered into by the Plaintiff in Error, and operated as a release of said receiver from liability. Objections and exceptions were filed to the report



of the master, which were heard by the court, and overruled; and the court thereupon entered a decree approving the final report of the receiver and discharging him, and also discharging his bondsmen from all further liablity on the receiver's bond.

It is contended by Plaintiff in Error that the release executed by the parties to this controversy was invalid; and should have been set aside by the court; and that the objections and exceptions which it filed to the master's report should have been sustained by the court. A contention is also raised in the case, concerning certain acts of the receiver in allowing the names of the policy holders in Plaintiff in Error's Company to be given to a rival insurance company; and that this act of the receiver resulted in loss of Plaintiff in Error's business. It is sufficient to say concerning the latter contention, that this was not a question properly arising on the approval of the recciver's report, which was necessarily limited to the matter of the restoration to the Plaintiff in Error of the physical and pecuniary assets and chattel property of the Plaintiff in Error, which had been placed in charge of the receiver by the court. And we are of, opinion also, that the findings of the master, and the decree of the court should have been limited to these matters. We find that the evidence fully sustains the finding of the master, that the release in guestion was executed as the free and voluntary act of the parties, and binding; but it should in this case be held to effect only the matters referred to. The objections and exceptions marked two and three, should have been sustained; the finding embraced in No. two, that the receiver made full restora-

Page 2

ton of the whole of the property and assets of the company or their equivalent, was erroneous; also the findinfi that the Plainitff in Error had no valid claim against the receiver, and that such receiver should be dscharged from all further liability, together with his bondsmen; which should have been limited to the matters contained in the receiver's report. We are of opinion, that under the evidence in the case, the decree in its findings should also have been confined in discharging the defendant from liability, to the assets and property embraced in the receiver's report, and the pecuniary and physical assets of which he had charge; and that therfore, the decree should be modified, so as to exclude a determination of liability con-

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cerning other matters.

For the reasons stated, the decree is affirmed insofar as the approval of the receiver's report is concerned, and his discharge as receiver; but the finding which releases and discharges him and his bondsmen from all liabilities and obligations whatsoever to the Plaintiff in Errror. is reversed; and the cause is remanded with directions to modify the decree, limiting the discharge from liability of the defendant and his bondsmen, to the matters embraced in the receiver's report, and the property and assets therein specified.

Reversed in part, and remanded in part, with directions.

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General No. 7366

Agenda No. 16

October Term A. D. 1921

Ensel, Meyer & Company, Defendant in Error

James C. Davis, Director General of Railrooads, etc., Plaintiff in Error.

Error to Sangamon, 27 I.A. 61

NIEHAUS, J.

This suit was brought by Ensel, Meyer & Company against James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads, operating the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, a common carrier, to recover damages for a breach of contract relating to the transportation and delivery of a shipment of whiskey on or about February 7th, 1919. The wet goods in question were received by the plaintiff in error at Peoria for transportation to Springfield, Illinois. The declaration which consists of nine counts, alleges seperate shipments; and charges that certain quantities of whiskey were received by the defendant in the suit as a common carrier, to be carried for the plaintiff in the suit to Springfield on the railroad referred to; and that the defendant was guilty of a breach of the carrying contract by failing to deliver the shipment to the plaintiff at Springfield. The defendant in defense of the suit, filed the general issue to the declaration, and two special pleas in bar. A demurrer was sustained to the special pleas; the defendant thereupon withdrew the general issue, and stood by his special pleas; a default was entered; and subsequently a stipulation entered into between the parties by which it was admitted that the shipments were made as charged in the declaration, namely, by the plaintiff to itself at Sprnigfield as alleged in the various counts of the declaration; that the packages containing the merchandise in question were re-

Page 1

ceived in good condition and not delivered to the plaintiff; and that the freight charges were paid thereon by the plaintiff. Evidence concerning the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff was heard and submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict assessing the plaintiff's damages at \$616.25; and the court rendered judgment against the plantiff in error for the amount found by the jury. The defendant prosecutes this writ of error to reverse the

judgment.

One of the grounds urged by the plaintiff in error for reversal of the judgment is, that the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the special pleas. Both special pleas presented practically the same character of defense, namely, that the contract of shipment which was entered into by the plaintiff in the suit and the defendant, was a part of a scheme or plan of the plaintiff for delivery of the intoxicating liquor contained in the shipment to itself for the purpose of subsequent sale in anti-saloon terrtory. Also, that the plaintiff in the making of the contracts declared on, for the carriage of intoxicating liquors to itself at Springfield, did so with the intention of making delivery thereof to purchasers at Springfield in anti-saloon territory. There is no statement in the pleas that the defendant had any knowledge or information at any time of the alleged plan or scheme referred to, and the pleas do not specify what plan or scheme the plaintiff had, nor do they aver, that the defendant had any knowledge of an intention of the plaintiff to sell the liquor in question in violation of the anti-saloon territory act, nor had any knowledge of any facts showing such intention; it is apparent that the averments in the pleas represent merely the pleaders conclusions without stating the facts upon which such conclusions were based. A mere intention to violate a law is not a violation of aw, especally

Page 2

in a matter of the violation of a statute, which makes certain acts if committed an offense, regardless of the intention of the person committing the unlawful acts; and this applies with peculiar force to a case like the present one, where the party charged with the evil intention was never in position to have carried it into effect, because he never received the liquor with which he, it is alleged he intended to commit the offense. The pleas in question contain no averments that plaintiff said or did anything concerning this shipment from which the inference could be reasonably drawn that he intended to violate the anti-saloon's law referred to, either by having made sales thereof which were prohibited, or made any agreements to deliver the liquor to purchasers, who had no legal right to purchase the same within 11e prohibited territory. Mere conclusions are not legally sufficient as a matter of pleading. Willard v. Zehr, 215 Ill. 148. For the reasons stated, the demurrer to the

pleas was properly sustained.

Another ground urged for reversal of the judgment is, that under the evidence concerning the market value, there could only be a recovery of nominal damages; that the evidence concerning the market value of the liquor, was insufficient; that there could be no market value of a commodity at the place of delivery, inasmuch as the sale at that place is illegal. Concerning market value, the witness Ben Meyer who had been in the liquor business for many years preceeding the trail, had been in the wholesale liquor business at Springfield, at Lincoln, and at the time mentioned, was in the same business at Peoria, was asked the following question: Q: What was the fair cash value per gallon of 41 gallons of Fay whiskey at the place of delivery. This question was objected to, "inasmuch as the stipulation shows that the place of delivery was anti-saloon territory; and inasmuch as under the local option act it was unlawful to sell intoxicating liquor in

Page 3

Springfield, the place of delvery, and at the time that the delivery should have been made there could have been no market value of whiskey in Springfield at that time. That there could be no market value of a thing which is forbidden to be sold." The Court over ruled the objection, whereupon the question was repeated as follows: "What was the fair cash market value in Springfield, the place of delivery?" This was objected to on account of the fact, that the court judicially knew the statute, judicially knew by this stipulation, that Springfield the place of delivery, was anti-saloon territory; judicially knew that it was unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors in anti-saloon territory; and therefore it could have no market value in Springfield. This objections were also overruled. We are of opinion that the objection was properly overruled. It was evidently based on the erroneous assumption, that because Springfield at the time in question was anti-saloon territory, no sales of any kind could therefore be legally made, and hence there could be no market for the sale of intoxicating liquors. In the case of Jacksonville v. C. & A. R. R. Co., the Supreme Court in discussing this point, said: "The Act expressly recognizes the right of property in intoxicating liquor. It makes its sale unlawful in territory which by vote of the people has become anti-saloon territory, but even in such territory intoxicating liquor may



still under certain conditions be manufactured owned used and sold." Jacksonville v. C. & A. R. R. Co. 274 Ill. 152. But assuming that counsel is correct in his position, that the evidence as to market value at Springfield is not clear and explicit, there is sufficient evidence in the record, from which the jury could ascertain with reasonable certainity the market value at Springfield. It was proper under the circumstances suggested by counsel, in determining the question of market value, to take into considera-

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tion the evidence of the market value of the liquors at Peoria, from where it was shipped. "If property has a market value at the place involved in the inquiry, evidence is properly directed to establishing it at that place. Where the issue involved relates to the sale and delivery of goods, evidence of value is properly directed to value at the place of delivery, but unless the evidence is clear and explicit as to the value of the article at the place of delivery, evidence of value at other places may be received. Where it is affirmatively shown that no market value for a commodity exists at the place involved in the inquiry, market value at otheir places may be shown, if these are sufficiently near to show, in connection with cost of transportation, etc., the value at the place in question." 22 Corpus Juris 189 Sec. 153.

The record does not disclose any reversible error; and the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Graves dissenting.



General No. 7377 Agenda No. 26

October Term A. D. 1921

Frank C. Jones, Appellec,

vs.

A. H. Hughes, Appellant.

Appeal from Sngamon.

NIEHAUS, J.

227 I.A. C183

This is an appeal from judgment in favor of Frank C. Jones ,the appellee, in the circuit court of Sangamon county, in a forcible entry and detainer suit, instituted by the appellee, to recover the possession of certain premises occupied by the appellant A. H. Hughes, under a lease from J. J. Wilmert, the owner of the premises in question. The lease to the appellant was made on the 1st day of March 1920; and expired on the 28th day of February 1921. In the mean time, on the 24th day of August 1920, Wilmert entered into a written agreement with the appellee by which he agreed to sell and convey the premises in question to him, which agreement was to be executed and carried into effect, on the 1st of March 1921. But the time was afterwards extended to January 1st, 1922. Wilmert also assigned to the appellee, the lease in question, under which appellant had possession of the premises. And in connection with these transaction between Wilmert and the appellee, it was verbally agreed, that the appellee should have possession of the premises, on the 1st day of March 1921. Shortly before the expiration of appellant's term, the appellee had a conversation with him, in which the appellant indicated to the appellee, that he probably would not be ready to deliver possession to him on the 1st of March; and on the 1st of March after the appellant's term had expired, the appellee had another conversation with the appellant, to induce him to deliver possession of the premises at once; and the appellant insisted, that he could not do so until later on, for certain reasons which he gave at that time. Under this state of facts.

Page 1

which the evidence

in the record discloses, the court directed a verdict in favor of the appellee. It is contended by the appellant, that this was error. We are of opinion, that the appellee under the facts and the law, was entitled to a verdict and judgment. Under the agreement which the appellement which was appellement which the appellement which which the appelleme



iee had with Wilmert, the owner of the premises, the appellee was entitled to take possession on March 1st, 1021; on that date the appellant still held possession of the premises, although his term had ended February 28th, and refused to deliver possession to the appellee. Under the forcible entry and detainer act, the person entitled to the possession of lands has the legal right to maintain the action; and under Sec. 2 Par. 4 of the act mentioned, the appellee could legally maintain this suit, to recover the possession that he was entitled to, of the premises, under his agreement with Wilmert. The fact that the agreement for possession was verbal, did not deprive him of this right. A verbal agreemnt for possession under the facts presented was legal and binding. Allen v. Webster 56 Ill. 393. Moreover, the appellant was not in position to question the legality of the verbal agreement. The appellant, by virtue of Sec. 12 of Chap. 80 of the act concerning landlord and tenant, was legally bound to surrender possession at the expiration of his term, namely on February 28; and his possession on March 1st, and thereafter was therefore wrongful, as to the appellee, to whom the landlord's right to retake possession of the premises had been transfered.

Judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

denied Oct 4, 1902

General No. 7896

Agenda No. 65

October Term A. D. 1921

Albert J. Meier, Appellant

George G. Moore, Appellee

Appear from Vermilion

NIEHAUS, J.

This is a suit in assumpsit, commenced by attachment, by the appellant Albert J. Meier in the circuit court of Vermilion county, against the appellee George G. Moore , to recover on a promissory note, made by the appellee for the principal sum of \$10,000, and interest. There was a trial by jury; and a verdict and judgment in favor of the apellee. This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment. It was pleaded in defense of the action to recover on the note, that the consideration for which the note had been given, had failed. The evidence shows that the note, with other notes, had been made by the appellee to the appellant for the purchase price of 106,250 shares of stock which appellant owned in the Missouri Metals Corporation. The evidence also shows that an agreement was made in connection with the making of the notes in September 1918, by which the appellee was to become the owner of the stock referred to, under the following circumstances: The appeiles was a resident of New York, and the appellant lived in St. Louis. At the instance of the appellant, who was desirous of selling his stock, F. E. Butcher, then also of St. Louis, and who had been connected in business with both parties, undertook to negotiate a sale of the stock to the appellee; and for that purpose, after having arranged for a meeting by the telephone communication went to New York to see the appellee; and had a conference with appellee, which resulted in the agreement by appellee to purchase appellant's stock. Appellee's testimony, as to what occurred between him and Butcher concerning this agreement to purchase, is as follows: "When Mr.

Page 1

Butcher came to see me, in New York in 1918, he telephoned me a few days before, and he referred to his telephone conversation, and said Mr. Meier would sell his stock at 50 cents per share, and take his pay in notes. I told him I wouldn't think of buying the stock



because it was worthless, the company was insolvent; I was a large creditor, and other large claims against it; but that if the trade which had been on with the St. Joe Lead Company, were completed, so that there would be enough to pay the debts, I would be willing to complete the purchase; I would sign the notes, and give them to him with that understanding. I told him I was going abroad in three or four days. So that he would known thoroughly what the trade was, with the St. Joe Lead Company, I had him see Messrs. Davis and Connell, lawyers acting in it, also arranged to call Mr. Crane, president of the company, so that he would have complete details of the trade. I also arranged that Mr. Butcher should be completely informed of the trade, as it progressed; I told Mr. Butcher I wanted him to get in touch with both the lawyers, and Mr. Crane, so that he would know. Mr. Crane is president of the St. Joe Lead Company, and promotor of, and negotiating the trade; I told him the only reason I would think of buying the stock was in the event that the St. Joe Lead Company completed it." Butcher, who was a witness in the case, corroborated the testimony of the appellee concerning the conditions under which the appellee agreed to buy the stock, and under which the appellee executed the notes, and gave them to him on this purchase. Butcher took the notes, and after returning to St. Louis, delivered them to the appellant apparently without informing the appellant of the conditions under which he had received them. It was a contested question of fact on the trial, whether the agreements for the purchase of the stock by the appellee, was as testified by the appellee, or was made upon the terms, which had been proposed by the appellant. The jury by their verdict found in favor of appellee on this question. It is contended by the appellant, that the verdict is against the weight of the eviuence. We cannot agree to this con-

Page 2

tention. The evi-

dence in the record fully warranted the conclusion reached by the jury. If the agreement to purchase the stock was as claimed by the appellee, the appellant has no right to recover, because the purchase of the stock was conditioned upon the proposed agreement or trade with the St. Joe Lead Company becoming effective. But aside from this matter, it is clear from the evidence that no agreement for the purchase of the stock, was never

consummated; and that whatever was said or done about the matter, it did not result in an actual sale; and that appellant retained the ownership and possession of his stock. The appellee never received the property, in part payment and consideration of which, he gave the note in question; and it is therfore evident, that the consideration for which the note was given, failed. The verdict of the jury, upon the issue of failure of consideration, is fully sustained by the evidence.

We find no reversible error in the introduction or rejection of evidence on the trial; nor in the instructions given for appellee, nor in the refusal to give the instructions contended for by the appellant. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

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General No. 7399

Agenda No. 44

October Term A. D. 1921

Faber-Musser Co., Appellant,

vs.

Wm. E. Dee Clay Mfg. Co., Appellee.

Appeal from Sangamon.

NIEHAUS, J.

7 I.A. 6185 In this case the appellant Faber-Musser Co. com menced suit in the circuit court of Sangamon county against the appellee William E. Dee Clay Manufacturing Company, to recover damages for an alleged breach of a contract to deliver to the appellant a large quantity of fire brick. There was a trial by the court; and a judgment was rendered barring the appellant from any right of recovery under the contract; and this appeal is pros-

ecuted from the judgment.

Appellant's right to recover depends upon whether the contract involved, which was made by Matthew M. Dee, acting as agent for the appellee, was binding, and legally effective without a subsequent ratification or acceptance, by the appellee. If Matthew M. Dee, as agent had authority, either as a matter of fact, or as a matter of law, to bind the appellee, the contract was binding without any subsequent approval or acceptance by the appellee. In this case the authority of the agent presented a question of law. Where the authority is implied from a certain state of facts, it becomes a question of law; Doggett vs. Greene 254 Ill. 134; and whether authority to bind the appellee, should be applied as a matter of law from the state of facts proven in this case, was passed upon by the Supreme Court on a previous appeal: Faber-Musser Co. v. Dee Clay Co. 291 Ill. 240. It was there held in effect, that under the facts proven, Matthew M. Dee's authority to bind the appellee by the contract in question, was implied as a matter of law, and that the contract should have


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been admitted in evidence as the contract of the appellee. If therefore, the contract must be considered as appellee's contract, (there being no question of a breach of the contract) it follows, that appellee has a right of action thereon for its breach; and



that the court erred in entering a judgment barring such action. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and Remanded.



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General No. 7367

Agenda No. 2

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October Term A. D. 1921

Lorena Reid, by Izora Reid, her Guardian; Defendant in Error

James O. Davis, Director General of Railroads, as Agent etc., successor to and substituted for Walker D. Hines, formerly Director General of Railroads and John Barton Payne, formerly Director General of Railroads, as Agent, etc.

Effor to Menard County 27 1 A. 619

HEARD J.

This case is before this court upon a writ of error to review a judgment of the circuit court of Menard county in favor of defendant in error, hereinafter called the plaintiff, against plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the defendant, for \$2,000 damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff in a collision between a freight train of defendant and a trackman's gasoline motor driven speeder upon which she was riding on the tracks of the C. & A. R. R. within the limits of Tallula, a village of about 700, inhabitants.

The C. & A. R. R. runs from the depot in Tallula in a southwesterly direction and in the southwesterly portion of the town there are three tracks on the right of way, the main track, a passing track and running off from the passing track an elevator side track.

To go in upon the passing track a train must run southwesterly from the depot to the switch points, which are about 1600 feet from the depot. The place where the switch points are located is in the sparsely built up part of the village. For a long time before the accident, a freight train had been arriving at Tallula from the north and "tying up" for the night on the passing and elevator tracks.

In order to run in on these tracks it was necessary to run down past the switch points and then run back northeasterly on the passing track.

At about 9:55 P. M., Aug. 20, 1919, this freight train arrived at Tallula from the north, did some business at the station, and a little before 10 o'clock started southwest down the track to go in on the side track to



"tie up" for the night.

The engine was headed southwest, but there was a box car being pushed in front of it, and there is a conflict of testimony as to whether the headlight was burning. The survivors of the accident, who were with the plaintiff on the speeder, all testify that it was not, while all the other witnesses testify that it was.

The train crew testify that on leaving the station the whistle was blown and the automatic bell was set in motion and continued to ring up to and after the time of the accident. The train proceeded southwesterly and as the engine passed over the switch points the steam was shut off and the train was "drifting" to get the rear car just far enough down to back in over the switch points, there being no occasion to go any farther than that, and when the rear end of the freight train was a short distance north of the switch points the front of the train collided with the speeder on which plaintiff was riding, and as a result of the accident she was severely injured.

The speeder was an old hand car propelled by a gasoline engine with which it had been equipped and was for the use of the section men during working hours, but had been used on several occasions by the section foreman and other section men on their personal business in going to Ashland which is about five miles distant from Tallula at the intersection of the C. & A. and B. & O. lines. This use, however, was against defendants rules and had been strictly forbidden and there is no evidence that the crew of the freight train had any knowledge of such use.


On the evening of August 20, 1919, with the acquiescence of the forman, John W. Reid took the motor car and inviting his daughters Anna and Lorena the girl for whose injuries the suit was brought to go with him left Tallula at about \$30 o'clock P. M., to go to Ashland to meet Wiley Potter, a section man, Mrs. Potter and Mrs. Austin, who were due in Ashland on the B. & O. passenger train from Springfield between nine and ten o'clock P. M., in order to bring them to Tallula that night. They left Ashland shortly before ten o'clock P. M., and on their return trip collided with the freight train not becoming aware of its presence until the instant of the collision. The freight crew was not aware of the presence of the speeder until after the collision.



the track with the speeder contrary to defendant's orders and the only questions involved in this case are the duty of defendant toward plaintiff at the time and place of the accident and whether or not defendant failed in the performance of such duty.

It was sought to bring the case within the line of cases holding a railroaid liable to trespassers for wilfulness for the reason that there had been such a notorious use of its right of way as a foot path as to impose some duty of anticipating the presence of persons on the track who might be injured, and some use of the track between Tallula and the water tank about 450 feet beyond the place of the accident, by foot passengers who were members of the Tallula Fishing Club, going to and from a pond which lies about 450 feet north of the northwesterly right of way line on the land of an adjoining owne: was shown. Much evidence was heard upon the subject and much space is devoted in the briefs and arguments of the parties as to the duty of defendants towards such members of the fishing club. A determination of whether they had any rights in the premises and, if so, what the rights of such foot passengers who if upon or near the track would be walking slowly and could readily step to one side upon the approach of the freight train would throw out little light upon the question of defendant's duty towards the occupants of the speeder whose prodress was confinded by the rails and whose approach was not only not to be reasonably expected, but whose presence there under the circumstances was unauthorized.

In Neice vs. C. & A. R. R. Co. 254 Ill. 595, it was said: "Upon the right of way of the railroad where the public are not invited or authorized to go for the transaction of business with the railroad company, those in charge of the train must have knowledge both of the presence of the trespasser and of his dangerous situation, but depot grounds and platforms provided for the use of the public in the transaction of its business, where persons have a right to be for legitimate purposes and where they may reasonably be expected are quite different. If they are there for a legitimate purpose in connection with the business of the company they have a right to demand the exercise of reasonable care for their safety. If they are simply idlers, loiterers or trespassers the duty of the company is only to abstain from wilfully or wantonly injuring them."



In G. & C. U. R. R. Co. vs. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, it was said: "The plaintiff can derive no support or advantage from the fact that the employees of the railroad, with their families and children residing within the enclosure were permitted by the company free ingress, egress and regress in and upon their track and land. This was a permission to special persons, for the benefit and necessities of the road, and cannot be extended to those not in this relation to the company."

Under the circumstances of the present case the only duty defendant owed plaintiff was the duty to abstain from wilfully or wantonly injuring her. It is contended by plaintiff that Berier vs. I. C. R. R. Co. 296 Ill. 464, is authority for finding defendant in this case guilty of wilful or wanton conduct. The facts in the Berier case vary greatly from the facts in this case. In that case it was stated "Here the engineer admits that when he was less than a block from these women he saw them walking directly in front of a heavy and fast moving train. He gave them no warning and made no effort to stop his train. When they were on the east rail of his track scarcely more than 100 feet from him, he failed to give them warning, but raising his eyes from them, allowed his engine to move on towards them, not knowing whether they realized their danger and not taking into account that they might become panic stricken when they found themselves between two passing trains." In that same case the court also said: "To constitute a wanton act the party doing the act, or failing to act, must be conscious of his conduct and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally or probably result in injury.'

In Covert vs. R. I. Ry. Co. 299 Ill. 288, it was said: "Wlful negligence implies an act intentionally done in disregard of another's rights, or an omission to do something to protect the rights of another after having had such notice of those rights as would put a prudent man upon his guard to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding injury to such other person."

There is no evidence in the record to show that defendant's servants had any notice whatever that plaintiff was in a place of danger and no evidence that tney were conscious from their knowledge of surrounding circumstances an existing conditions that their conduct



would naturally or probably result in injury.

We are of the opinion that the evidence fails to show that

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defendant failed to perform the duty it owed plaintiff of refraining from wilfully or wantonly injuring her and that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed.

FINDING OF FACTS.

We find that at the time of the accident in question defendant was not guilty of wilful or wanton negligence and that at the time of the accident plaintiff was not upon the right of way of defendant at defendant's invitation either express or implied.



Jun fred July 10-1932

General No. 7392

Agenda N. 64

October Term A. D. 1921

Lewis K. Pearl, as Administrator of the Estate of Hazel Bernice Pearl, Deceased, Defendant in Error,

vs.

William J. Jackson, as Receiver of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, Plaintiff in Error.

Error to Vermilion.

HEARD, J.

227 I.A. 11

Lewis K. Pearl as Administrator of the estate of Hazel Bernice Pearl, deceased, brought suit in the circuit court of Vermilion County against plantiff in error to recovery pecuniary damages alleged to have been sustained by the next of kin of the deceased by reason of her death which was the result of a collision between a passenger engine of Plaintiff in Error and an automobile, driven by Lewis K. Pearl, father of deceased, in which deceased was riding, at a place where Plaintiff in Error's railroad tracks cross one of the public streets of the Village of Alvin.

One of the material questions in the case was whether or not a bell was rung or whistle sounded in compliance with the statute prior to the accident. Harold Klauson, fifteen years of age, testified in behalf of defendant in error that he saw the train coming around the bend north of the place of the accident and that he heard it whistle for the first crossing and then heard it whistle the danger whistle.

Nora Klauson, mother of Harold, testified that she was present at a conversation, which she said occurred the afternoon of the day before the trial, between Harold Klauson and Mr. Wicks one of the attorneys who was engaged in trying the case for defendant in error, and that Mr. Wicks told the boy that if he testified that the train whistled he would be put in jail.

Mr. Wicks was not called as a witness to deny this statement, but in his opening argument to the jury sald "when Mrs. Klauson told my conversation with the boy she committed perjury," thus getting before the jury as evidence, under the guise of argument, his unsworn denial of Mrs. Klauson's testimony in language more emphatic than he would have been allowed to use upon the witness stand. Upon objection to the statement being made to the

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court by counsel for plainiff in error, the court did not rebuke Mr. Wicks but only said "counsel will have to confine himself to the evidence.

The conduct of the attorney in making this statement was highly improper and could not be otherwise than prejudicial to plaintiff in error as the effect of Mr. Wick's denial of Mrs. Klauson's testimony could not be eradicated from the minds of the jury by the Court's mild admonition to confine himself to the evidence.

Every litigant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. Where misconduct of an attorney is prejudicial to the appellant, courts of review will reverse the judgment and remand the case. Wright vs. Upson, 303 Ill. 118.

Other questions are raised upon the record, but as they are not likely to arise upon a retrial of the case we refrain from discussing them.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7394 October Term A. D. 1921

Alexander Brown, Appellee

Fernandes Grain Co., a Corporation, Appellant

Appeal from Sangamon. 2 7 1.A. 6143

Agenda No. 40

HEARD, J.

In this case the Appellee, A. C. Brown, hereinarter called the plaintiff, brought an action of assumpsit against the appellant, Fernandes Grain Company, hereinafter called defendant, for the balance claimed to be due unon nineteen car loads of wheat theretofore shipped by the said plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant pleaded the general issue and certain special pleas in the nature of a set-off. The pleas of set-off alleged that during the summer of 1920, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into seven separate and distinct contracts, whereby the plaintiffs had contracted to sell and did sell to the defendnt in all, some 33,500 bushels of wheat at certain designated prices; that the first six of said contracts had been completely filled by the plaintiff and a portion of the seventh, but that by reason of the refusal of the plaintiff to complete the seventh contract, the defendant had sustained loss equal to or greater than the amount claimed by the plaintiff. For replication the plaintiff denied the making of said seventh contract and further alleged that, if the same had been made, it not being in writing, and being for an amount in excess of the value of \$500.00, and there being no part performances thereunder, the same was void under the Statute of Frauds. To that replication the defendant rejoined, alleging part performance, in that the plaintiff had in fact delivered some 150 bushels of wheat on said seventh contract, but that he refused to complete the same.

Upon these respective allegations the parties came to issue, by the filing of the last pleading on April 15, 1921. The cause was called for trial and trial was begun on April 20, 1921, After the jury had been duly selected and the cause heard in part, the plaintiff asked and obtained leave to withdraw his replication and all subsequent pleadings and to demur to the defendant's plea of set-off. Over the objection of the defendant this application was allowed. Thereupon the Court sustained plaintiff's demurrer's to all Pleas of set-off, and the cause



thereafter proceeded upon the declaration general issue and the replication thereto. At the conclusion Page 1

of all the evidence the court upon motion of the plaintiff instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff for \$2388.24, the amount claimed by him and this was accordingly done. A motion for a new trial on the part of the defendant was subsequently overruled and judgment entered on the verdict. From that judgment the defendant brings this appeal.

It is claimed by defendant that the court erred in allowing plantiff to withdraw his replication and demur to the pleas of set-off. In a civil suit changes in the pleadings may be allowed, by the court, to be made upon such terms as are just and reasonable at anytime before final judgment and there was no error in allowing the changes in the pleadings to be made.

It is contended by the defendant that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to defendant's pleas of set-off. The seven contracts alleged by defendant to have been made are alleged in the pleas to have been seven distinct and seperate contracts and it attempted by the pleas to set-off unliquidated damages alleged to have been sustained by defendant by reason of a breach of the seventh of such contracts against claims of plaintiff arising out of six other disstinct and seperate contracts. It is the settled law of this state that unliquidated damages growing out of a breach of a contract other than that sued upon cannot be set-off in a civil action. Ewen vs. Wilbur 208 Ill. 507; Higbee vs. Rust, 211 Ill. 333. The court therefore, properly sustained the demurrer to the pleas of set-off.

It is contended by defendant that the court erred in instructing the jury to assess the plaintiff's damages at \$2,388.24, the full amount of plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff resides at Carlinville, in this state and is in the elevator business, and the defendant is a corporation engaged in the business of buying and selling grain, with its principal place of business located at springfield. During the summer of the year 1920, it is agreed that the parties entered into a number of contracts whereby the plaintiff sold and contracted to sell various quantities of wheat to the defendant. The plaintiff says, that there were six of such contracts and that the total amount of wheat which he so contracted to sell to the defendant was 28,500 bushels. Each of said con-



tracts or agreements specified the amount of wheat contracted for, the price per bushel, which in each case depended upon and varied somewhat according to the time when shipment

Page 2

should be made, and the freight rate

basis.

The making of said six contracts was not in dispute. The first known as Contract No. 5257 was made on June 29th; the second, Contract No. 5391, was made on July 13th; the third, Contract No. 5433, on July 16th; the fourth, Contract 5520, on July 21st; the fifth, Contract 5553, was made on July 28th, and the sixth, or Contract No. 5560, was made on July 29th.

The existence of a seventh contract is one of the disputed issues in this case. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that such contract was in fact made, the same being known as Contract No. 5585; that the same was made by telephone on July 31st, 1920, and was for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of 5,000 bushels of number one wheat at the price of \$2.17 per bushel, if delivered at any time between the first and fifteenth of August then next; or the price of \$2.14 per bushel if delivered bewteen the sixteenth to the thirtyfirst, inclusive, of said month of August; or the price of \$2.08 per bushel if delivered at any time bewteen the first and fifteenth of September, then next, free on board, Carlinville, and upon the basis of a freight rate of twenty-six and one-half cents per hundred weight to New Orleans, La.; that this freight rate basis means that the bids at the time of the making of each of these contracts were made to guard against change in freight rates; that the buyer would pay the freight, but if at the time of the shipment the charge therefor should exceed the rate selected as the basis, the seller should pay the difference; if on the other hand the rate at the time of the shipment should be less than the assumed rate the difference would be credited to the seller and that the buyer had a right to send the grain to any other port on that basis.

It is contended by plaintiff that even if the 7th contract were made, it being a contract to sell goods of the value of over \$500 it is not enforceable by reason of the provisions of Sec. 4 of Chap. Rev. Stats. Ill., anown as the uniform sales act which provides that:: " Λ contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be

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enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted

Page 3

to be sold or

sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment,, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf."

Sim Fernandes, president of defendant, testified that there is a well recognized and established custom with respect to the application of cars among outstanding contracts. The custom is to fill up all contracts. If the shipper gives directions as to how they are to be filled, these directions are compulsory; that in the absence of any directions on the part of the shipper, the buyers, say as to how the application should be made.

Contracts made in the ordinary course of business are presumed to have been made with reference to any existing usage or custom relating to such trade. El Reno Grocery Co. vs. Stocking, 293 Ill. 494.

The six contracts concerning which there is no dispute were for the shipment of 28,500 bushels of wheat and the evidence shows that 28,654 bushels and 33 pounds of wheat were shipped by plaintiff and Fernandes testifies that defendant, by right of the custom above mentioned, applied this 154 bushels and 33 pounds upon the 7th contract as part performance of the same. Plaintiff denied the making of the 7th contract and refused to fill the same.

The evidence shows that wheat increased in price and that if the alleged 7th contract was made the delendant was damaged to ac onsiderable amount by its breach.

A portion of plaintiff's claim in this case was for the purchase price of the 154 bushels and 33 pounds of wheat. If the 7th contract was made 154 bushels and 33 pounds of wheat were delivered by plaintiff to defendant on such contract and the same was received by the defendant as part performance of such contract, then under the plea of the general issue defendant had a right, as against the purchase price of said 154 bushels and 33 pounds of wheat but not as against plaintiff's claim growing out of the other six contracts, to recoup any damages he may have sustained by reason of a breach by plaintiff of the said 7th contract to the ex-

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tent of plaintiffs claim for the price of said 154 bushels and 33 pounds.

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Upon a motion to direct a verdict the court cannot weigh the evidence, but the evidence with all the reasonable intendents and inferences arising therefrom are to be considered in its aspect most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed.

We are of the opinion that the court erred in directing the jury to assess plaintiff's damages at the full amount of his claim.

The judgment of the circuitc ourt is reversed and the cause remanded.

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> General No. 7397 October Term A. D. 1921

> > H. O. Ware, Appellee,

John Lawrence, Appellant.


Appeal from McLean 227 I.A. 6194

Agenda No. 38

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$2500.00 in favor of appellee against appellant in a suit brought for personal injuries received by him by being struck by appellant's automobile on one of thei streets of the city of Bloomington.

Appellee testified among other things that about 9:10 or 9:15 P. M., daylight saving time on June 10, 1919, he was going from Normal to Bloomington on Main street; that it was just dusk between daylight and darkness; that he had no tail light or other signal light on his bicycle; that he had a flash light in his pocket, but did not use it; that he knew there was a car behind him; that he heard the car coming and got as close to the curb as he could; that he was running about six or seven mites an hour; that the first indication he had that anything was going to happen was when he felt the contact between the car and the rear part of his bicycle; that he then made an effort to throw himself toward the curb and get off on the right side of the bicycle; that his right foot stayed with the bicycle and his left caught on some part of the car and he was dragged a short ditsance when the wheel of the car passed over his right leg below the knee, tearing his right leg badly; that he "hollered" just as soon as he felt the contact; that he kne x at least half or three quarters of the block that the car was behind him; that he heard the car coming; that he heard the noise of the car and the occupants talking when they were a couple of rods away; that he was driving along thinking of other things; that there were some large trees in the south end of the block which extended over the street, but he was south of the trees when the accident happened; that the automobile was not going fast, but it was going faster than he was: that the bicycle was rubber tired and made practically no noise; that he did not know the automobile was directly in back of him; that after hearing the automobile coming he did not look around until the




Appellant contends that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence prior to the collision and in quoting these excerts from appellee's testimony we do not wish to be understood as intimating any opinion on that question, but we have selected portions of his testimony unfavorable to himself to show that this was a case which required accuracy of instructions.

At the request of appellee, the court gave the jury the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was injured by or in consequence of the negligence of the defendant as charged in the declaration; and that plaintiff at the time in question was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, then you should find the defendant guilty and assess his damages at the amount you may determine from the evidence.' Appellee in his argument contends that no care was required except at the instant of collision and that any prior point of time is immaterial. By this instruction the duty of appellee to exercise ordinary care for his own safety being limited to "the time in question" the jury might easily be misled into a belief in appellee's contention, whereas, appellee, knowing that an automobile, a dangerous instrumentality was approaching him from the rear faster than he was going, was in duty bound, from the time of acquiring such knowledge to exercise an amount of reasonable care for his own safety commensurate with the known danger.

We are of the opinion that in this case the giving of this instruction was reversible error. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of \$1,071.05 in favor of appellee against appellant in a suit brought to recover for consignments of beer alleged to have been purchased by appellant from appellee at East St. Louis in wet territory for shipment to Auburn in dry territory.

Beer was so shipped on seven occasions during the months of May, June, July, August and September, 1918 on written orders purporting to be signed by appellant.

The evidence shows that appellant cannot write and that the signatures to the orders in question was not his signatures and there was no direct evidence in the case that appellant authorized any person to sign his name to the orders or to act for him in the premises.

It is contended by appellant that the court erred in admitting in evidence over appellant's objection Plaintiff's exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which were the seven orders for the shipment of beer purporting to be signed by appellant. While it is true that the signatures were not signed by appellant, personally and he testified that he did not authorize any person to act as his agent in the matter, agency can be proved by other evidence. In Faber-Musser Co. vs. Dee Clay Co. 291 Ill. 240, it is said: "Circumstantial evidence is ordinarily competent to establish the fact or extent of agency. In case of doubt as to the extent of the agency and the authority to bind the principal reference may be had to the situation of the parties and property, usages of the country on such subjects, the acts of the parties themselves and any other circumstances having a legal bearing and throwing light upon the question."

As to the first five of these exhibits the evidence shows that appellant ratified his signatures to the orders, receiving and paying for the beer. Orders six and seven are in the same handwriting as the



for which payment was made. The orders are all in the same form and character and the directions for shipping were the same in the two latter orders as in the five lormer ones. The station agent of the railroad over which the beer was shipped testified that appellant received all the consignments, took the beer from the cars and paid the freight upon the same. In addition to these tacts three representatives of appellee testified that they presented bills for the two shipments to appellant and that he admitted the correctness of the accounts and promised to pay the same when he was able. In view of this evidence and other facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the fact of the agency of thew rited of the orders and his authority to bind appellant were fully established by the evidence in the case and that the written orders in question were competent evidence.

It is contended by appellant that the judgment is not supported by any competent evidence. The evidence that appellant took the beer from the cars and when presented with a bill therefor admitted its correctness and promised payment if believed by the jury was sufficient to warrant a larger judgment than the one rendered.

Complaint is made of the giving and refusal of instructions by the Court. Some of appellant's refused instructions did not state the law correctly, some were inaccurate, while others assumed controverted questions of fact. The court did not err in this respect.

The judgment is affirmed. Graves, J. took no part.

Page 2

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General No. 7416

Agenda No. 55

October Term A. D. 1921

Nina Dulin Russel, Appellee,

Frank L. Russell, Appellant.

Appeal from Macon County 7 I.A. 0202

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Macon County for seperate maintenance. The bill filed by Appellee alleged in substance that appellee and appellant were married October 3, 1918, and lived together until the 6th day of September, 1920; that complainant was compelled to abandon defendant because of a course of unkind, cruel and inhuman conduct toward her, specifically setting forth the cruel and inhuman conduct of which complaint was made.

Appellee also set forth in her bill that she was the sole owner of the homestead property occupied by the appellant at the time said bill was filed, and she prayed for a decree of seperate maintenance for her support and that of her child, and that the homestead property be decreed to be hers.

Appellant answered the said bill denying all the allegations of cruelty, therein specificially and alleged that the cause of abandonment arose wholly, not because of any faut of appellant, but through the parents of appeilee, who desired their daughter to live with them. The answer also denied that she was the owner of the homestead property and denied that she is entitled to any relief in this suit.

Appellant also filed a cross bill setting forth that he purchased the homestead property on June 17, 1919; and that he at the suggestion of the appellee's father, permit. ted the title to said premises to be taken in the name of the appellee, as grantee; that the said grantee did advance to him a large portion of the purchase price but that it never was the intention of either the appellee or appellant that she, was the owner of said premises, but that she, was to hold said title as trustee for the appellant and he prayed that the court should find that he was the true and lawful owner of

Page 1

said premises and that

she be required by decree to convey said premises to him



upon his paying back to her the amount of money advanced by her to him, plus interest on same, from date of said advancement.

The cause was heard by the court and a decree was entered finding the wife was entitled to seperate maintenance; that she was a tenant in common of the home, she having contributed part of the purchase price thereof, also a common owner with the appellant of this home. The court found that she had contributed 26-33 of the purchase price and that appellant had contributed 7-33 of the same. Appellee and appellant could not agree upon the present vaue of the home and thereupon, with their consent, the court appointed appraisers to appraise the present value of the home, which appraiser reported that its present value was \$7,000.00 The decree of the court was that the appellee was entitled to seperate maintenance, that the value of the property was \$7,000.00, that the appellee contributed 26-33 and the appellant contributed 7-33 of the purchase price and that they were tenants in common as owners of said premises and that there was a mortgage indebtedness on same of \$1900.00; that appellant should have the right by tendering to appellee 26-33 of the present value of said property; less the mortgage indebtedness, to have a deed executed by said complainant on or before July 1st, 1921, that if he did not exert this right, appellee then could, by offering to appellant 7-33 of the present value of said property less the said mortgage, demand a deed from him and in the event that neither the appellee or appellant exerted their right, the master in Chancery of the court was directed to sell same for cash, subject to said mortgage and divide the proceeds between appellee and appellant, according to said proportions. The decree allowed appellee \$5J.00 per month for seperate maintenance of herself and child.

An appeal was prayed and allowed on June 25th, 1921, upon the defendant's filing bond in the sum of \$1,000.00 with surety to be approved by the clerk within thirty days from that date. The bond was filed and approved on July 20th, 1921, and there

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after on the 25th day of July 1921, appellee applied to the court for writ of attachment against appellant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, in failing to execute the deed set forth in the decree upon the tender theretofore made by her of 7.33 of the present value of the home, less the mort-



gage. The writ was issued and thereupon the defendant appeared in court without process and complied with the order of the court under protest and executed the decd required by the decree.

It is contended by appellant that the evidence does not show that he was guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty and that therefore the decree is not supported by the evidence.

In order to sustain a decree for seperate maintenance, it is not necessary that the evidence should snow the existence of a statutory ground for divorce, but a wife who is not herself in fault is not bound to live and cohabit with her husband if his conduct is such as to directly endanger her life, person or health, nor where the husband pursues a persistent, unjustifiable and wrongful course of conduct toward her, which will necessarily and inevitably render her life miserable and living as his wife unendurabe, and where these facts exist the wife has good cause for living seperate and apart from her husband and is not at fault, if she leaves her husband and refuses to live and cohabit with him. Johnson v. Johnson 125 Ill. 510; Brown vs. Brown 265 Ill. 546,

No good purpose would be served by discussing the evidence in detail. Appellee and her witnesses testified to a state of facts, which if true entitled her to seperate maintenance. While their testimony is contradicated by appellant, the chancellor saw and heard the witnesses and his finding having the same weight when appeal as the finding of a jury, we would not be justified, under the evidence in this case, in setting aside the finding.

It is contended by appellant that the decree was erroneous in allowing 26-33 of the net value of the real estate to appellee without first allowing to appellant a homestead exemption. It is doubtful under the evidence whether a resulting trust existed

Page 3

and appellant had a homestead in the premises, but in any event appellant cannot complain of that portion of the decree fixing the property rights of the parties, as this portion of the decree was entered by consent and therefore not subject to review on appeal.

It is assigned as error that the court erred in ordering appellant to execute a deed of conveyance of the real estate in controversy in this case after an appeal had been perfected by him. The record does not show that he



was so ordered by the court after the filing of the appeal bond. Had such been the fact the action of the court in that regard could not be reviewed by us on this appeal as this is not an appeal from any order in that respect but is in an appeal from a decree which appeal was perfected before the issuance of writ of attachment.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

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filed July 10, 192 Agenda No. 61 General No. 7422 en an October Term A. D. 1921

Jeanette B. Liska, Administratrix of the Estate of Harvey Liska, Deceased, Defendant in Error.

The Director General of Railroads Operating the Chicago & Alten Railroad as Agent for the President of the United States Under the Transportation Act of 1920, And the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company (A Corporation)

Plaintiffs in Error 227 J.A. 6203 Error to McLean.

HEARD J.

This cause is founded upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The original declaration consists of four counts in case.

The first count charges that on August 1, 1919, the defendant was operating a certain railroad through the county of Logan, State of Illinois, and that plaintiff's intestate, Harvey Liska, was on said day in the service of the defendant as a brakeman upon one of its freight trains then engaged in Inter State commerce; that it was defendant's duty to provide and maintain for the use of plaintiff's intestate a reasonably safe place in which to perform his duties as brakeman, but the defendant made default in that regard in that it suffered to be and remain near the station of Griggs in said county and upon its premiscs a certain wire or wires then and there charged with strong and dangerous currents of electricity and running through a certain tile or culvert upon defendant's right of way, through which said culvert there flowed large quantities of water, and which said wires were so carelessly constructed, placed and maintained that the current therefrom passed into the water flowing through said culvert or tile, thereby so charging the water with electricity as to render same dangerous to the life of any person coming in contact therewith, which water then was and for a long time prior to that time had been used by the servants of the defendants to

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supply

water to the cabooses of its trains and to procure water for the cooling of hot boxes upon the wheels thereof; 15 a a a

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which said use of said water was well known to the defendant; and that the defendant also knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have known, that said water was charged with electricity and that said wires were so carelessly constructed, placed and maintained, as aforesaid; that plaintiff's intestate while engaged in the scope of his employment as brakeman upon said train, in attempting to procure water from said brook or drain for use in the caboose of said train, and while in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety became and was electrocuted. The other counts set up substantially the same cause of action.

Three additional counts were filed, the first which was substantially the same in all respects as the first original count, except that it charges that the defendant suffered to be and remain upon its said premises at the place in question certain wire or wires charged with strong and dangerous currents of electricity and running through a certain concrete culvert across defendant's right of way, which wires were so carelessly constructed, placed and maintained that the current escaped therefrom, thereby rendering the said wires and objects adjacent thereto, dangerous to the life of any person coming in contact therewith. The other additional counts were substantially the same. To the declaration and additional counts Plaintiff in error who is hereinafter designated as defendant plead the general issue.

A jury trial was had and at the close of the evidence introduced by defendant in error, who is hereinafter called the plaintiff, and again at the close of all the evidence, motions were made to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty, which motions were overruled by the court. The jury returned a verdict for \$10,000.00 in favor of plaintiff, upon which, after motion for new trial had been overruled, judgment was rendered, from which judgment this appeal has been taken.

The principal grounds of error relied upon by defendant are that

Page 2

the court erred in not instructing the jury to find the defendant not guilty and that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence in the case.

While liability cannot rest upon imagination, speculation or conjecture,—upon a choice between two views equally compatable with the evidence,—but must be



based upon facts established by the evidence fairly tending to prove them. (Wasson Coal Co. vs. Industrial Comm 296 Ill. 217) and before a recovery can be had a plaintiff must prove every element necessary to constitute the defendant's liability, such liability may be shown by the evidence of facts and circumstances together with the inferences and presumptions naturally arising therefrom.

Griggs station consists of a water tank, only, located upon the Chicago and Alton right-of-way, at a point about two and one half miles southwest of the city of Lincoln, Illinois. The Alton Company's right of way at that place is 100 feet in width. Its two main tracks, the westerly one being the south-bound and the other the north-bound, are laid upon a fill which, at the point of location of the concrete culvert mentioned in the declaration, about 300 feet south of the water tank, is about eight feet in height. The culvert is about three feet high by three feet in width and 35 or 40 feet in length. Through this culvert water flows in a westerly direction.

In 1910, or 1911, Jones, a farmer west of the right of way, employed electricians of Lincoln to construct for his exclusive use, an electrical transmission line which connected with the feeder wire of the Illinois Traction System whose tracks parallel the Chicago & Alton right-of-way on the east thereof. The Jones wire was connected with the traction system wire at a point about due east of the east end of the culvert in question. Commencing at its east end, the Jones line extended from a pole located at or near the westerly line of the Traction Sysem right-of-way through the culvert in question and

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from there to the improvements upon the Jones premises, the entire length of the line being one-eigth of a mile. Mr. Jones obtained current from the Traction System to operate a 5 horse-power motor to grind feed and to pump water, and also for a one-half horse power motor used to run a washing machine. After this first line had been in for about three years, Jones, who was working near the west end of the culvert, received a shock while handling one of the wires of the right-of-way fence. He thereupon caused all of the wiring from the west side of the Traction System right-of-way and across and to the west side of the Alton company right-of-way to be removed, and employed an

electrician to procure new material for, and to construct, a new line. In constructing the renewed portion of the line a continuous piece of lead-covered insulated wire of cable was used. At its east end this lead-covered cable was fastened at or near the tip of a stub pole set about 20 feet to the west of the aforesaid pole located at the westerly line of the Tracion System right-of-way. An insulated wire, spliced to the end of the new cable, was strung between the two poles and proper connection made with the Traction System line.

Upon the aforesaid pole at the west side of the Interurban or Traction System right-of-way, were located a lightning arrester, a fuse plug and a meter, all constituting parts of the Jones power line. The fuse plug was located on the south side of said pole, at a point a short ditsance above the meter box, which was at the south side of the pole, while the lightning arrester and the box in which it was enclosed was located toward the top and at the north side of the pole. The course of the wiring of the Jones line, starting with the tap-feeder wire, was from that wire down the side of the pole and through the fuse plug, thence through the meter, thence up the opposite side of the pole, where it led off across the Chicago & Alton right-of-way. There was another short wire which connected the lightning arrester witin the Jones load wire.

The function of the lightning arrester is to shut off or "take" charges of electricity, commonly called lightning, and to conduct same to the ground and thereby protect the main wire, apparatus

Page 4

and equipment in connection therewith, from damage or destruction. In many instances, however, the lightning arrester is unable to carry the load and is itself destroyed and partly, or entirely, burned up. In such instances the fuse-plug is "blown" and not infrequently the meter is also damaged or destroyed and the wires leading thereto burned off, and occasionally the tap-feeder wire is also burned or fused in two. All of these conditions frequently result from lightning stroke, or strokes of high voltage.

At about midnight of July 31, 1919, an unusually severe electrical sorrm raged for an hour or more at and in the vicinity of Griggs station. There was much tnunder and lightning, with considerable rain and some wind, the lightning having been especially severe and contin-

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uous. There is evidence tending to show that on the following morning, August 1, at about 4 o'clock, Jones tried to start his motor in the usual way for the purpose of pumping water, but it wouldn't go; that up to the evening before the motor had been operating all right and all of the electrical equipment was in proper working order. There is evidence tending to show that a repair man arrived at Griggs between 9 and 9:30 o'clock in the forenoon,-which was from one hour and a balf to two hours before the train upon which Harvey Liska was riding, as brakeman, arrived there; that he at once made an inspection and found the fuse-plug of the Jones line blown out and lying on the ground at the foot of the pole to which it had been attached; that he also found that the fuse wire had been fused or burned out for the space of about one inch, and that a small piece of the porcelian portion had been knocked off at the top end; that he did not replace the plug in its socket, or case, but left it there lying on the ground; that he also exan. ined the meter and the meter-box located on the same pole, and found that both of the wires to the meter, one on either side, had been burned off in the neighborhood of three inches away from the meter itself; that both had the appearance of being melted; that he also then discovered that the meter was practically destroyed, in so far as operating or functioning was concerned; that there was also a good sized hole burned in one side of it and that it was smoked up by the burning; that he also observed that some of the lightning arrester had been

Page 5

burned out and destroyed and that part of it was hanging down from the pole to which it was attached.

There was testimony from electrical experts that the blown-out fuse alone, or the burnt off wires leading to the meter alone, or the destruction of the lightning arrester alone, or the "putting out of commission" of the meter alone, would have made impossible the carrying of any current or voltage in any amount or degree to, by, or upon, the Jone line; that the instant any one of those things happened, the Jones line became absolutely "dead," and that an electrical "shock" from the Jones line, or any part of it, to any one who might come in contact therewith, was impossible.

The freight upon which Harvey Liska was riding, as rear brakeman, arrived at Griggs station about 11 o'clock A. M., on August 1st. When Liska's train arriv-



ed at Griggs, it stopped and he got out of the caboose. When last seen alive Liska was walking along the east side of the train, three or four car lengths ahead of the caboose. The train remained at Griggs, for fifteen or The crew were having trouble with some hot boxes, and at Ridgely Liska hung his galvanized iron bucket upon the east side of the train, eight or ten cars from the caboose. The train remained at Griggs for fiftten or twenty minutes. It then proceeded upon its trip to Bloomington, which was the end of the run for Liska's crew. After passing through Lincoln, the conductor discovered that Liska was missing, and searched the train for him.

The search disclosed that Liska was not on the train which fact was reported by the conductor upon the train's arrival at Bloomington at 2:15 o'clock in the afternoon. Thereupon a wire was sent to the crew of a south bound train, then at Lincoln, ordering them to look for a missing brakeman at and in the vicinity of Griggs. The members of this crew upon arrival at Griggs engaged in a search which lasted about 40 minutes, when Liska's dead body was found lying in a pool of water at the west end of the culvert in question, with his head "right in the mouth of the culvert." Liska's right leg and arm were flexed somewhat and his face and body were under the water, part of the right arm extending above its surface. Liska's empty bucket, at the time his body was found, was standing upright on the

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south side of the stream, about a foot and a half from the edge of the pool, and several feet west of the end of the wings which extended westwardly from the culvert proper. His body was placed upon the train, where a postmorten examination of his body was made and his vital organs examined which examination developed that death was not caused by drowning. The medical experts testifying for plaintiff gave it as their opinion that the conditions found were such as would indicate death of electrical shock. Medical experts called by defendant gave it as their opinion that the conditious found in Liska's heart and coronary artery were sufficient to cause instantaneous death, while plaintiff's experts testified that the condition of the heart and artery were not sufficient to cause sudden death.

When found Liska was lying upon his left side and

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his right arm. His right knee and elbow were out of the water and flexed. The right side of the heart was dilated and filled with blood, while the left side was nearly empty and the evidence tends to show that these conditions indicate death as the result of an electric shock.

The evidence tends to show that a person going to the place where Liska's body was found, for water would necessarily have to step over the wire, carrying normally 650 volts of electricty and the pipe in which it was. There is evidence tending to show that on August 1 the water had been up as high as the pipe; there is likewise evidence tending to show that any leakage on the line would be increased by having the apparatus wet or damp and that if there was sufficient water about it the line would be so robbed of its power that the machinery could not be operated; that if the wire came in contact with the water it would not blow out the fuse, but that if a man reached into the pool with a galvanized iron bucket and got a shock sufficient to knock him over and in so doing he came in contact with the iron pipe it would blow out the fuse; that if there was an abrasion of the insulation of the wire going through the culvert and there was a leakage and he put his hand in the water he would receive a shock.

One of the witnesses for plaintiff who examined the place in question on the following day testified that he observed a wire which came

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out from underneath the culvert; it was fastened to the culvert by insulators and came into the pipe on the outside of the culvert some six or eight inches (other witnesses put this distance a little farther); the insulation was very bad on the wire, ragged and torn and part of it gone; that it looked ragged when it goes into the pipe right next to west end of culvert; that it goes under the culvert and comes out and is coiled around before it goes into an iron pipe. Witnesses called by defendant testified that the wiring and insulation was in good condition. There was a quantity of weeds and high grass about the pipe and the place where Liska's body was found.

While none of the men who assisted in taking Liska's body out of the water received a shock one of plaint.ffs witnesses testified that other brakemen were in the habit of getting water at the place in question and that



about two weeks prior to Liska's death he went down to get a bucket of water and there was a dog lying dead at the edge of the pool; that he reached over to put the bucket in the water and it was knocked out of his hand and he was knocked backwards; that when he put his hand on the bank as he was stepping down he felt something tingling in his hand; that he had just touched the bucket to the water when it was knocked out of his hand.

There is evidence tending to show that prior to his death Liska seemed to be healthy and never sick; that he was always a strong and steady worker and lost no time on account of illness. He had been working for the C. & A. R. R. Co., twelve years and had been married fourteen years and his wife testified that she did not remember of his having had a physician during that time.

The evidence in the record was very voluminous and we have not attempted to set out all the material points of the evidence in full, but only sufficient to show that there was some evidence fairly tending to prove all the material allegations of plaintiff's declaration and that the Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury the defendant not guilty.

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While the evidence in the case is conflicting and there is a sharp conflict between the direct testimony of some of the witnesses and some of the proven circumstances in evidence we cannot say that the verdict of the jury is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

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Page 2x

It is contended by appellant that the court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain testimony and in the denial of defendants offer to make certain proof. We find no reversible error in this respect.

The evidence does not show any lia bility on the part of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. It is apparant from the record that at the time the cause of action originated, the Chicago & Alton Railroad was exclusively operated and controlled by the other defendant in the suit, the Director General of Railroads. The judgment so far as it concerns the Chicago & Alton Railroad is therefore reversed. M. P. R. R. Co. vs. Ault. 256 U.S. 554. The judgment is affirmed as to the Director General of Railroads.



General No. 7426

genda No. 5

April Term, A. D. 1922

Charles Farris, Plaintiff in Erro VS.

Wabash Railway Company Defendant in Error. Error To Maens

HEARD, J.

This was an action brought by Charles Farris, plaintiff below and plaintiff in error here against the Wabash Railway Company for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as the result of an alleged accident while he was acting as brakeman on a Wabash freight train engaged in interstate commerce. The case was based upon the Federal Employer's Liability Act. A trial resulted in a judgment for defendant for costs and in bar of the action and the case is now before this court upon writ of error.

The claim of the plaintiff was that while acting as brakeman on interstate freight train of the defendant proceeding from Decatur, Illinois, to Peru, Indiana, on or about July 27, 1917, the plaintiff, while in the night time mounting and ascending one of the cars of said train, in the course of his duties, and exercising care for his own safety, was struck on the head by a standpipe, at or near Sidney, Illinois, which the defendant negligently suffered and permitted to be and remain in too close proximity to the tracks, and that as a result thereof he was injured and partcularly became afflicted and still is afflicted with epilepsy. The defenses raised by appropriate pleas were that the plaintiff never met with the alleged accident at ail; that defendant was not guilty of negligence, and the defenses of contributory negligence, and assumed risk.

The court gave to the jury a number of instructions on the subject of the doctrine of assumed risk, one of which is as follows:

"The Court instructs the jury that the occupation of railroad brakeman is necessarily fraught with some danger to the employe, and that a brakeman of mature years is taken to assume the risk of such dangers and accidents as are normally and necessarily incident to such occupation, whether he is actually aware of them or not, and that

Page 1

he cannot in law recover damages for injuries arising out of and because of such ordinary and normal dan-



gers and risks incident to such occupation. The jury are further instructed that while such employe does not ordinarily assume the risks of other accidents and dangers that are not incident to such occupation, yet if such risks and dangers are so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances would have observed and appreciated them, then as to such, the employe is held to have assumed the risks thereof, and cannot recover damaages for injuries resulting theremrom."

It is contended that the giving of this and other similar instructions was error.

In Gila Valley Railroad Company vs. Hall 232 U. S. #94, it was said:

"The employe has a right to assume that the employer has exercised proper care with respect to providing a safe place to work and suitable and safe applicances to do the work, and is not to be treated as assuming the risk arising from a defect that is attribuatable to the employer's negligence until the employe becomes aware of such defect, or unless it is so plainly observable that he may be presumed to have known of it. Moreover, in order to charge an employe with assumption of risk attributable to a defect due to the employer's negligence, it must appear, not only that he knew (or is presumed to have known) of the defect, but that he knew it endangered his safety or else such danger must have been so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances would have appreciated it."

In Chespeake Railway Company v. Proffit 241, U. S. 462, it was said: "The employe is not obliged to exercise care to discover dangers not ordinarily incident to the employment but which result from the employers negligence."

In Wilson v. B. & O. Railroad Company 194 Ill. App. 491, a case where a conductor was injured, the negligence alleged and proven consisted in the faulty construction of the main line and the siding with reference to the distance between them. A judgment for \$45,000, which at that time was the largest personal injury judgment ever

Page 2

rendered in this State, was affirmed and certiorari denied by both the Supreme Courts of the State of Illinios and of the United States.

In U. S. R. S. Company vs. Wilder, 116 Ill. 100, the rule is laid down that a servant in entering upon an employment assumes generally only such risks as he has no-



tice of either express or implied and that where there are special risks of which the servant is not, from the nature of the employment cognizant, or which are not patent, it is the duty of the employer to noify him of them and on failure so to do, if the servant is injured by exposure to such risk, he is entitled to recover.

In Devine vs. Delano, 272 Ill. 166, it was said:

This court has held that a railroad company is guilty of actionable negligence to its employes in operating a train, either upon its own track or upon a track belonging to another railway company, past an obstruction located dangerously near to the track, provided the operating company knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, of such dangerous obstruction."

To the same effect is Illinois Central Railroad Company vs. Welsh, 52 Ill. 183.

For the error in giving these instructions in this case the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7430

Agenda No. 8

April Term, A. D. 1922

Frank J. Liesman, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

J. Q. Primm, Justice of the Peace, and Less Williamson, Defendants in Error.


Error to Logan.

227 I.A. 0205

HEARD, J.

Plaintiff in error, hereinafter called petitioner, filed a petition for mandmus in the circuit court of Logan county alleging that on August 28, 1920, he recovered a judgment for \$92.50 damages and costs, against defendant in error, Williamson, hereinafter called defendant, in Justice court before defendant in error, Primm, hereinafter called justice of the peace; that on Sept. 16, 1920, defendant filed with said justice of the peace an appeal bond, in the usual form, which bond was endorsed by said justice of the peace as follows: "Taken and approved by me at my office, this 16th day of Sept. A. D. 1920;" that defendant did not pay to the justice of the peace nor to the clerk of the circuit court the appeal fee of five dollars, that the docket of the Justice of the Peace shows an entry "Oct. 9th, 1920. Transcript and all papers sent to circuit clerk this day;" that on March 31, 1921, and on June 13, 1921, he filed praecipes for an execution on said judgment with said Justice of the Peace and that said Justice of the Peace refused to issue execution on said judgment. The petitioner prayed for a writ of man. damus commanding the justice of the peace forthwith to issue an execution on said judgment.

The petition for mandamus in this case was filed upon the theory as stated in plaintiff's argument that the failure of the defnedant, within twenty days from the rendition of the judgment in said justice court, to pay to said Justice of the Peace the fee provided by law for the filinf of such appeal was and is a failure on his part to perfect his appeal and that in law and in fact the said Less Williamson has never taken any appeal from the judgment aforesaid rendered by said Justice of the Peace against the said Less Williamson and in favor of the petitioner, Frank Liesman for the sum of \$92.50 and costs of suit, and that because of such failure to perfect his appeal petitioner is entitled to have execution of his judgment and that it is the duty of the Justice of the Peace



under the law to issue an execution upon said judgment.

The circuit court sustained a general demurrer filed by the defendants in error to the petition for mandamus and dismissed the petition for mandamus and entered judgment against petitioner for costs.

Page 1

While by Sec. 116 Chap. 79 Smiths Stat. 1921, the payment of the fee for filing the appeal within twenty days from the rendition of the judgment is one of the requirements for perfecting an appeal, it may be waived by the appellee and he may, if the cause is docketed, and no motion entered in the circuit court to dismisss the appeal, enter his appearance in the circuit court and the case then tried upon its merits and for anything which appears int he petition for mandamus that may have been what happened in this case.

The petition shows that the bond and all papers were transmitted to the circuit clerk and as long as the appeal is not disposed of in some manner by the circuit court mandamus will not lie to compel the justice of the peace to issue an execution on the judgment.

The judgment s affirmed.

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General No. 7436

Agenda No. 14

April Term, A. D. 1922

The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error,

vs.

Arl Young, Plaintiff in Error.

Writ of Error from Ford.

227.I.A. 6211

HEARD, J.

Plaintiff in error was indicted by a grand jury of Ford county for an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. The indictment was certified to the county court for trial and upon a trial by jury he was convicted and by the court sentenced to be confined in the county jail for thirty days and to pay a fine of \$400 and costs and ordered to stand committed to the county jail until the fine and costs were paid. To review this judgment of conviction plaintiff in error has sued out a writ of error from this court.

It is first contended that the court erred in denying plaintiff in errors motion for a continuance. The case was set for trial on Monday, Feb. 20, 1922. At 10:30 on this day plaintiff in error made an oral motion for a continuance and was given until 11 A. M., to file a written motion for a continuance. At 11 A. M. he did not appear and his recognizance was forfeited. At 11:55 he made a written motion to set aside the default and for a continuance, supported by his affidavit which stated in substance that on Sunday morning about eight o'clock, his attorney, C. E. Beach, who prepared the case, called him on the telephone and told him that his wife was at the point of death, that he had to take her to a hospital and that he could not try the case the following day; that he called the State's Attorney and told him the circumstances and understood that he would be granted a continuuance, but would have to come over and make a showing; that he asked the State's Attorney to notify witnesses not to come to spare expenses; that lawyers' offices were closed on Sundays and that he could not consult a lawyer until Monday, the day of the trial, when he employed L. J. Pacey; that the said E. J. Pacey knew nothing about the case, that he had not been employed in it before, and that he had had no opportunity to investigate the facts; that he had a meritorous defense in this case and if forced to trial would be deprived of his right of impartial trial before a jury; that his attorney, the said C. E. Beach, had in his possession all the papers relative to



this case, and that affiant had not had an opportunity to get the same and deliver them to the said E. J. Paccy, that the said C. E. Beach had in his possession a signed statement made by Charles Ryan, which

Page 1

statement sets up that the said Charles Ryan had not been in the house of Arl Young for twenty-three months prior to the bringing of said indictment; that the said Ryan was the principal witness for the state; and that it is upon his testimony that the prosecution relied, and said statement further states that he never at any time bought any liquor from the said Arl Young. The court denied the motion for a continuance and the cause was tried upon that day with the result above stated. It is contended that the court erred in refusing to grant a continuance. Where the motion for continuance is not based upon a statutory ground, but upon other grounds where it appears clearly from the evidence that injury is likely to result from a refusal of it, a trial court, in the exercise of sound discretion, will grant it, but being a matter within the discretion of the court, unless the court of review can see that there was an abuse of that discretion, a judgment otherwise fair upon its face will not be reversed. City of Elgin v. Nofs, 212 Ill. 20.

Sufficient time, however should be allowed to prepare a motion for a continuance and a continuance should be granted to prevent any person of crime from being forced to trial without a reasonable opportunity to employ counsel and properly prepare for trial. Bell vs. Tolucax Coal Co. 272 Ill. 576; People vs. Singer, 288 Ill. 113. As this case must be reversed on other grounds and this question is not likely to again arise in this case we do not deem it necessary to decide whether there was an abuse of discretion in refusing the continuance.

A witness Charles Ryan testified that he purchased a pint of liquor containing fifty per cent alcohol from Defendant in Error on Dec. 1st, 1920, at his home in Gisson City and paid \$12.50 therefor. Defendant in Error denied having sold Ryan any liquor and denied that Ryan was at his house on or about Dec. 1, 1920. A statement signed by Ryan in which he stated that he never at any time bought any intoxicating liquor of Defendant in Error and that he had not been at his house within 23 months prior to July 1921 was introduced in evigence which tended to impeach Ryan's tesitmony. Ryan and



defendant in error were the only persons testifying upon the question of the sale of liquor.

For the purpose of impeaching defendant in error the State's Attorney called four witnesses who were interrogated upon the question of

Page 2

defendant in errors repuutation for truth and veracity. Much of the evidence was incompetent and should have been stricken out when its incompetency became manifest. People vs. Willy, 301 III. 307.

At the request of the people the court gave the jury the following instruction: "The court instructs you that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient for a conviction of the offense charged in this case provided you are saitsfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the testimony of such witness." This instruction was erron eous. To warrant a conviction it is not sufficient that the jury be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the testimony of a witness, but they must be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant of the crime with which he is charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case four witnesses testified as to the defendants reputation. The jury might have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the testimony of one of these witnesses and yet have had a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt from the evidence.

The court also gave the jury the following instruction: "The court instructs you that if you find from all the evidence and circumstances in this case that Arl Young did sell intoxicating liquor within Prohibition Territory as charged in the indictment without at the time having secured from the Attorney General of this state a permit to sell intoxicating liquor within Prohibition Territory; then Arl oYung was guilty of a misdemeanor and it is your duty to find him guilty." This instruction entirely ignores the rule of law that before a defendant can be found guilty of a criminal offense, the jury must find him guilty from the evidence beyond "all reasonable doubt."

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.



Agenda No. 15 General No. 7437 April Term, A. D. 1922 Appellee. Jessie Davis. avis, Appellant. ester Appeal from Fulton. HEARD, J.

In this case the Circuit Court of Fulton County after a hearing upon a petition for temporary alimony, solicitor's fees and suit money, in a suit brought by Appellee against Appellant for seperate maintenance, found that the sum of seventy-five dollars per month would be a reasonable and proper allowance for temporary alimony for the support of appellee and her two children during the pendency of this proceeding and the sum of one nundred dollars would be a reasonable and proper fee to be allowed to complainant for her solicitors as a retainer, and to enable her to prepare her cause for trial and entered an order requiring appellant to pay to appellee seventy-five dollars per month until the further order of the court and the further sum of one hundred dollars as solicitor's fees for complainant's solicitors, from which order this appeal is taken.

Upon the hearing of the petition it was shown that appellee and appellant were united in marriage Feb. 15, 1905; that two children, Mary, aged 14 and Martha, aged 11, were born as the issue of such marriage; that appellee and appellant lived and cohabited as husband and wife from such marriage until the early part of 1917; that on April 17, 1917, appellee and appel)ant entered into a contract whereby appellee consented and agreed to live separate and apart from appellant during the remainder of her life and at no time thereafter to maintain or begin any proceeding whatsoever to require or attempt to require appellant to provide for the support of herself or the support, care, education of said children.

It is contended by appellant that this contract is a bar to the allowance of alimony in the suit. The evidence showed that after entering into the contract the parties again resumed the marital relation in October, 1917, and continued to live together as husband and wife untl the spring of 1919.



tract of April 17, 1917, so far as it related to the support of appellee and said children was abrogated and it is not a bar to the allowance of alimony in the present suit. Panther Creek Mines vs. Ind. Com. 296 Ill. 565.

The evidence upon the hearing showed that in February 19, 1919, the parties again seperated and entered into a written agreement dated February 25, 1919, which among other things contained the following recital:

"It is fully agreed and understood by and between the parties hereto, that the act of seperation between the parties is wholly the act of the said Jessie Davis, that she, the said Jessie Davis, is leaving and seperating herself from her said husband, and that the same is done aaginst the wish and desire of him, the said Lester Davis." Appellant's affidavit read upon the hearing states that appellee was living seperate and apart from him against his wishes and that he had been at all times ready to furnish the two daughters with a suitable home.

Appellant contends that as shown by the contract the act of seperation being wholly the act of appellee, she is not living seperate and apart from her husband without fault on her part and that for that reason she cannot maintain an action for seperate maintenance.

Appellee's affidavit read upon the hearing states that during the time appellee lived with appellant she discharged her duties as a wife and conducted herself properly. That he commencing in 1907, on numerous occasions was guilty of cruelty an inhuman treatment towards her and frequently struck, choked, bruised and otherwise ill-treated her when she would remonstrate and protest concerning his association with other women; that he shortly after said marriage committed adultery and particularly in the year 1909, committed adultery with certain lewd women in Peoria, as a result of which he contracted a veneral disease which he communicated to complainant; that in April, 1918, he committed adultery with one Eliza Totten and on numerous occasions prior and since said date has committed adultery with said Eliza Totten; that Eliza Totten is a woman of bad reputation and during the past three years appellant has frequently been in her company and called at her home;

Page 2

that appellee

remonstrated with him concerning his conduct with said Eliza Totten and tried to get him to desist from his adulterous relations with her, but he refused to do so and



continued to neglect his family and associate with the said Eliza Totten until his conduct became such that appellee was compelled to seperate from him on March 1, 1919, and since said time has lived seperate and apart from him.

When a husband has pursued a persistent, unjustifable and wrongful course of conduct toward his wite, which will necessarily render her life miserable, and living as his wife unendurable, she is not bound to live with him as her husband, and living seperate and apart from him under such circumstances is without her fault within the meaning of the statute. Johnson vs. Johnson 125 Ill. 510; French vs. French 302 Ill. 152. We are of the opinion that this objection to the order is not well taken.

In the contract of February 25, 1919, it was provided that appellant should pay to appelle the sum of \$10 weekly for the support of the children and it also provided as follows:

"And the said Jessie Davis, in consideration of the payment to her of the monies above mentioned and set forth in the amounts and at the times and place as above set forth for the support and maintenance of the said children and in consideration of the other agreements above set forth to be performed by the said Lester Davis, agrees and contracts to and with the said Lester Davis that she will not in any manner disturb, annoy or interfere with him during the time that they live seperate and apart, and that she will not commence any action in court against him either for the support and maintenance of herself or their said children during the time this contract is in force and effect and while the said Lester Davis is complying with the same, and that she will take good care of said children and support and maintain them in proper manner so far as her financial ability will permit with the assistance to be had from the payments to be made to her by the said Lester Davis as above set forth.

It is now mutually agreed and contracted by and between the

Page 3

parties, that the weekly payments to be made as aforesaid by the said Lester Davis to the said Jessie Davis, for the support and maintenance of the said children is to continue for a period of two years from the date of this contract unless the same is in some manner mutually changed by the consent of each of said



parties in writing, and that at the end of the said two years, this contract may be renewed either on the same terms, if agreeable to both parties, or on such other terms, if any further terms are then agreed on by the parties, as said parties may mutually at that time, agree upon, and that if this contract is not then renewed, or if no other contract is made by and between the parties, then either party at that time is at liberty to take such action in the premises as he or she desires to take."

It is contended by appellant that these provisions of the contract are a bar to this suit. This contract was not renewed at the expiration of the two years and appellee was then at liberty to take such action in the premises as she saw fit and appellant failing to contribute to her support and that of the chidren she was at liberty to commence this suit. French vs. French, supra.

Appellant has made twenty two assignments of error. We do not consider it necessary to consider the remainder of these assignments in detail. It is sufficient to say that we are of the opinion that the case as shown by the record is one which fully warranted the court in ordering the payment of the \$75 per month.

Orders of court fixing solicitor's fees must be based upon evidence and the evidence must be preserved by ceritficate of evidence. In the present case while the evidence, preserved in the certificate of Evidence, shows that it was a proper case for the allowance of solicitor's fees and suit money there is no evidence in the record year which to base the allowance of as pecific amount and that part of the order which provides for allowance of solicitor's fees must therefore be reversed.

That portion of the order providing for the payment by appellant to appellee of the sum of \$75 per month until the further

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order of the court is affirmed and the order is reversed and remanded as to that portion of it providing for the payment of \$100 solicitor's fees.

Opinion felia July 10-1922 Prosenua gleman Oct 4,1932

General No. 7481

Agenda No. 48

April Term, A. D. 1922 Jessie Davis, Appellee,

vs.

Lester Davis, Appellant.

Appeal from Fulton.

227 I.A. 62163

HEARD, J.

Appellee filed to the May Term, 1921, of the Circuit Court of Fulton County, a suit for seperate maintenance against appellant, alleging that she was living seperate and apart from him with two children born as the issue of said marriage without any fault on her part and because of the cruel and inhuman treatment and adulterous practices of appellant.

It appears from the record in this case that at the September Term, 1921, of the Circuit Court, the court made its order requiring appellant to pay appellee seventy five dollars per month until the further order of the court and the further sum of one hundred dollars as solicitors' fees for complainant's solicitors. An appeal was perfected by appellant from the order made at the September term an opinion in which case was filed at the present term of this court and is No. 7437.

After the filing of the appeal bond and perfecting said appeal appellee filed her petition in the Circuit Court on the 15th day of December, 1921, asking for alimony for herself and two children, pending said appeal, and for solicitor's fees and suit money to enable her to follow said appeal.

The court, after considering the evidence offered, entered its order requiring appellant to pay appellee fifty dollars (\$50) per month, pending the appeal from the first order, or until the further order of the court, and the further sum of fifty dollars (\$50) for solicitor's fees for services to be rendered in connection with said appeal and the additional sum of twenty-five (\$25) for suit money and expense money on said appeal.

Page 1

Eighteen assignments of error are made nearly all of which are the same as the assignments in Davis vs. Davis, supra, and what we then held disposes of these questions here.

By the order in question on this appeal the \$50 per month was allowed "pending said appeal so taken from



the order of this court or until the further order of this court, and it is contended by appellant that as the statute only provides for an allowance during the pendency of the appeal that the order as written provides for the payment of fifty dollars per month for a period greater than is provided for in the statute, and is improper, in valid and that lower court was without authority to make the same.

While the court was only authorized to make an allowance during the pendency of the appeal, we are of the opinion that the only proper construction of this provision of the decree is that the payments should be made during the pendency of the appeal unless the court should before the termination of the appeal proceedings made some other order.

The record differs from that in Davis vs. Davis, supra, in that in the present case the affidavit of appellee read in evidence shows that to follow the appeal and defend her interest would require the expenditure of at least \$75 and the court will take judicial notice of the amount of the fees of this court which appellee must pay.

We are of the opinion that the order of the Circuit Court was fully sustanied by the evidence and it is affirmed.

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Agenda No. 17

General No. 7439

April Term, A. D. 1922

M. H. Solliday, Appellee,

vs.

Peabody Coal Co. Appellant.

Appeal from Christian 27 I.A. 65

HEARD, J.

This is an action on the case brought by appellee against appellant for damages alleged to have been sustained by the subsidence of a portion of appellee's land in Christian County based upon the claim that appellant wrongfully, negligently and carelessly mined the coal from under the surface of said premises without leaving adequate support and failed to supply suitable and adequate artifical props to prevent the ground from sinking and that as a consequence of appellant's negligence great portions of the plaintiff land sank and that portions of the land by reason thereof have been rendered wholly unfit for agricultural purposes and other portions of said land rendered unfit for agricultural purposes unless at great expense for additional drainage. A trial of the cause resuited in a judgment in favor of appellee against appellant for \$3,700 damages and costs, from which judgment an appeal has been taken to this court.

It is claimed that there is a veriance between the declaration and the proof as to the date of the alleged subsidence. This variance was not pointed out to the court upon the trial and the point cannot be now considered here.

Complaint is made that the court allowed appellee to introduce evidence upon two different theories as to the measure of damages. Appellee introduced the evidence of a surveyor as to the necessity of draining the subsided land and as to the cost of installing such drainage and thereafter when appellee sought to introduce evidence as to the difference in the market value of the land before and after the subsidence counsel for appellant objected to this evidence as to difference in market value and moved to strike it out on the ground that appellee could not take both theories. Whereupon it was stated by counsel for appellee "The claim for damages here is based upon the depreciation to the market value of the land. The fact it needs to be drained is an incident which may enter into that." The court properly refused to

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strike out the evidence as to depreciation in market value.

Complaint is made of the admission of a plat in evidence as it was not made entirely from surveys made by the witness. As the plat and the estimate of the cost of drainage which is also complained of are not abstracted we are unable to see from the abstract that appellant could be in any way prejudiced by their admission in evidence. Courts of review will not

Page 1

go beyond the abstract to search for error upon which to reverse a case while they will examine the record for the purpose of sustaining the action of the trial court.

It is claimed by appellant that the damages are excessive. The damages allowed are clearly within the range of the testimony and we should not be justified in interfering with the finding of the jury in that regard.

Criticism is made of appellee's first given instruction because it used the word "suffered" instead of the word "sustained" with reference to the damages. As these words are synonyms we fail to find the error in such use. Criticism is made of other of appellee's instructions. While we think that the meaning of some of them might have been more clearly expressed we do not consider them erroneous.

We are of the opinion that the jury were fairly instructed and that no reversible error has been shown.

The judgment is affirmed.

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General No. 7442

Agenda No. 20

April Term, A. D. 1922

D. R. Noonan Appellee,

Emerson-Brantingham Implement Company, a Corporation, Appellant.

HEARD, J.

Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant \$1391 damages in the for \$1391 damages in the circuit court of Edgar County in a suit in assumpsit in which the declaration consisted of the consolidated common counts, from which judgment an appeal has been taken to this court.

Appellee filed a bill of particulars which is as follows:

"Emmerson-Brantingham Company

To D. R. Noonan, Dr.

To 1 E. B. 12-20 Tractor \$1395.00"

The facts in evidence pertinent to the issues as stated in appellees brief and argument are that: In the summer of 1918, D. R. Noonan, who was then an automobile dealer in the City of Baris. County of Edgar, and State of Illinois, was approached by agents of the company and asked to take the agency for a farm tractor which the appellant company was manufacturing and selling. After some discussion with the agents of the appellant company, the appellee took the agency for said farm tractor with a definite agreement that he would not be required to carry any tractor over the winter, providing that he decided not handle tractors for the year 1919. This agreement was made with the appellee by one B. W. Hollenbeck, who was manager of the appellant company's branch at Peoria, Illinois.

After the agreemnt was entered into the appellee proceeded to sell tractors and before the tractors were sent to him from the appellant company and before they were received by him, the tractors were shipped and a draft with a bill of lading attached was sent to the bank which the appellee was required to pay before he could secure the tractor from the railroad company.

Three tractors in all were shipped to the appellee, two of which he sold but all of which he paid for to the appellant company.

On the 19th of December, 1918, the appellee advised the appellant by letter that he had decided not to handle



tractors in 1919, and that he had one tractor on hard an as his agreement was that he would not be required to carry this over the winter, he asked appellant wnat disposition

Page 1

he should make of the tractor.

On December 20th, he recived a letter from the appellant company acknowledging receipt of his letter of the 19th and stating that the appellant company would have said tractor loaded and taken off his hands, but instead of carrying out that promise and the promise made to him at the time he took the agency for said tractor, the tractor remained in the store house of the appellee and was still there at the time of bringing this suit."

One of the points urged by appellant is that the evidence introduced upon the trial of said cause was at variance with and did not support the declaration of cause of action arises out of a contract which has been in part ticulars filed in support thereof.

The tractors were shipped upon a written order which no one seemed to consider of sufficient importance to introduce in evidence. If the contract was as stated by appellee then it was a special contract for a sale and for a resale contingent upon the happening or not happening of certain events.

The law in this state is well settled that a recovery cannot be had on the common counts where the cause of acton arises out of a contract whichh as been in part performed from which the plaintiff has derived some benefit and where as in the present case by recovering a verdict the parties cannot be placed in the exact situation in which they originally were when the contract was made. Rusell vs. Gilmore, 54 Ill. 147; Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Baker, 85 Ill. 410; Fish vs. Farwell, 160 Ill. 236; Heffron vs. Rochester Ins. Co. 220 Ill. 514.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7444

Agenda No. 21

April Term A. D. 1922

Edward H. Trabue, Appellant,

vs.

Robert L. Bowman, Appellee.

Appeal from Greene. 27 I.A. 622

HEARD, J.

Appellant filed his bill in chancery in the Circuit Court of Greene County against appellee, asking for the specific performance of a contract of sale of real estate and thereafter by leave of court, said bill was amended. A demurrer was sustained to the amended bill and appellant electing to stand by his bill, the court entered a decree dismissing the bill as amended and ordered appellant to pay the costs of the proceeding from which decree appellant has appealed to this court.

The bill as amended alleged in substance that appellant and appellee on the 20th day of May, 1920 entered into a verbal agreement and sale of certain lands of which appellant was owner and afterwards signed a memorandum of agreement in writing respecting the said sale and purchase in the words following to-wit:

"THIS INDENTURE, Made this 20th day of May, A. D. 1920, between Edward H. Trabue party of the first part, and Robert L. Bowman party of the second part.

WITNESSETH, That the party of the first part has this day sold to the party of the second part, the following described property to-wit: The N. ½ and the S. W. 1-4 of S. W. 1-4 and S. ½ of S. 1-4 of N. W. 1-4 of Section 31, Town 11, N. Range 10, West in Greene County, Ill. together with all appurtenances, thereto belonging and now thereon, for which the party of the second part agrees to pay the sum of Sixty-four Thousand and 00-100 Dollars, (\$64,000.00) payable as follows: Cash in Hand Thirteen Hundred and 00-100 Dollars, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Balance note for Four Thousand Dollars, payable March 1st, 1921, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged and the balance March 1st, 1921, (\$58,700.00): The above mentioned note to be without interest until maturity.

The party of the first part is to furnish to the party of the second part, or assigns, a warranty deed and a good and sufficient abstract of title, showing a good title of record to the premises hereinafter described in the party



of the first part, on or before March

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1st, 1921, assign all

insurance on said buildings, pay all taxes and assessments against said real estate, and if there is a mortgage on said property, pay interest and taxes thereon up to March 1st, 1921, and give possession by March 1st, 1921.

It is mutually agreed that time is an essential element in this contract and it is further agreed that in case either of the parties hereto fail to perform the stipulations of this contract, or any part of the same, the failing party shall pay to the other party of this contract the sum of Fifty-three Hundred Dollars (\$5300.00) as damages for non-fulfillment of contract.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the parties of aforesaid have subscribed their names the date above mentioned.

> Robert L. Bowman, 2nd Party, Edward H. Trabue, 1st Party."

The bill further alleges that the defendant paid the complainant Thirteen Hundred Dollars in cash and delivered to him his promissory note in the sum of four Thousand Dollars, due March 1st, 1921, without interest until maturity, both as a part of the purchase price for said lands; that the defendant afterwards paid the acte before the maturity thereof and accepted a surrender thereof by the complainant; that since the execution or said agreement the said defendant entered into the possession of and plowed a part of said real estate; that he purchased wire to construct a fence on the said real estate described in said contract.

The said bill further alleges that on and prior to March 1st, 1921, complainant had been ready and willing and was able to perform his part of said agreement; that on the 16th day of February, 1921, and again on the 1st day of March, 1921 complainant offered and tendered to said defendant an abstract of title to said real estate, showing a good title of record to said real estate in said complainant; that the defendant refused to accept, receive or examine said abstract, stating in each of said occasions that he knew the title to said real

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estate was

good and thereby relieved complainant from furnishing said abstract; that on and prior to said first day of March, 1921, the defendant declared to the complanant his in-

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tention not to perform his part of said agreement; that on the 16th day of February, 1921, said defendant said to complainant that he would not take the farm on account of the condition of things, and on March 1st, 1921 the defendant said to complainant that he was not going to take the place as the bottom had fallen out of prices; that by the defendant declaring his intention not to perform his part of said agreement he thereby waived the tender to him of said abstract, deed and the assignment to him of said insurance, and the delivery of possession of said real estate to him; that prior to March 1st, 1921, complainant and his wife executed and properly acknowledged a warranty deed for all of said real estate conveying said real estate in fee to the said Robert L. Bowman and on the 1st day of March, 1921, he offered to deliver to said defendant and demanded from said defendant the payment of the rest of the money due on said contract; that said defendant then stated to said complainant that he was not going to take the place because the bottom had dropped out of prices and refused to accept said deed and pay \$58,700.00, the balance of said purchase price and perform his part of said agreement.

The bill further alleges that there was no incumbrances upon said real estate, that all taxes and assessments which were due, or that would become alien on said real estate up to the first day of March, 1921, had been paid by said complainant; that said complainant was ready and willing to deliver possession of all of said real estate to said defendant and was ready, able and willing an offered to carry out his part of said agreement and to execute a proper conveyance of said real estate to said defendant and to furnish and deliver to him a good and sufficient abstract of title showing a good title of record to said real estate in said complainant and to assign all insurance on the buildings on said real estate; that the said defendant alleged and alleges that he is not bound in law or equity to carry out his part of said agreement, and does not deny or claim but what

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complainant on and

prior to March 1st, 1921, was ready and willing to carry out his part of said agreement.

The prayer of said bill is for a decree requiring specific performance of said contract by the defendant.

It is contended by appellee that by the terms of the

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contract tests, it appears that either party had the privilege of performing the contract, or failing to perform it, of paying to the other party \$5300.00 as damages for nonperformance and that therefore a court of equity will not decree specific performance.

The question before the court upon this appeal is not whether after a full hearing a court of equity should decree specific performance. The only question before us is, does the bill upon its face state a cause of action calling for the intervetion of a court of Chancery?

In Carr et al v. Butterworth, 219 Ill. App. 14, it was said: "When a contract for sale contains a provision for liquidated damages in case of breach a court of equity will not for that reason, alone decline to enforce it in a court of equity. Lyman v. Gedney, 114 Ill. 388; Koch v. Streuter, 218 Ill. 546; Mikelaiczak v. Krupps, 254 Ill. 209." In Gronowski v. Jozefowicz, 291 Ill. 266, it was said: "If it had been stipulated in the written agreement that upon a failure to perform the contract the party refusing to perform shall pay \$500.00 as liquidated damages, that provision would not prevent a court of equity from decreeing a specific performance."

It is claimed by appellee that appellant by the acceptance of the amount of the stipulated damages for nonperformance of the contract is barred from enforcing a specific performance of the contract in a court of equity. The bill does not allege that appellant accepted the amount of the stipulated damages for the nonperformance of the contract. The allegations of the bill in respect to the payment of the sums of \$1300.00 and \$4,000.00 are that said sums were paid as a part of the purchase price of the land.

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We are of the opinion that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the amended bill. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the Circuit Court to overrule the demurrer to the amended bill.



General No. 7451 Agenda No. 26

April Term A. D. 1992 George Carp, as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Carp, Deceased, Defendant in Error,

> John Gudausky, Plaintiff in Error. Writ of Error to Vermilion County.

HEARD, J.

This is an action on the case brought by defendant in error, George Carp, as the administrator of the estate of Joseph Carp, his fourteen year old son, who died as the result of injuries received in a collision with the automobile of the plaintiff in error, while the boy was riding a bicycle on a public street in the Village of Westville, Vermilion County.

The trail resulted in a judgment of \$2,000 in favor of defendant in error, to review which judgment plaintiff in error has sued out a writ of error from this court.

It is earnestly insisted that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in the case. As the case must be reversed and remanded on other grounds we do not deem it, proper to discuss this question.

At the request of defendant in error the court gave the jury the following instruction:

The Court instructs the jury that in suits brought to recover damages for the death of a minor child, if the proof shows that such minor child left a father or mother who were entitled to his services, then the law presumes that there has been a pecuniary loss to the father or mother from the death of such child, for which compensation may be allowed." This instruction is defective in not being terminated by the words "if you find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff" or their equivalent.

The court also gave to the jury an instruction as follows:

"The court instructs the jury that if you find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, then you are not confined in assessing the damages to the pecuniary value, if any, of the services of the deceased child to his next of kin until he would have arrived at the age of twenty-one, but the jury may consider the pecuniary benefit, if any, which the next of kin might have derived from said de-



ceased at any of his life, had he not been killed." The damages which a jury may give in a case of this nature where they find a verdict for the plaintiff are such damages as the jury

Page 1

shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death of deceased to his next of kin.

While it is not necessary that any witness shall have expressed an opinion as to the amount of such damages and the jury may fix such sum as they deem such just and fair compensation, their finding must be based upon the evidence in the case viewed in the light of their knowledge, intelligence, observation and experience in the affairs of life. The damages allowed must not be speculative or conjectural or be in compensation of such pecuniary benefit which the next of kin "might nave derived" from deceased at any age of his life had ne not been killed. Deceased had he lived "might have become fabulously wealthy and he "might" have lavished his wealth upon his next of kin, but it is not reasonably certain from the evidence that he would have done so. The only damages which the jury can allow are such damages as the jury shall deem from the evidence to be fair and just compensation to the next of kin for the pecuniary injury which the evidence shows they have sustained from such death and for such pecuniary injuries as the evidence shows when considered by the jury in the light of their knowledge, intelligence, observation and experience in life are reasonably certain to result to such next of kin.

For the error in giving instructions the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

• July 10, 1922

General No. 7452

Agenda No. 27

April Term A. D. 1922

Hester Kline, Appellee,

The Estate of Elizabeth Kline Deceased; A. L. Ruffer,

vs.

Executor, Appellan

227 I.A. 6223

Appeal from Clark.

HEARD, J.

Hester Kline, filed her claim in the county court of Clark county, Illinois, against the estate of Elizabeth Kline, deceased, for \$1,000 for "care, attention, washing, nursing, general housework and supplies furnished said deceased for 5 years before her death." The case was tried in the county court without a jury and judgment obtained by the claimant against the estate in the sum of \$1,000, from which an appeal was taken to the circuit court. The claimant amended her claim by increasing the demand to \$2,000 and upon the case being tried before the Court and jury a judgment was obtained in the sum of \$2,000 from which an appeal was taken.

Elizabeth Kline was 84 years of age living in her lifetime in Casey, Clark County, Illinois. Appellee was the wife of Henry Kline, a nephew of Elizabeth. Appellee resided with her husband in the country about 8 miles from Casey.

While the evidence shows that at various times appellee went to the home of Elizabeth taking her fruit, vegetables and other provisons and while there performed services, it is claimed by appellant that under the evidence by reason of the relationship of the parties the presumption is that the services were rendered gratiously. Mrs. Bowles a witness for appellee, testified that on different occasions Elizabeth Kline promised appellee pay for provisions and work.

In Hudson vs. Hudson, 218 Ill. App. 559, it was said: "In this case the evidence clearly shows repeated expressions by the deceased which indicated his appreciation of the value of the services which the claimant rendered for him, and that he expected to pay her for them. Some of these expressions were made within the hearing of the claimant, and under circumstances that indicated that the deceased had an understanding with the claimant about the matter of payment. The intention of the deceased to pay her, having been brought to her atten-

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ton, it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that the claimant expected that the deceased would carry out his intention and promise to pay her, and that she therefore understood and expected such payment to be made and the jury were warranted in drawing

Page 1

this inference from the

evidence."

We think the evidence of Mrs. Bowles was sufficient to require the submission of the case to the jury as far as this question was concerned.

It is claimed that the court erred in allowing two witnesses who had been present in court and heard the testimony of some of claimant's witnesses give their opinions, based upon the testimony which they had heard without qualifying such witnesses as experts. Had this objection been made at the proper time it would have been well taken cite of: Lou Forest vs. Buirday 276 Ill. 38. It was not however, raised in the trial court and cannot be considered here. The objection made was a specific one in each instance and each time in overruling the objection the court said: "If that is the only objection it will be overruled" thereby intimating that the questions were objectionable in some other respect.

It is contended that the judgment is not sustained by the evidence in the case. To sustain a judgment for \$2,000 upon a claim originally filed for \$1,000 the evidence as to the services rendered and goods furnished should be clear and specific and the evidence should show what they were reasonably worth at the time and place in question and the judgment must be based upon competent evidence.

We are of the opinion especially in view of the fact that claimant filed her claim in the county court for \$1000 that the judgment for \$2,000 is not sufficient sustained by clear, specific and competent evidence.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7453

Agenda No. 50

April Term, A. D. 1922

In the matter of the Conservatorship of William Elder Karr.

Appeal from McLean.

227 I.A. 622

HEARD, J.

June 12, 1911, Wm. E. Karr, being deeply involved in financial, marital, and other difficulties, entered into an agreement with appellant whereby appellant, as trustee, assumed the control and management of Karr's affairs and continued to act as such trustee until Sept. 21, 1911, when Karr was, by the county court, adjudged to be a spendthrift and drunkard and appellant was duly apponted as conservator of Karr's estate.

Karr was the owner of 200 acres of land in McLean county inventoried at \$44,000 upon which there was a mortgage indebtedness of \$17,000 and accured interest. Karr also had a contract for the purchase of 744 acres of California land upon which he had paid \$17,000 and agreed to pay a balance of \$33,000. Karr had about \$12,000 additional outstanding indebtedness. When appellant took charge of Karr's affairs foreclosure of the mortgage on the McLean county farm was threatened and the California contract was in danger of forfeiture as Karr was without funds and, by reason of his lack of financial ability and his dissipated habits, he was in danger of losing all his property. Karr also had about \$4,000 worth of personal property consisting of live stock and farm machinery on the McLean county farm. Prior to June 12, 1911, Karr had been absent from home on a spree for about six weeks and his live stock and other property were suffering from lack of proper attention.

Appellant assumed the management of Karr's affairs, took him out to the farm and effected a temporary reconciliaton with his wife and had the property properly taken care of and prepared for sale; appellant during the first 90 days spending about half of his time upon the farm.

During the time of his trusteeship Appellant received from sales of personal property and other sources \$7,727.77 and disbursed \$7,942.92, which left a balance due appellant of \$215.15.

Nov. 22, 1911, appellant procured a loan upon the farm to meet the pressing indebtedness and in the early part of 1912 entered into a contract for the sale of the



farm for \$50,000.

On April 24, 1912, appellant made a report as conservator, which was approved by the county court. This report showed receipts of of \$54,364.23; disbursements, \$31,745.06; balance, \$22,619.17. This report was approved and

the balance appellant was authorized by the county court to apply on the completion of the purchase of the California land, appellant agreeing to advance from his private funds the remaining sum necessary to complete the purchase.

Dec. 27, 1912, appellant filed a report as conservator showing receipts which with the balance on hand at the time of his last report amounted to \$24,507.43. The dispursements amounted to \$20,459.96, leaving a balance on hand of \$4,047.77. In this report he represented that he was entitled to the sum of \$500 for his services as trustee and to the sum of \$4,100, for services as conservator and trustee of Louise Karr, the wife, up to the time of filing his next report. This report was approved by the county court.

August 20, 1914, appellant filed his report as conservator in the county court showing receipts, including the balance on hand at his last report of \$15,809.78, and disbursements of \$16,219.97. This latter amount included \$4,600 allowed to appelant for his services as trustee and conservator. This report was approved by the county court.

November 20, 1917, appellant filed his conservators report in the county court showing disbursements of \$21,543.91; receipts, \$5,254.46, leaving a deficit of \$16,289.45, which was caused by payment on the California land. October 9, 1918, appellant filed his conservators report in the county court reporting the sale of the California land for \$50,310.00 and showing total disbursements, mostly in the repayment of loans at the bank which had oeen procured on appellant's personal credit, of \$18,499.95, leaving a balance on hand of \$32,393.89, which balance was invested in government bonds.

In his report of Nov. 20, 1917, appellant claimed commission at 5% on \$5,264.52, amounting to \$263.22. In his report of Oct. 1918, appellant claimed for services rendered in the sale of the Calfornia land at 3% of the selling price which claim is \$1753.55. In his report of November 20, 1917 appellant reported that he had not paid himself the sum of \$4,600 previously allowed but that

he had used the same to apply on the payment of the California land in order to avoid the necessity of borrowing this amount from the bank and had charged \$887.04 interest thereon.

Objections were filed to the report of Oct. 1918, on behalf of Karr and Martin A. Brennan was appointed guardian ad litem for Karr. The

Page 2

objections were as to the amount of commissions claimed by appellant for his services as trustee and conservator and as to the item of \$887.04 claimed for interest.

After hearing the objections the county court sustained the objections and entered an order disallowing the interest item and allowing appellant \$300 for his services as trustee and setting aside the allowance of \$4,100 and allowing appellant \$500 per year for seven years of services making a total of \$3,800 for his entire services as trustee and conservator.

From this order appellant appealed to the circuit court where upon a hearing a like order was entered by the circuit court, from which order appellant has appealed to this court.

It is contended by appellant that the order of the circuit court is manifestly contrary to the evidence in the case.

Sec. 36, Chap. 86, Rev. Stats. of Ill. provides "Conservators on settlement shall be allowed such fees and compensation for their services as shall seem reasonable and just to the court."

On the hearing in the circuit court, appellant testi fied in detail as to the services rendered by him and by his testimony showed that Karr's financial affairs were very involved and that without the efforts of a conservator practically the entire estate would have been lost. Karr's title to his McLean county farm was defective and he became involved in expensive litigation with his wife with reference to a divorce and the duties of the conservator were rendered unusually onerous by reason of the conduct of Karr and his wife, who prevented him from procuring a loan on the California land and necessitated the loaning of appellant's personal credit to the conservatorship. The evidence tends to show that instead of Karr and his wife assisting appellant in his efforts to conserve the estate their efforts were directed in a contrary direction. One phase of this conservator-



ship was before this court in Karr vs. Rust, 217 III. App. 555.

Three witnesses who had knowledge of appellant's services and who were acquainted with the value of such services respectively gave it as their opinions that appellants service were reasonably worth \$10,000; 8,000 and \$7,500.

Page 3

Appellee contends that the court in fixing fees is not bound to follow the testimony of witnesses, but should exercise an independent judgment in passing on the question of fees in any given case and cities Gentiemen vs. Sanitary Dist. 260 Ill. 317 and Remke vs. Sanitary Dist. 260 Ill. 380, in support of their contentions. These were cases where the court was required to fix an attorneys fee and the holding was that the court having knowledge on the subject could and should take into consideration his own knowledge of the services.

Appellee also cites Askew vs. Hudgens, 99 Ill. 468 and Griswold vs. Smith 214 Ill. 323. The fees involved in these cases were the fee of executors. In the latter case the court passed no opinion upon the merits of the case, but dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was not an appealable order. Conservator's fees differ in many respects from those of an administrator. The administrator or executor simply closes the estate and his fees are for the routine proceedings in such cases and in such case the county judge should have a better knowledge of the reasonable value of such services than any other person. On the other hand it is the duty of the conservator to conserve the estate and while his services are performed under the order of the court, the services vary with each particular estate and are very frequently, as in the present case, of such character that a court would have no special reason for having knowledge of their value.

It is contended by appellee on the authority of Askew vs. Hudgens supra and Griswold vs. Smith, supra, that the county judge, from his familiarity with the affairs of the estate, with the labor and difficulty attending its settlement, and with the amount of any former allowances he may have made, enjoys peculiar means of knowledge for determining what would be the proper amount of compensation to be made to the conservator for his services, and that when such judge, in view of all circumstances, has exercised his judgment in the matter,



and determined what is the proper compensation to be allowed the conservator for his services, it would be a plain case of the wrongful exercise of judgment which would justify another court in increasing the allowance.

This is the rule laid down in Askew vs. Hudgens, supra, as to administration, but unfortunately for appellee's contention as to its application to the facts of this particular case neither the county judge or the judge of the circuit.

Page 4

court from whose orders the appeals were taken were incumbents of their respective position; when the greater portion of the services were rendered so had no reason to have any special knowledge on the subject, while the county judge under whose orders the services were rendered fixed the value of a portion of such service at \$4,600,00.

It is urged by appellee that as appellant was allowed in his reports sums aggregating \$4455.72 for attorneys fees that that fact should be taken into consideration in fixing his fees. Appellant reported to the court the specific amounts paid for attorney's fees and as no objection was filed to them by appellee we must assume that such payments were necessary and reasonable and therefore the only effect of such evidence is to show that appellants duties were of an unusually intricate nature.

While under the law the county judge is given a discretion in fixing the fees of a conservator, this discretion is not an arbitrary one, but must have for its basis the evidence in the case. While it is the rule that when such judge in view of all the circumstances has exercised his judgment and determined the proper compensation to be allowed a court of review will not change the amount unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is also the rule that when the amount so fixed is against the mnaifest weight of the evidence the court will do so. People vs. Ballans, 294 Ill. 551.

We are of the opinion that the order of the circuit court is manifestly against the weight of the evidence and the order is therefore reversed and the cause remanded as to the amount which should be allowed appellant for his services as trustee and conservator.



allowed Agenda No. 29 General No. \$455 April Term A. D. 1922 H. E. Munson, Appellant VS. Dee Minor, Appellee. Appeal from Shelby. 227 I.A. 5

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee in an action of forcible entry and detainer brought by appellant before a Justice of the Peace and heard upon appeal in the circuit court of Shelby County.

T. C. Dove and F. R. Dove were the owners of certain real estate in the town of Windsor in Shelby county and on July 9, 1918, they entered into an agreement with Dee Minor, appellee, upon certain conditions therein named to convey said premises to him by warranty deed and appellee entered into possession of the premises under the contract and retained such possession until the time of the trial. On August 15, 1919, appellee assigned all his rights, title and interest in that agreement to one Fraze Carmon, and on that day Carmon assigned all his rights, title and interest in the same agreement to W. B. Richards. On November 20, 1919, Richards assigned all his rights, title and interest to the Commercial State Bank. On June 22, 1920, Dee Minor, appellee, again assigned all his rights, title and interest therein to Henry winson, appellant. All these assignments were made as collateral to secure loans made to appellee.

On July 30, 1920, T. C. Dove and wife, F. R. Dove and Dee Minor and wife conveyed to appellant by warranty deed, the same premises, described in the agreement between the Doves and appellee of date July 9, 1918, releasing and waiving homestead. On July 31, 1920, appellant entered into an agreemnt with Dee Minor, appellee, upon certain conditions therein named to convey to him by warranty deed the premises in controversy. On October 4, 1920, appellee assigned all his rights, title and interest in this last agreemnt to E. T. Swiney.

On April 19, 1921, appellee, the Doves and their wives made a guit claim deed of the premises in controversy to appellant to correct a mistake in the description of the property in the deed of July 30, 1920.

On July 13, 1921, appellant caused a written demand for possession of the premises to be served upon appellee



and possession not being given, this suit was brought.

Section 6, Chap. 2, Rev. Stats. Ill., provides that an action of Forcible Entry and Detainer may be maintained "When lands or tenements have

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
been conveyed by and grantor in possession, ** and the grantor in possession, ** refuses or neglects to surrender possession thereof after demand in writing by the person entitled thereto or his agent." It is contended by appellant that appellee having conveyed the premises in question to appellant and having refused to surrender possession thereof after demand in writing, that these facts are conclusive and that upon such facts being shown appellant was
entitled to recover.

The action of forcible entry and detainer is a possessory action and to entitle a plaintiff to recover under the provisions of the statute above quoted or any other provisions of such statute, he must show that he is entitled to the possession of the premises. It is not sufficient to show that the defendant is not entitled to the possession.

There is evidence in the record tending to show that while appellee's deeds to appellant were absolute in form they were in fact intended as a mortgage to secure an indebtedness from appellee to appellant and it is contended by appellee that under the rule laid down in West vs. Frederick, 62 Ill. 191, the grantee in a deed absolute in form, but in fact a mortgage, can not maintain forcible entry and detainer against the grantor. This position seems to be sustained by the weight of authority.

By the terms of the contract for a deed of July 31, 1920, between appellant and appellee, appellee was entitled to the possession of the premises so long as he made the payments and performed the covenants or agreements on his part to be performed. It was only on his failure so to do that appellant would "have the right to re-enter and take possession of the premises aforesaid with notice." There is no evidence in the record that appellee failed to make any of the payments or to perform any of the covenants or agreements specified in the agreement to be performed by him.

We are of the opinion that the judgment of the circuit court is sustained by the evidence in the case and the judgment is affirmed.



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General No. 7458

Agenda No. 32

April Term, A. D. 1922

Charles Branham, for the use of Brice Squires, Appellant,

Mary L. Gerrard and William Gerrard, Appellees.

Appeal from Vermilion 227 I.A. 323

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of apellee against appellant for costs and in bar of an action in assumpsit brought by appellant against appellees, Dec. 29, 1920, to recover an advance payment of \$2,000 made by appellant to appellees upon a land purchase contract.

The declaration consisted of the common counts and a special count setting up a contract between appellees and Branham by which appellees agreed to sell to Branham certain real estate; that said contact had been assigned by Branham to Brice Squires; that the contract specified that appellees should furnish an abstract of title showing good and sufficient merchantable title as of date of sale; that it was also stated in the contract that in the event of any defects being found in the title making the same unmerchantabe, that appellees were to have a reasonable time in which to correct the same; that Branham made an advance payment of \$2,000; that appellees failed to furnish to appellant a good, sufficient and merchantable title to said lands as of the said date of sale; and further that appellees did not keep their promise to correct the defects in such title, so as to make the same merchantable within a reasonable time.

Appellees filed a plea of the general issue and a piea denying that Squires was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase money and to carry out his part of the contract, and alleging that appellees did not fail, neglect or refuse to make Squires a merchantable title to said lands in a reasonable time.

It appears from the evidence that on March 6, 1920, at the office of Ralph B. Holmes, an attorney, at Danville, Ill., a contract for the sale and purchase of 120 acres of land was drawn up and signed by appellees and Branham (it being understood before the deal was closed that the real purchaser was Squires). It stipulated for a purchase price of \$29,040, of which \$2,000 was paid cash in hand. The transfer was to be by warranty deed, which was to be exectued by appellees and placed in the

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D.A.D. J.

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custody of Holmes for final delivery.

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The contract specified that the seller should furnish an abstract of title "showing good and sufficient merchantable title in first parties, as of date of sale."

It is also stated in the contract that in the event of any defects being found in said title making the same unmerchantable, that appellees were to have a reasonable time in which to correct the same.

It appears from the evidence that it was then and there agreed that the abstract of title should be submitted to George F. Rearick, of the firm of Rearick & Meeks attorneys, for examination, as to the title, on behalf of the purchaser.

An abstract certified to March 5, 1920, was, within a few days after the signing of the contract, delivered to the above firm.

Under date of March 17, 1920, said attorneys gave a written opinion, in which defects were pointed out, and concluding that in their opinion the title could not be approved as merchantable, unless other facts not shown of record should make it so. The opinion asked for certain information concerning a family of the name of Whrte, who were parties to a partition suit which involved the premises in question. An affidavit by two of the White sisters was procured and thereupon the abstract with the affidavit and a written citation of authorities was again submitted to the attorneys for the purchaser, and on April 14, 1920, said attorneys again gave their written opinion that they would not approve the title as merchantable and suggested that the matter should be cured by quiet title proceedings. The terms of court of Vermilion county are in May, October and January,

The last day for publiciation for the May, 1920 term was April 16th. Appellees lived at Ridgefarm, 18 miles from Danville. They were immediately notified of the opinion of appellant's attorneys and authorized Mr. Holmes to take the necessary steps to correct the title on the following day.

The abstract offered in evidence shows that the persons to be made parties to the suit were many and widely scattered and that it would be absolutely impossible for anyone even familiar with the facts to prepare a bill to quiet title, ascertain who were the necessary parties, and secure the necessary affidavits within the two days

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time.

A bill to quiet the title was filed for the succeeding October

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term of court; a decree was had quieting title in Mary L. Gerrard; the abstract was extended and furnished to Rearick & Meeks, attorneys for appellants. It was then discovered by Mr. Rearicks that only three weeks publication notice had been had to non-resident heirs instead of the four, required by statute; through error. The decree was thereupon vacated and leave taken to amend the bill, which, after consultation with, and suggestions from, appellants attorneys, was done, a new affidavit of non residents filed and publication for the January 1921 term of court.

On Nov. 27, 1920, Squires notified appellees by letter that they had not complied with their contract, had not furnished a merchantable title and had not corrected the defects within a reasonable time and gave notice that he rescinded the contract and demanded the payment of \$2,000 which had been made by Branham together with interest and damages.

Upon the trial the court held that at the time of the comencement of the suit the title had not been made merchantable.

Under the pleadings and evidence in the case the only question which arises upon this record is whether or not on Nov. 27, 1920, a reasonable time had elapsed within which to correct the defects in the title and make it merchantable.

It is contended by apellant that the facts being practically undisputed this court should hold as a matter of law that a reasonable time had elapsed. In Morris vs. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627, it was said: "The law cannot prescribe in general what shall be a reasonable time except on certain and determined facts, because the question must depend upon the situation of the parties and circumstances peculiar to each case. Where the law itself prescribes what shall be reasonable time in respect to a given subject the question is one of law, and the jury is confined to finding the facts as to the subject. Whenever the special facts are such that the court cannot by the aid of any legal rule or principle, decide upon the legal quality of the facts, the jury must draw the inference as to what is a reasonable time with reference to the ordinary course and practice of dealing under the circumstan-

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Upon the trial the Court had the court of th

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ces of the particular case (Citing authorities). The question as to reasonable time being one of fact, ordinarily the time is reasonable or unreasonable, in point of law, according to the finding of the jury in point of fact."

Page 3

Reasonable time has been defined as follows: "So much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires should be done having a regard for the rights and possibilities of loss, if any, to the other party to be affected. Citizens Bank Bldg. vs. Wertheimer, 126 Ark. 38.

"Reasonable time is so much as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires in the particular case should be done." Bowen vs. Detroit City R. R. 54 Mich. 501.

In Gridley vs. Globe Tobacco Co. 71 Mich. 528, it was said: "The rule that certain acts shall be performed in a reasonable time requires that such reasonable dilgienco shall be exercised as under then and all subsequently existing circumstances may fairly be expected."

In Emmerson vs. North Amer. Trans. Co. 303 Ill. 282, "The most recent case where the subject it was held that the question of what would be a reasonably time was ordinarily a question of fact."

Under the circumstances of this case what was a reasonable time was clearly a question of fact for the jury and we cannot say that their finding upon this question was manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Some complaint is made of the court's rulings in the giving and refusing of instructions. We find no error in that respect.

Much space in the briefs and arguments of both parties is devoted to the question of whether the title was made merchantable by a decree in Feb. 1921. Under the pleadings and evidence in this case that question is not before the court.

The judgment is affirmed.

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il in il , si tour, in , or Euro General No. 7465. Agenda No. 38.
April Term, A. D/1922

City of Pekin, Appellant.

John E. Neddermann, Appellee,

Appeal from Tazewell.

" ui. 15-29

HEARD, J.

This case was commenced by appellee against appellant to recover damages which he received by being run into and injured by a street car operated by the city, by reason of its careless and negligent operation. A trial of the case resulted in a judgment for appellee against appellant for \$850. damages and costs, from which judgment this appeal was taken.

It is contended that appellee's given instruction No. 2 is erroneous. This instruction tells the jury that the greater weight of the evidence is not alone determined by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts. It then enumerates certain things which it tells the jury they should take into consideration, omitting from this enumeration all references to the number of witnesses and tell the jury in conclusion that "from all these circumstances determine upon which side is the weight of the evidence". White the weight of the evidence is not alone determined by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts it is one of the elements which the jury should consider. The weight of the evidence is to be determined not solely from a consideration of the matters enumerated in the duty of the jury to consider, as well, all the evidence in the case. This instruction has been repeatedly condemned and should have been refused. Chicago Union Traction Co. vs. Hampe, 228 Ill. 346; Lyons vs. Ryenson, 242 Ill. 409. The seventh of appellee's instructions single out a single fact, which it tells the jury they should take into account.

At the request of appellee the court gave the jury the following instruction: "The Court also instructs the jury as a matter of law that it is the duty of those in control of a street car as well as those driving a team and vehicle, to exercise a greater degree of care and watchfulness at street intersections in a thickly populated and heavily travelled portion of the city than at other places

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not intersections and not so thickly populated." This instruction is erroneous. While a greater amount of care may be required at street intersections, than other places the degree of care required, which is ordinary care, is the same.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. $\label{eq:page_2} \textbf{Page 2}$

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General No. 7467

Agenda No. 39

April Term, A. D. 1922 Charles P. Saillard Appellant,

Frank Schaefer Appellee.

Appellee from Sangamon. 27 I.A. 623

HEARD, J.

In this case a general demurrer interposed to an amended declaration was sustained by the Court, whereupon plaintiff elected to abide by the amended declaration and judgment was rendered against plaintiff, in bar of action and for costs of suit. It is from this judgment that this appeal is prosecuted.

The charging part of the first count of the amendment declaration is substantially as follows: "For that, Whereas, defendant on the 28th day of June, A. D. 1921, was the owner of a certain residence building in Springneld Illinois, commonly called a flat building or apartment house, which defendant their owned and used for the purpose of leasing to persons who might desire to live therein; and plaintiff avers that on the date aforesaid, and prior thereto,, said building has been and was leased to divers persons who were then and there residing as tenants; and plaintiff avers that on the north side of said building, on what is known as the front thereof, defendant kept and maintained a certain large porch, which said porch was then and there reserved by defendant from his said leases to the said divers tenants, and was then and there maintained and controlled by defendants as a common passageway or entrance for the various tenants living in said flat building, and for all other persons who should rightfully enter and leave the said building; and plaintiff avers that on the date aforesaid, he was then and there a tenant in said premises and as such, used and occupied a certain room on the second floor of the said building by means whereof, it became and was necessary for plaintiff to use the aforesaid porch or common passageway as means of ingress and egrees to and from the aforesaid rooms so used and occupied by plaintiff.

And plaintiff avers that by means of the premises it became and was the duty of the defendant to maintain said porch or common passageway in a reasonably safe condition, so as not to injure plaintiff in his - 1.2.

going and coming through and upon said common passage way, but defendant did not regard his duty in this behalf, but on the contrary thereof, allowed a certain part of said common passage way, to-wit, a railing around same to become defective, rotten and loose, to an unreasonable degree and so to remain for a long period of time all of which the defendant then and there had notice

Page 1

or in the exercise of reasonable care in that behalf would have had notice; and plaintiff avers that on the date aforesaid, while he was upon and along said common passage way and while he was attempting to enter the premises, so used and occupied by him by means of said common passageway, and while he was where he had a right to be, and while he was in the exercise of due care and caution of his own safety, he there casually leaned against said railing and that said railing, by means of the loose, rotten, defective and unsafe condition, aforesaid, then and there gave away and caused plaintiff to fall to and upon the ground in a forceful and violent manner, by means whereof, plaintiff was then and thereby seriously and painfully injured, etc."

In this state many of the superficial and artificial forms of common law pleading have been abandoned and a declaration is now held to be good which in plain and simple language states the essential elements of a cause of action.

In McClure v. Hoopeston Gas Co., 303 Ill. 89 ,the

"This court has stated, in harmony with the authorities on the question, that the essential elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) The existence of a duty on the part of a person charged to protect the complaining party from the injury received; (2) a failure to perform that duty; and (3) an injury resulting from such failure. (Devaney v. Otis Elevator Co. 251 Ill. 28.)

In Smith vs. Morrow, 220 III. App. 627, it was said: "The law is well settled in this State that a landlord wino rents different parts of a building to various tenants and retains control of the stairways, passageways, hallways and other methods of approach to the several portions of the building for the common use of the tenants, has resting upon him an implied duty to use reasonable care to keep such places in a reasonable safe condition, and that he is liable for injuries which result to persons who

are lawfully in such building, from a failure to perform such duty." (B. Shoninger Co. vs. Mann. 219 Ill. 242.)"

We are of the opinion that the first count of the amended declaration, tested by the rules laid down in the authorities above cited stated a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the injury received, a failure to perform that duty and an injury resulting from such failure.

Page 2

The first count of the amended declaration having stated all the essential elements of a cause of action it was error to sustain the demurrer to it. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the circuit court to overrule the demurrer to the first count of plaintff's amended declaration.

Page 3

Divin fred Jay 10, 1922

General No. 7471

Agenda No. 41

April Term A. D. 1921

John E. Ingersoll, Appellee

vs.

The Union Automobile Insurance Association

Appellant

Appeal from Tazewell

7 I.A. 6254

HEARD J.

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$793.33 in favor of appellee against appellant in an action of assumpsit on a policy of insurance brought to recover loss sustained by appellee by reason of a fire destroying the automobile to insure which the insurance policy had been issued by appellant.

It is contended by appellant that appellee having alleged in his declaration a full compliance with the conditions of the policy, the burden was upon him to show that proofs of loss were furnished as provided for by the policy and that having failed to furnish such proof appellee was not entitled to recover upon proof of waiver of performance. While this is ordinarily the correct rule (Hensel vs. C. L. N. Ins Co. 219 Ill. App. 77) in the present case appellee filed with his declaration an affidavit of claim and defendant filed with his plea an affidavit of merits in which the only defense set up was that the policy had been cancelled and was not in force at the time of the loss. Appellant was confined to the defenses set up in his affidavit of merits and not having set up therein a failure to furnish proofs of loss cannot now urge such failures as a defense.

The policy in question was issued to appellee April 10, 1918, insuring an Overland automobile for the sum of \$900. Under the rules of the association an assessment of \$11.25 became due on October 10, 1918, as appellee's pro rata share of the losses of the association for the past six months.

Demand for the payment of this assessment was made upon appellee, who failed to pay it, and afterwards, in January 1919, L. F. Shepard, the secretary and general manager of the association, who had authority to employ and appoint agents and give authority to the agents of the association, sent out one Fred C. Rudolphsen to collect, among other delinquent claims, the claim against the plaintiff, and to arrange with the plaintiff.

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and other delinquent subscribers, for the reinstatement or cancellation of the lapsed policies as the subscribers might wish, and gave to him authority to enter into cancellation agreements with delinquent subscribers. Mr. Shepard gave Mr. Rudolphsen a list of the subscribers whose policies had lapsed, asked him to see each of them personally and explain to them that the premium deposits were due the association because the association

Page 1

had carried insurance for them for a period of six months prior to October 1918, and that the amount was due for the protection they had received during that period. He also authorized Rudolphsen to ascertain from each subscriber whether or not it was the subscriber's desire to continue or cancel the policy and to inform them that if they did not desire to continue the policy, no further charges against them would be made. He also instructed Rudolphsen to report the wishes of each subscriber that he interviewed back to the office of the association on his return. The plaintiff, Ingersoll, was one of the partes on the list which Shepard gave to Rudolphsen, With the list given to him by Mr. Shepard, Rudolphsen went to Delavan, Illinois, where plaintiff resided and found Ingersoll at his home.

There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to what took place at the interview between appellee and Rudolphsn. Rudolphsen testified that appellee met him at the door and he (Rudolphsen) explained to him that the assessment was due and appellee stated that he did not like the company and had dropped the insurance; that he (Rudolphsen) explained to him that he could drop the insurance any time that he was dissatisfied but that cancellation would not relieve him from paying the assessments then due and that appellee then said that he would pay the amount of the assessment and invited Rudolpasen into the house; that appellee gave him a check for the amount of the assessment and that he asked appellee if he wanted to continue the policy and appellee said he did not wish to keep the policy any longer, that he wanted it cancelled and that he told appellee he would cancel the policy as soon as he returned to the home office; that he asked appellee for the policy and appeliee looked for it, but did not find it; that he asked appellee to send it to the home office and appellee agreed to do that; that he then receipted the deposit assessment notice, marking it paid in full, dating it and signing his name to it and gave the receipt to appellee and reported the matter to the insurance office the next day for cancellation; that appellee in the conversation told him that he did not want any more assessment notices coming to his house as he would not

Page 2

not pay them. Appellee directly contradicts the greater part of this testimony and testifies that he did not make the statement to the witness, Rudolphsen, that he had dropped the insurance and that he did not tell Rudolphsen that he would drop the insurance; that Rudolphsen, did not ask appellee if he wanted to continue the policy and appellee did not tell him that he did not wish to keep it, or that he wanted it cancelled; that he did not ask appellee if the policy might be in the safety deposit box in the bank, and appellee did not agree to send the policy to the home office of appellant, at Bloomington; that Rudolphsen did not ask appellee for the policy or tell him that he would have to return the policy when he cancelled it. Rudolphsen testified that when he received the check from appellee he made a notation on his list marking the letters "Pd" and the letter "C" on the list before he left appellee's home.

The witness Rudolphsen when being examined with reference to these notations was asked the question "What is the meaning of these initilas or letters?" 'To this queston an objection that it was incompetent and immaterial was sustained. It was proper to explain the meaning of these notations. People vs. Thompson, 295 Ill. 187.

When Rudolphsen reported the collection and cancellation to the company on June 25, 1919, a bookkeeper for the association wrote upon appellee's application the words "Cancelled January 25, 1919." The policy was also marked cancelled on a card record thereof kept by the association on the policy register.

On Cross examination of the witness Rudolpsen when he was being examined as to his talk with appellee with reference to the cancellation of the policy, he was asked this question: "You knew that must be in writing?" Objection was made to the question and the objection improperly overruled. While the policy of insurance contained a provision: "This policy may be cancelled at any time by the subscriber by giving written notice to the association but such concellation shall not relieve a sub-

scriber from paying any assessment levied against him prior to the date of his request for cancellation" this was not the only manner in which it could be cancelled. An ordinary policy of insurance can always be cancelled by a mutual agreement therefor made between the insured and an agent of the insurance company authorized to make such agreement on behalf of the company.

Page 3

In the conflicting state of the record it was necessary that the jury should be accurately instructed. At the request of appellee the court gave to the jury the following instruction: "The jury are instructed that the greater weight of evidence in the case is not alone determined by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts. In determining upon which side the greater weight of the evidence is, the jury should take into consideration the opportunities of the several witnesses for seeing or knowing the things about which they testify; their conduct and demeanor while testifying; their interest or lack of interest, if any, in the result of the suit; the probability or improbability of the truth of their several statements in view of all other evidence, facts and circumstances proved on the trial and from all these circumstances, determine upon which side is the weight of the evidence." This instruction has frequently been critisized. It eliminates the number of witnesses testifying to a fact or state of facts as one of the elements in the determination of the question of the weight of the evidence. It is misleading in enumerating certain elements and telling the jury they "shoula" consider them. It is erroneous in enumerating certain elements and telling the jury that "from all these circumstances" the jury should determine upon which side is the weight of the evidence. The instruction omits many elements proper for the jury to take into consideration in determining the question. The jury must determine upon which side is the weight of the evidence from a consideration of "all the facts and circumstances in evidence" and not from the certain facts and circumstances in evidence enumerated in this instruction.

Appellee's third given instruction is as follows: "The court instructs the jury that you are the judges of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be attached to the testimony of each and all of them; and you are not bound to take the testimony of any witness as absolutely true; and you should not do so, if you are satis-

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fied from all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial that such witness is mistaken in the matters testified to by him or her or that for any other reason his or her testimony is untrue or unreliable." This instruction is erroneous. It allows the jury to reject the testimony of a witness if for any reason, not based upon the evidence, they are satisfied that his testimony is untrue or unreliable. Some people are so prejudiced against insurance companes in general that "for that reason" they consider the testimony of all

Page 4

employees of insurance corn-

panies as unreliable.

Complaint is made of the giving of an instruction which told the jury that before appellant could cancel the policy it must have been requested to do so by appellee. This is not an accurate statement of the law. A policy can be cancelled by mutual consent and in such case it is immaterial whether the request comes from the insured or insurer.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7475

Agenda No. 44

General No. 7475

April Term A. D. 1922

Mary A. Grainey, Appelled

vs.

Neil H. Schafer, et al, Appellants.

Appeal from Montgomery

HEARD, J.

Appellee, in the circuit court of Montgomery county, recovered a judgment for \$5,382.66 against appellants in an action of assumpsit brought upon two promissory notes executed by appellants and payable one to "Micheai J. Grainery or Mary A. Grainery or order" and the other payable to "the order of Mary or Michael Grainery."

Appellants filed during the course of the pleading, seven pleas to the declaration to each of which the court sustained a demurrer. These pleas were verified by affidavits of merits and the affidavits were stricken from the files.

Appellants stood by their pleas and the only errors here relied upon are that the court erred in sustaining the demurrers and striking the affidavits of merits from the files.

The pleas and affidavits of merits were very lengthy but in substance they set forth that no consideration for the notes passed from appellee to appellants; that they would never have borrowed the money for which the notes in question were given from appellee's husband and would never have executed the notes, had it not been for the solicitations of appellee's husband and promise that he would never collect the same, but would ute share out of his estate; that appellants, because of the promise to return said notes and never collect the same and to make a gift of the notes in question to appellants and solely on that account purchased two certain tracts of real estate situated in Montgomery county, one being purchased at the time the first note was executed and the smaller tract purchased at the time the secondn ote was executed and the sixth and seventh special pleas further set forth that appellants invested \$4,000 of their own funds, which they had prior to the time the advancement was made by appellant's husband, which funds of their own they would not have invested nad it not been for such promise of appellee's husband: that Michael Grainery who was the payee in the alter-



native with his wife in both notes, while he was still in possession of the same, and while he was sick in bed at his home in the presence of his wife, the appellee made a gift of the notes to the appellant, Georgia G. Schafer, and directed the appellee to get the notes, which were then in

Page 1

the home of the two payees and deliver the same to the appellant, Georgia G. Schafer, and that appellee Mary Grainery promised to do so, but pretended sine could not find the same, but that her promise was fraudulent and deceitful and that she wrongfully and fraudulently promised to turn the same over to appellants, although at the same time were given to appellants by the lawful owner; that the payment of said notes or the rendition of a judgment against the defendants by the plaintiff on said notes for the principal sum and the issuing of an execution and enforcement of said judgment will inevitably cause the bankruptcy of the defendants.

While many of the artificialties of ancient pleading are no longer necessary in this state every allegation of the plea is to be taken most strongly against the pleader and a plea to be good must state a good defense to the action or some part thereof.

The pleas in this case while purporting to allege a lack of consideration alleged facts showing a consideration for the notes. The pleas sought to vary the written terms of a contract by parol evidence; they sought to set up a gift of the notes by Michael Grainery, but fail to set up facts sufficient to show a gift, either inter vivos or or causi mortis, and attempt to set up an estoppel, but the facts so set up constitute no defense to the notes. Rothwell vs. Taylor 303 Ill. 226.

The demurrers were properly sustained and it folows in natural sequence that the affidavit of merits was properly stricken from the files.

The judgment is affirmed.

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General No. 7476

Agenda No. 45

April Term, A. D. 1922

Joseph Madison, Jr., by Joseph Madison, Sr., his Next Friend, Appellee,

227 I.A. 624

Loose-Wiles Biscuit Company, a Corporation, Appellant.

Appeal from Sangamon.

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$4,000 in a suit in trespass brought by Joseph Madison, Jr., a minor by his next friend, Joseph Madison, Sr., against the Loos-Wiles Biscuit Company, a corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Joseph Madison, Jr., on January 29, 1918, by reason of appellant's motor truck, on which Joseph Jr., was riding, striking a snow drift, thereby turning it over on him, breaking his leg and otherwise injuring him.

The evidence shows that at the time of the accident one of the bones of Joseph Jr.s thigh was broken and that at a time subsequence thereto while walking in the street on crutches he slipped and fell and broke his leg in another place.

The court gave to the jury the following instruction: "If you find the defendant guilty, you may assess the plaintiff's damages; if any, at such sum as you believe from the evidence will fully and fairly compensate him for the injuries he has sustained." This instruction does not limit plaintiff's recovery to the injuries which Joseph Madison Jr., had sustained as the proximate result of defendant's wilful negligence, but allowed the jury to assess damages for all injuries plaintiff had sustained whethproximately resulting from such negligence or not. It was a controverted question in their case whether the second injury to Joseph, Jr., was a proximate result of the first injury or was the result of negligence on his part. The giving of this instruction was erroneous as was also the giving of another instruction, on the subject of damages, for the same reason.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7479

Agenda No. 59

April Term, A. D. 1922

John J. Logan, Appellee,

vs.

Frank Rees Appellant

227 I.A. 624

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County.

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of \$871, damages in favor of appellant in an action for fraud and deceit.

The declaration charges in substance that on July 1st, 1919, appellee bargained with appellant to buy of appellant certain hogs and that appellant for the purpose of inducing appellee to buy said hogs falsely and fraudulently represented and stated to appellee that said hogs were sound and healthy and free from hog cholera and other contagious diseases and that they had been theretofore vaccinated as a preventative of hog cholera; that said statements were false; that said statements were false; that said statements were then and there known to appellant to be false; that appellee believed them to be true and confiding in their truth bought of appellant the said hogs for \$711; that said hogs were not sound and healthy; that they had not been vaccinated as a preventative for hog cholera and that said hogs sickened and died.

Complaint is made of the giving of all of the instructors given at the request of appellee but our attention is not called by appellant in his brief and argument to any particular in which any one of these instructions is in accurate or in correct.

While a court of review will search the record for the purpose of affirming a judgment it will not search for or consider errors not specifically pointed out by the appellant in his brief and argument and all alleged errors not specificially pointed out will be considered as having been waived.

Page 1

It is claimed by the appellant that the evidence in the case does not establish a case of fraud and deceit.

In Billstrom vs. T. T. T. Co. 220 Ill. App. 550 it was said "In order to establish an action for fraud and deceit the evidence in the case must show 1 That the representations as charged in the declaration were made by the defendants or one of them. 2 That the representations were false and known to be false by the defendants

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dants making them or made as a positive assertion recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and such representations must be made to deceive the Plaintiff. 3. That the plaintiff believed the representations to be true. 4. That the plaintiff making the purchase or entering into the contract relied upon the representations and was induced to make the purchase or enter into the contract because of the same. 5. That the plaintiff has suffered damages thereby."

Appellee testified that when negotiating with appellant for the sale of the hogs that he told appellant he would buy provided he could get a full car and get healthy hogs but that he would not buy hogs that had not been vaccinated; and that appellant told him that all his hogs had been vaccinated about three weeks previous and that they were all healthy and all right and that they then agreed upon the prices appellee was to pay for the hogs.

Appellant denied these statements entirely and testified that appellee did not ask him whether any of the hogs had been vaccinated; that vaccination was never mentioned; that here was nothing said about health and that the only thing discussed was the price. Appellant is corroborated by other persons who were near at the time of the conversation but say that they did not near the subject of vaccination or health discussed. There was evidence of one witness that he looked at the hogs the day before the sale and that some of them did not appear to be well.

Page 2

There is also evidence that while some of the hogs had been vaccinated others had not.

Within a day or two after the purchase some of the hogs sickened and within a short time they all died the disease being diagnosed as hog cholera.

Appellant testified that when sold the hogs were all healthy and this he is corroberated by other witnesses. While the number of witnesses testifying on each side as to a particular fact or state of facts is a proper element to be considered by the jury in determining upon which side the preponderance of the evidence is as to such fact or state of facts, the preponderance of the evidence is not alone determined by the number of witnesses tesifying for or against the existence of such fact or state of facts. The preponderance of the evidence is to

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5. That the plaints is

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Appellant cailed those so that in the arthropy of the tiffel that a politic rich time what a politic rich him, whether a logs had been vaccinated; that vaccinations are mentioned; that here was nothing at 1 to at health, and that the any mind we was nothing at 1 to at health, and of the conversation but the time for the conversation but the time field and not are the time of the conversation but the time field and not are at the action of reaching the time of the conversation of the time that the field of the time at the time that the field of the time at the time.

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be determined by the jury from a consideration of all the evidence in the case.

In this case if the evidence produced by appellee is believed then appellee proved all the elements necessary to estabish a case of fraud and deceit. If appellant and his witnesses are believed then appellee has not established such case. Weighing the evidence is peculiarly the province of the jury and they having found in favor of the appellee upon the controverted questions of fact and their finding having been approved by the Judge who saw and heard the evidence, we cannot say that the verdict of the jury is so manifestly contrary to weight of the evidence as to warrant us in setting aside their finding.

The Judgment is Affirmed.

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General No. 7480

Agenda No. 47

April Term A. D. 1922

H. M. Rudolph, Appellee,

VS.

The County of Ford, in the State of Illinois, and '1.16 Members of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Ford in the State of Illinois, to-wrt: W. M. Miller; Geo. M. Farley, A. D. Thompson, J. K. Montelius, J. E. Parkins, Peter C. Anderson, Onno Arends, E. D. Cameron, James A. Jordan, W. A. Kreitzer, Albert Froyd, Fred Danielson, (Ass't Supervisor) and Sherman Frederick, as members of the said Board of Supervisors of the County of Ford in the State of Illinois, Appellants.

Appeal from Ford.

227 I.A. 624

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HEARD, J.

Appellee by leave of court filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, setting forth that in November 1918, he was elected county superintendent of schools of Fora county for a term of four years from August 1, 1919; that at the June 1919 meeting of the Board of Supervisors of said county a resolution fixing salaries of county officers was passed as follows:

"Moved by Supervisor Althouse, seconded by Supervisor Froyd, salaries of County Officers as fixed by the Board and read by the Clerk shall be approved as read. Carried.

Sheriff \$1500.00 and expenses

 Deputy
 1000.00

 Circuit Clerk
 1500.00


 Deputy
 1000.00

 Treasurer
 1500.00

Deputy hire \$900. 600.00 for extra clerk

State's Attorney 1700.00

Superintendent of Schools \$1500.00 and \$1,000.00 extra compensation. Motion carried;" that by this motion his extra compensation as county superintendent of schools was fixed at \$1500 and \$1000 or \$2500 per annum; that although such extra compensation had been fixed at said sum no provision had been made for its payment; that for several quarters he had presented bills for \$250.00 per quarter and that the same had been allowed and paid to him; that there was due at the time of filing the petiton \$3291.67



ty-one Dollars and Sixty-seven cents (\$3,291.67) payaore to H. M. Rudolph, County Superintendent of Schools; for extra compensation due him up to November 4th, 1921.

Page 2

And commanding T. A. Flora, County Treasurer of the county of Ford or his successor or successors in office to countersign said check or order so to be issued by the County Clerk and pay the same.

Appellants answered in substance that the salary of County Superintendent of Schools of said county, as fixed by statute at the time said motion was made, was \$1500.00 per annum, and that by the adoption of said motion the extra compensation of appellee for his term of office was fixed at \$1,000.00 and that by presenting his bills to the county for \$250.00 per quarter, and collecting payment in accordance therewith that appellee is estopped from claiming any additional compensation above \$10.00 per quarter.

Appelee demurred to the answer to the petition and amendment, and appellants moved to carry the demurrer back. The demurrer to the answer was sustained and the motion to carry the demurrer back, was denied. Appellants elected to stand by their answer and motion and moved in arrest of judgment. This motion was denied, and a writ of mandamus was awarded as prayed for in the petition.

Appellants prayed this appeal and contend that the court erred in allowing the motion to file the petition; in sustaining the demurrer to the answers; in overruling the motion to carry the demurrer back to the petition and amendments thereto; in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, and in rendering the judgment for appellee.

We do not deem it necessary in this case to decide whether mandamus is a proper remedy in cases of this character.

The vital question in the controversy is the meaning of the resolution or motion passed at the June 1919 meeting of the Board of Supervisors of Ford county.

Whether we are construing an agreement between parties, a statute, a constitution or a resolution of a Board of Supervisors, the thing we must seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. The instrument must be

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construed as a whole, and the intention of the parties is to be collected from the entire instrument and not from detached portions, it being necessary to construe all its parts in order to determine the meaning of any particular part. Words used in one 'part of an instrument

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are, as a general rule, deemed to have been used in the same sense in another part of the instrument, where there is nothing in the context to indicate otherwise. Chicago Home for Girls vs. Carr, 300 Ill. 478.

The motion in question purports to be a resolution to fix salaries. In its various officers are specified and opposite each in a perpendicular column are figures which in each instance represent the salary of the officer. When expenses or extra clerk hire appear, they do not appear in this perpendicular column, but are carried out on the same line after the salary. The last officer named in the motion is "Superintendent of Schools." Directly opposite, and directly underneath the figures indicating the salaries of the other officers, are the figures "1500" and then after on the same line as in the other cases where an extra allowance is made are the words "and \$1500.00, extra compensation." The \$ sign does not appear in front of the figures 1500, but does appear at the head of the column.

While it is true that the salary of the County Superintendent of Schools, fixed by statute of 1919 (Chap. 53 Sec. 27) at \$1500.00, was payable out of the state school fund, and the only authority which the Board of Supervisors had was to allow additional compensation to be paid out of the county treasury, it is evident that they were not aware that it was not necessary for them to specify the amount fixed by the state law in their motion, as the item next above is state's attorney 1700.00;" which state's attorney salary was fixed by statute at \$1700. Sec. 17, Chap. 53 Smith's Ill. Stats. 1921.

Applying the rule of construction above mentioned to the motion in question we are of the opinion that it was the intention to fix the sum of \$1,000 as extra compensation and not the sum of \$2,500. Had they intended to fix the latter sum there is no reason why they should not have so fixed in one amount.

The proceedings of the Board of Supervisors in question were set out in full in the petition for mandamus. The petition on its face therefore showed that petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought. In Chaney v. Bak-

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Wine tracks and tracks are tracks and tracks are tracked and tracks are tracks are tracks are tracks are tracks are tracked are tracks are tracked are trac

The wave of cut could be provided by the course of the cou

er, 302 III. 481, it is said: "The rule is that a demurrer searches the whole record and will be carried back to the first substantial defect." The demurrer should have been carried back and sustained to the petition.

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The judgment is reversed.

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General No. 7435

Agenda No. 13

April Term A. D. 1922 Nancy C. Hess, Appellant

George A. Minier, Appellee Appeal from Pike.

NIEHAUS, P. J.

227 I.A. 6244

It appears from the evidence in this case that the appellant Nancy C. Hess rented a safety deposit box from the appellee George R. Minier, who conducted a banking business in the town of Pierce in Pike county; and in conjunction with the business of banking, rented out safety deposit boxes to customers, for the safe keeping of valuable papers. These safety boxes were arranged and located in a vault, which was a concrete stru cture, with steel doors, and combination lock, and was connected with appellee's banking room. The appellee rented one of the boxes to the appellant; and she placed therein for safe keeping \$11,000.00 in Liberty Bonds. These bonds were lost by burglarly, which was committed June 29, 1919. The vault was broken into, and the bonds in question stolen from appellant's box. Afterwards the appellant commenced this suit in the circuit court of Pike county against the appellee, to recover the value of the bonds in question; and alleging, that the appellee was a bailee of the bonds in the vault for hire; and that the vault provided by the appellee was not a safe place for the keeping of her bonds; and that the appellee was negligent in not having provided a safe place. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict for the appellee. The court rendered judgment on the verdict, and this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment.

The principal errors assigned relate to the introduction of certain evidence by the appellee, and the giving of instructions, claimed to be erroneous. The appellee Page 1

over the ob-

jection of the appellant, was allowed to testify, that prior to the loss of the bonds in question, he believed that he was furnishing reasonable protection

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for the property in the vault. We are of opinion, that appellee's testimony as to his belief, was not competent under the issues; and had a tendency to mislead the jury into thinking that the elements of good faith, was an important or controlling one upon the question of appellee's liability, whereas the controlling factor in appellee's liability was, whether or not, he exercised the care that men of ordinary prudence usually exercise with reference to the safety of their own property. C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Scott 42 Ill. 132. "The appellant was bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the preservation of the property entrusted to him by the appellee. Ordinary care in such cases is such care as every prudent man takes of his own goods; and ordinary negligence in the preservation of such goods is such diligence as men of common prudence usually exercise about their own affair." Mayer v. Brensiger 180 Ill. App. 110; National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead 250 Ill. 584. Evidence was also admitted, concerning burglaries of other vaults and safety deposit places, in other banks. We are of opinion that this evidence was also incompetent, and had a tendency to raise false issues in the case. Concerning the instructions given for appellee, it must be pointed out, that in the first instruction this language is used concerning the effect of the prima facie case made out by the appellant, namely, that "when the defendant introduces other proof which tends to rebut or contradict the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to make out her prima facie case, then such prima facie case vanishes, and it devolves upon the plaintiff to establish her case by a preponderance of all the evidence." Any kind of evidence, no matter how weak or trivial it might be; or how unsatisfactory to the jury, under this instruction would do away with the prima facie case established; the only requirement being that it had a tendency to contradict the presumption arising from appellant's prima facic proof. The

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evidence introduced by the appellee to contradict the appellant's prima facie case, must not only have a tendency to do so, but it must be of such a char-

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acter and sufficiency, that the proof is at least equal in evidenciary force and effect, to the prima facie case made out. Miles v. International Hotel Co. 289 Ill. 320. The 11th instruction given for appellee, is also objectionable. in that it assumes, that the vault door in question was sufficient to resist some burglar attacks, though not all of them. We are of opinion that the instruction No. 3 requested by the appellant was properly refused, inasmuch as it singled out a certain act of the appellee concerning the keeping of his own bonds, disconnected from the circumstances under which the act was done, and told the jury, that they might consider it on the question of the care which he bestowed on appellant's bonds; it also gave this act of appellee special emphasis and undue prominence. For the errors indicated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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General No. 7438

genda No. 10

April Term A. D. 1922

Orion A. Woodson and Sarah M. Carver, Appellees

vs.

Wabash Railway Company, Appellant

Appeal from Scott.

NIEHAUS, P. J.

227 I.A. 6245

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Scott county upon the verdict of a jury finding the appellant, Wabash Railway Company, guilty of negligence; and assessing damages against it, in the sum of \$1754.17; the damages assessed being for injuries to the crops situated on the lands of the appellees, Orion A. Woodson and Sarah M. Carver, and are alleged to have resulted from the overflow waters of Wolf Run Creek, a water course running across the right of way of the appellant and under a bridge known and designated as 277 A. It is averred in the declaration, 'that about the year 1888, the railway company, then owning and operating the railroad line in question, caused the bridge 277 A to be built; and by the consent and agreement, or acquiescence of the railway company, then operating said line, in the year 1889, Wolf Run Creek was diverted from the course in which it then flowed, and turned in a northerly direction over and across the right of way of the Keokuk division of said railway line, under said bridge 277 A; and that said stream has ever since uninterruptedly and continuously flowed over and across railway company's right of way, at that point and to bridge 277 A, with the acquiescence of the railroad company in control of the railroad.' It appears from the evidence, that bridge 277 A was built in 1888 by a railroad company, which was the A was built in 1888 by a railroad company, which was the an agreement which it made with the commissioners of the Scott County Levee & Drainage District; and that this agreement was in writing; and that the construction of the bridge was made in accordance with the written agreement; and that the waters of



Wolf Run Creek, were

thereupon diverted from their natural course, and turned to run down through the present channel, under the bridge in question. Under this state of the proof; it is evident, that the liability of the appellant under the obligations which were assumed in the building of the bridge and to take care of the diverted waters or Wolf Run Creek, depend upon the terms of the written contract referred to. No writing or writings, containing the agreement, were introduced in evidence; and there is no evidence to show what the agreement was, nor of its terms and conditions; nor of the obligations which the railroad company assumed thereby. In the absence of any proof, it cannot be presumed that the appellant under the agreement had any obligation or duty concerning the taking care of the waters of the stream in question. which are alleged in the declaration. And to entitle the appellee to recover it must affirmatively appear in evidence that the railroad company assumed the duties and obligations concerning bridge 277 A which are alleged in the declaration. For the reasons stated, the proof in the record is insufficient to show that appellant was guilty of negligence. Judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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General No. 7441

Agenda No. 19

April Term A. D. 1922

Homer English, Trustee in Bankraptcy, Plaintiff in Error

vs.

T. F. Grady, Defendant in Error

Appeal from McLean. 227 I.A. 625

NIEHAUS, P. J.

This suit in assumpsit was commenced in the circuit court of McLean county by George Weinzierl, to recover the price of 1941 bushels of yellow corn, which he claims to have sold to the appellee, T. F. Grady, the owner of a grain elevator at Downs. After this suit had been commenced, the appellant Homer English as trustee in bankruptcy for Weinsierl, was substituted as plaintiff in the suit. There was a trial by jury and a verdict and judgment for the appellee; this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment.

It was the contention of the appellee in defense of appellant's claim that he did not purchase the corn referred to; but that it had been received in his elevator, and held therein, for shipment for Weinzierl to Peoria or some other market; and subject to the directions to be given by Weinzierl; and that he never received any orders from Weinzierl to ship the corn; and that hence the corn, or corn of like quantity and quality, remained in his elevator subject to the order of Weinzierl. The evidence concerning this transaction is confined to the testimony of Weinzierl and appellee's agent, Robert A. Hoover, who was in charge of the elevator at Downs; and who transacted the business for the appellee. These parties flatly contradict each other upon the material points testified about. In order to determine whether or not there was a sale of the corn, as claimed by Weinzierl, it was necessary for the jury to pass upon the respective credibility of these two witnesses. Hoover testified that he took the 1941 bushels of corn from Weinzierl merely for the present; and subject to his order; and that he had corn of the same quality and

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amount in the elevator at all

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times after that; and until March 1st, 1921 the year following. In rebuttal of this testimony, the appellant called Robert Price, a former employe of the appellee, as a witness; and offered to prove, that Price was in the enaploye of the appellee, during the month of January 1921: and that, at that time, he swept every bin in the elevator; and that the same was clear of corn; and that there was no corn in the west elevator; and less than 500 bushels in the east elevator. The introduction of this evi dence was objected to by the appellee; and on his objection ruled out. This ruling of the court is assigned as error. We are of opinion, that the evidence was competent rebuttal; and it should have been submitted to the consideration of the jury; it had a material bearing on the issue involved; and it was an important circumstance which the jury might have considered, upon the question of whether appellant or appellee's version of the contract made was the correct one; also upon the matter of the credibility of the two witnesses referred to. For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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General No. 7446

Agenda No. 49

October Term, A. D. 1921

Town of Windsor, Shelby County Illinois, Appellant

Charles W. Wittenberg, Appellee

Appeal from Shelby.

227 I.A. 625

NIEHAUS, P. J.

This action was brought in the name of the appellant Town of Windsor, against the appellee Charles W. Wittenberg, for the recovery of the penalty provided for by statute, for obstructing a public highway. On the first trial, before a justice of the peace, appellee was found not guilty. An appeal was thereupon prosecuted to the circuit court, where another trial also resulted in a verdict of not guilty. And the court rendered judgment on the verdict, and an appeal is prosecuted from the judgment.

It is insisted by the appellant, that the evidence clearly shows, that the appellee set out his line fence into a public highway, which had been legally dedicated for public use, and in such a way, as to take in a strip of land having an average width of about six feet and ten inches; and knowing that he had no legal right to do so. Whether the strip in question was a part of the dedicated highway, was a controverted matter in the case, and a question of fact for the jury to determine. Town of Harmnoy v. Clarke 250 Ill. 57. Two juries determined this question against appellant. We cannot say, that the finding of the last jury is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. It is assigned as error, that the trial court allowed the appellee to testify, that before he built his fence, he had a telephone conversation with the county superintendent of highways; and with the town clerk concerning the line of the road. We are of opinion that this evidence was not competent; and was of no evidenciary value or force, upon the question at issue, namely, where the actual line of the road was; but, we do not regard the error either as important or prejudicial; and it cannot therefore be considered as a

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the judgment. Appellant also complains because this action was designated in some of the instructions as a quasi criminal proceeding. This was not error. Underwood v. Ankrum 190 Ill. 365. Nor did the court err in instructing the jury that the proof should show the appellee's guilt by a clear preponderance of the evidence. A. T. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. People 227 Ill. 270; Ruth v. City of Abingdon 80 Ill. 418; Gilbert v. Bone 79 Ill. 341; T. P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Foster 43 Ill. 480. We find no reversible error in the record, and judgment is therefore affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

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General No. 7454

Agenda No. 28

April Term A. D. 1922

Marian Myser, an infant, by May Myser, her father and next friend, Appellee

vs.

Central Illinois Public Service Company, a Corporation,
Appellant
Appeal from Douglas.

NIEHAUS, P. J.

227 I.A. 625³

This is a suit commenced by the appellee, Marian Myser, an infant about nine years old, by Max Mayser, her father and next friend, in the circuit court of Douglas county, against the appellant, Central Illinois Public Service Company, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by her from injuries received, in consequence of an alleged negligence on the part of the appellant. There is no controversy about the manner in which the appellee was injured. On or about the 27th day of July, 1921, she was walking on the sidewalk along the street in front of the First National Bank building in the village of Villa Grove; the bank building being situated on the northwest corner of Main and Monroe streets in the village. The bank entrance had a stone ornament which suddenly fell from its position, and struck the appellee on the head, causing the injuries of which she complains.

The evidence shows, that in providing for an additional electric lighting, which was thought necessary for the band concerts in the village, a contrivance was devised; and in order to hold this contrivance in place, guy wires were used, one of which had been fastened to the stone ornament referred to. At the time of the injury, it is alleged, that the appellant by its servants were at work on this lighting contrivance, and in the course of the work, and in consequence of the strain put upon the guy wire thereby, the stone ornament was pulled off, and thereby caused it to fall upon the appellee. The main contested question


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in the case is, whether Paul



Knox, who was in the employ of the appellant; and by whose assistance, and supervision it is claimed, the light. ing contrivance was put in place, was acting for the appellant in his capacity as superintendent or maintenance man, and within the scope of his employment as such, or was merely acting on his personal responsibility and individual initiative. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the appellee fixing her damages at \$3500.00 The appellant moved for a new trial, whereupon the appellee entered a remittitur of \$1500.00; and the court thereupon denied the motion and entered judgment for \$2000.00 against the appellant, from which an appeal is prosecuted. It is contended by the appellant, that hearsay evidence was introduced to show what position Paul Knox was holding in the appellant's service. Evidence was introduced to show, what was generally understood in the neighborhood to be his connection with the appellant company. It is clear that this evidence was not competent; and the objection to it, should have been sustained; the nature and character of Knox's employment was one of the important and contested questions in the case; and it was necessary that it should be proven by competent evidence. Complaint is also made about the giving of the third instruction for the appellee. This instruction is erroneous, in that it assumes that Knox was agent or servant of the appellant, and that in assisting in the work of attaching anu fastening the electric lighting fixture in question, he was acting for the appellant, and within the line and scope of his employment; and not on his individual initiative and responsibility. The instruction directs a verdict, and must therefore be regarded as reversible error.

For the reasons stated, judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.



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General No. 7463

Agenda No. 37

April Term A. D. 1922 Marie L. Hacke, Appellant

Charles Griffel, et al., Appellees.

Appeal from Macoupin.

NIEHAUS, P. J.


227 I.A. 6254

The appellant Marie Hacke commenced this suit in assumpsit in the circuit court of Macoupin County, to recover from Charles Griffel, William Griffel and John Griffel, appellees, the amount realized by the appellees, from the sale of coal underlying certain lands, which the appellant had previously conveyed to them; which amounted to thirty four acres and a fraction. Her claim was based on alleged understanding and agreement which she claims to have had with the appellees at the time the conveyance was made; and to the effect, that whatever they realized from a subsequent sale of the coal, in the part conveyed by her, should be paid over to her as a part of the consideration for the conveyance. All the appellees, in the testimony given by them, deny, that any such agreement had been made with the appellant; but that the amount paid to the appellant for the conveyance, was the entire purchase price and consideration for the land conveyed; and that no reservation was made, obligating them to pay anything additional to her. There was a trial by the court; and the court found the issues for the appellees; and entered a judgment in bar of appellant's suit; this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment.

It is contended by the appellant, that the finding of the court is against the weight of the evidence; and this is the only question presented for consideration on this appeal. It was necessary for appellant to prove her contention by a preponderence of the evidence, to entitle her to recover. The Court in deter-

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mining the matter of the preponderance of the evidence in this case had to pass on the credibility of the witnesses. If the testimony



of the appellees is to be taken as true, it is clear, that the appellant had no ground of recovery; and the trial court must have reached the conclusion that the appellee's version given of the transaction between the parties was the true one; and therefore rendered judgment accordingly. Where issues are tried by the court, the findings of the court on facts, have the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury; and are therefore usually regarded as conclusive where there is evidence to sustain them; especially where there is a conflict in the evidence concerning the facts necessary to a recovery. And the findings of a court on questions of fact, should not be disturbed on review, unless they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Berghofer v. Frazier 150 Ill. 577; Holt v. Simpson 230 Ill. 170; People v. Askins 200 Ill. App. 621; H. S. B. & Co. v. Mill Co. 152 Ill. App. 479; Chikora v. Platzke 151 Ill. App. 280. We are of opinion, that the finding of the court was fully warranted by the evidence; and therefore this court would not be justified reversing the judgment on the ground that it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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Agenda No. 40 General No. 7468

1922 April Term A. De G. W. Ludwick, Plaint ff and Appellee

Helen Deutsch, Defendant and Appellant Appeal from Vermilion. 227 I.A. 62

NIEHAUS, P. J.

This action was brought by the appellee G. W. Ludwick in the circuit court of Vermilion county, against the appellant Helen Deutsch, to recover damages alleged to have resulted to appellee, in consequence of the negiigence of the appellant; which negligence it is claimed, brought about a collision of the appellant's automobile with that of the appellee. There was a trial by jury which resulted in a verdict and judgment against the appellant for \$415.00; and this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment.

It is insisted on appeal, that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the appellant. It is sufficient to say, concerning this contention, that the court properly refused to do so, because there was evidence adduced on the trial tending to show the negligence alleged. But the proof concerning the damages sustained by the appellee is clearly insufficient to satisfy the legal requirements. The evidence does not show the extent of the injury to appellant's car; nor what particular parts of the car had been broken by the collision; nor the necessity of substituting any new parts; nor the extent and cost of the repairs which were made necessary on account of the collision. The only instruction given for appellee which directs the jury's attention to the amount of admages he was entitled to is as follows:

The court instructs the jury that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the charges contained in each count of the declaration in order to entitle him to recover in this case. If the plaintiff proves the charges contained in any one of the counts, by the preponderance of the evidence, he will be entitled to a verdict for such an amount as the preponderance of the

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evidence shows that he is entitled to, not to exceed the amount claimed in the declaration.

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This instruction does not correctly state the measure of damages. The true measure of damages in this case is the cost of repairs necessary to put the car in substantially as good condition as it was before the collision. T. P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Roberts 71 Ill. 540; Coyne v. C. C. C. & St. L. 208 Ill. App. 125; Walton v. B. B. & C. R. R. Co. (Opinion by this Court filed April Term 1921). We find no error in the giving of appellee's instruction No. 4, nor in the refusal of Instructions requested by the appellant numbered 15, 16 and 17; but for the error indicated, judgment is reversed and cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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General No. 7474

Agenda No. 55

April Term A. D. 1922

Peyton E. Kries, Appellant

vs.

W. W. Hughes, Appellee

Appeal from Sangamon.

The appellant Peyton E. Kreis took judgment in the circuit court of Sangamon County for \$1227.64 against W. W. Hughes the appellee, on a judgment note, made by appellee. At the succeeding term of the court, on motion of the appellee, the judgment was opened up, and the appellee was allowed to plead in defense of appellant's claim. He pleaded the general issue, and two special pleas; one alleging that the consideration for the note was an illegal one; another that the note was given for money won by the appellant from the appellee in speculation on the market price of grain; the other plea averred, that the note was made without any good or valuable consideration. Issue was joined on matters set up in defense. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict for the appellee, upon which a judgment in bar was rendered; and from this judgment an appeal is prosecuted.

The vital question in this controversy, is whether the buying and selling of grain, which was involved in the transactions between the parties, and in the pecuniary settlement for which the note was given, were a violation of Section 130 of Chapter 38 Revised Statutes. This Section provides that

"Whoever contracts to have or give to himself or another the option to sell or buy, at a future time, any grain or other commodity, stock of any railroad or other company, or gold, where it is at the time of making such contract intended by both parties thereto that the option, whenever exercised, or the contract resulting therefrom, shall be settled, not by the receipt or delivery of such property, but by the payment only of differences in prices thereof, or whoever forestalls the market by spreading false rumors to influence the price of commodities therein, or corners the market, or attempts to do so in relation to any of

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such commodities, shall be fined not less than

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\$10 or more than \$1,000 or confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both; and all contracts made in violation of this section shall be considered gambling contracts, and shall be void."

It will be noticed that under the above section, the intention of the parties to a contract concerning the delivery of the grain purchased, is one of the controlling factors in giving character to the transaction, either as a contract for gambling, or a legitimate contract for the purchase and sale of grain; and this feature has also been emphasized by Supreme and Appellate Courts in Pelouze v. Slaughter 241 Ill. 215; Pixley v. Boynton 79 Ill. App. 351; Dillon v. McCray 59 Ill. App. 505; Ennis v. Edgar 154 Ill. App. 544; Barnett v. Baxter 64 Ill. App. 544.

To make purchases and sales of grain, such as are here involved, gambling transactions, it must appear that neither party intended actual purchases and sales to be made, but that both had the intention of settling on the differences in price only. Kertling v. Sturtevant 181 Ill. App. 517. And the burden of proof to show that the contracts for purchase and sale of grain were in fact gambling transactions, rests upon the party who asserts the fact. Johnson v. Milmine 150 Ill. App. 208. It was a question of fact for the jury to decide, whether it was the intention of both parties to the contracts involved, that the options whenever exercised, or the contracts resulting therefrom, should be settled, not by the receipt or delivery of grain, but by the payment of the differences in the prices. This being the legal status of the controversy, we are of opinion, that the giving of the second instruction for appellee was erroneous. This instruction, which apparently aims to follow the statute in defining a gambling contract, omitted the important element of the intention of the parties, found in the statutory definition. The omission eliminated from the consideration of the jury an element which they should have considered in order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning the legality of the transactions. It is true this omission does not appear in other instructions, which

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were given; but inasmuch as the instruction referred to directs a verdict and is misleading concerning an importth mistra of the control of the cont

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ant legal element in the controversy, it constitutes reversible error. Judgment is therefore reversed and cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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General No. 7440

Agenda No. 13

April Term A. D. 1922

Paul Murray, Admr, etc., Defendant in Error

corporation), Plaintiff in Error. Wheal from his head

Standard Pecan Co. (a

This cause was before the court at a prior term and was then reversed and therefore amended. (Murray vs. Standard Pecan Company 217 Ill. App. 587.) A second trial was had upon a stipulation of facts before the court and judgment entered for defendants in error hereinafter called the plaintiff, against plaintiff in error hereinafter called defendant. To review that judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.

The undisputed facts are that R. M. Nicholson was on September 12, 1912, a sales agent of defendant, a corporation, authorized to sell its stock for cash at the rate of ten dollars per share; that certain certificates of stock signed by the President and Secretary of defendant company, with corporate seal affixed, were delivered to Nicholson in blank, with authority to fill in said blanks, in case of sale, with the name of the purchaser, the number of shares sold, and the date of the sale; that Nicholson had been given no authority whatever to sell said shares of stock with agreement or contract attached providing for the repurchase of said stock by defendant; that said Nicholson did on September 12, 1912, sell :o Mrs. A. G. Murray, plaintiff's intestate, one hundred shares "Class B Cumulative Preferred" stock of defendant at the price of ten dollars per share; that without the knowledge or consent of defendant and without afterwards reporting the same to plaintiff Nicholson wrote upon the back of said certificate the following: "It is hereby agreed that the Standard Pecan Co., shall at the end of three years from date repurchase this stock at \$11.00 per share upon thirty days notice. The owner does not need to sell said Company the stock unless she

Page 1

so desires. (Signed) Standard Pecan Co. per R. M. Nicholson;" that said Nicholson delivered said certificate



so endorsed by him to Plaintiff's intestate, the purchaser and collected from her one thousand dollars for said stock which he paid over to defendant; that Nicholson. also before delivering said stock to the purchaser filled out the blanks properly with the date of issue, name of the purchaser, number of shares, etc; that defendant never knew that said certificate had any endorsement thereon relating to repurchase thereof until after the death of the purchaser and until after three years from the date of the certificate when its secretary received by mail a notice signed by the heirs of the purchaser, stating in substance that they were giving thirty days notice in writing of their election to resell to it the said shares of stock in accordance with the terms of the writing on the back of the certificate, and demanding a repurchase by it of said stock at eleven dollars per share at the expiration of said thirty days; that immediately upon the receipt of said notice defendant by its proper officers replied thereto advising the heirs that it would not repurchase said stock, and that the agent who sold the same had no authority to make any agreement with the purchaser that the Company would repurchase said stock and that it repudiated any such agreement to repurchase; that defendant has not repaid Mrs. A. G. Murray, nor to her legal representatives, etc., any part of the purchase money paid for said stock; that there was paid to her two dividends on the stock.

Defendant contends that upon the stipulated facts the plaintiff cannot legally recover anything from it in this suit;

- 1. Because having received the purchase price of its stock under an authorized sale by its agent, whose authority was limited to the sale of its stock, it is neither required to perform under the agent's unauthorized agreement to repurchase the stock, nor to refund the purchase price upon its repudiation of the unauthorized agreement to repurchase.
- 2. Because the endorsement on the back of the certificate

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authority, as agent, was an independent agreement, and no part of the certificate which the agent was authorized to sell.

- Because the unauthorized endorsement by defendant's agent of an agreement to repurchase, written
 by the agent on the back of the certificate did not make
 the sale conditional.
- 4. Because plaintiff's intestate in dealing with defendant's was bound in law at her peril to ascertain the scope and extent of the agent's authority at the time sne dealt with him and was bound in law to inquire into the agent's authority, in addition to the sale of the stock.

When this case was before this court at a prior term on substantially the same statement of facts this court said:

"The purchase made by decedent, and for which the money was paid, was a certificate of stock with a purported agreement by appellee to repurchase it endorsed thereon. If such endorsement is not valid on account of want of authority on the part of appellee's agent to make it, then the whole contract fails for the reason that apepllant's intestate was a party to no contract of which the endorsement was not a part. * * * * Eberts vs. Selover, 44 Mich. 519. The contract in question consisted of that which appears on the face and back of a certificate of stock, which taken together constitute a conditional sale. (Roush vs. Illinois Oil Co. 180 Ill. App. 346) and appellee cannot separate the parts and ratify one, and thereby make it an absolute sale enuring to its benefit and repudiate the remainder. (Taylor vs. Conner. 41 Miss. 722; Sternbach vs. Leopold, 50 Ill. App. 476)"

The Circuit Court in its findings followed the rule that laid down and the judgment should therefore be affirmed.

General No. 7445

Agenda No. 54

April Term A. D. 1922 Flora M. Nelson, Appellee

Richard Elmer Nelson, Appellant Appeal from Hancock.

HEARD, J.

227 I.A.


On October 8, 1918, appellee brought suit for seperate maintenance against appellant in the circuit court of Hancock County. Appellant in his answer to the bill of complaint denied that appellee was his wife and alleged that at the time of the purported marriage of appellee and appellant, appellee was the wife of one Robert Jones. The answer also denied that appellee was living separate and apart from him by reason of his fault. Appellant also filed a cross bill asking for an annulment of the purported marriage alleging that she was the wife of Jones at the time of his purported marriage with her.

After hearing, the court entered a decree dismissing the cross bill and requiring appellant to pay \$100.00 per month as alimony to appellee and \$1500.00 for her solicitor's fees, together with costs of suit, from which decree this appeal is prosecuted.

Three questions are presented for our consideration. Was Fora M. Nelson, the wife of said Richard Elmer Nelson, under the purported solemnization of marriage with him, or was she at that time still the wife of one Robert Jones, and incapable of contracting marriage with said Richard Elmer Nelson? Was there a valid decree of divorce between Flora Jones and Robert Jones?

Was she at the time of filing her said Bill for separate maintenance, living separate and apart from him, the said Richard Elmer Nelson, without her fault?

The facts as disclosed by the record are that appellee on June 14, 1899, was lawfully married to Robert Jones and that she lived with him until about April 25, 1907, in Kentucky; that afterwards she came to McDonough County, Illinois, and became a resident there, and on August 6, 1909, filed a bill for divorce against said



that at the time said Robert Jones was a non-resident of the State of Illinois; that she never obtained a divorce from Robert Jones, or attempted to, except by said suit in the Circuit Court of McDonough County, Illinois.

In her said suit for divorce, appellee filed with the bill an affidavit of non-residence showing that said Robert Jones was a non-resident of Illinois and that process could not be had upon him and giving his place of residence as Louisville, Kentucky. A publication of a nonresident notice was made in the Macomb Bystander, a daily newspaper printed at Macomb in said McDonougi County, Illinois. A publisher's certificate which was filed in said cause on August 11, 1909, shows that the non-resident notice was published "for three successive weeks, the first insertion of which was in the issue of said paper bearing date August 7, 1909, and the last insertion in the issue of same bearing date August 21, 1909," while another publisher's certificate filed Auguse 27, 1909 shows publication for "four successive weeks, the first insertion being August 7, 1909 and the latest August 28, 1909." Each of the certificates being filed at a time prior to the last publication date mentioned therein.

The decree in the case was in part as follows:-"And the court having examined the affidavit of non-residence filed herein.and the certificate of publication of notice to the defendant Robert Jones, and being thereby and otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds * * * that thereupon publication notice to the said defendant, Robert Jones, was made in the Macomb Bystander, a daily secular newspaper, of general circulation in the County of McDonough, State of Illinois, in which said suit was brought, published in the City of Macomb, County of McDonough and State of Illinois, which said newspaper has been regularly published in the said City and County aforesaid, for more than six months prior to the first publication of said notice, which said notice contained a statement of the pendency of this suit, the names of the parties hereof, the title of the court and the time and place of the return of summons herein, the first pub-



lication of which notice was made in an isssue of said paper dated the 7th day of August A. D. 1909

Page 2

and the last

publication of said notice was made in the issue of said paper dated the 21st day of August, A. D. 1909; and which said notice was published in said paper for three successive weeks, the first publication being more than forty days prior to the first day of the present term of this court, and it further appearing to the court that the clerk of this court did within ten days after the first publication of said notice, mail, postage prepaid, a copy of said notice to the said defendant, Robert Jones, at this post office address aforesaid; and the court being fully advised in the premises finds that this court now has jurisdiction of the person of the said defendant, Robert Jones, and of the subject matter of this suit; and the said defendant, Robert Jones, having been three times solemnly called in open court to appear, except, demur, plead or answer, the complainant's bill, came not nor anyone for him, but herein made default."

It is contended by appellant that the Circuit Court erred in not finding that the purported decree of divorce entered in the suit of Flora Jones v. Robert Jones was a nullity and that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the person of said Robert Jones, and that said purported decree did not constitute a divorce, and the greater portion of appellant's 102 page brief and argument and his 37 page reply brief is devoted to a discussion of this question.

It has frequently been said by the Supreme Court that there probably is no word in common use which is more often incorrectly used by writers of Judicial opinions than the word Jurisdiction.

By statute the circuit court is given authority to hear and determine divorce cases and had jurisdiction over the general class of cases to which the Jones case oelonged. When appellee who was a resident of the County, filed her bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Mc-Donough County, filed her affidavit of non-residence, caused publication to be made in a newspaper within



three or four weeks, appeared in open court, and caused the defendant to be defaulted, submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court and when she procured the court to grant her a decree of

Page 3

divorce and Robert Jones relying upon the legality of the divorce remarried, the decree of divorce as to appellee, no matter how erroneous, so long as it was not reversed in a direct proceeding, was not a nullity as to appellee, and she, having lead the court into error, (if there was error) could not take advantage of her own wrong and have the decree set aside or vacated. Guggenheim v. Guggenheim 189 Ill. App. 146; Sloan v. Sloan 102 Ill. 581.

The court in the Jones decree found "that this court now has jurisdiction of the person of the said Robert Jones and of the subject matter of this suit."

Any rule adopted in this regard must be a general rule and to hold that a husband who has married a woman who had obtained a decree of divorce, which she herself could not have annulled or set aside, after living with her for years and begetting children, could, by the sanction of a court, have a decree, to which he was a stranger, declared a nullity, his children bastardized and his wife thrown upon the mercies of the world, would be abhorrent to our conception of justice and a blot upon our jurisprudence.

It is contended by appellant that the evidence does not show that appellee was living separate and apart from appellant without fault on her part. The evidence is quite voluminous and it is usual in such cases it is very contradictory. No good purpose would be conserved by reviewing this evidence in detail, Suffice it to say, that appellee testified her husband beat her with his fist, choked her and was guilty of divers other acts of cruelty, which if true, fully justified her in leaving appellant. The court who saw and heard the witnesses has found this question of fact in her favor and, although these acts are denied by defendant and his witnesses, we would not be justified in disturbing the finding.

The decree is affirmed.



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General No. 7449

Agenda No. 24

April Term A. D. 1922

Bert Robertson and Chas. A. Smith, Appellees

vs.

Farmers Elevator Company of Homer, Illinois, Appellant Appeal from Champaign.

HEARD, J.

227 I.A. 6265

This was an action in assumpsit, brought by the appellees against the appellant, claiming the purchase price of certain oats grown in the year 1920 on land owned by one Josephus Yount, and sold by one Alex McElroy to the appellant. The declaration consists of the common counts only, to which the appellant pleaded the general issue.

On May 4, 1920 appellees took a chattel mortgage from McElroy which purported to cover, among other things, a one-half interest in sixty-five acres of growing oats, growing on the Yount farm in Sections 2 and 3, Township 18 North, Range 14, West, in Vermilion county The mortgage was properly acknowledged and recorded in Vermilion County.

Alex McElroy had been a tenant of one Josephus Yount, under a written lease dated February 12, 1920, whereby Yount leased to McElroy certain lands situated in Vermilion County in Section 2, 3, 10, and 11 of Township 18 North, Range 14 West, for grain and cash rent. On the back of this written lease appeared a written endorsement dated March 1, 1920, whereby McElroy, for certain considerations therein named, assigned and transferred to Yount all his rights under the lease and all his interests in the grain grown or to be grown on said land. This written assignment the court refused to admit in evidence.

There was evidence tending to show that the night before July 16, 1920, McElroy had a conversation over the telephone with the

Page 1

appellee Smith in which Smith authorized McElroy to make sale of the oats in question. McElroy then made inquiries of grain buyers in Homer,



Illinois, including the appellant, as to what price they were paying for oats, and on July 16, 1920, the appellant company having offered the highest price, McElroy sold the oats in question to appellant. The place of business of the appellant was in Homer, which is in Champaign County, Illinois, a different County from that in which the oats were growing, and the mortgage recorded.

Upon the sale being made and prior to the delivery of the oats, appellant advanced to McElroy \$30.00, upon this sale. The oats in question amounted to about \$867.00, and were delivered to the appellant at Homer, about August 2, 1920, and settlement for the same made with McElroy. At the time of the settlement therewere present McElroy, Josephus Yount, the owner of the land, and the witness Byers, who was the manager of the appellant company. At this settlement the appellant paid to Yount, the landlord, out of the proceeds of the oats, \$200.00 due Yount for rent under his lease with McElroy.

The appellant's agents with whom the business was transacted testified that they never had any knowledge or information that appellees had a chattel mortgage on these oats, or had any claims thereto until after sale, delivery and settlement for the oats in question. The appellee Smith testified that early in the summer of 1920, he told the company's manager, Byers, that they held a chattel mortgage on the grain, and that McElroy was going to deliver the oats either to appellant or to some other elevator, and that appellees wanted the money for the oats paid to them. Byers absolutely denied ever having had any such conversation.

The appellees made no demand on appellant for the oats in question. After the settlement was made by the elevator company, appellees demanded that they be paid the amount of the purchase price of the oats, and upon this being refused, brought this suit, declaring under the common counts only upon the theory that claiming to have a chattel mortgage they were entitled to recover from the company the amount which the company had contracted to pay McElroy



as the purchase price of the oats.

Both at the close of the evidence for the plaintiff and at the close of all of the evidence in the case, appellant moved to exclude the evidence and to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. Both of these motions were denied by the court.


The claim of the appellees was for the entire amount of the purchase price of these oats without allowing any deduction for rent paid the landlord or anything else, and amounted to \$201.56. The verdict of the jury was for the entire amount of appellee's claim \$200.67. #-60.4.

Motion for a new trial was made by appellant, and overruled by the court, and judgment entered in favor of the appellees and against the appellant for **EST.57* # 604.

It is contended by appellant that the court erred in not instructing the jury to find the issue for the defendant. Appellees claim that the evidence shows appellant to be indebted to them and that such indebtedness can be recovered under the common count for money had and received and while many authorities are cited in an attempt to sustain this contention, an examination of these authorities fails, however, to show any holding that assumpsit for money had and received is a proper remedy. Appellant received no money which in equity and good conscience belonged to appellees. It only purchased in the open market property in which appellees had only a special interest. In such case the mortgagor cannot recover from the purchaser the purchase price of the property, but can only recover the property in an action of replevin, or recover in an action of conversion to the extent of his special interest and he can not recover from the purchaser beyond his specail interest in the property. Bailey vs. Godfry 54 Ill. 507; Howard v. Burns 44 Kan. 543; Bank of Commerce v. Morris, 114 Mo. 255.

The court should therefore have sustained appellants motion to instruct the jury to find the issues for appellant.

Accordingly the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and judgment entered here for defendant in bar of the action and for costs.



General No. 7456

Kgenda No. 30

April Term A. D. 1922

Elmer F. Stark, Administrator of the Etsate of James Lowell Lewis, deceased, Appellee

ve

Coles County Telephone and Telegraph Company, a Corporation, and Central Illinois Public Service Company, a corporation, Appellant

Appeal from Coles. 227 I.A. 627

HEARD, J.

This is an action of case brought by appellee, as administrator of the estate of James Lowell Lewis, for the wrongful death of Lewis, alleged to have been caused by the joint negligence of the appellant, and the Coles County Telephone and Telegraph Co., originally prought against both but later dismissed as to the telephone company.

The declaration charged the appellant with operating an electric transmission line through the alley in which the deceased lost his life; that at one point in that alley there was a crossing of two telephone wires with the lines of appellee, the telephone wires being above the electric wires; that the electric wires were carrying a high and deadly voltage of electricity, and that the msulation on the wires carrying this electricity had become rotten and decayed and had fallen off in many places. The declaration in different counts sets out various alleged acts of negligence and alleges that as a result thereof a telephone wire fell across the wires of appellant and as a result of faulty insulation thereon, became charged with a deadly current of electricity; that said telephone wire, so charged, hung in said alley, and that James Lowell Lewis, a pedestrian lawfully using said alley, and in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety, came in contact with said wire and received a charge of electricity which

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killed him.

The trial of the cause resulted in a judgment for \$7916 in favor of appellee against appellant from which 11 (-1 -1 -1 -1

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judgment the appeal has been taken.

Appellant interposed a challenge to array of Jurors on the ground that the Jury list had not been prepared by the Board of Supervisors in accordance with the provisions of the statute relating thereto. As the judgment must be reversed upon other grounds and before the cause can be tried another jury list will have been prepared it is unnecessary for us to discuss this point.

Appellant contends that the court erred in the giving of instructions to the Jury. Modified instruction, No. one is erroneous in not confining the consideration of the Jury to the negligence of the defendant alleged in the declaration or some count thereof and in not informing the Jury what negligence was charged in the declaration. Modified instruction No. 2 is defective in not confining the consideration of the Jury to pecuniary damages. Modified instruction No. 3 is erroneous as it assumes that appellant was negligent and only submits to the Jury the question as to whether or not such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lewis.

As the record in this case was made the court did not err in excluding evidence of the alleged settlement of appellee with the telephone company. The competency of evidence to go to the Jury is a question for the court and it would have been proper for appellant to have examined witnesses as to the terms of the alleged settlement out of the presence of the Jury for the purpose of determining the competency. If the telephone company paid money for a covenant not to sue then evidence as to the amount paid was clearly incompetent.

For the error in giving instructions the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

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General No. 7469

Agenda No. 51

27 I.A. 62

April Term A. D. 1922 Thomas Oseland, Appellee

vs.

Wabash Railway Company, Appellant Appeal from Christian.

HEARD, J.

This is an action on the case for damages for personal injuries sustained by appellee, Thomas Oseland, because of the alleged negligence of the appellant, Wabash Railway Company, on the 13th day of May, 1920, by the plaintiff falling into a hole in the side walk at the intersection of a public street of the village of Stonington and appellant's right of way. The trial of the cause resulted in a judgment for \$1575.00 and costs in favor of appellee from which judgment this appeal has been taken.

The amended declaration contained three counts making the allegations usual in similar cases.

To this declaration a plea of the general issue was filed and a special plea that the plaintiff was barred from his action because at the time the said street was laid out by the Village of Stonington over the right of way of the defendant company, the said defendant and the said Village of Stonington entered into a written contract which was set forth in the plea, that in consideration that the Village of Stonington desired to open the said street over the right of way of said railroad company, that the said Village would pay to the said defendant the sum of \$12.50, being the cost of placing the side walk between the tracks of the defendant, and that the said village would construct and forever maintain the approaches to said tracks and all necessary side walks upon said street over said railroad property; also that said Village agreed to abandon proceedings for the opening of another street for the period of five years and until the necessity of said village had become greater; that in consideration thereof the defendant company granted to the village a right of way over the said tracks to be kept open and maintained as a thoroughfare, which contract



in full force and effect relieved the defendant from maintaining or keeping in repair the said approaches to the said crossing; and that by reason thereof defendant was not liable for failing so to do.

To this plea a demurrer was sustained. Appellant stood by its special plea and contends that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.

Section 62, Chapter 114 of Smiths Revised Statute of Illinois, provides: "Hereafter at all of the railroad crossings of highways and streets in the State the several railroad corporations in this State shall construct and maintain said crossings and the approaches thereto, within their respective right of way, so that at all times they shall be safe as to persons and property."

In Illinois Central Railroad vs. Stuart, 130 Ill. App. 197, it was said: "The statute, in expressed terms; im poses the duty upon the railroad corporations to construct and maintain at all railroad crossings of highways and streets in this state, crossings and approaches thereto within their respective rights of way of such railroad corporations so that at all times such crossings and the approaches thereto shall be safe as to persons and property. This duty so imposed upon railroad corporations cannot be delegated by them so as to enable them to escape liability to a person injured where there has been a failure to perform such duty."

The contract in question was only between appellant and the Village of Stonington and in no way affected the rights of appellee as against either party. The demurrer was properly sustained.

At the request of appellee the court instructed the jury as follows:—

- 1. "The court instructs the jury that under the statute it is the duty of the defendant to construct and maintain crossings and approaches thereto at highways and streets in this state within its right of way so that at all times they shall be safe as to persons and property."
- "The court instructs the jury that it is the duty of the defendant to construct and maintain crossings and approaches thereto

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within its respective right of way so that at all times they should be safe as to persons and property, and if you believe from the evidence that the crossing in question was upon the right of way of the defendant, and that it failed to use reasonable care to construct and maintain said crossing and the approaches thereto so as it would be safe as to the persons and property, and as a result thereof, the plaintiff while passing over the same, exercising due care and caution for his own safety, if the evidence shows he was exercising due care for his own safety, was thrown to the ground and injured and sustained damage as a result thereof, then you should find the issues for the plaintiff and assess his damages in such an amount as you believe under the evidence he is entitled to."

Appellant contends that railroad companies are not insurers of the safety of their crossing, but are only bound to exercise reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of the same and that therefore the instructions in question did not correctly state appellant's duty under the law.

The portion of the instruction of which complaint is made is in the next language of the Statute prescribing appellant's duty. By the constitution of the State of Illinois, the law making power is vested solely in the legislature and a court has no right to vary, modify, alter or abolish a constitutional law when properly enacted by the legislature.

While in a few isolated cases, courts have perhaps inadvertently condemmed instructions given in the language of the Statute, notably People v. Willy, 301-IR. 2017, the duty resting upon the court in the matter of the giving of instructions to the jury, is to lay down the law upon this particular question involved as it exists in this State, and it has long been the settled law of this state that "When an instruction is given in the language of the Statute it must be regarded as sufficient, because laying down the law in the words of the law itself ought not to be pronounced to be error." Mt. Olive and Staunton Coal Company vs. Rademaker, 190 Ill. 538; Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Peton 192 Ill. 41; Kellyville Coal Co. v.



Page 3

Stine, 217 Ill. 516; Mertens v. Southern Coal Co. 235 Ill. 540.

It is contended by appellee that the judgment is excessive. Appellee introduced evidence tending to show that the use of appellee's left arm had been permanently impaired by reason of the accident. The assessment of damages is pecularily the province of the jury and in this state of the record we should not be justified in disturbing the finding of the jury.

The judgment is affirmed.

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General No. 7472

Agenda No. 42

April Term A. D. 1922 H. K. Parker, Appellee

Arthur Maton and Anton Berger, Appellants
Appeal from Montgomery.

HEARD, J.

227 T.A. 821

This is an appeal from a judgment for \$60 and costs in favor of appellee against appellants in an action of debt on an attachment bond executed by appellant Maton as principal, and appellant Berger as surety in an attachment suit brought by Maton against appellee before a Justice of the Peace. The attachment writ was quashed by the Justice of the Peace and the proceeding terminated in appellee's favor. Appellee then brought this suit upon the attachment bond.

There were three counts in appellee's declaration but the bond was not set out therein in **haec verba** and no copy of the bond was filed with the declaration. Appellants craved over of the writing mentioned in the declaration which was granted and the instrument was thereupon read and became a part of the record.

After an amendment had been made and a demurrer had been overruled to the amended declaration appellants filed seven pleas. The first plea was nil debit. The second was non est factum. The third was a plea of non damnificatus. The fourth and fifth were pleas of performance. The sixth was a plea of set off, alleging that plaintiff was a non resident of the State of Illinois and setting up a claim for unliquidated damages claimed to be due from appellee to Maton. The seventh was also a plea of set off. A demurrer was sustained to the first, third, sixth and seventh pleas. Appellants stood by their pleas to which demurrer had bene sustamed and issues were then made up and the cause proceeded to trial with the result aforesaid.

Much space is devoted in appellant's brief and argument

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to an alleged variance between the bond offer-

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ed and admitted in evidence and the bond described in the declaration. No variance is pointed out between the bond admitted in evidence and the writing which became a part of the pleading after oyer.

The court did not err in admitting the bond in evidence.

.It is contended by appellant that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to appellant's pleas. A plea to be good must raise a direct issue with the facts set up in the declaration or confess and avoid them. In an action of debt upon an attachment bond a plea of nil debit does neither and is not a good plea. Mix vs. People 86 Ill. 329. Neither was a plea of non damnificatus good in this case. In McClure vs. Erwin 3 Con. 332 it was said. "The plea should go to the right of action and not to the question of damages. The plaintiff, so far as it depends upon the pleadings, shows his right to recover by setting forth the bond with its condition, and alleging a breach of that condition, either general or special, as the case may require. If the defendant by his plea admits that the condition has been broken, he concedes the plaintiff's right to recover, and by not denying the breach assigned, but instead of doing this, interposing the general plea of non damnificatus, he, in effect, admits the breach." It has been so frequently held that unliquidated damages cannot be set off in an action of this kind that no citation of authorties is necessary. The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the pleas in question.

It is claimed by appellants that the damages allowed appellee were excessive. There is evidence in the record which amply sustained the judgment if credit were given it by the Jury. The Jury having given credence to such evidence we would not be justified in disturbing their finding.

Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

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Agenda No. 5

General No. 7488 October Term, A. D. 1922

A. J. Brown, et al, Appellants vs.

H. L. Fouts, Co., Treas., et al., Appellees Appeal from Circuit Court Fulton County, Illinois.

HEARD, J.

Appellants filed their bill in chancery in the Circuit A. 627 Court of Fulton County, setting up the pretended organization of Community High School District No. 281 in the counties of Fulton, Schuyler and McDonough; that certain appellees were holding and executing without any authority of law the pretended offices of members of the Board of Education of said district; that the said pretended members of the Board of Education of the said Community High School District No. 281 attempted as such Board to make a levy of taxes for and on behalf of said supposed Community High School District No. 281, and filed their certificates of levy with the respective County Clerks of the Counties of Fulton, McDonough and Schuyler aforesaid against the respective properties of these complainants in said Counties within the territory of the said supposed Community High School District; and which said clerks have extended said levies against the properties of complainants upon the tax books of said Counties; that complainants have refused to pay said taxes levied and assessed as aforesaid, on behalf of said District No. 281, for the reason that said Community High School District was never legally organized and that there were no persons legally authorized to make such levies; that the respective County Collectors of said Counties are now endeavoring to enforce the collection of said taxes from complainants, respectively, and have made applications to the respective County Courts of said Counties for judgments, as provided by law for the collection of unpaid taxes, and costs and interests; that complainants have in said courts filed

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their objections to said applications for judgments for said Community High School taxes, giving reasons for said objections that said Community High School District was never legally organized, and that there was no one legally authorized to levy said Community High School tax:

that the said respective County Courts hold that said objections are ineffectual to stay the collections or said taxes, and that said Courts can not undertake to investigate the validity of the authority of said Board of Education to levy such taxes;

that the said respective County Collectors of said Counties are now threatening to sell the lands of complainants to enforce the collection of said taxes, and will begin such sales on June 12, 1922, in pursuance of advertisements published by them for such purposes, unless restrained by the Court; that quo warranto proceedings are now pending in the Circuit Court of Fulton County to test the validity of the organization of said district;

The prayer of the bill was that H. L. Fouts, County Treasurer and County Collector of Fulton County, James A. Barclay, County Treasurer and County Collector of McDonough County, Illinois, C. W. Worthington, County Treasurer and County Collector of Schuyler County, Illinois, and the Board of Education of Community High School District No. 281, in the Counties of Fulton, Mc-Donough and Schuyler, Illinois, P. R. Johnston, F. O. Holmberg, Marion Young, Elmer Onion and L. K. Mc-Fadden, members of the Board of Education of Community High School District No. 281 in the Counties of Fulton, McDonough and Schuyler, Illinois, their attorneys, solicitors, agents and servants, and each of them, may be restrained by an order and injunction of the Court from collecting or attempting to collect or from proceeding in any manner to enforce the collection or payments of the said taxes for said Community High School District No. 281 in the said Counties of Fulton, McDonough and Schuyler until the further order of the Court,

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and that said tax for the said Community High School District No. 281 may be held and declared to be illegal and levied and assessed without authority of law and of no force and effect, and that said complainants may have such other and further relief in the premises as equity may require, etc.

A temporary injunction was granted by the Master in Chancery. A motion was filed by appellees to dissolve the injunction for want of equity upon the face of the bill. This motion coming on to be heard by the Court the injunction was dissolved and the bill dismissed for want of equity at appellant's costs, by decree of the Court from which decree an appeal was taken to this Court.

In People vs. Holton, 298 Ill. 225 the rule is laid down that "The question of revenue is involved when some recognized authority of the state or some municipality authorized by law to assess and collect taxes is attempting to proceed, under law, to collect the same; and questions arise between it and those of whom taxes are demanded."

In Sec. 118, Chap. 110, Smith's Rev. State of Ill., it is provided that appeals from Circuit Courts in all cases relating to revenue shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court. This case being one relating to revenue, the appeal should have been taken to the Supreme Court instead of this Court, and the cause is ordered transferred to the Supreme Court.









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Ill. Unpublished Opinions

